

みんなくりポジトリ

国立民族学博物館学術情報リポジトリ National Museum of Ethnology

Sharing, Money and Modern Inuit Subsistence : Obligation and Reciprocity at Clyde River, Nunavut

メタデータ	言語: eng 出版者: 公開日: 2009-04-28 キーワード (Ja): キーワード (En): 作成者: ジョージ, ウェンゼル メールアドレス: 所属:
URL	https://doi.org/10.15021/00002845

Sharing, Money, and Modern Inuit Subsistence: Obligation and Reciprocity at Clyde River, Nunavut

GEORGE W. WENZEL
McGill University

FOCUS AND SETTING

... a subsistence economy is a highly specialized mode of production and distribution of not only goods and services, but of social forms [LONNER 1980: 5]

Few aboriginal societies possess so overarching an image as prototypical large game hunter-foragers as do the Inuit¹⁾ (see, for instance, Watanabe [1978]). Beginning with Boas's early work on Baffin Island [1888], the primacy of wildlife has dominated virtually all discussion of Inuit ecologic and economic adaptation. Moreover, until relatively recently, the main focus of Inuit subsistence research has concerned itself principally with the methodology of hunting, man-environment bioenergetic exchange, and the basic quantification and econometrics of modern harvest production. Much less apparent, especially in the literature on Canadian Inuit, is any significant remark, beyond broad statements about generalized reciprocity as "characteristic" of Inuit band formations, about the socioeconomic relations of Inuit subsistence—that is how (1) the allocation of labor and materiel to hunting and (2) the distribution of traditional products from hunters to consumers were, and are now, structured.

An important exception to this situation is the work of Damas. While principally concerned with Central Eskimo social and environmental relations [1963, 1969a, b, 1971, 1972a], Damas also was aware of a lack of any extensive treatment of food sharing as an aspect of Inuit subsistence. As a result, he [1972b] carried out a comprehensive three society ethnographic overview of Copper, Netsilik and Iglulik Eskimo sharing practices, in which he focused on the role of social organization as a facilitator in the distribution of harvest products, definitively establishing the primacy of social relations, most notably as expressed through kinship, in Inuit resource allocation. This work, in turn, stimulated Wenzel's [1981, 1995] research on the social organization and material pattern of resource sharing among East Baffin Inuit, albeit with the distribution of traditional food products (*niqi/niqituinnak*²⁾) still the central focus of this work. It is the "modern" element of Inuit *ningiqtuq*, or sharing, specifically of non-traditional

resources—including money, that will be the focus this paper.

The geographical, cultural, and socioeconomic provenience for this discussion is the Nunavut³) community of Clyde River (*Kangiqlugaapik* [70°27'N., 68°36'W.]), a village of approximately 800 Inuit and 25 Euro-Canadians, on the east coast of Baffin Island (see Fig. 1). While the Clyde Inuit are typically categorized as members of the Baffinland (or southern Baffin) Eskimo grouping [KEMP 1984], the majority of the community, in local dialect, social organization and dietary practice, may be more appropriately seen as belonging to the northern regional sub-group of the Iglulik Eskimo (see Mary-Rousseliere [1984]).

Presently, Clyde is unofficially classified by the Nunavut Territory's Department of Sustainable Development (formerly the Northwest Territories Department of Resources, Wildlife and Economic Development), using such informal yardsticks as rate of local wage employment, external economic investment and volume of wildlife harvesting, as being among the most "traditional" villages in the Eastern Canadian Arctic. Further, it is also the case that Inuit in the region have had continuous commercial relations with non-Inuit since 1923, first through the agency of the Hudson's Bay Company and independent fur traders and now with Northern Stores Inc., and that at least sporadic contact and barter with Europeans is traceable to the early nineteenth century [PARRY 1821: 275–287].

Thus, Clyde Inuit have for a considerable time had some measure of access to various imported tools, foods, and raw materials. Despite this long history of economic relations with non-Inuit, however, Clyde Inuit, as correctly judged by Nunavut's economic analysts, still remain critically dependent on local marine and terrestrial fauna, principally ringed seals (*Phoca hispida*), arctic char (*Salvelinus alpinus*), polar bear (*Ursus maritimus*), narwhal (*Monodon monocerus*) and caribou (*Rangifer tarandus*), as their major source of high quality energy and nutrition (see Borré [1990: Appendix 5, Figure V]; Wenzel [1991: 81–82]). These species, together with small amounts of bearded seal and migratory waterfowl, form what may generally be termed the traditional or country food (Inuktitut: *niqui* or *niquituinnak*) component of the Clyde Inuit food system.

At the same time, Clyde hunters, like Inuit in all smaller Nunavut communities, are now conducting their harvesting activities under conditions in which money has become as fully a part of the subsistence environment as food or other natural raw materials. And, while, as Fienup-Riordan [1986: 314] has noted, "... (monetary income) is perceived as the means to accomplish and facilitate the harvest, and not an end in itself", it is the scarcity of money, or at least limitations on access to money, that, as much as weather or prey conditions, presently affect Clyde subsistence relations.

NINGIQTUQ: SHARING AT CLYDE RIVER

What has come to be understood as the traditional socioeconomic system of

sharing is still extensively practiced by the Clyde Inuit. This set of behaviors—which Damas in his essential reconstruction of Central Eskimo food distribution [1972b] termed *ningiq*⁴ and which Wenzel [1991, 1995] refers to as the *ningiqtuq*—has generally come to be seen as a multi-layered strategy by which participants achieve the widest possible intra-community distribution of resources. However, while Damas used *ningiq* to refer only to the social movement of *niqituinnak*, *ningiqtuq* is conceptualized here as a set of socioeconomic operations that also encompass labor and non-traditional resources. (Despite apparent terminological and conceptual differences between Damas and Wenzel, these are more of degree than kind; a more substantive conceptual difference does exist between Wenzel and Smith [1988, 1993], with Smith arguing that sharing functions primarily as a risk reducing mechanism while Wenzel [1995] suggests that the structure of *ningiqtuq* relations provides to individuals and/or households social means to optimize resource access). Throughout the remainder of the present discussion, *ningiqtuq* will be used to denote as the process for the sharing of resources.

Damas [1972b], in his ethnographic reconstruction, correctly viewed country food as the central good or commodity circulating within the pre-contact sharing system. By the early 1970s, however, informant data and observation of *ningiqtuq* practice at Clyde River clearly showed that the material scope of the system had expanded to include a number of introduced foods, notably sugar, flour and tea, with these considered by informants as being “Inuit foods” (see also Brody [1975]). Moreover, since the 1983 European Union sealskin boycott, substantial items of technology, such as snowmobiles and motorized boats, have become subject to sharing. In other particulars, especially the social organization of *ningiqtuq*, Damas and Wenzel closely coincide.

THE SYSTEM IN OUTLINE

The *ningiq* food sharing framework outlined by Damas [1972b] for the Iglulik Inuit of northern Foxe Basin almost exactly describes the food allocation component of the Clyde Inuit *ningiqtuq* system. Likewise, a strong partial correspondence can be seen between the Clyde system and aspects of Netsilik Eskimo (Damas [1972b], see also Balikci [1964]; Kishigami [1994]) food sharing. Absent, however, from the Clyde system (and that of the Iglulingmiut [DAMAS 1969a, 1972b]) is any mechanism functionally analogous to the *piqatigiit* and *niqaturvigiiit* seal sharing partnerships detailed by Damas [1972b: 223, 228], respectively, for the Copper (also see Collings et al [1998: 305]) and Netsilik Eskimos (see Balikci [1964]; Van de Velde [1956]). In these partnership systems, a hunter distributed the meat from his catch among a named set of partners, each of whom was identified by the seal part involved; thus, among the Copper Eskimo, *taliqatigiik* (flipper partners) always exchanged this specified part.

The main distributional operations that operate at Clyde are shown in Table One. Within these, however, three sets are perceived as primary or “traditional”.⁵

These are: 1) *tugagaujuq*—the transfer of food from a hunter to the head (*isumataq*) of the hunter's restricted *ilagiit*s; 2) *tigutuinnaq*—transfers between *ilagiit* heads and genealogical subordinate *ilagiit* members; 3) *nirriyaktuqtuq* and *minatuq*—transfers between any *ilagiit* head or task group leaders (*angijukak*) and the general community. Regarding these sets, it should be noted that 1 and 2 complement each other. Additionally, several informants noted that *tugagaujuq* sharing was obligatory between a son-in-law and his spouse's parents. Further, the practice of *minatuq*, as an aspect of *nirriyaktuqtuq* or commensal sharing was a matter of minor dispute between informants; likewise, several informants were unsure about the *angijukak* aspect of the third set.

As already noted, the primary distributive operations (noted by various Clyde informants as being "traditional"⁶) are: 1) *tugagaujuq*; 2) *tigutuinnaq*; 3) *nirriyaktuqtuq-minatuq*, as are sets 7 and 8. Regarding these sets, it should be noted that 1 and 2 complement each other and function exclusively within the context of the restricted extended family.

In addition, three kinds of transfers have emerged under modern community conditions. These are: Set 4—between unrelated, cooperating hunters (*uummajusiutiit*); Set 5—between age subordinate hunters and unrelated task group leaders (*angijukak*). Informants perceive both of these forms as recent in origin, i.e. as arising after movement of the region's population to Clyde River (ca. post-1950), noting that physical circumstances for such sharing would have been occasional at best prior to resettlement. Finally, Set 6—generalized distribution of food organized by leaders of focal settlement institutions, notably the Anglican Church, and the community; this last can be reliably dated to 1960 when a permanent Church of England mission was established at Clyde.

One further note on *ningiqtuq* practice at Clyde. While the above forms are

Table One. Clyde Inuit *Ningiqtuq* Interaction Sets

Set Type	Flow Direction	Reference
Traditional ² :	1a. <i>isumataq</i> << <i>ilagiit</i> subordinates	<i>Tugagaujuq</i> ¹
	1b. <i>isumataq</i> >> <i>ilagiit</i> subordinates	<i>tigutuinnaq</i>
	2. father-in-law << son-in-law	<i>tugagaujuq</i> (?)
Modern ³ :	3. <i>isumataq</i> >> community	<i>nirriyaktuqtuq/minatuq</i> (?)
	4. between unrelated hunters	<i>uummajusiutiit</i>
	5. <i>angijukak</i> << unrelated hunters	<i>taliqtuq</i>
Other	6. <i>angijukak</i> >> community	<i>nirriyaktuqtuq</i> (?)
	7. between unrelated young and elders	<i>nalaktuq</i> related
	8. between same generation non-kin; generally among the elderly	inviting in and "gifting"

¹ *Tugagaujuq* and *tigutuinnaq* are complementary and participants are generally seen as being *niqiliriiq* (sharers of food).

² Traditional types correspond to sets 1, 2, 3, in text.

³ Modern types correspond to sets 4, 5, 6

Table Two. Aspects of Clyde Inuit *Ningiqtuq*

Social Context	Behavioral Directive	Form	Description
1a) Individual	<i>Ungayuk</i> (solidarity-affection)	<i>akpallugiiit</i>	inviting in guests (typically same generation non-kin)
1b)	<i>Ungayuk</i>	<i>quaktuaktuq/ niqisutaiyuq/ paiyuktuq</i>	food gifts to close affines and non-kin (generally restricted to elders)
1c)	<i>Ungayuk</i>	<i>niqitadianaq</i>	<i>uummajusiutiit</i> (“partnered” hunters)
2a) Intra- <i>Ilagiiit</i>	<i>Naalaqtuk</i> (respect-obedience)	<i>niqiliriiq</i>	<i>tugagauyuk-tigutuinnaq</i> complementary
2b)	<i>Naalaqtuk</i>	<i>nirriyakuqtuq</i>	restricted commensalism
3a) Inter- <i>Ilagiiit</i> / Community	<i>Ungayuk</i>	<i>nirriyakuqtuq</i>	open commensalism
3b)	<i>Ungayuk</i>	<i>minaqtuq</i>	distribution of stored food
3c)	<i>Naalaqtuk</i>	<i>katujiyuk</i>	within task group

generally structured through kinship, such as in *tugagaujuq-tigutuinnaq* transfers, or cooperative participation in a hunt, as in modern operations 5 and 6, it also appears that age relations (see Table Two: 1a and 1b) can have some importance in food allocation.

Both observational and informant data indicate that younger individuals are under some obligation to “share” with older members of the community with whom they have no geneological connection, but, because of age difference, to whom they are nonetheless *naalaqtuq*. Such transfers usually involved infirmed elders or widows who lacked other sources of support. In addition, transfers of food, either through the medium of “gifts” or through specific invitation to participate in a meal, also commonly occurred between older persons.

The former practice seems, at least in part, to relate to the behavioral demands of *naalaqtuk*, or the respect-obedience relationship that exists between in a kin terminological superior-subordinate relationship [DAMAS 1963: 48]; thus, it would appear that *naalaqtuk* encompasses not only geneological, but also chronological, interpersonal relations. In the case of the second type of sharing noted above, that is transfers between individuals in the same generation, the basis seems to be “friendship”. Structurally, Damas [1963: 48] terms such bonds as having their basis in *ungayuk*, that is affection; Wenzel [1995] sees such affective relations as also being produced by shared life experience, most notably among aged members of the community who represent a generation whose numbers have dwindled over time.

As Table Two shows, food sharing at Clyde is a multi-level system that encompasses within it social relations ranging from the action that occurs between paired isolates (as in *akpallugiiit*) to means that effectively span the entire community (*minaqtuq*). And while *ningiqtuq*, as practiced today by Clyde Inuit,

includes aspects related to the changed pattern of settlement that came about through Canadian government centralization policies in the 1950s and 1960s, the organization of system remains based on traditional principles of, foremost, kinship and, second, intra-generational solidarity.

Operational Examples

In functional terms, the greatest sharing activity in terms of social focus occurs within the restricted extended family context. Within the *ilagiit* essentially all members are in a *niqiliriiq* (literally, “those who share food”) relationship. And it is within the *ilagiit* that the *naalaqtuk* (Damas’ [1963: 48] respect-obedience dyad, but which may be conceptualized as responsibility-obligation [WENZEL 1981: 83–85]) directive that structures intergenerational/interpersonal behavior is most apparent.

Naalaqtuk, as an effector of sharing within the extended family, is found most obviously in the *tugagaujuq* component of *niqiliriiq* relations. This aspect of *ningiqtuq* is best described as the upward movement of resources from genealogical subordinate extended family members to the head of the social unit, usually the oldest consanguinally related male, but occasionally the *isumataq* role may be held by a genealogically superior woman (for example, the widow of a leader in the absence of a male of sufficient sociocultural stature). In practical terms, the output from the hunting activity of younger family members is deposited at the residence and/or community freezer locker of the *ilagiit* leader whereupon it becomes “common property”.

Tigutuinnaq is the complement of this “upward” flow and is the most direct mechanism through which subordinate members of an *ilagiit* access the unit’s now common pool of resources. It, in effect, reverses the flow of resources by virtue of the responsibility imposed upon a family leader by *naalaqtuk* to ensure the welfare of his/her *ilagiit*. *Tigutuinnaq* activity, except under dire circumstances, is restricted to *ilagiit* and any core member can freely draw from this “store” depending on product availability and household or individual need.

Whereas *tugagaujuk-tigutuinnaq* activities function almost wholly within the social context of the extended family, as Tables One and Two indicate, mechanisms for the more generalized distribution of food resources are also present. Chief among these is *nirriyaktuqtuq*, or communal meal. Such commensalism may be restricted to the *ilagiit*, particularly when resources are scarce,⁷⁾ or may include a large segment of the community. In either circumstance, communal meals are always held in, or immediately adjacent to, the dwelling of the hosting extended family head.

There are two main differences between “restricted”/intra-*ilagiit* and “open”/community commensal meals. When a meal is intended for family, word is circulated directly to the expected participants, today usually by telephone. Open meals, which may involve upward of 100 participants and last for several hours, are however publicly announced, ideally by the children or grandchildren of the host

acting as “town criers” or, as happens frequently today, by announcement over the community radio. The other difference between the two sub-types is in the disposition of surplus food. After a restricted *nirriyaktuqtuq*, any uneaten food is left for later consumption by the host and his household, while any remains from an open meal, which may be substantial if participation is low, are generally taken away by attendees.

NINGIQTUQ AS GENERALIZED RECIPROCITY

Damas, following from his analysis of Central Eskimo *ningiq*, concluded that Sahlins [1965] proposition that kinship ties between givers and receivers of shared items “... direct reciprocity towards the generalized pole” [DAMAS 1972b: 238] was incorrect. Rather, while most sharing types, like intra-*ilagiit ningiq* and various extra-extended family practices (to include *nirriyaktuqtuq*/commensal meals, *paiyuktuq*/gifting and *akpaallugit*/"inviting-in") conformed closely to Sahlins's concept of generalized reciprocity [DAMAS 1972b: 237], a number of practices—notably Netsilik and Copper Eskimo seal sharing partnerships-exemplified balanced reciprocal relations.

Wenzel [1995] agreed with Damas about the generalized character of Inuit commensal and other “beyond the *ilagiit*” practices. He was, however, less confident than Damas about the generalized nature of *niqiliriiq* sharing among *ilagiit* members. In his analysis of this form of sharing, Wenzel noted [WENZEL 1995: 55] that the *tugagaujuq-tigutuinnaq* subsystem, while ensuring equal access to food to all within the *ilagiit*, also had, because of contributory differences between participants, the long-term potential to become unbalanced. Thus, he [WENZEL 1995: 56] concluded that it was the multi-layered character of *ningiqtuq*, with its more visible commensal and other “open” forms overlaying the (externally) less visible balanced exchange occurring within *ilagiit*, that contributed to the overall appearance of systemic generalized reciprocal relations.

NON-FOOD RESOURCES: FROM NINGIQTUQ TO DEMAND SHARING

... in the Baffin Inuit economy ... cash has become as fully a part of the resource environment as food or other natural raw materials [WENZEL 1986]

Damas's analysis of *ningiqtuq*, having been developed through ethnographic reconstruction, was concerned exclusively with the sharing of traditional foods. While he [DAMAS 1972b: 238] did note, however, that among the three Central Eskimo societies included in his reconstruction limited inter-societal exchange of scarce non-food items (for instance, the trading of musk-ox horn and caribou hides by Netsilik Eskimo to the more marine-oriented Iglulingmiut) did occur, information about the sharing of resources other than food is sparse. For the most

part, when the matter of property is addressed in the ethnographic literature (see, for instance, Parry [1821: 281]), it is mainly to say that individuals owned their personal hunting and other tools. Further, with regard to imported foods, there is essentially no acknowledgment of southern foods being incorporated into the sharing system, although Wenzel [1995: 52] notes that by the early 1970s items like flour and sugar were situationally distributed among *niqiliriiq* following *ningiqtuq* precepts (but see Collings [1998]). So, while observation of contemporary *ningiqtuq* practice at Clyde [WENZEL 1981, 1991, 1995] confirms the essentials of Damas's reconstruction of the main elements of the Inuit sharing system, the inclusion of equipment and non-traditional foods within *ningiqtuq* relations appears to be much more problematic for sharing between individuals. (It should be noted that Kemp [1971], through his research in the late 1960s, early on demonstrated the material integration of traditional and imported resources in Inuit ecological activities.)

It might nonetheless be assumed that Inuit, because of the existence of a well-established system for the distribution of *niqi* and because of the present importance of snowmobiles and other imported technologies to contemporary Inuit ecological activities, have adapted the *ningiqtuq* system to encompass these new tools. Thus, despite a lack of firm data, it is not unreasonable to posit that *ningiqtuq* now structurally and behaviorally encompasses such items and possibly even the money needed for their acquisition. Further, this supposition can appear to be intuitively supported by the considerable anecdotal data that non-specific questions about sharing elicit from both Inuit and non-Inuit respondents.

Equipment

Early research at Clyde during the 1970s [WENZEL 1981] seemed in fact to suggest that the sharing of snowmobiles, boats, and rifles as a part of *ningiqtuq* relations was the normative case. However, the analysis of more recent data from Clyde, spanning the period 1985–1995, which indicated the emergence of demand sharing of equipment and money between subordinate kinsmen and genealogical superiors within *ilagiit* (Wenzel [1995]; see also Peterson [1993]), prompted a reexamination of the 1970s dataset. The result of this re-evaluation led Wenzel [1995] to conclude that what had been interpreted as the open or general sharing of equipment, and to a degree money, related not to an enlarging of *ningiqtuq* material relations per se, but to the particular economic conditions that prevailed in Clyde between the late 1960s and the mid-1980s.

In brief, the years from circa 1962 to about 1983 were a time when the ability of Clyde hunters to capitalize and maintain the mechanized and other technologies that are now part of the “standard” Inuit hunting outfit was effectively equal to all individuals. Although snowmobiles and the like were expensive even at that time, the general strength and receptiveness of external markets to various byproducts⁸⁾ of Inuit hunting—sealskins, polar bear hides and narwhal ivory—ensured that virtually any physically able hunter could produce the funds needed for their

purchase. In very rapid order, therefore, nearly every adult Clyde hunter came into possession of the tools needed for day-to-day subsistence.

An important effect of this “generalized” access to salable commodities, and thus money for investment in harvesting operations, was the apparent open/general sharing of equipment. In point of fact, however, items, with some exceptions, were more typically borrowed, with temporary “loans” involving both kin and non-kin.

The appearance of a *ningiqtuq*-like sharing of snowmobiles and the like actually relates to the often extended usage that was made of borrowed items, especially ubiquitous items like rifles and sleds. These were commonly used by borrowers for considerable lengths of time, not least because most lenders possessed several sleds and rifles (in 1985, an inventory of hunting equipment in Clyde revealed that one man possessed 21 rifles and three sleds). Larger items, like snowmobiles and motorized canoes, however, were almost always returned to their owners at the immediate conclusion of their use. Furthermore, the relative freedom in the early 1970s that prevailed around equipment, including snowmobiles, is partially indicative of the ability of lenders to put equipment back into operation should it be damaged while in use by a borrower.

The emergence of demand sharing, beginning in the mid to late 1980s, at Clyde, especially given the at least limited openness of temporary “sharing”, requires some explanation. Data collected between 1985 and the mid-1990s indicate that the lending-sharing of large items of equipment, especially between non or only distantly related members of the community, had become considerably reduced. Interviews with Clyde hunters done first in 1988 and repeated in 1991 elicited several perspectives, depending on the respondent’s economic circumstance, about the sharing situation.

In both sets of interviews (n. 24) it was universally voiced that hunters found themselves at a disadvantage in terms of their ability to operate and maintain, let alone purchase, increasingly costly technologies. That this was the case was related by them to several factors: 1) the 1983 collapse of the world market for sealskins (see Malouf [1986]; Wenzel [1991]; also Hovelsrud-Broda [1997]; Lynge [1992]; Nuttall [1990]); 2) increasing regulatory restrictions on other “cash species”.⁹⁾

Beyond this, however, perspectives diverged depending on whether a respondent held full-time or substantial part-time wage employment. Unemployed hunters frequently linked their inability to hunt as frequently as before to the “selfishness” of job holders, whom they saw as having sufficient equipment and/or monetary resources to support “hunters”. This situation seemed to be further exacerbated by the view that these resources were generally underutilized, in terms of hunting, by those who possessed them. Conversely, those with employment, which necessarily limited the time available for hunting, often noted that they were reticent to “share” their resources so that they would be available when opportunities to hunt, usually restricted to weekends and evenings, arose. As has been pointed out [WENZEL 1991], the decade following the European Union

sealskin boycott was one in which hunters became differentiated in terms of having either the time needed to hunt but insufficient equipment (the unemployed) or the cash-equipment resources to do so but too little time (wage workers).

An important consequence of this development was that young adults, the group that most possessed the skills (English literacy, numeracy) required by the expanding wage sector, has found itself under pressure from older kinsmen to provide access to high cost items of hunting equipment. Repeat interviews with a sample of younger Clyde males (n. 17; age range 19–34) done between 1994 and 1996 revealed that 11 participants who either held wage employment or who had made purchases of major equipment during the three survey years had permanently given a major piece of equipment to either a father, older male sibling, other older cognate (usually father's brother), or, in one case, to a father-in-law. While the majority of these transfers involved lesser, if still costly, items like sleds and rifles, for one individual it meant the loss of two snowmobiles (to his father and father-in-law), while for another respondent a \$9,000 outboard engine to his oldest brother. In nearly every case mentioned in the survey, the respondent noted that the "sharing" was initiated by a request from the recipient.

As Wenzel [1995] has noted, the pattern of major equipment sharing that was occurring in Clyde by 1990 indicates a shift from both the *ningiqtuq* and 1970s borrower-lender pattern. Instead, transactions, like those described above, clearly resemble what Peterson [1993] terms demand sharing. Attributes of this recent form are: 1) that transfers are initiated by a direct request from the receiver; 2) the transactions involve resources which receivers are unable to reciprocate at a similar scale. What is also notable about Clyde demand sharing is that it partially maintains a critical structural element that underpins *ningiqtuq* relations—this is the *naalaqtuk* relationship by which subordinate kin are obligated to respond to genealogical and/or terminological superiors. However, the reciprocal complement of this aspect of *naalaqtuk*—concerning the responsibilities of superior kin to younger group members, which is evident in *niqiliriq* sharing—seems to have been abrogated. Thus, where both *ningiqtuq* and borrower-lender activities incorporated within them, as noted by Damas [1972b], an essential reciprocal balance between actors, the demand transfers distinctly disfavor genealogical subordinates.

Thus, the change in the movement of equipment between hunters that developed in Clyde around the mid-1980s appears to have its bases in an increasing differentiation in access to a single critical resource—money—among hunters. Further, this differentiation appears to have catalyzed a shift from more or less open/situational pattern of equipment "sharing" to one of demand or inertial sharing with regard to both equipment and money at Clyde that affects not only relations between non-kin, but also intra-ilagiit relations (see Wenzel [1995: 53–55]). In essence, food distribution at Clyde, both among the extended family *niqiliriq* and generally, continues to conform to the *ningiqtuq* schema despite the economic and temporal constraints that now variously affect participation in

harvesting. Last, it is clear, anecdotal statements aside, that *ningiqtuq* is considerably less operationally flexible with regard to incorporating new material resources.

Money

As the discussion of equipment sharing above suggests, money, if anything, has become, especially since the early 1980s, both the most important resource required by Clyde Inuit for the conduct of ecological activities and even more problematic than equipment in terms of incorporation within *ningiqtuq* relations. It is, therefore, essential to evaluate the position of money in relation to wildlife harvesting activities and to subsistence relations in the larger sense.

As pointed out already, harvester access to money was considerably disrupted by the collapse of the European commercial market for ringed sealskins. In this regard, Wenzel [1989; 1996] (see also Hovelsrud-Broda [1997]; Nuttall [1990] regarding effects in Greenland) has interpreted this market demise to be the signal event marking definitive change in the relationship between Eastern Arctic, and, especially, Baffin, Inuit hunters and money. And, as it may appear that too much significance is being burdened on this one event, it is worth some further elaboration.

While sealskins are generally understood to have been an important item of exchange throughout the history of the fur trade in the Canadian Arctic, in fact, the trade all but disappeared by the late 1940s in the Eastern Arctic when the demand for white fox pelts, the bellwether of the pre-World War II northern fur industry, declined. Over the next decade and a half, Inuit had virtually no local commodity that was much sought by Europeans (see Tester and Kulchyski [1994: 55] regarding relief payments to Inuit between 1941–1950). It was only in the early 1960s [WENZEL 1989, 1991] that sealskins developed commercial value and, thus, provided Inuit with re-entry into the fur trade.

Ringed seals, however, had several important differences from white fox. The first was that ringed seal, in contrast to arctic fox, was an important dietary item for Inuit; thus, the commercialization of sealskins did not divert Inuit, as was sometimes required by trapping, from the pursuit of food. Second, ringed seal, unlike arctic fox, was not subject to cyclical ecological “booms and busts” in its availability. Last, although somewhat problematic, fox trapping may be thought of as requiring considerable specialized experience before being mastered, while seal hunting was an “all life” activity for Inuit prior to the 1980s.

The sale of ringed sealskins was important for another reason. This was that the addition of monetary value to sealskins coincided with the increasing incorporation of imported technologies, especially for transportation, into Inuit hunting, an occurrence that was at least in part catalyzed by the Canadian government’s policy of resettling Inuit from their dispersed indigenous communities into regionally central villages. These technologies, especially the snowmobile, provided Inuit with the mobility necessary to sustain their full range of

subsistence needs, including money as well as food, from these new locations (see Wenzel [1991: 95, 165–6] for an extended discussion of this point).

The shift from a dispersed settlement pattern to one in which mechanized hunting offered certain ecological and social advantages also meant that money became an important resource for the maintenance of the hunting component of Inuit subsistence. While this was certainly a new condition for hunters, it was mitigated by the fact that the cost of snowmobiles and other equipment circa 1965 (see Müller-Wille [1978]) was relatively modest in relation to the level at which hunters, as individuals and as members of cooperative *ilagiit* units, could secure ringed seals. Thus, aspects of this demographic-technological shift buffered the cost associated with mechanization.

As data from the mid-1970s at Clyde indicate [WENZEL 1991: 125], even at that time the overall cost of a typical hunting outfit was moderately steep, requiring in the best case approximately Can\$6,900 (or about 360 sealskins) overall. While the Clyde Hudson's Bay Company's record of sealskin purchases from that time indicates that the average annual per capita sales was approximately 80–100 skins,¹⁰ (about \$900–\$1,300), a number in and of itself insufficient for the capitalizing and maintenance of a "complete" hunting outfit [WENZEL 1991: 125], two factors mitigated this situation.

The first is that while ringed seal was the primary commodity—by total number—exported by Clyde Inuit, the sale of other wildlife products, notably of polar bear hides (see Wenzel [1983]), produced approximately another \$650 per hunter. These additional sales, coupled with individual participation in mainly seasonal wage employment, brought the total moneys per hunter to \$2,500/annum. Given the fact that some items, like rifles and snowmobiles, did not have to be replaced annually [WENZEL 1991: 116], the year to year costs of equipment was considerably below the overall outfit cost cited earlier.

The other factor of importance in understanding the econometrics of modern Inuit hunting, circa the 1970s, is that not every hunter necessarily needed to be equipped with every piece of equipment. Items that were better utilized by several cooperating hunters, such as motorized boats, were essentially owned by *ilagiit* and mainly used at the direction of the family *isumataq*. In fact, nearly every Clyde extended family in the mid-1970s had at least one boat that had been purchased with the pooled funds of several close, but subordinate, male relatives of the family head. (Interestingly, by the late 1970s, and before a community freezer was built, another item appeared in the equipment inventory of most *ilagiit*. This was a large capacity chest freezer which invariably was placed in the entryway of the extended family head's home where it was accessible to all *niqiliriiq*.)

By 1975, virtually every active hunter at Clyde possessed a snowmobile and the other equipment (rifle, pressure stove, snow knife, tent, sled) required for daily hunting activities. Although it was as common then as now for one or another hunter to have his snowmobile under repair, such circumstance was easily alleviated by either borrowing a machine from a man who might be inactive on that day or,

less commonly, by joining another hunter as a sled passenger.

The most apparent difference between that time and the early 1990s hunter situations is that by the latter period a substantial percentage, between 15 and 20%, of potential hunters (estimated to be able men between 16 and 60 years of age) no longer had the funds to either purchase major equipment or effectively operate their existing gear on a daily basis [WENZEL 1989; 1991]. Interestingly, this condition developed in an economic environment in which more full and part-time (i.e. not seasonally limited) wage employment (30–35 positions) existed in Clyde River than was the case through the 1970s when wage work did not exceed 14 jobs.

While Clyde in the 1970s appears to be, and indeed was, cash-poor in terms of the total amount of money available to Inuit than in this decade, it was also the case that hunters in this earlier time had far more secure access to a relatively constant flow of money through sealskin sales, with this supply not infrequently being supplemented by “windfalls” from polar bear, narwhal ivory and seasonal wages. In contrast, by the 1990s, sealskins were essentially monetarily valueless, while windfalls from other “cash species” became far less common due to increasingly stringent regulatory restrictions.¹¹⁾

The preceding discussion on demand transfers of hunting equipment, almost by definition centered on relations between same *ilagiit* male kin. While money also was undoubtedly requested, and provided, between related males, admittedly limited observational and interview data suggest that it was the female consanguinal kin of hunters, typically unmarried daughters holding wage positions, that were focal with respect to the demand sharing of money (See Cases I and II). However, it appears that similar demands also were placed, albeit with perhaps somewhat less frequency, on subordinate *ilagiit* males (Case III).

Case I: The gender aspect frequent in demand sharing at Clyde River is best illustrated through two 1994 Clyde case examples. The first concerns a tightly bonded extended family composed of an older couple, of whom the male spouse (termed ego for the remainder of the discussion), despite advanced age, was a highly successful hunter, three married adult sons and five adult daughters, of whom two were then married and three maintaining single parent households. Two of the three sons and all the daughters held full-time wage positions in the community, while the parental household directly received a modest income from the ego's old age pension and the woman's handicraft sales.

All the adult children resided independently of each other and their parents, but virtually every evening saw the five daughters and at least one of the sons gathered in their parents' home to share a *nirriyaktuqtuq* meal. Invariably, this meal was provided by the father's hunting or consisted of meat received from one son-in-law who was himself an active hunter. None of the sons, however, invested appreciable effort in hunting, in part because of the two working sons' restricted time (in fact, between the three, there were only one boat and one snowmobile). Ego, in contrast, owned a full complement of major hunting equipment, including

a snowmobile, a 6.7 m fiberglass freighter canoe and a 75 hp. outboard engine, which allowed him to hunt as often as weather permitted. The extent of ego's equipment inventory was impressive, as it represented about a \$20,000 capital investment, especially as its operation, given his level of harvesting activity and discounting other than minimum maintenance expenses, conservatively required the outlay of another \$2,000. Ego and his wife's combined direct annual income, however, was at best \$10,000.

This situation led me to inquire of him about how he was able to support, let alone renew, his outfit, especially as he informed me that his yearly household expenses were about half of the moneys that he and his spouse received. But he further noted that nearly all his fuel costs were paid for by two of his employed, unmarried daughters and that his snowmobile, along with several important, and expensive, spare components, his newest rifle, and his two-year old outboard engine had been purchased at a discount rate available to a third daughter through her place of employment (the same was the case with his wife's new sewing machine). When asked if this daughter's use of her limited access to discounts (the firm where she worked has a ceiling on how much merchandise an employee may buy at discount) was some disadvantage to her, ego responded that she, as his panik, had to assist him.

This example illustrates how strong the *naalaqtuq* obligation is between individuals who are terminologically linked as *naalaqtigiik* (sub-superordinate kin pairs, see Damas [1975: 16]). That such obligation exists for subordinate positioned persons to obey terminological superiors even when to do so places the structurally weaker at an economic disadvantage, as in this case, relates to the way the *naalaqtuq* structure in Iglulik Eskimo society emphasizes age and gender difference [DAMAS 1975: 20]. The need for the employed daughter to apply her economic advantage to ego, at no little cost to herself, corresponds exactly to the gender aspect of *naalaqtuq* relations that Damas found emphasized among the Iglulingmiut.

Case II: This second example concerns the demand relationship between a well-employed, unmarried woman (ego) and two male members of her extended family. Ego maintained her own household, which, besides herself and her child, included her seventeen year-old younger brother, who lived, at her parents' request, with her.

As was described above in Case I, this woman received considerable pressure from her father to provide monetary support which was then invested in hunting equipment. However, unlike Case I, the funds that she provided to her father, who himself held a secure wage position in the community, were not used directly by him, but were instead given by him to the brother who lived with her. Through ego's contributions (approximately \$8,000 over two years), her brother was able to acquire and maintain a snowmobile and thus conduct a substantial amount of hunting (the 1994–1996 Clyde harvest survey identified this adolescent as one of the

most productive young hunters in the community). The brother, although co-resident with his sister, followed normative *tugagaujuq* sharing and always deposited the results of his hunting efforts with his father.

Clearly, the most interesting element of this demand case is how the sub-superordinate *naalaqtuq* relationship that dominates daughter-father relations led to the re-distribution of money to a sibling who was clearly in a subordinate position to his sister. While, as Damas [1975] has noted, cross-sibling, to include older sister-younger brother, relations tend toward a male bias, it is nonetheless likely that, if not for the intervention of her father, ego could have most likely resisted any requests for support from her brother.

With regard to demands made on subordinate members of *ilagiit* for cash resources, it appears, as the above examples illustrate, that young women, because of gender and weak terminological position relative to demanders, are both highly important and considerably disadvantaged by such sharing. Moreover, while several cases are known in which wives are the critical source of money for their hunter spouses, it seems that daughters, especially those who are unmarried but with access to cash, are the most important providers. However, there are circumstances when equally strong demands for money are exerted on subordinate *ilagiit* males.

Case III: During an interview in 1989 with a middle-aged (early-40s) male about his seasonal hunting and camping activities, ego responded that he had been unable to be very active. Because the man held particularly well-remunerated employment (\$55,000+ per annum) during the work year and also enjoyed a considerable holiday period when, in past summers, he had done considerable hunting, I expressed the view that he must have accumulated a considerable bank account, as his household was relatively small (just his spouse and three children).

He, however, noted that, while that might seem the case, he had, in fact, entered into debt that summer. He then enumerated the following: a) that he was the financial maintainer of his widowed mother's household; b) that he had provided approximately \$10,000 to an older cousin (mother's brother's son, *illu*), who, with his family, had spent three months in summer camp away from Clyde River; c) that he had not had use of his outboard engine for this period because he had loaned it to the son of the above mentioned cross-cousin, himself a very active hunter, for use while in camp; and, d) that he had provided between \$3–5,000, during the past year to the same cousin so he could operate his snowmobile. At the same time, ego explained that he received occasional food from his cousin, although he did not participate in commensal meals held by his uncle.

In sum, therefore, he had provided moneys in the range of \$25,000 to members of his kindred over the preceding year. While there was no mention by him that any of these transfers resulted from explicit requests from the recipients, he noted that he felt under tremendous pressure because he was the only member of his "family" with significant income from a source other than transfer payments.

Thus, as he put it, if he were not “generous” he could not be “comfortable”. And, while he expressed a willingness to continue as a provider of money to his extended kin, the following year he took a leave of absence from his job and shortly thereafter relocated his household to another community (see Myers [1989]).

In contrast to Cases I and II, the kind of explicit demanding that characterized the transfers that occurred between younger women and their fathers appears to be absent. Indeed, the general response from older males when asked about the *naalaqtuq* obligation of their sons to accede to monetary requests from them was that, while sons should assist a parent, it was important for the parent to recognize that the young have responsibilities to their own households. On the other hand, based on the emphasis placed on family in Case III, it would seem that the strong *naalaqtuq* obligation that has been observed to pertain at Clyde between sub-superordinate *ilagiit* males around equipment can be extended to monetary transfers. Certainly, with reference to the interaction of the man in Case III with his mother’s consanguines, this structural obligation, despite placing ego at a considerable economic disadvantage, was paramount (for cross-cultural comparison, see Altman and Peterson [1988]).

SUMMARY ANALYSIS

(Economy is) the structured arrangements and rules which assure that material goods and specialist services are provided in a repetitive fashion. [LONNER 1980: 2]

The overwhelming weight of data from Clyde River indicates that food *ningiqtuq* is still systematically practiced and, perhaps more importantly, still structurally conforms to the traditional framework explicated by Damas. Thus, it can be said that this component of the Inuit behavior exhibits a coherence in its organization that belies the notion that it constitutes an informal economy. In fact, the *ningiqtuq* system is highly elaborate. Further, given the substantial amounts of *niqituinnak* that are produced by harvesters (see Donaldson [1988; Wenzel [1991]) and the multiple levels by which food continues to be distributed within *ilagiit* and across the community (see Wenzel [1995]), it may be said that *ningiqtuq* continues to reproduce critical social, as well as material, relations needed to sustain the Inuit subsistence system.

This structural-functional retention is viewed here as indicative of the continuing integrity of the *naalaqtuq* and *ungayuk* principles that Damas [1963] defined during his Iglulik research (and which Mary-Rousseliere [1984] and Wenzel [1981] note as present, respectively, at Pond Inlet and Clyde River). Although the latter may be less apparent than the former as being integral to the conduct of Inuit social relations, Wenzel [1995] has interpreted *ungayuk* as being particularly important in borrower-loaner relations involving non-traditional resource transfers between non-*ilagiit* actors. Thus, while Inuit sharing in its practice does not appear

to be as materially or socially generalized as has sometimes been projected, the kind of quasi-sharing that emerged in the 1970s, based as it was on aspects of *ungayuk*, suggests at least an element of structural flexibility based on larger social relations that Lonner [1980: 5] attributes to subsistence.

Beyond this, however, the linkage between traditional sharing structure and behavior regarding non-traditional resources is tenuous. While in the 1970s equipment was mobile, with temporally limited transfers taking place between unrelated hunters as well as within *ilagiit*, the impermanence of these actions, despite the appearance of incorporation, mark snowmobiles and the like as behaviorally different from customary *ningiqtuq* resources.

The appearance that equipment and money are shared seems to relate to two factors beyond the structural. The first is simply that loaner-borrower events took place with such frequency that these transfers resembled actual *ningiqtuq*. The other is that such quasi-sharing then occurred in an economic environment in which access to money was sufficiently generalized via sealskin sales that most hunters can be seen as occupying an equal economic plane. Therefore, there was essentially no economic motivation to resist a temporary transfer—generally a similar piece of equipment could be borrowed from another source or in the event that a loaned item sustained damage, the funds to repair it were obtainable through sealskin sales.

The question of why equipment and money did not become *ningiqtuq*-integrated in actuality is much more difficult, as: 1) the local Clyde economy, at least in the 1970s, made non-traditional resources relatively easy to access; 2) Clyde Inuit then, as now, ascribed considerable importance to sharing. A very tentative explanation of this is that a format for handling equipment as individual, rather than corporate, property already existed. That this was the case before the appearance of widespread imports is seemingly attested to in both the ethnographic and early exploration literatures. (While these accounts may indicate European biases about property, challenging this interpretation is beyond the scope of this paper.)

Some support for this hypothesis comes from the 1970s Clyde database. This information indicates that large motorized boats, unlike snowmobiles (and dogteams) and most other hunting equipment, were integrated with some frequency into the general resource pool of individual *ilagiit*. Unlike other kinds of gear, these craft, like the indigenous *umiak*, generally required the cooperation of several hunters to be used effectively for hunting; indeed, Damas [1972a] notes that the *umiaqqatiqiit*, or boat crew, formed a critical associative set among some Central Eskimo groups. It is, therefore, possible that this proprietary difference relates to this necessary cooperative aspect of boat operations.

The displacement of loaner-borrower behavior by the emergence of demand sharing after the imposition of the European Union sealskin boycott is seen here (also Wenzel [1995, 1996]) as instrumental to this behavioral change. Essentially, the collapse of sealskin sales substantially changed the ability of hunters to access

money. What is less realized about this is that this shift also upset the relative economic equality that the market provided to hunters.

Analytically, the most striking aspect to the emergence of inertial sharing is that its success as a strategy relates to the structural power of the same *naalaqtuq* obedience precept [DAMAS 1975: 16] that is central in *ningiqtuq* sharing. In fact, where *naalaqtuq* appears to have been of lesser import than *ungayuk* in the 1970s lend-share process between non-kin at Clyde, with the decline of sealskins *naalaqtuq* reassumes, as the three cases presented bear out, structural primacy.

Adapting Peterson's [1993: 867] point about demand sharing and kinship to the recent Clyde situation, it is clear that demands to "share" by terminologically superior kin upon subordinates, buttressed as these are by the force of *naalaqtuq* obligation, are essentially irresistible, even when compliance clearly imposes economic disadvantage on these subordinate providers. Under the conditions of local economy at Clyde after 1983, in which the non-traditional resource disparity between job holders, mainly younger men and women, and hunters (whom ego in Case III described as "unemployed"; conversely many hunters spoke of wage earners as "selfish") regarding access to key equipment and/or money became increasingly pronounced, *naalaqtuq* provided the only normative structural means for redirecting these resources into subsistence relations. As Fienup-Riordan has noted with reference to Yup'ik hunters, "... monetary income is perceived as the means to accomplish and facilitate the harvest" [1986: 314]; this certainly represents the perspective of Clyde hunters and *naalaqtuq* can be thought of as the only culturally consonant means by which the redistribution of these scarce resources could be achieved.

One further, and last, note. Inuit social structure is typically described as flexible and that this social flexibility forms a critical component of Inuit ecological adaptation. This paper brings out not only the relationship between the adaptiveness of this structure vis à vis Inuit affiliational behavior, but also its centrality to economic organization [DAMAS 1972b] (see also Heinrich [1963: 68]). It is, however, also a tenet of "Inuit studies" that role complementarity, between genders, within task groups and, ultimately, between the structural principles of *naalaqtuq* and *ungayuk*, is essential to this adaptiveness.

Regarding this complementarity, it is strongly suggested here, after examining the economic organization of Clyde sharing under changing "environmental" conditions, that *ungayuk-naalaqtuq* complementarity is no more static in terms of Inuit economic behavior than it is in other areas of Inuit social life. *Ningiqtuq* relations around food can be seen as the idealization of this complementarity, despite ethnographic and contemporary examples that demonstrate the effect of situation on practice, as in, for instance, the temporariness of lender-borrower transactions (but see Woodburn [1998]). However, by comparing sharing behavior before and following the decline of sealskins as a monetarily valuable commodity, it is clear that these structural principles allow Inuit the normative flexibility to respond adaptively to drastically different conditions. But, it is also clear that

naalaqtuq-ungayuk complementarity is not without the same tensions, especially in the face of new resource forms, as are present in other levels of Inuit interaction.

Appendix Glossary of Inuktitut Terms

TERM	MEANING
<i>Akpallugiiit</i>	form of sharing between individuals (“inviting in”)
<i>Angijukak</i>	generally leader, sometimes glossed as “boss”
<i>Ilagiit</i>	extended family
<i>Isumataq</i>	head of an <i>ilagiit</i> ; literally “one who thinks” (root: <i>isuma</i> —thought)
<i>Katujiyuk</i>	apportioning of meat within a cooperating task group
<i>Minatuq</i>	a form of commensalism
<i>Naalaqtigiik</i>	denotes sub-superordinate kin pair
<i>Naalaqtuq</i>	behavioral term meaning respect or obedience
<i>Ningiq</i>	a share of a hunted animal
<i>Ningigtuq</i>	to share a portion of a hunted animal
<i>Niqaturvigiiit</i>	seal sharing partnership (Netsilik Eskimo)
<i>Niqi</i>	food, to include imported/stored foods
<i>Niqiliriiq</i>	the <i>tigutuinnaq-tugagaujuq</i> “subsystem”
<i>Niqitianaq</i>	transfers of food between two unrelated hunters
<i>Niqituinnak</i>	meat from a hunted animal (often glossed as “real food”)
<i>Nirriyaktuqtuq</i>	commensal meal
<i>Paiyuktuq</i>	a gift of food (related forms: <i>quaktuaktuq</i> , <i>niqisutaiyuq</i>)
<i>Pigatigiit</i>	seal sharing partnerships (Copper Eskimo)
<i>Taliqtuq</i>	transfers of food between unrelated hunters
<i>Tigutuinnaq</i>	transfers (usually food) from an <i>isumataq</i> to a subordinate
<i>Tugagaujuq</i>	transfers (usually food) from a subordinate hunter to superior kin
<i>Umiaqqatiqiiit</i>	boat crew
<i>Ungayuk</i>	behavioral term meaning affection or solidarity
<i>Uummajusiutiit</i>	unrelated, cooperating hunters

Acknowledgement

Over the years, my research at Clyde River has been supported by the Carnegie Museum (1971–1972), Canadian Ethnology Service (1973–77, 1979–83), Department of Indian and Northern Affairs (1978), Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (1984–93, 1995–98) and the National Science Foundation (1994). I am deeply indebted to all these agencies for their support. I must also gratefully acknowledge the willingness of the Clyde Hamlet Council for consistently allowing my research in the community to go forward.

On a more personal level, I must express my deep appreciation to Ms. Laurie-Anne White for her bibliographic and other editorial assistance and to David Damas, David Lee, Grete Hovelsrud-Broda, and James Savelle for their extensive and insightful comments on earlier drafts of this paper. I am also indebted to the four generations of Clyde Inuit who

have tolerated my intrusions and most especially to Piungnituq, Iqalukjuak, Sanguya, Qillaq and Mannasie for their careful guidance in teaching me the rules. I alone, of course, am responsible for any errors either of fact or interpretation that may appear herein.

Notes

- 1) Inuit is the cultural designation used in Canada for speakers of the *Inuit-Inupiaq* (Eastern Eskimo) branch of the Esk-Aleut language [WOODBURY 1984]. In deference to former ethnographic application, however, the term Eskimo (i.e. Copper Eskimo) will be used when citing antecedent research.
- 2) *Niqi* is the general term in *Inuktitut* meaning food, including imported foodstuffs; *niqituinnak* (sometimes translated as “real food”) refers to meat that is hunted.
- 3) On April 1, 1999, Nunavut (“Our Land”) will replace Northwest Territories as the political and geographic designation for those portions of the N.W.T., including the Baffin Region, encompassed by the Nunavut Agreement 1993. In anticipation of 1999, Nunavut is used here.
- 4) The terms *ningiqtuq* and *ningiq* translated literally mean, respectively: 1) (to) get a portion of a hunted animal; 2) a share or portion of a hunted animal. Damas [1972b] has used *ningiq* as a specific referent for inter-*ilagiit* sharing, while I [WENZEL 1989, 1991, 1995] have employed *ningiqtuq* to denote the overall system.
- 5) Balikci [1964: 29–31] has used the term restricted *ilagiit* to denote the extended family unit formed by consanguinally-related males, their spouses and their offspring (but see also Steenhoven [1959]).
- 6) The terms “tradition” and “traditional” are used here to mean Inuit social and economic patterns known to predate the “government era” (ca. post-1945).
- 7) At Clyde, restricted *nirriyaktuqtuq* meals may also be held to celebrate the return of a kinsperson after a prolonged absence or even to simply bring *ilagiit* members, who are residentially dispersed across the settlement, together.
- 8) Sealskins and other wildlife market commodities are seen here as “byproducts” because none of the “commercial” species, with the exception of arctic fox, is excluded from the customary Clyde Inuit diet [WENZEL 1989, 1991; BORRÉ 1990].
- 9) In 1985, the annual polar bear quota allocated to Clyde Inuit was reduced from 45 to 15 animals, while from 1971 to 1990 the number of eligible hunters enrolled by the Hunter and Trappers Association rose from 41 to over 150; as a result of these two developments, the opportunity to participate in polar bear hunting changed from an “open access” system to a lottery one.
- 10) The Hudson’s Bay Company record of sales should not be construed as a precise indicator of the overall per capita harvest of ringed seals; Clyde harvest survey data [WENZEL n.d. a, b, c] from the 1970s suggests that each hunting household used about 10% of harvested sealskins for domestic purposes (boots, mitts, windpants, handicrafts) and that at least a further 10% was discarded because of poor natural condition or because of damage during the preparation process.
- 11) By comparison, in 1976–77 the volume of ringed seals traded in the Northwest Territories was 49,485 skins [JELLISS 1978: 3].

REFERENCES

- ALTMAN, J. and N. PETERSON
 1968 Rights to Game and Rights to Cash Among Contemporary Australian Hunter-Gatherers. In T. Ingold, D. Riches and J. Woodburn (eds.), *Hunters and Gatherers 2: Property, Power and Ideology*. Oxford: Berg. pp. 75–94.
- AMES, R., D. AXFORD, P. USHER, E. WEICK and G. W. WENZEL
 1988 *Keeping On the Land: A Study of the Feasibility of a Comprehensive Wildlife Harvest Support Programme in the Northwest Territories*. Ottawa: Canadian Arctic Resources Committee.
- BALIKCI, A.
 1964 Development of Basic Socioeconomic Units in Two Eskimo Communities. *Bulletin 202*. Ottawa: National Museum of Canada.
- BOAS, F.
 1888 The Central Eskimo. *Sixth Annual Report of the Bureau of American Ethnology for the Years 1884–1885*. Washington, D.C.: The Smithsonian Institution. pp. 399–669.
- BORRÉ, K.
 1990 A Bio-Cultural Model of Dietary Decision Making Among North Baffin Island Inuit: Explaining the Ecology of Food Consumption By Native Canadians. Unpublished Ph. D. Dissertation, Department of Anthropology, University of North Carolina.
- BRODY, H.
 1975 *The People's Land: Eskimos, Whites and the Eastern Arctic*. New York: Penguin.
- COLLINGS, P., G. W. WENZEL and R. CONDON
 1998 Modern Food Sharing Networks and Community Integration in the Central Canadian Arctic. *Arctic* 51(4): 301–314.
- DAMAS, D.
 1963 Igluligmiut Kinship and Local Groupings: A Structural Approach. *Bulletin 196*. Ottawa: National Museum of Canada.
 1969a Characteristics of Central Eskimo Band Structure. In D. Damas (ed.), *Contributions to Anthropology: Band Societies*. *Bulletin 230*. Ottawa: National Museums of Canada. pp. 116–138.
 1969b Environment, history, and Central Eskimo Society. In D. Damas (ed.), *Contributions to Anthropology: Ecological Essays*. *Bulletin 228*. Ottawa: National Museums of Canada. pp. 40–64.
 1971 The Problem of the Eskimo Family. In K. Ishwaran (ed.), *The Canadian Family*. Toronto: Holt, Rinehart and Winston of Canada. pp. 54–78.
 1972a The Structure of Central Eskimo Associations. In L. Guemple (ed.), *Alliance in Eskimo Society*. Seattle: University of Washington Press. pp. 40–55.
 1972b Central Eskimo Systems of Food Sharing. *Ethnology* 11(3): 220–240.
 1975 Three Kinship Systems from the Central Arctic. *Arctic Anthropology* 12(1): 10–30.
- DONALDSON, J.
 1988 The Economic Ecology of Hunting: A Case Study of the Canadian Inuit. Unpublished Ph. D. Dissertation, Department of Organismic and Evolutionary Biology, Harvard University.

- FEIT, H.
 1991 Gifts of the Land: Hunting Territories, Guaranteed Incomes and the Construction of Social Relations in James Bay Cree Society. In N. Peterson and T. Matsuyama (eds.), *Cash, Commoditisation and Changing Foragers. Senri Ethnological Studies* 30: 223–268. Osaka: National Museum of Ethnology.
- FIENUP-RIORDAN, A.
 1986 When Our Bad Season Comes. *Alaska Anthropological Association Monograph* No. 1. Anchorage: Alaska Anthropological Association.
- HEINRICH, A.
 1963 Eskimo-Type Kinship and Eskimo Kinship: An Evaluation and a Provisional Model for Presenting Data Pertaining to Inupiaq Kinship Systems. Unpublished Ph. D. Dissertation in Anthropology, University of Washington.
- HOVELSRUD-BRODA, G.
 1997 Arctic Seal-Hunting Households and the Anti-Sealing Controversy. *Research in Economic Anthropology* 18: 17–34.
- JELLISS, A.
 1978 Report on the Impact of Depressed Sealskin Prices in the Northwest Territories. Unpublished Report, Economic Analysis Division, Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development. 14 p. (mimeo)
- KEMP, W. B.
 1971 The Flow of Energy in a Hunting Society. *Scientific American* 225(3): 105–115.
 1984 Baffinland Eskimo. In D. Damas (ed.), *Handbook of North American Indians*. Vol. 5, Arctic. Washington, D.C.: The Smithsonian Institution. pp. 463–475.
- KISHIGAMI, N.
 1994 Extended Family Food Sharing Among the Contemporary Netsilik Inuit. Paper Presented at the 9th Inuit Studies Conference, Iqaluit, Northwest Territories.
- LA RUSIC I.
 1978 *The Income Security Program for Cree Hunters and Trappers: A Study of the Design, Operation and Initial Impacts of the Guaranteed Annual Income Programme Established Under the James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement*. Ottawa: Department of Indian and Northern Affairs.
- LANGDON, S.
 1991 The Integration of Cash and Subsistence in Southwest Alaskan Yup'ik Communities. In N. Peterson and T. Matsuyama (eds.), *Cash, Commoditisation and Changing Foragers. Senri Ethnological Studies* 30: 269–291. Osaka: National Museum of Ethnology.
- LONNER, T.
 1980 Subsistence as an Economic System in Alaska: Theoretical and Policy Implications. *Subsistence Division Technical Paper* No. 67. Anchorage: Alaska Department of Fish and Game.
- LYNGE, F.
 1992 *Arctic Wars, Animal Rights, and Endangered Peoples*. Hanover: University of New England Press.
- MALOUF, A. (ed.)
 1986 Sealing in the Northern Economy. *Seals and Sealing in Canada: Report of the Royal Commission*. V. 2. Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada. pp. 224–285.
- MARY-ROUSSELIERE, G.
 1984 Iglulik. In D. Damas (ed.), *Handbook of North American Indians*. Vol. 5,

- Arctic. Washington, D.C.: The Smithsonian Institution. pp. 431–446.
- MÜLLER-WILLE, L.
 1978 Cost Analysis of Modern Hunting Among Inuit of the Canadian Central Arctic. *Polar Geography* II(2): 100–114.
- MYERS, F.
 1989 Burning the Truck and Holding the Land: Pintupi Forms of Property and Identity. In E. Wilmsen (ed.), *We Are Here: Politics of Aboriginal Land Tenure*. Berkeley: University of California Press. pp. 15–42.
- NOOTER, G.
 1976 Leadership and Headship: Changing Patterns in an East Greenland Hunting Community. *Mededelingen Van Het Rijkmuseum Voor Volkenkunde* No. 20. Leiden: E. J. Brill.
- NUNAVUT Agreement
 1993 Agreement Between the Inuit of the Nunavut Settlement Area and Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada. Ottawa: The Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development and the Tungavik Federation of Nunavut.
- NUTTALL, M.
 1990 Animal Rights and Greenlandic Sealing: A Threat to Cultural Survival. *Polar Record* 26(158): 240–242.
- PARRY, W.
 1821 *Journal for a Voyage for the Discovery of a Northwest Passage from the Atlantic to the Pacific Performed in the Years 1819–20*. London: John Murray.
- PETERSON, N.
 1990 Introduction: Cash, Commoditisation and Changing Foragers. In N. Peterson and T. Matsuyama (eds.), *Cash, Commoditisation and Changing Foragers. Senri Ethnological Studies* 30: 1–16. Osaka: National Museum of Ethnology.
 1993 Demand Sharing: Reciprocity and the Pressure for Generosity Among Foragers. *American Anthropologist* 95(4): 860–874.
- REEVES, R., G. W. WENZEL and M. KINGSLEY
 1998 Catch History of Ringed Seals in Canada. In H.P Heide Jorgensen and C. Lydersen (eds.), *Ringed Seals in the North Atlantic*. Scientific Publications, Vol. 1. Tromso: North Atlantic Marine Mammal Commission. pp. 100–129.
- SAHLINS, M.
 1965 On the Sociology of Primitive Exchange. In M. Blanton (ed.), *The Relevance of Models for Social Anthropology*. ASA Monograph 1. London: Association of Social Anthropology. pp. 139–236.
- SMITH, E.
 1988 Risk and Uncertainty in the ‘Original Affluent Society’: Evolutionary Ecology of Resource-Sharing and Land Tenure. In T. Ingold, D. Riches and J. Woodburn (eds.), *Hunters and Gatherers 1: History, Evolution and Social Change*. Oxford: Berg. pp. 222–251.
 1991 *Inujjamiut Foraging Strategies: Evolutionary Ecology of an Arctic Hunting Community*. Chicago: Aldine de Gruyter.
 1993 Comment. *Current Anthropology* 34(4): 356.
- STEENHOVEN, G. van den
 1959 Legal Concepts Among the Netsilik Eskimos of Pelly Bay. *NCRC Report 3*. Ottawa: Department of Northern Affairs and National Resources.

- TESTER, F. and P. KULCHYSKI
 1994 *Tammarniit (Mistakes): Inuit Relocation in the Eastern Arctic 1939–63*. Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press.
- VALLEE, F.
 1962 *Kabloona and Eskimo in the Central Keewatin*. N.C.R.C.-62-2. Ottawa: Department of Indian Affairs and National Resources.
- VAN DE VELDE, F.
 1956 Rules for Sharing the Seal Amongst the Arviligjuarmiut Eskimo. *Eskimo* 41: 3–6.
- WATANABE, H.
 1978 Systematic Classification of Hunter-Gatherers' Food Habits: An Ecological-Evolutionary Perspective. *Minzokugaku Kenkyu* 43(2): 111–137 (text in Japanese, with English summary and tables).
- WENZEL, G. W.
 1981 Clyde Inuit Adaptation and Ecology: The Organization of Subsistence. *Canadian Ethnology Service Mercury Paper No. 77*. Ottawa: National Museum of Man.
 1983 The Integration of "Remote" Site Labor into the Inuit Economy of Clyde River, N.W.T. *Arctic Anthropology* 20(3): 79–92.
 1986 Subsistence, Cash and the Mixed Economy: Adaptation Among Baffin Inuit. Unpublished Report to the Baffin Regional Office of the Department of Economic Development and Tourism. Yellow Knife: Government of the Northwest Territories. 27P.
 1989 Sealing at Clyde River, N.W.T.: A Discussion of Inuit Economy. *Études/Inuit/Studies* 13(1): 3–22.
 1991 *Animal Rights, Human Rights: Ecology, Economy and Ideology in the Canadian Arctic*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
 1994 Recent Change in Inuit Summer Residence Patterning on East Baffin Island. In E.S. Burch and L. Ellanna (eds.), *Key Issues in Hunter-Gatherer Research*. Oxford: Berg. pp. 289–308.
 1995 Ningiqtuq: Resource Sharing and Generalized Reciprocity in Clyde River, Nunavut. *Arctic Anthropology* 32(2): 43–60.
 1996 Inuit Sealing and Subsistence: Managing After the E.U. Sealskin Ban. *Geographische Zeitschrift* 84(3–4): 130–142.
 n.d.a Author's Field Notes, Clyde River, 1971–1973.
 n.d.b. Author's Field Notes, Clyde River, 1978–1979.
 n.d.c. Author's Field Notes, Clyde River, 1981–1985.
- WHITE, L. -A.
 1998 Nunavut Hunters Support Program: An Evaluation of the Early Years. Unpublished Report to the Northern Scientific Training Program. (mimeo)
- WILMOTT, W.
 1961 *The Eskimo Community at Port Harrison, P.Q.* N.C.R.C.-61-1. Ottawa: Department of Indian Affairs and National Resources.
- WOODBURN, J.
 1998 'Sharing Is Not a Form of Exchange': An Analysis of Property-Sharing in Immediate Return Hunter-Gatherer Societies. In C. Hann (ed.), *Property Relations: Renewing the Anthropological Tradition*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 48–63.

WOODBURY, A.

- 1984 Eskimo and Aleut Languages. In D. Damas (ed.), *Handbook of North American Indians*. Vol. 5, Arctic. Washington, D.C.: The Smithsonian Institution. pp. 49–63.

