

Can Citizen Involvement Overcome Hate Crime in Local Communities?

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Miharu Yui

Center for Transdisciplinary Innovation, National Institute of Humanities

1. Introduction

Hindu and Muslim riots have persisted as a social and political issue in India since the 1947 Partition, with considerable sacrifice of human life. During a two-week period from December 1992 to January 1993, Hindu–Muslim riots in Mumbai, Maharashtra State killed 900 and caused unprecedented damage.¹⁾ Gujarat State has remained the center of anti-Muslim violence, with more than 2,000 lives taken during 2002 alone, marking the situation a massacre, rather than a riot.

The Government of India defines Hindu–Muslim riots as pre-planned, organized acts of violence by members of one community against members of the other, intending to create or express ill-will or hatred and leading to murder or bodily harm of people (Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India 2007). We argue that the major trigger for Hindu–Muslim tension since the 1970s is the Hindu nationalist organizations' promotion of various forms of agitation to gain support among Hindus.

Since the 1980s, Hindu nationalists have claimed that Indian Muslims pose a threat to Hindu dominance by falsely depicting Muslims' indiscreet family planning as causing their rapid population growth. Shiv Sena, a Hindu nationalist party based in Maharashtra State, inflamed hateful feelings with its campaign movement "*Hum Do, Humare Do*," intended to criticize the rising Muslim population in India since the 1980s. Its slogan, "*Hum do, Hamare do: Hum Paanch, Hamare Pachees*" means "we are two, our children are two: we are five, our children are 25 offspring," harshly criticizing the growing Muslim population. Similarly, in 2002, then Chief Minister of Gujarat Narendra Modi – now Prime Minister of India – remarked that refugee camps became child-producing centers. That claim spread anti-Muslim prejudice through the state election campaign at a time when Muslim refugees were forced to stay in camps following the Gujarat massacre of 2002.²⁾

Various methodologies, including historical, anthropological, and socioeconomic, have been used to study the causes and related factors of Hindu and Muslim riots in India. From a historical standpoint, Panikkar (1991: 1–2) contends that the confrontation between Hindu and Muslim groups is rooted in the British "divide and rule" policy, intended to weaken resistance against colonial rule after the 1905 Act of Bengal Partition.

From an anthropological perspective, Tambiah analyzes the performative features of rituals and public events on riots in South Asia. Furthermore, the riots are routinized and ritualized, drawing on the public's cultural repertoire of presentational forms and practices (Tambiah 1996: 221–222). According to Engineer, the riots are caused by both macro and micro factors. The former include country-wide socioeconomic changes resulting from the pursuit of capitalist development, policies of the ruling parties in both central and state governments, and competition between castes and religious groups to ensure electoral victory. The micro factors include proportional representation of the Muslim population, the nature of economic competition between the two communities, the history of riots, and local politics (Engineer 1989: 1–14).

On December 6, 1992, Babri Mosque in Ayodhya, Uttar Pradesh was demolished by a mob of more than 150,000 Hindus. Led by Hindu nationalists, including Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP), and Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), the mob claimed the site as the birthplace of Rama and demanded the reconstruction of the Hindu Ram temple. This incident immediately triggered a series of nationwide Hindu–Muslim riots. Since then, political researchers have focused especially on the ideologies, organizations, performance, and politics of Hindu nationalists (Jaffrelot 1996; Ghosh 1999).

Some studies show that Hindu nationalists have exploited religious issues and riots as political instruments in various power struggles. Brass (2003: 15–24; 377–379) describes an institutionalized riot system including processes of preparation, activation, and explanation, overseen by local Hindu activists eager to gain political power in the area. Wilkinson (2005: 137–203) particularly addresses election competition at states governments which assumes the discretion of calling out of police and paramilitary forces to control riots in the area.

Some recent studies have specifically examined riot prevention. Varshney (2002: 119–261) describes how the joint participation of local Hindu and Muslim residents in business or vocational associations can control riots in less riot-prone cities. We recognize Varshney's contribution, which explains that cooperative civic engagement by Hindus and Muslims is effective in preventing riots. As Verma (2007) explains, Indian police control the triggering of riots using situational prevention methods to handle large crowds and mobs at political demonstrations, strikes (*bandh*), public meetings, religious processions, and elections. Verma stops short of raising the critical point of dysfunction, namely local police conspiring with mobs in looting, setting fires, and murder.

The present study elucidates some approaches to riot prevention, particularly addressing the involvement of local citizens of different religious communities. The study examines the effect of local citizen involvement through community policing, as one way to overcome the religious hate crimes that trigger Hindu-Muslim riots. For this research, we examine the case of community policing in Mumbai City, Maharashtra State from the 1990s to 2000s. As described above, two large scale riots occurred in Mumbai from December 1992 to January 1993. In the aftermath, the Mohalla Committees Movement Trust (MCMT) quickly launched community policing in April 1993. The risk of riot occurring became acute on several occasions during the 1990s and 2000s; however, the

collaborative efforts of local police and MCMT members were able to tackle hate crimes and prevent the recurrence of riots there. We demonstrate how local citizen involvement in community policing can prevent riots by analyzing two incidents, in 1995 and 2002 respectively, when danger became imminent in Mumbai. We consider Mumbai an instructive case in suggesting the extreme necessity of tackling hate crimes through local citizens' cooperation, before the situation gets worse for riot in India.

The concept of community policing was introduced into criminology in the United States when the crime rate worsened in the mid-1980s. Trojanawicz and Bucqueroux defined it as “ the premise that both the police and citizens must work together to identify, prioritize, and solve contemporary problems such as crime, drugs, fear of crime, social and physical disorder, and overall neighbor decay, with the goal of improving the quality of life in the area (Trojanawicz and Bucqueroux 1998: 2)”. The concept and practices of community policing have been adopted in various countries, such as Canada, Australia, Singapore, and Nigeria (Peak and Glensor 2012: 288–301; Aremu 2012).

Some researchers suggest that community policing is effective in preventing terrorism (de Guzman 2013: 403–405; Kappeler and Gaines 2015: 543–548). In addition, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) advocates embedding community policing in a comprehensive, coherent, and human-rights-compliant strategy to combat terrorism in all its forms and manifestations. It also highlights the importance of tackling the conditions under which terrorists win support and recruit, focusing on the level of trust and cooperation between the police and the public (OSCE 2014). Therefore, from the perspective of security, global society has devoted much attention to the effectiveness of community policing in counterterrorism.

A few states in India, including Union Territory Delhi (Neighborhood Watch Scheme), Maharashtra (Mohalla Committees ; Mohalla Committees Movement Trust), Tamil Nadu (Friends of Police Movement), West Bengal (Innovative Policing Scheme), Madhya Pradesh (Nagar Raksha Samiti), and Kerala (Janamaithri Suraksha Project) have introduced community policing practices since the 1980s (Nalla and Newman 2013; Mohanty and Mohanty 2014).

Former Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, of the Indian National Congress, called for institutionalizing community policing at the Conference of Director General of Police on November 2013.³ Additionally, in its manifesto for India's 2014 general election, the ruling BJP pledged to introduce community policing practices (Bharatiya Jana Party 2014). In short, the Government of India has devoted much attention to community policing activities, following the global trend. This study demonstrates both the academic significance and social demand for the proposition of policy recommendations to promote the activities of community policing. Section 2 of this presents the conceptual framework, comprising hate crimes and community policing. Section 3 then analyses the practices of the Mohalla Committees Movement Trust to prevent riots during the 1990s and 2000s. Finally, section 4 presents the conclusion: local citizen involvement is the key to solving hate crimes and promoting multicultural symbiosis in a post-riot society.

2. Hate Crimes in India

In this section, we examine the conceptual framework of hate crimes and community policing. Hate crimes have provoked riots in India through speeches, propaganda, slogans, and false rumors. In particular, hate crimes have triggered Hindu–Muslim riots in India since the 1980s.

The concept of hate crimes, also known as bias crimes, was formed during the intensification of racial strife in the United States in the 1980s. Since 1992, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has reported annual “Hate Crime Statistics” based on their own inquiries. The FBI has also examined historic incidences of (what are now called) hate crimes against African Americans, investigating as far back as World War I. Such crimes increased following the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The FBI defines a hate crime as a “criminal offense against a person or property motivated in whole or in part by an offender’s bias against a race, religion, disability, sexual orientation, ethnicity, gender, or gender identity.”⁴⁾

Green *et al.* (2001) designate hate crimes as unlawful conduct directed at targeted groups involving acts of violence, destruction of property, harassment, or trespassing. Features of these phenomena include cross-burning in front of homes owned by black people, vandalism directed against Jewish cemeteries, and assaults against men leaving putative “gay bars” (480–481).

In India, Rahman identifies the subjects of hate crimes as religion, caste, language, race, and scheduled tribes. He emphasizes that hate crimes between Hindus and Muslims have mainly been instigated by Hindu nationalists, the RSS, the BJP, and the VHP, mobilized by Indians’ shame at the abusive rule of the Mughal Empire. There is the governmental inaction of duty in not upholding and enforcing laws concerning hate crimes, mass killings, rape, and arson (Rahman 1998). Therefore, Governments have not been active in handling hate crimes. Then the situation tended to escalate to killings, rape, and arson.

The Indian Penal Code, 1860 has criminalized hate propaganda, slogans, speeches, writings, and other behaviors that engender violence intentionally against particular communities. Some relevant concrete provisions include:

- Section 153A “Promoting enmity between different groups on ground of religion, race, place of birth, residence, language, etc., and doing acts prejudicial to maintenance of harmony”;
- Section 295 “Injuring or defiling place of worship with intent to insult the religion of any class”;
- Section 295A “Deliberate and malicious acts, intended to outrage religious feelings of any class by insulting its religion or religious beliefs”;
- Section 296 “Disturbing religious assembly”;
- Section 297 “Trespassing on burial places, etc.”;
- Section 298 “Uttering, words, etc., with deliberate intent to wound the religious feelings of any person.”⁵⁾

In brief, hate propaganda, slogans, speeches, writings, and other behaviors are clearly stipulated in the Indian Penal Code as hate crimes.

2.1 Hate Crimes by Slogan, Speech, Interview, Injuring a Place of Worship, or Fabrication

We describe the circumstances of hate crimes to seek to understand which actors and forms triggered past riots. This study distinguishes between small and large-scale Hindu-Muslim riots based on the insight provided by Vibhuti Narain Rai, the former Additional Director General of Police in Uttar Pradesh. His knowledge is clearly based on first-hand experience of confronting violence as an Indian Police Service (IPS) officer. Rai shared his experiences in an interview with *Communalism Combat* magazine. According to Rai, no riot can last for more than 24 hours unless the state administration wants it to continue.⁶ Therefore, if local police officers have no anti-Muslim bias, we infer they can control a riot within a day, without requesting the dispatch of paramilitary forces. Consequently, this study categorizes riots with reference to who ultimately controls them (police alone or police and paramilitary forces), their duration (one or more days), and the number of resulting deaths.

Table 1 presents the details on the five riots motivated by hate crimes in Maharashtra State during 1970–2001. The main actors were the Bharatiya Jan Sang (BJS) and Shiv Sena. Accompanying the details of each riot's location, the table presents the form of each hate crime, the precise words used, the scale of each resulting riot, and the number of deaths caused thereby.

Five riots occurred in Maharashtra, all provoked by hate crimes intended to insult Muslims' religious beliefs.

On May 7, 1970, during a Hindu religious procession of Shiv Jayanti in Bhiwandi, BJS and Shiv Sena activists led over 15,000 participants. As they passed Muslim localities, they shouted "Muslims are thieves. If you obstruct our way, you will go to die," intended to threaten violence against Muslim residents. The agitated participants and Muslim residents started to quarrel and throw stones at each other. As matters escalated, the ensuing riot triggered looting, arson, and murder (D.P. Madon Commission 1974: 68–69; 74–76). This riot was confined to a small scale because local police officers were able to control it within a single day, nevertheless 78 people died. This hate crime was, thus, embodied in a violent slogan chanted at a religious procession.

To prevent a reoccurrence of the May 1970 Bhiwandi riot, the Government of Maharashtra prohibited the holding of the Shiv Jayanti procession indefinitely. For Shiv Sena, this procession played an important role in appealing for support from Hindu voters. Therefore, Bal Thackeray, the leader of Shiv Sena, warned municipal officers that Shiv Sena activists planned to hold a protest march with mobs of over 5,000 if they were not permitted to hold the procession in 1984. On May in this year, the Government of Maharashtra finally granted a permit to hold the procession (Abraham 1984: 829). Consequently, Hindu-Muslim riots erupted again in Bhiwandi after that year's Shiv Jayanti procession. In this case, Bal Thackeray's inflammatory speech in Mumbai in January was a trigger. Thackeray's speech attacked Muslims, declaring that "we will have

Table 1 Forms and details of hate crimes triggering Hindu — Muslim riots in Maharashtra State (1970–2001)

Dates and Duration	Location(s)	Form of Hate Crime	Specific Statements	Riot Scale	Number of Deaths
7/5/1970 (1 day)	Bhiwandi	Shouting call during Shiv Jayanti procession, led by Bharatiya Jana Sang and Shiv Sena activists on May 7, 1970.	“Muslim is a thief. If you obstruct our way, you will go to die.”	Small	78
17/5/1984– 23/5 (7 days)	Bhiwandi Mumbai Thane Kalyan	Speech in Mumbai by Bal Thackeray, founder of Shiv Sena in January 1984.	“We will have to launch another Quit India movement to get rid of these elements (Muslim).”	Large	258 (Bhiwandi 109; Mumbai 87; Thane 52; Kalyan 10)
		Speech in Mumbai by Bal Thackeray, founder of Shiv Sena in April 1984.	“Indian Muslims are cancer for this country. Cancer is an incurable disease. In 1947 this cancer was two and half crores; now it has spread all over the country. Its cure is operation.”		
		Message on the boards of Shiv Sena throughout Mumbai city on May 16, 1984.	“If you wish to stay in Hindustan, behave yourself, if you continue to act like traitors, you will die.”		
		Shouting in Bhiwandi: call by Shiv Sena activists who led the Hindu rioters on May 17, 1984.	“Give one more push, crush Pakistan.”		
		Interview of Bal Thackeray in the newspaper, <i>Free Press Journal</i> , dated May 24, 1984.	“It is no secret that swords and other lethal weapons had been stored in Mosques.”		
6/12/1992– 16/12 (11 days)	Mumbai	Shiv Sena’s party Newspaper <i>Saamna</i> , dated December 8, 1992	“The demolition of the Babri Mosque is the good fortune of the Hindus. Muslim in Mumbai and Maharashtra are attacking Hindu temples. Why should we tolerate?”	Large	227
5/1/1993– 25/1 (21 days)	Mumbai	Shiv Sena’s party Newspaper <i>Saamna</i> , dated January 11, 1993.	“A.A. Khan (Assistant Police Commissioner) has tried to shoot the Hindus. There is no justice, for fanatic traitors go scot-free while the terrorist Khan fires at Hindus. The people and the police have been fired at from mosques with Pakistani weapons.”	Large	673
26/10/2001– 7/11 (8 days)	Malegaon	Shiv Sena’s party Newspaper <i>Saamna</i> , dated October 26, 2001.	“Hindus should arm themselves against Muslims.”	Large	7
		Marathi Newspaper <i>Vaartaahaar</i> , dated October 28, 2001.	“Terrorism in Malegaon. Bomb blast in Hanuman Mandir, priest was killed. Hindu women were raped.”		

Sources: Collated by the author from: D.P. Madon Commission 1974, Vol. IV: 68–69, 74–76; Engineer 1984: 94–95; The Committee for the Protection of Democratic Rights 1984: 15, 17, 26–27; Swami and Katakam 2001; Sanzgiri 2001; Lokshahi Hakk Sanghatana 2001: 12–13.

to launch another Quit India movement to get rid of these elements” (Engineer 1984: 94–95). The speech was intended to impugn Indian Muslims, asserting that they had no sense of patriotism and so should leave India. At a subsequent speech in April 1984, Thackeray’s rhetoric again became extreme: “Indian Muslims are cancer for this country. Cancer is an incurable disease. In 1947 this cancer was two and half crores; now it has spread all over the country. Its cure is operation.” Thackeray, thereby, expressed that Indian Muslims were a cancer that required surgery. His speech clearly intensified anti-Muslim tendencies by mentioning the 1947 Partition. As news of this speech spread, some Muslims were incited to oppose Shiv Sena and Thackeray.

After the Shiv Jayanti procession in Bhiwandi, on May 17, 1984, fighting erupted between Shiv Sena activists and angry Muslim youths over the hoisting of flags bearing their religious symbols (saffron and khaki). On the same day, Shiv Sena activists led Hindu rioters into Muslim localities to loot and destroy the area. They were shouting one call: “give one more push, crush Pakistan” (The Committee for the Protection of Democratic Rights 1984: 26–27). In their hostility, the Shiv Sena activists and rioters called the Muslim-dominated areas “Pakistan,” and came to ruin them. The riot in Bhiwandi spread to the neighboring cities of Mumbai, Thane, and Kalyan. The situation came to pose a huge regional difficulty.

On May 16 1984, the people of Mumbai found one message in Marathi on the boards of Shiv Sena throughout the city: “If you wish to stay in Hindustan, behave yourself; if you continue to act like traitors, you will die” (The Committee for the Protection of Democratic Rights 1984: 15–17). Shiv Sena declared that Indian Muslims were likely to betray others; Muslims who did not obey their warning would face death. After a series of violent acts, 4,500 paramilitary troops were called up to control the situation in Bhiwandi and Mumbai. Rioting continued in the four cities until May 23. According to state police reports, the total death toll reached 258 (109 in Bhiwandi, 87 in Mumbai, 52 in Thane, and 10 in Kalyan) (Engineer 1984: 159; The Committee for the Protection of Democratic Rights 1984: 82–83).

In an interview with *Free Press Journal* on May 24, 1984, Thackeray asserted, “It is no secret that swords and other lethal weapons had been stored in Mosques” (Engineer 1984: 95). He claimed the riots were preplanned and caused by Muslims, who had prepared weapons in mosques. No proof was given that Muslims had caused the riots. Thackeray evidently intended to justify the actions of Shiv Sena activists and to frame Muslim residents as the culprits by spreading false information. Thackeray had twice used hate speech to trigger the circumstances that induced rioting, which spread to four Maharashtra State cities in May 1984. Nevertheless, despite the occurrence of two Hindu-Muslim riots in Bhiwandi, the Government of Maharashtra took no measures to monitor and control Shiv Sena’s activities. Consequently, in Maharashtra State, signs of a worsening situation in the Hindu-Muslim confrontation have arisen since the 1980s.

In 1983, the VHP launched the Ramjanmabhumi Movement to demolish the Babri Mosque and to reconstruct the Ram Temple in Ayodhya, Uttar Pradesh State, supported by the BJP, Shiv Sena, and other Hindu nationalists. As this campaign spread throughout the country, Hindu-Muslim riots escalated. When Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi permitted

a cornerstone ceremony of the Ram temple to be held in November 1989, those Hindu nationalists raised their voices to demand demolition of the Babri Mosque (Engineer and Puniyani 2011: 235–240).

On December 6, 1992, thousands of kar sevaks, who were volunteer supporters organized by the VHP, demolished the Babri Mosque in just six hours, using dynamite, hammers, and pickaxes (Awasthi 1992). This incident affected the entire country. The resulting riots constituted a terrible disaster, as 1,116 were killed during December 1992 across 13 states.⁷⁾

The same day, leaders of the BJP and Shiv Sena held a procession in Mumbai, celebrating the demolition of the Babri Mosque as a Hindu triumph in Mumbai City. As some Muslims protested against this procession, riots erupted in several places throughout the city. Additionally, on December 8, 1992, Shiv Sena's party newspaper *Saamna* published false information about Muslims: "The demolition of the Babri Mosque is the good fortune of the Hindus. Muslims in Mumbai and Maharashtra are attacking Hindu temples. Why should we tolerate?" (Swami and Katakam 2001). Shiv Sena praised the demolition of the Babri Mosque as an auspicious sign for Hindus, even as their own party newspaper's headlines claimed that Muslims in Maharashtra were attacking temples in retaliation. The B.N. Srikrishna Commission, appointed by the Government of Maharashtra to conduct an inquiry into the riots, confirmed in its official report that the information was completely unfounded, distorting the facts to incite Hindus. Shiv Sena had dishonestly sought to justify the riots and their actions against Muslims.

It took ten days for paramilitary forces to control the December riots. The total death toll in Mumbai reached 227 from December 6–16, 1992 (Sharma 1995: 276–277; 282). When a stabbing occurred in the Dongri area on January 5, 1993, rioting in Mumbai was reignited. The second phase of rioting targeted Muslims more severely. Aside from attacking Muslim residents, Shiv Sena targeted senior Muslim police officers in their party newspaper. *Saamna's* headline on January 11, 1993 alleged that "A.A. Khan, Assistant Commissioner of Police has tried to shoot the Hindus. There is no justice, for fanatic traitors go scot-free while the terrorist Khan fires at Hindus. The people and the police have been fired at from mosques with Pakistani weapons" (Swami and Katakam 2001). Shiv Sena, thus, described a named Muslim Assistant Commissioner of Police as traitorous and a terrorist for shooting Hindus. Its papers also reported that Muslims held weapons smuggled from Pakistan, which they used to shoot Hindus from inside the mosques.

Evidence later emerged that, in the control room, Hindu senior officers had ordered constables to set fire to Muslim people's property (Fernandes 1993: 219–220). According to the Srikrishna Commission's report into the two large-scale riots, which unfolded during a period of just two weeks from December 1992 to January 1993, the total number of deaths was 900, of whom 575 were Muslims, 275 Hindus, and the other (B. N. Srikrishna Commission 1998: 18).

The demolition of the Babri Mosque was an unprecedented and symbolic event caused by hate crime, particularly embodying religious insults. Furthermore, destroying a mosque is addressed clearly in Section 295 of the Indian Penal Code: "Injuring or

defiling place of worship with intent to insult the religion of any class.” Released in 2005, the report of the Liberhan Ayodhya Commission of Inquiry into the causes, the situation and conspirators in destruction of the Mosque ran to over 1,000 pages. The commission observed that the demolition had been pre-planned, and identified 68 named BJP, RSS, VHP and Shiv Sena leaders who had been involved (Ministry of Home Affairs 2009: 958–962).

Thackeray’s speech and some of the articles published in *Saamna* also violated the Indian Penal Code. Local police took action against Bal Thackeray and Shiv Sena by filling cases under Sections 153A and 153B in January 1993, shortly after the riots; however, the Government of Maharashtra were reluctant to apply for sanctions (D’Souza 1993: 22–24). Consequently, in Maharashtra, Shiv Sena has allied with the BJP in state politics since the 1990s.

Large-scale inter-faith violence returned to Maharashtra in 2001, when a Hindu–Muslim riot raged in Malegaon City, Nasik district from October 26 to November 7. A Muslim youth was distributing leaflets calling for a boycott of US- and UK-manufactured goods, in protest at military action against Afghanistan following the 9/11 terrorist attacks. The State Reserve Police (SRP) forces stationed in the city snatched the youth’s leaflets and beat him while forcing him into the police van. Muslim residents who observed the scene began surrounding the SRP station, shouting their protests. To control the situation, the police opened fire indiscriminately on the Muslim mob. Three unrelated bystanders were killed by stray shots (Lokshahi Hakk Sanghatana 2001: 4–5). The police shootings triggered a riot in Malegaon. In fact, 9/11 engendered the sentiment of threats against terrorism worldwide. In India, Hindu nationalists incited a mob to anti-Muslim action as tension was heightened throughout the country.

On October 26, 2001, Shiv Sena’s *Saamna* published the headline, “Hindus should arm themselves against Muslims,” after a riot occurred in Malegaon earlier that day (Sanzgiri 2001). This message exhorted Hindus to counter with armed aggression against Muslims. Two days later, Shiv Sena reported, “Terrorism in Malegaon. Bomb blast in Hanuman Mandir, priest was killed. Hindu women were raped,” in their local Marathi newspaper, *Vaartaahaar* (Lokshahi Hakk Sanghatana 2001: 12–13). Shiv Sena intended to sow fear among Hindu residents by fabricating these accounts of violence. Hindu people bore suspicion and hatred against Muslims. Consequently, the riots escalated to large-scale demonstrations that continued through to November 7, 2001 when paramilitary forces eventually secured complete control over the situation. In Malegaon, 12 people were killed by police shootings and the crushing throngs.

As described above, in five cases in Maharashtra from 1970 to 2001, Hindu nationalists used slogans, speeches, interviews, or fabricated newspaper stories intended to arouse hateful feelings among residents and to incite mobs to riot. Shiv Sena was active behind the scenes in all these riots in Maharashtra State, over the course of around 30 years.

2.2 Hate Crime by Spreading False Rumors

The intentional spreading of false rumors and ill will induced hateful feelings among

ordinary people before the riot in general. According to Horowitz, spreading rumors has formed an important part of riot processes worldwide, from Asian to African countries. Rumors justify violence that is about to occur and mobilize ordinary people to participate in the most extreme actions (Horowitz 2001: 75–79). In other words, false rumors support extremism and arouse hateful feelings when people hear and discuss them and discuss them.

In India, the role of rumor-mongers is clearly evident, whether as members of Hindu nationalist organizations or used by them to stir tensions at the scene of riots. As Agnihotri explains, rumors play an important role in not only initiating but also sustaining a riot. Rumors have been found to be the major cause of disturbances spreading to new, previously undisturbed areas. Rumors that are especially effective in driving hate into a passionate frenzy include: a woman of one community has been molested, gang-raped, or abducted by a member of the other community; a cow has been slaughtered in a public place or near a Hindu locality; or pigs were lying in or near a mosque. Authorities' treatment of rumor-mongers must be exemplary to deter others and to break their formal and informal channels of communication (Agnihotri 2007: 135;

Table 2 Details of rumors triggering Hindu–Muslim riots (1964–1993)

	Dates and Duration	Location(s)	Details of the Rumors	Riot Scale	Number of Deaths
1	18/3/1964–26/3 (9 days)	Rourkela, Orissa State	“Refugees from East Bengal, then in Pakistan, had been vomiting after eating bread said to have been poisoned by a Muslim.”	Large	62
2	29/3/1978 (1 day)	Sambhal, Uttar Pradesh State	“Hindus have killed the local Imam.”	Small	16
3	5/10/1978 5/11/1978–9/11 (6 days)	Aligarh, Uttar Pradesh State	“Muslims had killed a Hindu.”	Large	27
4	13/8/1980–18/8 (6 days)	Modarabad, Uttar Pradesh State	“Muslims came to a religious service armed and ready for a fight; they had poisoned the drinking water, destroyed a temple, and murdered the priest.”	Large	112
5	30/4/1981–5/5 (6 days)	Biharsharif, Bihar State	“After Hindu families fled a Muslim area, some 200 Hindus were reported to have been massacred.”	Large	53
6	17/5/1984–23/5 (7 days)	Bhiwandi, Maharashtra State	“Hindus had allegedly been massacred by Muslims.”	Large	109
7	30/10/1990–/2/11 (3 days)	Bijnor, Uttar Pradesh State	“The local council had allocated Hindu land to Muslims, the president of a Hindu organization had been kidnapped and killed, and a Muslim physician had abducted Hindu women.”	Large	30
8	6/12/1992–16/12 5/1/1993–/25/1 (23 days)	Mumbai, Maharashtra State	“Pakistanis and arms shipments arrived in Bombay from the sea.”	Large	900

Sources: (Horowitz 2001: 75–76; Ghosh 1987: 118–226; Wilkinson 2005: 406–444)

193).

Table 2 presents details of the rumors that triggered eight typical cases of rioting from 1964 to 1993.

One common tendency is for rumors to be spread to slander Muslims before a riot, except in the March 1978 riot in Sambhal, Uttar Pradesh. In that case, the rumor was that “Hindus have killed the local Imam.” The small-scale riot was controlled by local police within one day.

Specifically, rumors were spread that Muslims: poisoned food and water, killed a Hindu or priest, came to fight with weapons, destroyed a Hindu temple, kidnapped a Hindu, raped Hindu women, or (in Pakistan) were prepared to wage armed conflict in India (Horowitz 2001: 75–76). In each case, the rumors were intended to defame Muslims with abusive and false information. Furthermore, in seven cases, the resulting riots escalated to a large scale. Therefore, we infer that the rumor-mongers were Hindus, and that, in most cases, they deliberately sought to hurt Hindu feelings to incite them to confront Muslims. Whereas Hindu nationalists exacerbated the hateful feelings of mobs at the public level, rumor-mongers aroused individual sentiments at the private level. The evidence demonstrates that Hindu nationalists and rumor-mongers both triggered large-scale riots in the past.

2.3 Limitations of Law Enforcement on Hate Crime

Since 2005, the Ministry of Home Affairs has attempted to construct a legal system specialized for riot prevention: from the Communal Violence (Prevention, Control and Rehabilitation of Victims) Bill of 2005 to the Prevention of Communal and Targeted Violence (Access to Justice and Reparations) Bill of 2011, legislative efforts have been devoted to reinforcing the existing Indian Penal Code, 1860 and Criminal Procedure, 1973⁸). The Prevention of Communal and Targeted Violence Bill, 2011 prescribed prevention and control of targeted violence, conduct of quick investigations and legal formalities, and provision of relief and compensation for victims. Hate crimes have been clearly defined in Section 8 (Hate propaganda) of the Prevention of Communal and Targeted Violence Bill, 2011:

Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, whoever publishes, communicates or disseminates by words, either spoken or written, or by signs or by visible representation or otherwise acts inciting hatred causing clear and present danger of violence against a group or persons belonging to that group, in general or specifically, or disseminates or broadcasts any information, or publishes or displays any advertisement or notice, that could reasonably be construed to demonstrate an intention to promote or incite hatred or expose or is likely to expose the group or persons belonging to that group to such hatred, is said to be guilty of hate propaganda.⁹

Thus, the Ministry of Home Affairs has considered past situations of extremists or leaders committing hate crimes before and after the riots, and defined such actions clearly as “Hate propaganda” in this section of the bill. However, the VHP claimed that

this bill would deprive the Hindu community of its rights, and that it was unconstitutional.¹⁰⁾ The bill has not yet overcome their opposition.

Also relevant is the bias in enforcing the Indian Penal Code's provisions against religious criminal contempt. In April 2012, Raj Thackeray, now leader of the Maharashtra Navnirman Sena (MNS) having broken away from Shiv Sena, delivered a speech asserting that the Muslim-dominated Maharashtra cities of Malegaon and Bhiwandi are "safe heavens" for terrorists.¹¹⁾ His controversial speech was condemned as illegal, but the government has not applied for sanctions against his behavior. In contrast, Akarbar Uddudin Owaisi, who belongs to the All India Majlis-e Ittihad al-Muslimin, was arrested for alleged hate speech in January 2012 after stating, "Muslims will not let you Hindus live peacefully, Muslims could teach the rest of the world a lesson" (offences under Section 153A and 295 of Indian Penal Code).¹²⁾ Indeed, we find a tendency for the government to disadvantage Muslims in their application of the Indian Penal Code.

Furthermore, friction between Hindus and Muslims concerning the ban on cow slaughter has become increasingly severe. For example, in Uttar Pradesh State in September 2015, false rumors accusing a Muslim of killing and eating a cow led to a Hindu mob beating him to death.¹³⁾

Hate crimes committed through hate propaganda and spreading false rumors have been urgent and critical issues in India. In addition, recent cases have underscored the limitations of law enforcement against hate crimes. Therefore, we analyze how citizen involvement through community policing can overcome hate crimes insulting a person's religion, which risk triggering Hindu-Muslim riots.

3. Experiments of the Mohalla Committees Movement Trust in Mumbai

This section analyzes the effectiveness of popular involvement through community policing in overcoming hate crimes, focusing on Mumbai. By examining cases in 1995 and 2002, it discusses how community policing defused the tension through which Hindu nationalists intended to trigger further riots.

3.1 Foundation on the Mohalla Committees Movement Trust

Local residents in Mumbai suffered extensive damage in the riots, losing family, property, and homes. Furthermore, serial bomb blasts killed 257 people at 13 sites on March 12, 1993. Hindus and Muslims felt mutual hatred and suspicion of each other. Mumbai police were tasked with sweeping away residents' distrust while immediately restoring proper law and order.

After the large-scale riots and the bomb terror of 1992–1993, the Sheriff of Mumbai City, Fakruddin Khorakiwala, suggested in March 1993 that Chief Minister Alexander Sharad Pawar should introduce community policing activities in Mumbai. In addition, Commissioner of Police Satish Sahney, retired Commissioner of Police Julio Ribeiro, and social activist Sushobha Barve held several meetings in Mahim to hear of losses caused by the riots, complaints against the police, and about their living conditions face-to-face with the Muslim citizens. Pawar then agreed, in June 1993, to form an organization of

community policing, the Mohalla Committees Movement Trust, which was established in stages in the areas of Jogeshwari, Mahim, Ghatkopar, and Colaba (Barve 2003: 169–170; 171–190). During the meeting in Mahim, Mumbai police tried to restore public trust by hearing complaints against and demands made of them. Muslim citizens had good opportunities to state their viewpoints to higher-level police officers in person. The means of communicating between police and citizens in the Mahim area meetings formed a solid basis of the MCMT. Remarkably, it was a prominent Muslim leader who proposed the foundation of community policing, officially authorized by the Government of Maharashtra. Local police attached importance to the opinions of Muslim citizens, who had borne hatred among local communities during the riots.

The purpose is to construct good friendships between local police and citizens and to maintain religious harmony in a multicultural society¹⁴). Gradually, various citizens belonging to Hindu, Muslim, Christian, and Sikh communities have taken part in the MCMT's activities, successfully solving problems together.

A principal objective of the MCMT is to encourage religious harmony. This is especially epitomized by a local Muslim member, Waqar Khan: in 1996, he developed for the MCMT the slogan "*Ham Sab Ek Hain*" ("We are all one") and the symbol depicting four children – dressed in the traditional attire of Hindus, Muslims, Sikhs and Christians, respectively – against the backdrop of a tricolor Indian flag. Later, in March 2008, Khan was awarded the Gandhi Peace Award for his long dedication in the Dharavi area by the Gandhi Memorial International Foundation (Hammed 2009). This slogan and symbol have been plain and highly visible, supporting the spread of community policing functions by the MCMT.

In 2014, through my observations, 48 core members of the MCMT worked together with the 41 zonal police stations, comprising 28 Hindus, 13 Muslims, and 7 Christians in 2014¹⁵). Collaborative practices have been organized by members of local Hindu, Muslim, Christian, and police groups since 1993, focused on enhancing citizens' quality of life by supporting job-seeking, empowering women, and holding sports events. The composition of MCMT members aims to reflect the organization as one of religious harmony in a multicultural society.

3.2 Defusing Trouble over the Screening of "Bombay"

The MCMT's activities had received much attention among Mumbai's residents by April 1995. Controversial issues arose in relation to the film *Bombay*, directed by Mani Ratnam, which particularly focused on a series of events including the Babri Mosque's demolition and the riots in Mumbai in 1992–1993.

The film's principal themes were intermarriage and harmony, but some political leaders raised a collective of criticism against the screening of the film, seeking to have it banned. For example, G.M. Banatwalla, leader of the Indian Union Muslim League, commented that "the film reportedly shows the Muslim community as arrogant and hostile." Then leader of Shiv Sena, Bal Thackeray, stood firmly behind the movie: "It seems some fundamentalists are preparing for another partition but they should realize that there is no Nehru or Gandhi to back them now" (Ghosh 1999: 42–43). The film was

designed to depict the disastrous situations produced by riots to avoid mounting tension. However, Bal Thackeray claimed, inflammatorily, that the film encouraged separation of the territory again by fundamentalist Muslims.

A ban on screening was indeed imposed after protest marches in Agra and Aligarh, Uttar Pradesh State, as senior police officers and administrative officers who had seen the film expected its release to create civil unrest. Then Commissioner of Police Sahney decided to postpone screening for eight days and implemented measures to calmly address the situation with members of the MCMT. Bal Thackeray quickly criticized the move in *Saamna*: “Sahney’s decision was cowardly, and [he] should quit if he cannot withstand the pressure from a handful [of] cranks.” Thackeray attacked the Commissioner of Police as weak-kneed in handling the situation. Even three years after the riots, people were yet to recover. The threatening situation in Mumbai became sensitive, and people worried that riots may reoccur after the film’s screening.

After watching the film before its release, the MCMT members prevailed upon local people by their utmost efforts to ensure that it would not engender any hostility or confrontation. Consequently, the opposition campaign was calmed. Ultimately, the film was shown peacefully and without incident (Sharma n.d.: 7). This case demonstrates the effectiveness of citizen involvement in maintaining law and order through close dialogues among residents, thereby preventing riots without force.

3.3 Measures during the Gujarat Massacre 2002

In 2002, and at the time of the Gujarat massacre, local citizen involvement in Mumbai was able to defuse a dangerous situation concerning Hindu–Muslim rioting.

The trigger for the massacre in Gujarat was the VHP’s campaign to reconstruct the Ram Temple in Ayodhya, which began in December 2001. On February 27, 2002, when train coaches caught fire near Godhra station, 59 Hindu passengers, including 45 VHP activists, were burned to death. They had been returning from Ayodhya after celebrating the function as part of Ramjanmabhumi Movement at the site. Instantly, then-Chief Minister Narendra Modi claimed this incident to be a “pre-planned, violent act of terrorism.”¹⁶⁾ When Modi arrived to inspect the site of the fire, an angry crowd of VHP activists surrounded him, clamoring for prompt action to be taken against those responsible. Some shouted a slogan demanding his resignation if he failed to do so. He assured the crowd that his government would do everything possible to bring the culprits to justice.¹⁷⁾ The next day, the bodies of the victims were brought to Ahmedabad. The VHP activists demanded that Muslims should condemn the attack. They then incited a counter-reaction against Muslims that threatened to become uncontrollable¹⁸⁾. The VHP activists called for a bandh (strike). On February 28 alone, 248 Muslims were murdered by mobs (Dhattiwala and Biggs 2012: 486). In response, Modi commented that “every action has an equal and opposite reaction,” quoting Newton’s third law.¹⁹⁾ Similarly, an Member of the Legislative Assembly (MLA) leader of BJP commented, “after the post-Godhra spontaneous Hindu upsurge, the party will have to consider the people’s strong feelings on Hindutva and nationalism” (Mahurkar 2002). Their statements seemed to justify the violence targeting Muslims and to incite revenge on the Muslims, thereby

inflaming anti-Muslim sentiment.

According to Human Rights Watch, which arrived to investigate the causes and damage of the Gujarat massacre in April 2002, local people found the painted message on walls “*Police hamarey bat hai. Jaan se mar dengey*” (“The police are with us. We will kill you”) on the streets of Ahmadabad (Human Rights Watch 2002: 22). From this message, we infer that rather than handling the violent mobs, the local police conspired with them to attack Muslim residents.

For several months, the VHP did relent in its hate campaign in Gujarat. VHP activists distributed leaflets among the Hindu residents in Ahmedabad, urging them to “save our country by boycotting Muslims economically and socially,” followed by the warning that “Traitors and terrorist are coming to murder you” (Bunsha 2002: 4). A series of Hindu nationalists’ propaganda efforts, also aiming to incite hate feelings, adopted the same in tone, referring to Muslims as traitors and terrorists who were killing Hindus during this time.

Consequently, the wave of the massacre continued for more than six months, resulting in the murder of approximately 2,000 Muslims throughout Gujarat State (Jaffrelot 2012: 77). Following an official enquiry into the train fire at Godhra station, the Justice U.C. Banerjee Committee reported on January 17, 2005 that the incident was purely accidental (Kumar 2005). However, the Nanavati-Mehta Commission, appointed by the Government of Gujarat, concluded in September 2008 that the burning of the train coach had been a “planned conspiracy” (Government of Gujarat 2008: 158–175). Although the subject has remained controversial, the accident was found to have been falsely framed as a terrorist attack, intended to kill VHP activists returning from Ayodhya. It triggered a widespread massacre in Gujarat, in which thousands lost their lives. Hate crimes had a vital function in escalating and justifying the violence of the Gujarat massacre.

3.4 Effects of Community Policing by the MCMT during the Gujarat Massacre

Supported by Shiv Sena and the BJP, VHP activists called for a bandh in Maharashtra State to protest the Godhra incident of February 27, 2002.²⁰⁾ There were visible indications of hate crimes committed by the VHP to trigger riots. However, we present evidence of struggles to resist the expected rioting in Maharashtra State.

On February 27, 2002, two Shiv Sena politicians of a municipal corporation were convicted for making inflammatory speeches back in 1994. They were sentenced by the Fifth Metropolitan Magistrate Court to one year’s imprisonment. The relevant events in 1994 concerned the alleged rape of a girl by a Muslim man. Two politicians delivered a speech “expressing her concern over the law and order situation in the city,” seeking to incite mobs against Muslims. The frenzied mobs set fire to two motorcycles.²¹⁾ Later prosecution of the politicians expressed the determination of the Government of Maharashtra to take firm action against hate crimes. As a result of these convictions, Shiv Sena and the BJP refused to join the VHP-led bandh in Maharashtra.²²⁾

As a leader of the MCMT, Ribeiro held meetings with local police in the Mahim and Dongri areas, and conducted strict patrolling with MCMT members soon after

hearing news of the incident in Gujarat on February 27. In addition, the Dongri Police organized amity cultural programs, in which eight schools participated with the MCMT members.²³⁾

While the VHP coordinated its 12-hour bandh on March 1, the Government of Maharashtra put paramilitary forces on high alert and maintained close coordination with the railway administration and the police. Joint Commissioner of Police D.V. Jadhav appealed to the public to refrain from rumor mongering.²⁴⁾ In fact, some cases of stone pelting and rail blockage occurred. Mobs tried to attack local mosques in Thane and Kolhapur districts. Additionally, police officers extinguished a burning tire on the highway in Kandivli area. A metal sleeper placed on the rail tracks by demonstrators, intending to stop trains, was removed by local police and residents.²⁵⁾ A peace march was jointly organized by Dongri Police and MCMT members to appeal against the bandh.²⁶⁾ The situation in Maharashtra State became threatening, with stone pelting, arson, and miscreants attempting derailments pursuant to the bandh.

The MCMT's members tried to suppress and expose false rumors to trigger violence while keeping contact with the local police. People heard false news of a stabbing in Andheri, rioting in Malvani, looting in Dharavi area, and of seven residents being killed in Mahim area.²⁷⁾ Forty members of the MCMT patrolled with local police, seeking to detect false rumors and monitor tension between the residents; they advised people not to become panicked by false rumors. At the same time, the police used their jeeps to take Muslims to safer areas.²⁸⁾ There were severe situations of rumor-mongering, with perpetrators actively endeavoring to divide local residents according to religious differences, and to escalate the confrontations in Mumbai. Prior to these events, the MCMT had developed community policing activities, which included holding facilitator meetings to decide their common policy, and organizing peace rallies and cultural programs. Thus, the practices of community policing, which had begun in 1993, reached a critical juncture in their approaches to local citizens.

In February 2002, the MCMT conducted an experiment in the Dharavi area. Waqar Khan and Baul Korde had produced a motion picture related to the 7.9 magnitude Gujarat Earthquake on January 26, 2001, titled "*Ham Sab Ek Hain: Ekta Sandesh*" ("We are all one: The message for Unity"). The disaster's death toll had 19,727. The film promoted religious harmony and a multicultural society, narrating the story of Hindu and Muslim families rescuing each other irrespective of their religious differences (Khan and Korde 2001). Authorized by Prasar Bharati, the film was screened from February 2002 at events organized by the MCMT (Citizens for Peace 2009; Hameed 2009). Though the film had been shot in June 2001, in the aftermath of the earthquake, its message was received more strongly among audiences as it was exhibited during the 2002 massacre. It is noteworthy that Khan and Korde used film, the most popular medium in India, to project the importance of harmony in a multicultural society. Their intellectual endeavor was important for spreading the message of harmony among many people simultaneously, irrespective of age, gender, and religion.

4. Discussion and Conclusion

This study examined the effectiveness of local citizen involvement in community policing as a means to overcome hate crimes and religious insults, either of which can potentially trigger Hindu–Muslim riots in India.

The paper explored the culpable actors and the forms and processes through which propaganda and false-rumor hate crimes have triggered Hindu-Muslim riots. At both public and private levels, hate crimes have played a key role in escalating potentially incendiary situations. Consequently, some provisions of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 have expressly proscribed hate propaganda, writing, and other behaviors as religious contempt. However, the combination of prejudices and defects in enforcing the law have blunted its effectiveness. The actions of Hindu nationalists, in particular, have sometimes been deplorable. Seeking to counteract their influence, the Ministry of Home Affairs has proposed the Prevention of Communal and Targeted Violence Bill, 2011 to regulate hate propaganda. However, some Hindu nationalist leaders have opposed the bill resolutely, such that it yet in force. The sensitive tension caused by hate crimes remains an extremely important issue in India.

Community policing practices have been supported to effect a breakthrough in tackling hate propaganda and false rumors, which have, on several past occasions, become widespread in local society (and beyond). In this study, we discussed the practices of the MCMT in Mumbai, Maharashtra State, particularly addressing in danger of causing the riot. The MCMT's character is marked in the outstanding leadership of Muslim citizens, with responsible participation from members of different religious communities endeavoring to prevent inter-faith riots.

As community policing functions have developed, the MCMT's members have held sport and cultural events, supported job-hunting, and empowered women irrespective of their religion. The mingling of local citizens through sports and culture has promoted mutual understanding and religious tolerance. Consequently, people are less likely to be inflamed by hate propaganda. They have developed sympathy for multicultural symbiosis through community policing, which is especially apparent in times of danger or crisis.

In the midst of campaigns against the screening of *Bombay* in 1995, members of the MCMT watched the film before its release. They then reported to the public, by word of mouth, that the story did not provoke hatred or confrontation, nor was it discriminatory. Additionally, when Hindu nationalists sought to incite rioting in Maharashtra State during the Gujarat massacre of 2002, the MCMT's members cooperated with local police and appealed to the populace to remain calm, resisting calls to mobilize against Muslims. They also organized peace rallies and cultural programs in collaboration with local police. Ongoing daily cooperation between the police and local citizens effectively dampened the tense situation through dialogue.

In conclusion, we find support for the effectiveness of state community policing in controlling violent crime and riots; in a post-riot society, such civic engagement has a key role to play in enhancing public resistance to hate crimes. The MCMT established its objectives under direct authorization from the state government, conferring legitimacy on the group's existence and actions. Consequently, from 1993, the MCMT became able to

lead community policing activities with the confidence of and support from both local police and citizens. Our findings demonstrate that local citizen involvement through independent community policing has achieved sustainable activities, both organizing local people and enhancing their quality of life. Accordingly, we propose that local citizen involvement in India can be a role model for community policing for riot prevention, able to foster obedience to law and order among local residents. It is reasonable to conclude that such local citizen involvement serves two key purposes in India: enabling the formation of relationships of equality between the police and public, and sustaining the functions of community policing.

Notes

- 1) The city of “Bombay” was renamed “Mumbai” in 1995. For consistency and uniformity, this paper refers to the city as Mumbai in recounting events both before and after 1995.
- 2) “Should We Run Relief Camps? Open Child Producing Centres?” *Outlook*, September 20, 2002.
- 3) “Manmohan advocates community policing to check growing urban crimes.” *The Hindu*, November 23, 2013.
- 4) The Federal Bureau of Investigation, n.d., Hate Crimes. https://www.fbi.gov/about-us/investigate/civilrights/hate_crimes (accessed December 4, 2013).
- 5) Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India, n.d., The Indian Penal Code 1860. http://mha.nic.in/sites/upload_files/mha/files/pdf/IPC1860.pdf (accessed January 21, 2014).
- 6) “No riot can last for more than 24 hours unless the State wants it to continue.” *Communalism Combat*, February 1995. <http://www.sabrang.com/Infocus/VNRAI1995.htm> (accessed April 11, 2016).
- 7) “Nation’s Shame.” *India Today*, December 31, 1992: 40–3.
- 8) This bill was drawn up under the title “Communal Violence (Prevention, Control and Rehabilitation of Victims) Bill, 2005.” In 2010, this was changed to the “Communal and Sectarian Violence Bill, 2010.” The final version submitted, submitted in 2011, was titled “Prevention of Communal and Targeted Violence (Access to Justice and Reparations) Bill, 2011” (Peer n.d.: 144).
- 9) Communal Violence (Prevention, Control and Rehabilitation of Victims) Bill, 2005: Article 8: Hate propaganda.
- 10) Vishwa Hindu Parishad, 2011, “VHP for uplifting the marginalized in society.”
- 11) Thackeray, Raj, 2012, “Malegaon, Bhiwandi safe heavens for terrorists”. http://www.ummid.com/news/2012/April/12.04.2012/raj_thackeray_in_malegaon.htm (accessed June 4, 2015).
- 12) “Politician Akbaruddin Owaisi held over ‘hate speeches.’” *BBC.com*, January 8, 2013. <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-20942476> (accessed June 5, 2015).
- 13) “UP launches probe into killing over beef.” *The Hindu*, September 30, 2015.
- 14) Personal Interviews with 22 members of the MCMT in Mumbai City from March to April 2010 and January to February 2011.
- 15) Unpublished data, “List of Facilitators, police stationwise and zonewise,” provided to the author by the members of MCMT (June 3, 2014).

- 16) "Modi terms attack as pre-planned." *The Times of India*, February 28, 2002.
- 17) "VHP activists mob Modi at Godhra." *The Times of India*, February 28, 2002.
- 18) "VHP appeals to Muslims to condemn attack." *The Times of India*, February 28, 2002.
- 19) "'Newton' Modi has a lot to answer." *The Times of India*, March 2, 2002.
- 20) "VHP calls for Maharashtra bandh on Friday." *The Times of India*, February 28, 2002.
- 21) "Sena corporator convicted for inflammatory speeches." *The Times of India*, February 28, 2002.
- 22) "Sena refuses to play second fiddle on home turf." *The Times of India*, March 1, 2002.
- 23) "Mohalla Peace Panels Meet on Bandh Eve." *The Indian Express*, March 1, 2002.
- 24) "Police gear up to ensure peaceful bandh in city." *The Times of India*, March 1, 2002.
- 25) "Stray incidents mar bandh in city." *The Times of India*, March 2, 2002.
- 26) "City police gets pat on the back for good work." *The Times of India*, March 3, 2002.
- 27) "Rumor-mongering blamed for spreading panic in city." *The Times of India*, March 18, 2002.
- 28) "Mohalla Peace Groups Unite against Bandhs." *The Indian Express*, September 26, 2002.

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