@article{oai:minpaku.repo.nii.ac.jp:00004460, author = {畑中, 幸子 and Hatanaka, Sachiko}, issue = {2}, journal = {国立民族学博物館研究報告, Bulletin of the National Museum of Ethnology}, month = {Aug}, note = {Traditional political systems versus modern political institutions in Papua New Guinea have been widely discussed by social scientists. Papua New Guinea became independent from Australian administration in 1975, but political independence was not a product of the struggle. There were no nationalist movement and little clamour for an end to colonial rule. During the last fifty years, the New Guinea Highlanders have been confronted with an endless, dramatic change, and as a matter of course their cosmos fell into considerable confusion. In rapid succession they have had to deal with kiap (patrol officers) & missionaries, appointed village officials, local government councils, combined councils' conferences & Area Authority, Self-government and Independence, village courts, and now the Provincial Government. New Guinea cultures have proved extremely durable and still have an influential role in contemporary politics. The Constitution of Papua New Guinea stemmed in part from, and reinforced the convictions of the traditional socio-political character of the Melanesians. The 'Melanesian Way' stresses obligations to kinsmen and requires a slow process of consultation and compromise leading to consensus within the clan or village group. Since decolonisation, traditional New Guinean political attitudes and processes have been obstacles to the immediate assimilation of new institutions, especially with respect to the legitimacy and constitution of democratic legislatures, and the law. A single problem crucial for current politics is the effect of superimposing a centralized state structure on the stateless societies of Papua New Guinea. The general construct of a basically egalitarian, self-governing society, using group consensus but allowing a limited role for leaders who arise in open status competition, was known as the bigman model. Hitherto, there was no tradition of succession or stratification of subgroups, rather, traditional leadership was achieved through personal charisma and by the accumulation of wealth (pigs, shells, feathers, iron-tools, and the like) that could be used to aid others, and in so doing place them under an obligation. A bigman should be both more prominent in ceremonial exchange and a more powerful orator. Thus, a leader could successfully dominate others, either through his ability to help them or to retain their respect. More popular leaders were 'manager' or 'director' types. ' At present leaders are politicians in either provincial or national governments. In Chimbu, where I undertook field researches, I observed a most typical example of Melanesian political culture. A Chimbu politician, an Opposition leader, appealed to Chimbu dignity, believing that the stature of the whole group could be raised by the activities of a few entrepreneurs. He insisted that businessmen were generous and supportive, and that a cultural 'levelling' effect would operate. Even men highly educated in the Western system have grafted onto the bigman theory a notion of egalitarianism. Politicians —mostly young businessmen— gave money to local leaders, who then held parties for their groups, distributing pigs, carcasses of beef and dozens, or occasionally hundreds of cartons of beer. Thus they grafted these non-traditional items onto the traditional exchange system. Throughout Highland society, men having political authority are called Vida man', whereas 'bigpela man' refers to any prominent man who has achieved renown for his wealth, as in modern business activities, but who has no political stature. Apart from business, political and public service careers provide the main avenue for individual advancement, although these two careers are often combined. The overlapping membership of the political and economic elites of Chimbu does not indicate an egalitarian society, although competition for political office is intense. Present Highland leaders have proved both the succession and discontinuity of the bigman model. Equality of opportunity no longer exists, and Highland societies have few socio-economic equalities. In the Highlands there exists an implicit or explicit hierarchy of social and economic status levels. On the other hand, prior to the early 1970's the administrative system functioned slowly and was excessively bureaucratic. Decentralisation in Papua New Guinea, with devolution of power from the center has proved expensive. And there is always the risk that the experiment will not work and that the country will fragment with the authority of the central government becoming increasingly nominal. The highland provinces were eager to establish the Provincial Government in response to a separatist movement on Bougainville Island. In 1976 Provincial Government started throughout the country. The inevitable problems of a new system of government are emerging in all provinces. No member of the new Secretariat is highly experienced in public service, or in fact in the work for which appointed. The formerly high morale of the field service as an elite group comprising both expatriates and nationals, had already largely disappeared prior to Independence. There is the possibility that the administrative capacity of the state will fragment in the decentralisation programme, thereby endangering not only public order but also the government's goals of equity and rural development, as well as its own ultimate survival. The aims of Provincial Government are decentralisation, greater coordination of development activities undertaken by government officers in the Districts. In Chimbu, teamwork was almost totally lacking. Several Provincial Governments have been pre-occupied with the acquisition of power, and resources are being devoted to serving politicians rather than to maintaining the previous levels of service to villagers. Many local government councils under the Provincial Government broke down through corruption and mismanagement. The largest single problem in the bureaucracy is the lack of competent manpower to realize the full requirements of a decentralised administration. Papua New Guinea's aims of reducing both social and geographic inequality, which are expressed in the National Constitution, are endangered by the Provincial Government system. On the other hand, the villagers are unable to unite readily to replace their politicians, given the highly fragmented social and political structure, as well as the obligations of kinship and patronage. Not just anybody has the representational function of linking villagers and government in the Highland society. In practice, the institutions may not be suited for the political culture. Under the Provincial Government system, local elites will have greatly increased resources with which to increase their wealth and to entrench themselves, without necessarily improving their political legitimacy. This fact alone makes the whole system politically unstable. By late 1978 the initial enthusiasm for decentralisation had started to wane. The Government of Papua New Guinea is rich when compared with those of other newly independent countries. This might be one reason why the Central Government can dominate and remain superior to the Provincial Governments.}, pages = {197--252}, title = {部族社会における近代政治の過程}, volume = {8}, year = {1983}, yomi = {ハタナカ, サチコ} }