

## Jihad as Dialectical Movement and Formation of Islamic Identity among the Fulbe

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## Jihad as Dialectical Movement and Formation of Islamic Identity among the Fulbe

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### Abstract

This paper discusses the radical transformation of the social and cultural identity of Fulbe "conquerors" who have participated in the Fulbe jihads and subsequently formed Islamic states. Employing a dialectical and synthetic approach, I will explain how the Fulbe "conquerors" have changed their identity from an ethnic one to an Islamic one. This question is, however, more than a simple identity change at the psychological level. Rather, it concerns the total socio-economic system of the Fulbe "conquerors" and the fact that they played the role of "*avant-garde*" in a political/religious movement directed to the construction of an Islamic super-ethnic world. Islam came to replace their ethnic foundations and facilitated their integration into a new world order and later a new industrial-commercial economy.

Using the case of Rey-Buuba we shall see that the transformation of the Fulbe "conquerors" was indeed a total one, leading them to abandon their ethnic solidarity as well as their pastoralist way of life which had constituted the economic and material basis of their ethnic identity. Most of the Fulbe "conquerors" settled and developed intimate socio-economic relationships with their *maccube* (captives) on one hand, and entered into a new commercial economy on the other. Unlike other African peoples, the Fulbe were producers of cattle, privileged material endowed with high economic and political value. They could, economically, politically and religiously, manipulate this wealth in such a way as to aid in the construction of a new kind of Islamic society which has its roots in the jihads.

### Introduction

What is the role played by the Fulbe in the so-called Fulani jihads and the subsequent formation of Islamic theocratic states? How have the Fulbe changed during this process? These are the fundamental questions which lead the following discussions, through which I will show the radical transformation of Fulbe society.

There are two opposing positions about the role of the Fulbe in the jihads. One position is negative about the Fulbe ethnic role and emphasizes the clerics' (especially the *Toorodbe*) religious initiative. The other emphasizes the political role of the Fulbe ethnic group. This question is accordingly related to the question

of whether the jihad was a religious or political war. If Toorodbe clerics led the jihad, it was a religious war, but if the Fulbe constituted its main proponent, the jihad was, on the contrary, a political and racial war, dominated by Fulbe ethnic and material interests<sup>1)</sup>.

Several discussions of the Fulbe jihads are influenced by a moral concern that seeks to judge the jihad legitimacy. Y. Saint-Martin, therefore, asked for a total reconsideration of the jihad of El Hadj Omar, saying "*Réviser un procès* (Revise a trial)" (Saint-Martin 1970 : 7)<sup>2)</sup>. A trial is however no longer necessary; discussions of jihads should be free of a trial-like arguments. Rather, they should seek to understand how sub-Saharan societies and cultures have changed with the Fulbe jihads and why a pastoral people like the Fulbe played such an important role in what is the largest movement of Islamic state-formation in the history of West Africa.

On the more scientific level of epistemology, a mechanical and reductionist manner of questioning has dominated the discussions of jihads, seeking mainly to determine one crucial "moment" or "motivation" of the movements. Instead of taking all relevant factors into consideration, they have ignored the existence of some elements which had not appeared of obvious importance. This kind of reductionist approach ends not only in the impoverishment of phenomena, but also in doctrinal conflicts which are impossible to reconcile. It presupposes also that the identity of a people does not change.

A total reconsideration of the theoretical framework is therefore necessary for the discussion of the Fulbe jihads. Here I will adopt a synthetic and dialectical point of view from which to comprehend the Fulbe jihads.

The Fulbe jihads were synthetic movements in the sense that they were not simple wars characterized only by one instance or motivation—political, economic, or religious. Rather, they were wars of such a highly complex nature that they affected the lives of West African peoples in their totality. It is therefore necessary to take into consideration as many elements as possible in order to fully understand the Fulbe jihads<sup>3)</sup>. It is particularly important to look at the relation between the clerical factor and the Fulbe factor as a complementary one. I will show that the

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1) For classifications of the studies of the Fulbe jihads, see Smith (1980), Adu Boahen (1964) and Waldman (1966). According to Adu Boahen, whose classification is the most detailed, the principal explanations for the jihads fall into four categories: 1) racial war; 2) religious war; 3) racial and religious war); and 4) class war.

2) "*Réviser un procès : beaucoup de ce qu'on a pu écrire, en France surtout, sur El Hadj Omar et Ahmadou, est entaché de parti pris, parfois même de partialité haineuse et chauvine, marque d'une époque où l'on vengeait sur le Niger les insultes subies sur le Rhin. La plume des chroniqueurs s'est souvent montrée injuste, les jugements hâtifs abondent, l'incompréhension est étendue.....*" (Saint-Martin 1970 : 7).

3) Some scholars pay attention to the existence of various converging factors in the jihads as well as to the overall complexity of the movements (Waldman 1966; Adeleye 1974 : 74-75).

Fulbe jihads were Islamic religious wars in which the Fulbe had an important role along with the Toorodɓe or other indigenous clerics, though the relative importance of each factor differed according to geographical area and time. Accordingly, we must investigate the significance and nature of the co-existence of these apparently contradictory factors in the Fulbe jihads.

This complementary relationship is not a simple mechanical one, limiting the role of the Fulbe to the political domain. The Fulbe conquerors also have changed so as to be integrated to the Islamic super-ethnic society which they had fought to construct. In this sense, the Fulbe jihads were dialectical "self-destructing" movements of the Fulbe conquerors. This is the fundamental thesis underlying this discussion.

Examples are mainly taken from the Fulbe jihad in old Adamawa where Adamawa Emirate was constructed under the leadership of Moodibbo Adama. More particularly the discussion is based on the case of Rey-Buuba, one of its sub-emirates, where I undertook intensive field research for one year between 1979 to 1980. Being situated in a remote region of Cameroon where modernization has yet to fully penetrate, Rey-Buuba offers a privileged case study: it is one of few existing Fulbe Islamic states maintaining its traditional authority system, relatively in vigor in spite of the political domination from which it has suffered since the colonial era (Shimada 1984). I have also worked in the Upper Niger Delta, Massina, since 1986, and the discussion will occasionally refer to this case. But because the Islamic State of Sheikh Ahmadu no longer exists, I will be more prudent in incorporating the observations which I have obtained there.

## **I. Jihad as a Re-Creative Movement of Islam by African Indigenous People**

### **1. Jihad as a Synthetical Movement**

The importance of the Fulbe factor in the jihads cannot be denied. Every Fulbe jihad which resulted in theocratic state-formation was born in the regions where pastoral Fulbe were numerous. Jihads were in fact waged in the areas most suitable for pastoralism in West Africa, including riverain zones along the Senegal river (Futa Toro), the Niger river (Massina), and the Sokoto and Komadugu rivers (Sokoto), and on the Futa Jallon and Adamawa plateaux. This fact tells of the importance of pastoralists in the jihads<sup>4</sup>.


In spite of this correspondence, it is equally true that Islamic clerics, especially those of Toorodɓe background, initiated the jihads. All the founders of Fulbe

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4) The exceptions are the Chad Basin and the Niger Valley around Gao and Timbuktu. But they do not necessarily contradict the importance of pastoralist factor in the jihads. In these cases, Fulbe pastoralists became rivals of other pastoralist groups, the Tuareg in case of the Niger Valley (Ba & Dajet 1984 : 199-231, 259-266; Rouch 1953 : 229-232; Abbatucci 1938 : 9-11), and the Tuareg, the Tedda and the Shuwa Arabs in the case of the Chad Basin (Brenner 1973 : 89ff; Tijani 1986 : 64). These pastoralist rivalries greatly influenced the course of the jihads.

theocratic states were Islamic scholars well known for their eminent piety and knowledge. Their dedication to Islam is shown by the taking of Arabic Islamic title names, such as Almaamy, Sheikh and Caliph, by the leaders of the jihad states. For this point, the case of Adamawa provides a good illustration.

Adamawa Emirate was established in around 1810 as one of the largest emirates of the Sokoto Caliphate in the region called *Fommbina* (south) in Fulfulde, corresponding to the southern fringe of the Central Sudan. Here, the Fulbe factor was very important. Unlike in Hausaland where Sheikh 'Uthman dan



Map 1. Lamidate of Rey-Buuba (after Mohammadou 1979 : 353)

Fodio began a jihad and constructed the Sokoto Caliphate in an Islamic area, Adamawa was mainly a pagan land. Islam was little developed, not only among the indigenous agricultural peoples, but also among the Fulbe newcomers; specialized Islamic clerics were very few. Almost all Fulbe were pastoralists. They had recently immigrated to this land, grazing their herds under the leadership of *ardo'en* (sing. *ardo*), the traditional Fulbe heads of cattle herding units, based on the Fulbe clan-lineage system.

These *ardo'en* became the chiefs of most of the sub-emirates of Adamawa Emirate (see Map 1), whose number reached more than fifty. With the Islamic factor being of little importance, the jihads in Adamawa apparently took the appearance of a Fulbe racial war. P. F. Lacroix goes as far as to say that in Adamawa Islam was a simple pretext to justify Fulbe ethnic domination and that Adamawa society became a racially stratified society on the top of which were situated the Fulbe conquerors (Lacroix 1965 : 18).

But the founder of the Adamawa Emirate, Moodibbo Adama, himself was a simple marabout, that is, an Islamic teacher whose clan and Fulbe origin was suspicious (Njeuma 1978 : 29,82). When he declared jihad in the Benue region, he was only thirty years old, with neither brother nor son. He was a marginal man in the traditional Fulbe society, and his battles were started with or against the Fulbe chiefs who were highly independent. Notwithstanding, it was under the name of this marginal Islamic teacher (called *moodibbo*, namely, "learned one") that Fulbe chiefs pursued their own jihads with the white flags offered to them by Adama. The extremely tribalistic and numerically-dominant pagan Adamawa societies were then conquered and incorporated into an Islamic emirate, named "Adamawa" after Moodibbo Adama.

The co-existence of the Fulbe factor and the clerical factor is similarly apparent in the case of the Massina jihad. Though Massina is often considered as a typical case of an Islamic theocratic state, the Fulbe factor was no less important: it provided rich ecological conditions, so that its pastoral Fulbe populations are much denser than those of Adamawa. Like Moodibbo Adama, Sheikh Ahmadu was an orphan marabout and started his jihad, mainly with the support of his own *taalibe* (students) and in spite of antagonistic Fulbe traditional chiefs (Ba & Dajet 1984 : 28-47; Shimada 1988).

In short, in these cases, we can see the Fulbe factor and the clerical factor, which are apparently contradictory, but are certainly unified with each other under some logic. This will become clearer when we place the investigation in the context of the history of Islam in West Africa.

## 2. Pre-Jihad Processes of Islamization

West Africa has had two major peaceful ways of Islamization. One is that employed by the traders or merchants who engaged in the trans-Saharan or trans-Saharan long distance trade. The other is that taken by specialized Islamic clerics, particularly Toorodbe, who originated in the Senegal valley.

Arab-Berber traders of North Africa were, at first, the main agents of Islamization. Through them, Islam was transported from North Africa to the sub-Saharan area. Their activities continued until the 19th century, penetrating as far as the courts of the pagan kingdoms of the West African coast, such as Ashanti (Wilks 1980). The legendary Wangara traders, probably of mixed origin from Arab-Berber peoples and the Soninke of ancient Ghana, are also known as diffusers of Islam in the Sahelo-Sudanian zone. Subsequently, other indigenous African merchants, including the Dyula and the Hausa relayed Islam into the southern savanna region, so that the Islamization of West Africa, even that of coastal towns on the Atlantic Ocean, cannot be understood without considering these merchants' activities. Such activities also contributed largely to the Islamization of the medieval African kingdoms like Mali, Songhay, Borno and Hausa.

But merchants' main interests were not in Islamization itself, but in economic activities. We can easily imagine that they had little proselytizing zeal or religious knowledge and rigor. They were consequently not resistant to syncretism<sup>5</sup>). In addition, most of the merchants remained foreigners to local life, since most African peoples at that time were not as yet significantly integrated into the commercial economy. As a result, medieval African Islamic cities were often divided into two quarters of Muslim merchants and indigenous pagan peoples (Cuoq 1975 : 99-108). The same dual structure can also be seen in contemporary Dyula and other commercial towns (Akasaka 1976; Rodney 1975 : 286; Barth 1965 : vol. 2, 149; Lewis 1980 : 26). The merchants' way of Islamization succeeded only in a loosely reticulated pattern following the network of trade routes and towns. The Islamization of local life by this means was by necessity a superficial process accommodated to local traditional life. That of the medieval pre-jihad kingdoms was also superficial and syncretic; Islam remained in them as a "class religion" or an "Imperial cult" (Trimingham 1962, 1980).<sup>6</sup>

### 3. Toorodbe as Indigenous African Clerics

The appearance of the Toorodbe clerics was almost revolutionary in contrast with this long history of the merchant's type of Islamization because they were

5) Following Trimingham's statement, "They were not proselytizers of Islam, but sellers of protective charms" (Trimingham 1962 : 143). It is certainly true that in this process, "a few attained a higher level of Islamic education and became specialized clerics" (Levtzion 1975 : 197). But citing a severe remark of Tarikh al-Sudan concerning the Jenne *'ulama*, Levtzion says that they placed "greater emphasis on the ritual rather than on the legal aspect of Islam"; most were "concerned with the fabrications of amulets, and few were really scholars" (Levtzion 1975 : 197-198). See also Willis (1979 : 13-21).

6) A similar view is found in Levtzion (1973), Fuglstad (1978), and Rodney (1975 : 223-324). This type of Islamization can be observed in Islamic states that have existed since before the jihads, such as the Hausa kingdom of Maradi (Nicolas 1975) and the Kotoko Chiefdom (Lebeuf 1969). The Bamoun kingdom can be classified similarly, though its Islamization resulted from the Fulbe jihad (Tardits 1980; Wazaki 1984, 1987, 1990).

specialized indigenous clerics<sup>7)</sup> and their religious zeal and knowledge greatly exceeded that of the Muslim merchants. Evidently, they were so serious that they severely criticized both Africanized Islam and the traditional Muslim kings for tolerating this kind of accommodation. But more important to this discussion is that they were indigenes of West Africa. In pre-jihad times there were a few specialized clerics in sub-Saharan West Africa, most of whom were foreigners who were not attached to the life of West African indigenous peoples. Their political power was hence much weaker than that of the indigenous Toorodbe, who could readily take possession of political power during the Fulbe jihads. The Fulbe Islamic states thus constructed were, above all, the first West African Islamic states from the beginning under Islam, while in the pre-jihad Islamic states, Islam was only grafted upon the stock of the pagan kingdoms. In this sense we can agree with Trimingham that West African Islam had arrived at the stage of a "state religion" (Trimingham 1962, 1980).

But the meaning of this Islamic revolution can not be reduced to a simple return to a purer Islam, nor to that of the construction of genuine Islamic theocratic states. Since West African indigenous clerics initiated these Islamic movements, the Fulbe jihads can rather be viewed as part of the process of the Africanization of Islam in which West African indigenous clerics openly asserted for the first time their religious autonomy from foreign clerics. Massina jihad is a good illustration of this point: indigenes rejected the foreign religious authority of the Kunta and mixed Moroccan 'ulama who had dominated the two most traditional and prestigious Islamic cities in West Africa, Timbuktu and Djenne (Ba and Dajet 1984 : 22-42, 151-158, 211-231). Though some historians are apt to stress the origins of the Toorodbe from among foreign clerics, such as the Moors, the movement of the Toorodbe requires further investigation.

It cannot be ignored that other clerics of non-Toorodbe origin also participated in Fulbe jihads. For instance, Bornoan Islamic tradition, in which Moodibbo Adama obtained an Islamic education (Abubakar 1977 : 47-48), had no direct relation with the Toorodbe. Even Sheikh Ahmadu was not of Toorodbe origin. The rise of Toorodbe clerics is therefore one of the best examples illustrating the emergence of West African indigenous clerics.

#### **4. Participation of the Fulbe in the Jihads**

The significance of the Fulbe in the Islamic history of West Africa also includes their indigenous character. The thesis which regards the Fulbe as a people foreign to the land of West Africa is debatable. Because of their relatively nomadic way of life with little attachment to a particular area, in addition to their distinct physical features, they could easily have been mistaken as foreigners or even invaders by

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7) The concept of Toorodbe is sometimes defined as "men of Futa Toro." But in Futa Toro, although Fulbe and Toorodbe often intersect each other, they are not synonymous. Toorodbe is a caste-like social group devoted to Islam, rather than a ethnic group.



other peoples. But in comparison with the traditional agents of Islamization, namely the merchants, the Fulbe are clearly more indigenous. First, with their sphere of activities limited to the West African savanna and steppe, they were less migratory than the merchants. Second, and more definitively, as pastoralists, they were an important innovating society in West Africa, introducing new economic activities and kinds of property in most areas where they migrated. For example, the Adamawa area had not known the pastoralist mode of production before the coming of the Fulbe, except among some mountain and riverain peoples who practiced small-scale cattle breeding with much smaller breed than the zebu of the Fulbe. Moreover, the Fulbe introduced some new varieties of cultivated plants, especially dry season sorghum known as muskwari and rice,<sup>8)</sup> which grow on flood plains.

From these facts the most important aspect of the Fulbe jihads becomes clear: in the movements, a West African "producer people" became for the first time a main supporter of Islam. This is why Islam could for the first time penetrate into African remote areas, like Adamawa, far away from sub-Saharan commercial centers and routes.

Probably, when the Fulbe jihads began, at least some of the pastoral Fulbe were profoundly Islamized. But it is erroneous to make an overly rigid distinction between the clerics and the lay masses, because the formation of groups of indigenous clerics depends on the masses who can support them. The Toorodbe were called beggars (*toorotoodo*) (Gaden 1931 : 316-317). This is not, however, strange, since every cleric and student devoted to the study of Islamic sciences must essentially be a "beggar" who lives on charity.

The formation of indigenous clerics with a higher level of knowledge and piety suggests, therefore, the existence of Islamized masses who could appreciate and support them and their religious activities.

There was no dichotomous choice between the identity of cleric and that of Pullo. A clerical family need not always be clerical, and a Pullo need not always be a pastoralist. Innumerable clerics have been born from Fulbe pastoralist families, and they have often lived in the bush and contributed in their turn a great deal to the Islamization of both pastoral and agricultural peoples living in rural areas. Although Islam is considered a "religion of the city," it began to penetrate into rural areas with the clerics of Fulbe origin. The Toorodbe clerics themselves are the indigenous clerics from the Fulbe dominant strata of Futa Toro.

##### 5. Jihads as "Africanization" of Islam

The co-existence of the clerical and the Fulbe factors in the Fulbe jihads was far from contradictory: they combined in a complementary manner to create a new Islamic world. West African indigenous peoples then engaged in their own process

8) See Burhnam (1978), Guillard (1965 : 263-268), and Barth (1965: Vol. 2, 58, 137-138). Archeological pollen analysis confirms the great contribution made by the Fulbe migration to the agricultural development of Adamawa (David 1976). The Fulbe around Maroua are also good cultivators of onion (Cabot 1965 : 197).

of Islamization and constructed their own Islamic societies. I do not deny that the Fulbe jihads were reformatory movements to purify the overly accommodating African Islam. But they were also attempts to Africanize Islam at a deeper level.

This Africanization is evidently distinct from that which has been discussed as an accommodation of Islam to African pagan societies and cultures. There was evidently something creative in the process so that African traditional societies and cultures, especially the Fulbe, have also radically changed in this process. In this sense, the Fulbe jihads are also a kind of "religious re-creative movement" which sought to re-create Islam in a more suitable way so as to change the sub-Saharan world. They were a dynamic and creative synthesis of two apparently contradictory movements, a return to a purer or more fundamental form of Islam and an adaptation to the African situation. The appearance of indigenous clerics on the stage of West African Islamic history not only symbolizes this equivocal movement, it also made possible the success of the movement.

Is it possible to find a series of such re-creative movements in the history of any universalist religion? The development of a universalist religion does not follow a style of mechanical diffusion; its style is essentially heterogeneous and dynamic. And whenever and wherever an universalist religion succeeds in penetrating to some degree among a people, does it also require some reformatory movement led by indigenous clerics, as in the Protestant Reformation in the history of Christianity? History shows that the consolidation of a religion in each milieu requires such a movement, in which people can willingly accept the new changes. The religion is then no longer a simple imported foreign religion; it is the people's own religion, capable of resolving their own concerns. And it is through this kind of religious re-creative movement that people can more willingly and more drastically change themselves.

## 6. Dialectical Point of View

Islam in a broad sense has penetrated greatly among the Fulbe conquerors. For example, although a particular Fulbe system of morals or ethics, known as *pulaaku* (Fulbeness), is well known among the pastoral Fulbe who have lived relatively outside the influence of the jihads (Riesman 1974; Ogawa 1987), I have rarely heard of it in Rey-Buuba and Massina. People of these communities (except among some pastoral nomads) talk mainly about Islam.

But Islamization did not induce a simple identity change limited to the religious and moral consciousness level. All aspects of Fulbe lives—moral, religious, economic, material, social, cultural and political—were affected. This change was so radical and obligatory that the Fulbe who had essentially been nomadic pastoralists became sedentary during their conversion to Islam. This caused a total change of their mode of life. My own research in Northern Cameroon (Shimada 1985), found that two fundamental socio-economic changes took place with Fulbe sedentarization. Firstly, the Fulbe conquerors entered into a new agro-pastoral economy related to an Islamic market economy. Secondly, they abandoned their

ethnic solidarity and began to build up new social relations, especially with conquered local pagan peoples, promoting at the same time differentiation between the Fulbe ruling families and the commoners. In short, the relatively homogeneous Fulbe ethnic society entered into a wider, though politically more hierarchical, super-ethnic and Islamic world related to a market economy. A good illustration of this is the case of Rey-Buuba.

## II. Jihad as a Dialectical Movement of Fulbe Conquerors


### 1. Rey-Buuba as a Super-Ethnic Center

Among the most paradoxical features of Rey-Buuba city, which was founded as a capital of the Fulbe lamidate (a sub-emirate of Adamawa Emirate), is its multi-ethnic character. (Later, I will argue that this is a super-ethnic one.) The capital of Rey-Buuba includes about twenty ethnic groups in its small-scale population of about 2,500 (see Table 1 and Map 2). Rey-Buuba is situated in a remote savanna, away from actual modernization, so that its multi-ethnic character was evidently a result of the jihad. During the jihad, many conquered or allied local people moved to the capital, sometimes by force, and began to live there as captives or slaves (*maccube*), eventually occupying a large percentage of the total population of the city. Statistically speaking, Rey-Buuba is a town of *maccube* or, more precisely, a town of the chief's (laamiido's) *maccube* (*maccube baaba*—literally, "father's slaves"), who are therefore royal *maccube*.

As mentioned above, Fulbe traditional chiefs (*arfo'en*) played a very important role in the Adamawa jihad. They founded almost all the sub-emirates and most of their descendants have maintained their traditional title "arfo" until recent

Groups of Local Origin ( <i>Maccube</i> Status)			Groups of Free Status		
No. of Households		%	No. of Households		%
Duru	105	22	Fulbe	81	17
Mbum	64	13	<i>Riimaybe</i>	17	3
Dama	59	12	Hausa	15	3
Laka	41	8	Bornoans	10	2
Mono	36	7	Others	3	1
Lame	15	3			
Galke	14	3			
Mundang	11	2			
Kali	8	2			
Pam	4	1			
Guikaw	3	1			
Fali	3	1			
Total	361	74	Total	126	26

Table 1. Ethnic Composition of Rey-Buuba City



Map 2. Ethnic Groups of Rey-Buuba (after Mohammadou 1978)

times. Nowadays, they are generally called *laamdo* (plural, *laambe*) or *laamiido* (plural, *laamiibe*). In the 19th century, there existed strong tensions between the chiefs of the sub-emirates and the central government of the emirate, which had been founded by Moodibbo Adama. The lamidate of Rey-Buuba, established by a most prestigious ardo of the Yillaga clan, clashed three times with the central government of Adamawa. The most serious crisis for the history of Rey-Buuba came from the attacks on its metropolitan government. Rey-Buuba was also one of the most redoubtable enemies of Yola. Notwithstanding, it did not become a Fulbe ethnic center.

## 2. The Dynamic Process of Jihad in Rey-Buuba

The analysis of the oral traditions collected by Mohammadou (1979) and Von Strümpell (1980) shows how a non-Fulbe super-ethnic political center was formed at

Rey-Buuba. The jihad of Rey-Buuba was not simple. It was conducted in three different directions: firstly, against local pagan peoples (*haabe*); secondly, against other Fulbe groups in the area surrounding Rey-Buuba; and thirdly, against Yola, the capital of Adamawa Emirate.

Buuba Djidda, the founder of the lamidate, did not encounter many problems during the first and only legitimate phase of the jihad in Rey-Buuba (see for example Hurault and Henry 1969, 1970). As noted earlier, the Fulbe were not invaders to the region. Conflicts between pastoralists and cultivators have often been exaggerated, though some conflicts did occur. The coming of the Fulbe was generally peaceful in sparsely populated Adamawa, and the success of the jihad in this region was associated with the peaceful penetration of the Fulbe and the alliances they established with the local peoples. At least, this was the case in Rey-Buuba, principally founded on two interrelated factors, matrimonial and economic. The Fulbe gave their cattle to local pagan peoples in exchange for wives and their permission to graze their territory (Mohammadou 1976: 77-83, 1979: 276-277, 1977: 29; Abubakar 1977: 22,41; Njeuma 1978: 12; Strümpell 1980: 112). They also systematically distributed clothes to the "naked" pagan peoples that they wanted to subjugate. Out of desire for the clothes, many pagan peoples became Muslims and accepted the hegemony of the Fulbe (Shimada 1992).

The most serious challenge for Rey-Buuba came from Yola, during a civil war. The population of Rey-Buuba was forced to leave its capital and take refuge in a fortress city (Tcholliré) in a mountain area. During this war a significant event took place: the Fulbe ran away, leaving their chief among the *maccube* and the *riimaybe* (freed captives). Consequently, it was these servile populations who supported do Rey-Buuba and his war against Yola (Mohammadou 1979: 185-189).

This latter history is not yet episodic, but structural because Fulbe traditional pastoral society is essentially segmentary and their history of migration from Malle was that of repeated scission (Mohammadou 1979: 141-142); hierarchical centralism is alien to it. In Adamawa, rivalries were very strong among the Fulbe, and that is why many *arđo'en* pursued their own independence and became chiefs of their own sub-emirates. But these scissions were not of the same kind as the earlier ones, because they included the local pagan allies. The Fulbe chiefs who became stronger in this process were those who obtained more numerous allies among the local peoples, whose societies were equally segmentary and apt to fragment. This explains why the strongest lamidates such as Rey-Buuba, Tibati, and Ngaoundéré were all situated on the periphery of Adamawa Emirate, a zone of intense contact with local pagan peoples (Map 2). In these rivalries, some weak *arđo'en* were subjugated by the stronger ones. Rey-Buuba thus possesses three white flags, since its founder, Arđo Buuba Djidda, conquered two other *arđo'en* who had received white flags from Moodibbo Adama. Fulbe ethnic solidarity, though it was an essentially fragile one, was thus breached.

After the consolidation of Rey-Buuba sub-emirate, there arose another kind of intra-ethnic conflict. This was a fraternal rivalry between the royal princes

(*yerima'en*) for succession to the office of chief. There were two cases of succession in the 19th century. In both cases, not only was the new chief forced to go through severe fratricide among a decade of brothers, but princes also tried to drive their father from the throne; in one case, they killed him (Mohammadou 1979 : 195-200, 214-217, 221-222). Thus Fulbe ethnic solidarity was breached even at the minimal level of the consanguineous family. Because it was impossible to depend on the other Fulbe in this situation, only a prince who had gained the strong support of the conquered population became a chief. This is why all the chiefs of Rey-Buuba have been chosen from sons of non-Fulbe women of local origin.

Correlated with this situation, it has been almost a royal duty for the chiefs to take women from other ethnic groups as their wives or concubines and to form a kind of harem of more than fifty women. Consequently, the Fulbeness of the royal families became almost nominal, not only in their physical and social make-up, but also in their culture, especially since children are educated by their mothers and servants, who are non-Fulbe. The decline of ethnic solidarity and identity also affected the conquered local peoples, especially the royal maccube who had served as the most obedient and trustworthy subjects of the Fulbe chief. The political core of Rey-Buuba has thus consisted of these two different kinds of people, both of which have been the most detribalized—the royal Fulbe and their maccube.

### 3. Islamic Assimilation of Slaves

The Fulbe and their maccube have not been unified solely by shared political interests or historical contingencies. Islam also became the basis of their common identity and a social bond, as did the Islamic system of slavery. Under Islam slaves should not remain segregated from their masters, but rather assimilated into the Islamic world, to the extent that the education of slaves into Islam is a duty of their master. Though it is said that in Adamawa the Fulbe have neglected this duty and have manipulated Islam in order to maintain a racially-stratified social system, evidence suggests the contrary. Certainly, most maccube have little Islamic knowledge. Nonetheless, they are still Muslims and eagerly practice their duties whenever possible. When I lived in Rey-Buuba, it was the maccube who were the most sensitive to my not being Muslim.

In Adamawa, maccube are no longer pagan in their appearance since they now wear gowns and bonnets and shave their heads. Having been a naked people's country before the jihad and nakedness being synonymous with paganism, wearing clothes has become an important indicator of whether someone is Muslim or not. It has hence become one of the most important duties of masters to offer Muslim gowns or shirts to their maccube, since whether maccube are well dressed or not is a most visible indicator of whether masters really perform their religious and economic duties. In fact, the best dressed persons in Rey-Buuba are now the royal maccube, who wear luxurious embroidered gowns prepared in the laamiido's court and given to them by the laamiido. They are often confused with the Fulbe by foreign observers. Even in official colonial documents, the maccube were mentioned as

"Kirdis évolués" or "Haabe assimilés" (Shimada 1985 : 333-335).

While discussing the Fulbeization of maccube, some scholars have included the wearing of Islamic gowns as a main element in the process (Shultz 1984, Baldus 1977). But since gowns constitute one of the most distinctive and common features of West African Muslims, wearing of clothes among the maccube signals their Islamization, not their Fulbeization. For example in the region of Maradi where Muslim and pagan Hausa co-exist, the Muslims are called "men of dress" (*'yan riga*), while the pagans are characterized by a skin loin-dress (Nicolas 1975 : 32). Further, the gown has no intrinsic rapport with Fulbe-ness, because many pastoral Fulbe have not worn Muslim robes until recently, preferring short practical clothes for their works or even "a loin-covering of cow-hide or antelope skin" (Brackenbury 1924 : 216). This suggests that it is incorrect to discuss the Fulbeization of maccube, since the so-called Fulbe system of slavery does not exist for Fulbe ethnic interests, but for Islam. The ethnic assimilation of maccube is contradictory to the Islamic system of slavery whose *raison d'être* consists of the integration of slaves of non-Muslim origin into the Islamic world. If a maccudo is assimilated into the society and culture of his master, this latter's world is a not Fulbe one, but an Islamic one.

To gain a precise understanding of the Islamic social structure which was installed by the Fulbe jihads in Adamawa, it is necessary to distinguish between the following concepts: *haabe* (sing. *kaado*); *maccube* (sing. *maccudo*) or *horbe* (sing. *kordo*) for women; *riimaybe* (sing. *diimaajo*); *rimbe* (sing. *dimo*), as shown in Figure 1.

Firstly, the distinction between the *haabe* and the *maccube* is very important. The *haabe* are non-Muslim or pagan, while the *maccube* are Muslims (*juulbe*). Though their position is peripheral and they are in the novice stage of becoming veritable Muslims, the *maccube* constitute an integral part of the Islamic world constructed during the jihads, together with the *riimaybe* (freed captives) and the *rimbe* (free people). Therefore the *maccube* feel shame if they are called *haabe*. But *maccube* are often proud to be so, especially in the case of the royal ones, for it means that they are members of the political core of an Islamic community. The concept of *maccube* can not be compared to the Western concept of slave. It is rather close to the English concept of servant, as this term is employed in phrases like "Her ma-




Figure 1. Islamic Social Categories at Rey-Buuba

jesty's most obedient and very humble servant."

The distinction between the concepts of *maccuɓe* and *riimayɓe* is important for understanding the dynamic character of the Islamic system of slavery, which promotes the Islamic assimilation of *maccuɓe*. The *riimayɓe* are freed captives or slaves and men of free status, though scholars have often mistaken the concept of *riimayɓe* with that of "slave" (for example, Riesman 1974). The category of freed slaves or captives (*riimayɓe*) does not exist in the tribal systems of slavery, because slaves or captives in the non-Islamic pagan societies change their status when they are assimilated into their master's ethnicity or lineage system (cf. Miers and Kopytoff 1977). But in the Islamic slavery system, freed captives cannot be assimilated into their masters' ethnicity, because the Islamic system of slavery does not seek the ethnic assimilation of captives. They instead must remain as freed captives (*riimayɓe*). From an ethnic perspective, they are segregated from their master's world, but Islamically-speaking, they are assimilated into the Islamic world to which their master belongs and where they can gain high status.

#### 4. Detribalization of *Maccuɓe* through Inter-Ethnic Marriage and Divorce

The ethnic foundations of the *maccuɓe* were also minimized by a particular kind of matrimonial system related to the Islamic system of slavery. First, inter-ethnic marriage is almost institutionalized under the Islamic system of slavery, because children begotten by a captive woman (*kordo*, pl. *horɓe*) are officially owned by her master, and female children of captives may be given to the *laamiido*, who is their master. Some work at the palace as his servants, while others become his concubines or legitimate wives when they beget children. Most of the female captives given to the *laamiido* are also distributed among his male captives, for the master also bears responsibility for the marriages of his captives. Consequently, most *maccuɓe* dignitaries, who can receive this gift as a reward for the services they render to the *laamiido*, possess more than four wives, sometimes as many as ten. And, this almost institutionalized form of polygamy offers in its turn more occasions for inter-ethnic marriage; for marriages among individuals of same ethnicity are extremely rare at Rey-Buuba. As I mentioned earlier, the royal family of the Fulbe have become the most ambiguous peoples in their ethnicity through the same system, because the chiefs of Rey-Buuba have repeatedly intermarried with local, non-Fulbe women and have chosen their heirs from among sons begotten by non-Fulbe women (Mohammadou 1979 : 326; Strümpel 1980 : 112)<sup>9</sup>.

Divorce is also extremely frequent. Generally, even those who are now monogamous have experienced many marriages and divorces. It is not rare to find

9) Last remarks that Sokoto was attentive to matrimonial policy in order to avoid racial stratification (Last 1974 : 24-25). To my surprise, polygamy and divorce are very rare in the Inner Delta area of the Niger. Marriage is strongly endogamous in comparison with that in Cameroon. But I do not know whether this tradition comes from the Diina system of Massina or is only a recent phenomenon.



those who have divorced more than ten times. Children who grow up in this kind of matrimonial environment cannot remain attached to one ethnicity. They live not only with many step-mothers (*yaadikko*) of different ethnic origins, but also frequently with their own mothers who often divorce and remarry.


With this particular kind of matrimonial life, the ethnic identity of the maccube has also become extremely ambiguous. It is not possible for them to identify their ethnicity by tracing their agnatic genealogies. Ethnicity thus identified is however of little importance in their social life. What is important is firstly whether they are maccube baaba or not; sometimes, some are maccube of other princes or even of maccube dignitaries; and secondly, which offices they occupy in the maccube system, for example, as ward head (*hooreejo*) or archer (*bigawla*). And when they are addressed by others, each is called by the name of the office he occupies, or by the general name *jaagord'o* (notable).

There are really no other perplexing questions for the maccube than to ask them to which ethnic group they belong. They sometimes respond that they are Fulbe without any intention of camouflaging their real ethnic names, simply because it is so difficult and boring for them to explain their complicated ethnicity to foreigners. It is also because foreigners easily confuse them with Fulbe due to their appearance which is often much more dignified than that of the Fulbe. For example, one of my friends of maccube status who worked as a secretary of the laamiido came and asked me, one day, to lend him my mirror. He wanted to know whether he really resembled a prince, since he was so often mistaken as such. Indeed, the maccube baaba need not pretend to be Fulbe. It is not at all shameful for them to be maccube, because they are the numerically and politically dominant inhabitants of the capital city of the lamidate of Rey-Buuba.

##### 5. Political and Spatial Structure of Rey-Buuba as an Islamic Super-Ethnic Center

Politically speaking, Rey-Buuba may be described as a town of the laamiido and his captives (maccube baaba). They administer this capital city and the Fulbe are almost excluded from the system, except for a few religious offices such as *alkaali* (judge) and *liman* (imam, responsible for the mosque). Besides, the office of *alkaali* which has political significance has been entrusted to eminent *moodibbe* (learned men) who originated outside Rey-Buuba. The highest military office (*sarki yaaki*) has also been occupied by maccube dignitaries.

This maccube baaba's dominant administrative function is most clearly illustrated by the system of wards (*fattude*), which were originally constituted as the administrative and military units for the capital of the lamidate and have also functioned as labor units for the laamiido's fields. Their offices, which are comprised of a head (*hoore yolnde* or *hoore yunde*), a chief of archers (*bigawla*) and a chief of shielders (*kacalla*) and an auxiliary (*gammbaara*), are principally occupied by maccube dignitaries. The population of the city is actually divided into 26 *fattude* (see Map 3), which fall roughly into three types, as follows: 1) functionally organized maccube wards, whose heads are called *hoore yunde* or *yolnde* (head of gate); 2)



Map 3. Rey-Buuba City

ethnically organized maccube wards, whose heads are simply called *hoore* (head); and 3) wards for peoples of free status, whose heads are called *jawro* (chief in Fulfulde) or *sarki* (chief in Hausa) (see Table 2). But the Fulbe do not have independent wards, being included in the wards of the *hoore yolnde*. The number of the third kind of ward is only three, being comprised of wards of Hausa, blacksmiths, and griots. Because the Hausa had been forbidden to live in the lamidate, their ward was only created recently. The ward system of Rey-Buuba city is therefore mainly constituted by the first two kinds of maccube wards.

The two kinds of royal maccube are, however, separated under this residential system. First, are the royal maccube in the strict sense. They are organized into non-ethnic and functional wards of *hoore yunde* and perform diverse functions—from that of simple gate keepers to ministerial work. Since they are profoundly involved in the administration of the lamidate, they can be seen as the “functionaries” of the lamidate and as the most detribalized among the maccube. Second, are the maccube who are organized into ethnically-divided wards of *hoore* and are equally royal maccube, but have no precisely determined function. This ethnically based

Wards of <i>Hoore yunde</i> (Functionally Organized Wards)		Wards of <i>Hoore</i> (Ethnically Organized Wards)		Wards of Free Status People	
Sifakaare	83	Dama groups		Kila (blacksmith)	14
Goonga Sabi	19	Ndoro	20	Wammbaaɓe (griots)	19
Funden	10	Godi	11	Hausa	13
Jaga	17	Aray	9		
Wawoobe	17				
Biɓɓe—Hoɓe I	9	Mono group	19		
Biɓɓe—Hoɓe II	13				
Allaɓeddi	6	Mbum groups			
Damngal	5	Ndokutaawo	7		
Bigawla Jabbo	4	Mai Kude	19		
Doogari	9	Mbere	7		
Domaayo	28				
Waynaabe	18	Laka group	15		
Muusa Hurso	37				
		Duru group			
		Sasa	8		
		Kasala J.	15		
		Son	11		
		Bogga	4		
		Kali group	5		
Total	291	Total	150	Total	46

Table 2. Number of Households in Rey-Buuba by Ward, Ethnicity and Clan

residential arrangement enables them to maintain their nominal ethnicity, while their political position is less important than the maccube of the first category.

The spatial structure of the city reflects the dominant political position of the detribalized maccube in Rey-Buuba city. They occupy the center of the city around the royal palace, while the Fulbe and other peoples of free status (except for the laamiido and a few religious officers such as the alkaali and the liman) are excluded from this area. More precisely, the central circle around the palace as well as the sides of the city's six gates (yolnde or yunde) are occupied mainly by the royal maccube of the first category who inhabit the non-ethnic wards. The other royal maccube who live in the ethnic wards occupy the second concentric circle zone. This residential pattern is not accidental, for official houses are prepared specifically for the maccube of the first category around the palace and the city's gate sides. The most peripheral zone is mainly for the population of free status including the riimaybe, except near the strategically important sides of the city's gate. There is even a quarter for the settled Fulbe (Wuro Tuppe), created specifically for the descendants of the half brothers of Buuba Djidda, located outside the city walls. This residential set-up further confirms that the lamidate was founded by a small family of Fulbe rather than the Fulbe as an ethnic group.

Finally, the Mbororo, who some regard as Fulbe of the purest and most traditional livelihood, live in the bush with their herds. They are viewed as foreigners to city life and also as nominal Muslims. Other conquered indigenous agriculturalist peoples who live in the nearby provinces of the lamidate have also maintained their traditional beliefs and lives and are still viewed as haabe (heathen). Thus certainly, all the peoples included in the lamidate of Rey-Buuba are not detribalized, but the center of the lamidate is dominated by the laamiido and his maccube, all of whose ethnic identity has become extremely ambiguous. Politically less important peoples with clearer ethnic identities live far away from this political center. This structure (summarily depicted in Figure 2) is also found in the other sub-emirates of Adamawa, and it is why almost all European explorers, from Barth to Froelich via Mizon, Von Morgen, even André Gide, who could directly observe the Fulbe states, were surprised by the ethnic amalgamation dominating their political centers.

### III. Sedentarization of the Fulbe and its Socio-Economic Implications

#### 1. "Liberation" of the Fulbe from Pastoralism

The formation of an Islamic super-ethnic center is more fundamentally related to the sedentarization of the Fulbe and the socio-economic "transformations" that subsequently took place. In Rey-Buuba, most Fulbe entered into a settled life after the jihad, which is remarkably different from that of the pastoral Fulbe, particularly the Mbororo (who are still observable around Rey-Buuba city). The most fundamental difference between their livelihoods is the "liberation" of the settled Fulbe from pastoral work. Most settled Fulbe still remain emotionally attached to pastoral life and often possess many head of cattle; sometimes they possess as




Figure 2. Socio-Political Structure of Rey-Buuba

**Table 3.** Herd Size of Settled Fulbe and Mbororo in Rey-Buuba  
 n = number of households (total 156)  
 (Source: Centre Zootechnique et Vétérinaire de Rey-Buuba 1980)

	Herd Sizes	10-29	30-49	50-99	100-149	150-199	200+	Total
Mbororo	n =	19	18	27	11	8	3	86
		20%	21%	31%	13%	9%	4%	100%
Settled Fulbe	n =	14	13	29	10	2	2	70
		20%	17%	41%	14%	3%	3%	100%

many as the Mbororo (Table 3). But they simply own them and rarely attend to work in the pasture, leaving their herds with younger members of their own families or hired herdsmen. The latter may receive as their annual pay one or two young bulls or heifers as well as the milk produced by the herd every day. Instead the settled Fulbe find work as traders, farmers, or Qur'anic teachers; sometimes they engage in all three occupations.

This means that the settled Fulbe have entered into a more complicated socio-economic system than pastoralism, characterized firstly by the formation of an agro-pastoral complex. They no longer base their livelihood on the milk of their own cows which are often in the bush, far away from their villages. Hence they must engage in agriculture or employ maccube as agricultural laborers so that they have become the most active developers of flood plains in many regions.

This agro-pastoral complex is however only one part of a more comprehensive division of labor which was established following the Adamawa jihad. The Fulbe themselves are not very enthusiastic about cultivating the soil, preferring to give this work to their maccube or others. One explanation for this is that the Fulbe are not physically adapted to such work. But another more positive explanation for this is that settled Fulbe prefer other more profitable or honorable works such as trade and the clergy. Nowadays, for example, in Rey-Buuba almost one-half of the settled Fulbe who possess more than thirty head of cattle are *mallum'en* (teachers) (Table 4).<sup>10</sup> While weaving has been regarded as the work of caste-like people, tailoring and selling clothes is respected; as noted earlier, the culture of clothes is intimately related to Islam. This suggests that after the jihad in Adamawa, the Fulbe developed and entered the secondary (manufacturing) and tertiary (services) categories of production, leaving the works of primary production to others: animal production among the pastoral Fulbe and agriculture among the maccube. The jihads provoked such a dynamic integration of many primary modes of production, particularly pastoralism and agriculture, that a new market-industrial economy, related to Islam, was adopted in the rural areas which had been

10) The actual number of *mallum'en* among the settled Fulbe may be higher than this rate, because there are many other *mallum'en* who have less than thirty head of cattle.

**Table 4.** Number of Mallums, El Hajj and ardo'en in Rey-Buuba by Size of Herd  
(Source: Centre Zootechnique et Vétérinaire de Rey-Buuba, 1980)

Sizes of Herds	Mbororo'en ardo/El Haji/mallum'en n=84			Sedentarized Fulbe El Haji/mallum'en n=70	
200					1
150-199		1		1	1
100-149	1	5		1	3
50- 99	2	4	2	3	8
30- 49	1	2	1		2
10- 29			1		1
Total	4	12	4	5	16

dominated by a subsistence kind of economy. Thus there emerged a new kind of society with an essentially heterogeneous character or "organic solidarity," from which settled Fulbe gained their new identity.

## 2. "Liberation" of Settled Fulbe Men from Pastoralist Marital Strategies

Sedentarization had major consequences for the Fulbe system of marriage. Settled Fulbe men can marry more easily with non-Fulbe women than the pastoral Fulbe, because their wives no longer need specialized knowledge and techniques necessary for pastoral life. Only the girls who have been trained appropriately from their childhood can become the wives of pastoralists. As a result, pastoral Fulbe, especially Mbororo, tend not to marry outside their group, and they maintain purer Fulbe physical traits. But since the settled Fulbe no longer need wives trained for pastoralism, inter-ethnic marriages are easier to practice. In a general way, sedentarism "liberated" the settled Fulbe from having to marry pastoral women. This process also conforms to the Islamic way of life, in which women's modesty is desirable. The Muslim women should not engage in work as among the pastoral Mbororo women who must go to villages to sell sour milk or butter<sup>11)</sup>. They had better refrain from exposing their figures in public, and in fact in Rey-Buuba women usually stay in an enclosed compound, with maccube or horbe (female slaves) to work conduct their business for them outside the compound. Islam as well has made it easier for settled Fulbe men to marry non-Fulbe women: Islam promotes marriages across ethnic boundaries.

## 3. The "Liberation" of Fulbe Cattle from Their Role as Immobile "Capital"

The "liberation" of the Fulbe from full-fledged pastoralism is related to that of

11) This is one of the questions seriously discussed among Fulbe scholars at Sokoto including Sheikh Uthman himself (Last 1974 : 24).

cattle from their role as immobile "capital." This finally explains why the Fulbe and not other peoples became the main supporters of the Fulbe jihads.

Though pastoralists have been often regarded as "invaders" or "thieves" in arid areas, their economic capacity is remarkable, firstly, by reason of their high capacity of transport, and secondly by reason of the high commercial value of cattle which they produce. Here I must give emphasis to the latter reason. Cattle now have a high economic value and are considered as among the most important exports of the sub-Saharan countries. In Cameroon, one can even buy a car with cows. (A cow sells at more than 10,000 francs CFA by head.) If one has over thirty head of cattle, the minimum herd size for pastoralism, one has extremely important property that traditional African cultivators cannot gain. Merchants of cattle are among the richest in sub-Saharan Africa.

It is however well known that African pastoralists have not willingly adopted commercial pastoralism, instead preferring to accumulate their cattle. Economic developers have often remarked that this "irrational" and "sentimental" attitude of pastoralists toward cattle is one of the main obstacles to the modernization of pastoral society. This is because cattle has served for them as a kind of fixed capital. First it is the "capital" from which they produce milk which constitutes their main source of income. Further, large herds are also necessary in the event of famine or other critical occasions, which frequently attack African pastoralists living under not very favorable conditions. Cattle also has social and ritual significance. Fulbe do not like to kill their cattle, except for ceremonial occasions, and few Fulbe are butchers. Thus, the "cattle complex" as discussed by Herskovits (1926) for East African pastoral peoples is found to some extent among the pastoral Fulbe<sup>12</sup>). Cattle therefore is rarely an object of simple economic speculation among the pastoral Fulbe.

With Fulbe sedentarization, cattle were however transformed into mobile capital, because the settled Fulbe ceased to depend directly on pastoralism. They have other sources of income and, being integrated to a wider Islamic super-ethnic society, their social and cultural life depends less on cattle. Thus, settled Fulbe can much more freely dispose of their cattle, since they no longer have regard for traditional ethnic restrictions resulting from pastoralism.

Cattle thus "liberated" from its former role became in its turn the main economic "capital" with which many settled Fulbe could start new businesses such as trader, Islamic work, tailor and so on. For instance, becoming a mallum (teacher) requires some investment, for students must commit themselves to learning for a long time without working. In Rey-Buuba, they say that when a young

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12) Dupire writes: "Le bétail en effet n'est pas nécessairement une valeur économique transférée dans un seul sens, il peut être utilisé sous des formes multiples—sacrifices, cession complète ou partielle à l'une ou l'autre des quatre parties du contrat, don fictif symbolique etc. —et recouvrir des fonctions diverses" (Dupire 1970 : 25). See also Hopen (1958 : 23).



man wants to become mallum, he must pay at least three head of cattle, in addition to providing labor to his master. The work of tailor also is only possible for those with capital; for the price of a sewing machine surpasses the economic capacity of the average African individual.

#### 4. Formation of "Islamic Cattle Complex"

More fundamentally cattle became the socio-political "capital" with which the settled Fulbe created an Islamic super-ethnic society. Cattle was too valuable to sell for simple economic items. Its value was so great that it was converted into human value, for instance, slaves in the 19th century<sup>13</sup>). First of all there were few material objects corresponding to the value of cattle, except for horses, clothes and imported rare articles. The Fulbe used their cattle to their political advantage. Before and during the jihad, the Fulbe of Adamawa established in this way numerous amical relations with local indigenous non-pastoral peoples. As mentioned earlier, with cattle they obtained slaves, or wives or grazing rights from local pagan peoples. Later, they used cattle to assert their political domination over them, or they gave cattle to reconcile with their former enemies.

As among pastoralist peoples, we can thus note the equally political and sociological manipulation of cattle developed among the settled Fulbe. But in this case, it is practiced within a framework of wider Islamic super-ethnic relations, including a market economy in such a way as to destroy the inner social solidarity of this pastoralist society. In some respects, it can be said that an "Islamic cattle complex" is now found among the settled Fulbe.

#### 5. The Position of the Ruling Fulbe in the Islamic Cattle Complex

Especially in the past, cattle was important for relations between Yola and its vassal chiefs of the sub-emirates. It is well known from H. Barth (1965: v. 2, 191) that the sub-emirates of Adamawa would send many slaves to Yola as tribute. Though scholars are apt to cite only this passage, Barth also notes that they would send much cattle to Yola. Oral traditions confirm this (Mohammadou 1979: 12). The slaves and cattle were sent to Yola as the Islamic religious tax, *zakat* (*jakka* in Fulfulde), to pay to the religious authority. This has been and is even now paid in cattle, not in grain<sup>14</sup>). Moreover, it has been a primary source of revenue for the treasury of the sub-emirates, more important than taxes in the form of crops. For instance, in 1948 Ngaoundéré sub-emirate obtained 3,051 head of cattle as *jakka*, while the revenue from crops was only the equivalent of 350 head of cat-

13) See for example, Barth (1965: vol. 2, 193), Passarge (1895: 96), Chevalier (1908: 357). Cattle had a currency-like value. Documents from inheritance cases in the court of Ngaoundéré in the beginning of this century show that highly valuable objects such as captives and horses were all given value in cattle. For instance, one servant was valued at two head of cattle, while one old woman servant was worth one head of cattle (Froelich 1954: 61).

tle (Froelich 1954 : 50). Cattle therefore has occupied a crucial position in the newly established Islamic society resulting from the Fulbe jihads and can be considered, even today, as perhaps constituting the political and religious foundation of this society. Although the Fulbe consider the *jangali* tax on their cattle as illegitimate they are more willing to pay jakka, in order to fulfill their Islamic obligations.

They say that it is not to the laamiido, but to the poor that they give their cattle as jakka. The laamiido is only the intermediary for the circulation of this gift. But it is true that he has the effective right to demand jakka from the Fulbe and the power to collect it through the system of maccuße baaba. In this sense there is a tension between the Fulbe and the government of the laamiido. Nevertheless, the Fulbe consider the laamiido as the legitimate intermediary, because he is not a mere Fulbe ethnic chief, but their Muslim chief, therefore a kind of *amir al-mu'minin*.

It is therefore not correct to regard the Fulbe Islamic states as simple predatory states whose economic foundations have been provided by the labor of slaves or the selling of the slaves itself. This kind of discussion ignores the role that Fulbe cattle played as the socio-economic and religious foundation of the Fulbe Islamic states. In this sense, cattle constitutes an "Islamic cattle complex" in the system of the Fulbe Islamic states.

## Conclusion

Based on the case of Rey-Buuba, this paper has attempted to show the meaning of the Fulbe jihads, within their own contexts. Religion in particular is not a simple matter of consciousness or a simple theological matter. It affects the people's way of life. The Fulbe jihads largely affected the lives of the peoples concerned, especially that of the Fulbe "conquerors" themselves.

The Fulbe jihads are therefore best comprehended as a dialectical movement among the Fulbe conquerors who have played the role of *avant-garde* for the construction of an Islamic world. In it, they changed their identity, not only in their religious consciousness, but also in their socio-economic life. In a word, their way of life has changed from a pre-Islamic nomadic one to an Islamic settled one.

These socio-economic changes can be subsumed under three kinds of "liberation" for the Fulbe. The first and second are those of themselves from pastoral works and having to marry their compatriot women, and the third is that of their own cattle from their role as immobile capital. Their future life depends on how they can continue to use the liberated cattle to their advantage, that is, how they can retain their dominant status, and assert themselves as members of the new Islamic world in their region which began with the jihads.

The identity of settled Fulbe is nowadays very different from that of pastoral

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14) Regarding the precise rate of the jakka on cattle, see Mohammadou (1980 : 103ff.), Dognin (1981 : 152-153). The term *'ushr*, which is non-Qur'anic, seems to have been generally employed to designate the tax on cereals (Gardet 1981 : 83).

Fulbe, particularly the Mbororo. The two groups should not be viewed, however, as having different origins. They can rather be considered as groups that have differentiated from each other in a vertical manner, in terms of their occupational specializations, particularly with the sedentarization of the pastoralists. During horizontal differentiation, the groups remained pastoral. In the former case, they changed more radically, some becoming merchants, others Islamic teachers or functionaries, and even kings, to name a few.

In this way, the pastoral Fulbe have tried, I suppose, to adapt to the complexities of the world surrounding them. Certainly, this is a tendency which has accelerated during the process of modernization, which itself has led many Mbororo pastoralists to settle. However, this tendency began long before the coming of colonialism, and the Fulbe jihads can be comprehended as its first political manifestation. This suggests that the socio-economic situation in sub-Saharan Africa had already become so mature and precarious by the 18th and 19th centuries that Fulbe pastoralists could not maintain their traditional way of life any longer. The Islamic wars were thus launched as a means of creating a new way of life and social order so as to reorganize the existing tribal world into a new wider super-ethnic and more market-oriented world. This process occurred even at Rey-Buuba, a remote savanna region situated in the most peripheral zone of the Sokoto Caliphate, and an Islamic state was founded by an ardo, a traditional Fulbe chief.

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