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Nunavut Inuit and Polar Bear : The Cultural Politics of the Sport Hunt

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Nunavut Inuit and Polar Bear: The Cultural Politics of the Sport Hunt

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1. INTRODUCTION

No animal has as large a symbolic place in Canadian Inuit culture as the polar bear (*Ursus maritimus*; Inuktitut: *nanuq*). This prominence is evidenced by the fact that for millennia Inuit and polar bear have shared the arctic marine environment as essentially co-equal apex predators, or at least they did so until firearms became widespread. It is no surprise, therefore, that *nanuq* has been a central figure in Inuit cosmology (see e.g., BOAS [1888]) and that the species still possesses considerable socio-cultural importance. Polar bears may also be the most carefully managed marine mammal species in the circumpolar world, being the subject of a sustained international conservation effort for the last three decades.

Along with their cultural symbolism, polar bears have been, and continue to be, a component of the Inuit subsistence system (see e.g., NELSON [1969]; ROBBE [1975]), at times contributing significantly to the traditional subsistence economy. While their present subsistence contribution is fairly well known in its quantitative dimension (see e.g., DONALDSON [1988]; WENZEL [1991: 82]), much less attention has been devoted to the contemporary socio-cultural importance of *nanuq* (but see SANDELL and SANDELL [1996] regarding East Greenland).

The ideational importance of the species will only be tangentially touched on in this paper. Instead, the present discussion will be concerned with the continuing subsistence role of polar

bear for the Inuit of Nunavut. Not least, this continuation relates to the way(s) the economic environment of Nunavut has undergone change—from one defined by the application of knowledge and energy in the pursuit of food to one requiring a spectrum of resources, including money, in order to hunt. Not surprisingly, therefore, the subsistence role of polar bear has also changed. Among the parameters of this new system are that Inuit now live in a very different spatial and demographic arrangement from that of barely fifty years ago, having been incorporated into a “globalized” political-economic complex, and having to necessarily assume international obligations which were originally negotiated without their input.

Thus, after some four millennia in which polar bear could clearly be called an Inuit cultural resource, today this species has assumed, through the activity of outfitted sport hunting, an economic role in the lives of Inuit that may be larger than at any time in the past. That is the product of a process that began because of non-Inuit interest in polar bears in the nineteenth century, accelerated through the northern fur trade, and evolved into the present situation following the 1983 European Union sealskin boycott.

The focus of this paper is on two aspects of the contemporary relationship between Inuit and polar bears. The first is the unique subsistence contribution of polar bears to small Nunavut communities, particularly for Inuit who lack direct access to the non-transfer monetized (i.e. cash) component of the modern subsistence economy.

The second is the several levels of conflict affecting optimal subsistence use of this resource by *Nunavummiut*. Here optimal use is assumed to be the designating of a portion of a community's annual legal harvest allocation for sport hunt purposes. To this end, three case studies are presented to illustrate the kinds of intra-community and inter-cultural conflicts that affect effective subsistence use of the polar bear sport hunt for many *Nunavummiut*.

2. *NANUQ* AND PRE-MODERN INUIT

As already noted, Inuit have been intimately involved with polar bears in ecological and ideological terms for millennia. However, until perhaps a century ago, the subsistence role of the bears was likely much more circumscribed than it is today, not least because the tools available to Inuit for use in face-to-face confrontations (e.g., harpoons, spears and smaller projectiles) were relatively modest from a technological perspective. In addition, large, conical traps constructed from boulders and believed to be for trapping polar bears have been reported from Ellesmere Island [SCHLEDERMANN 1977], and western Hudson Bay [McCARTNEY, personal communication]. Various early ethnographies (see, e.g., BOAS [1888]) also note the use of frozen baleen and fat “chokers” to kill polar bears (and wolves) and it is presumed here that the same method was employed prehistorically.

It is also clear, however, if the faunal inventories recovered from Palaeoeskimo and Neo-Eskimo sites (see SAVELLE [1994]) are an accurate indication, that polar bear was a relatively rare item in the overall subsistence efforts of pre-modern Inuit. Perusal of his summary tables covering twenty-six Eastern Canadian Arctic site complexes shows that polar bear remains comprise barely seven-one hundredths of the total specimens identified to at least the level of genus (919/127,758). Further, in those collections in which a minimum number of individual bears (MNI) could be determined, only two, the Thule sites at Skraeling Island [McCULLOUGH

1989] and Pordon Point [PARK 1989], included significant numbers—35 MNI and 17 MNI, respectively. Similarly, MØHL [1979] found only five of the 27,000 osteological elements collected at the West Greenland Nugarsuk site to be from polar bears.

Thus, it is highly likely that it was only with the widespread introduction of firearms that the relationship between Inuit and *nanuq* changed in clear favor of Inuit. Likewise, it is the presence of firearms that made it possible for Inuit to begin to harvest polar bears in numbers sufficient to complement ringed seal as a winter food.

Polar bear also became an important object of Inuit-European economic relations, especially as one bear hide was the equivalent in trading value to a dozen or so fox pelts. Indeed, for a brief time in the mid-1970s the sale of one polar bear could equal 100+ sealskins. It is not surprising, therefore, that since ca. 1960 the polar bear, while maintaining its cultural importance, has also assumed a material role greater than in any previous period, and not least as a medium for accessing the scarcest of modern subsistence resources - money. This change began in the early decades of the twentieth century, accelerated in the mid-1970s, and, in the wake of the 1980s European Union sealskin boycott [WENZEL 1991], achieved seeming near-total commodification [WENZEL and BOURGOUIN 2000].

As simple as this progression from a “classic”, if opportunistic, subsistence resource to a cash-producing export may appear, its reality is more complex, not least because of the species’ continuing socio-cultural importance. Thus, in order to analyze this latest phase of the Inuit-*nanuq* relationship and its associated conflicts, it is necessary to examine more closely the political-economic history of polar bear sport hunting.

3. THE COMMODIZATION OF POLAR BEAR: CIRCA 1850–1970

As European (and, later, American) interest in the Canadian Arctic moved beyond geographic exploration to the exploitation of resources, this new focus eventually brought another dimension to the relationship between Inuit and polar bears. Through most of the 19th century, non-Inuit focused on the commercial exploitation of bowhead whales (*Balaena mysticetus*). However, after ca. 1890, as these large whales were reduced in numbers, other species, such as walrus and narwhal for their ivory, were hunted to supplement whale revenues. Polar bears, already occasionally killed for protection and recreation by the whalers, became part of this commerce. Indeed, as the profit margin of whaling fell, some ships’ owners and captains sold places to huntsmen interested in shooting, among other game, polar bears for sport (see ROSS [1985]).

By the beginning of the last century, the bowhead populations of the Eastern Arctic had become so greatly reduced that furs and ivory not only supplanted whaling as foci of northern commerce, but also changed its nature. The crux of this change centered on the fact that, because Europeans were present in the Arctic in low numbers only, efficient exploitation of these species could only be accomplished by Inuit, who already possessed the knowledge, skill, and energy to do so. Thus, a new economic dynamic emerged based on Inuit trading furs and ivory for imported European goods.

Polar bears, while an element of this relationship, were for a considerable time only a minor item of trade, due primarily to the limitations of traditional Inuit technologies. However, by the 1940s bears, following the availability of more modern firearms to Inuit, clearly become

more prominent in the northern fur trade. For example, fur records from the Hudson's Bay Company (HBC) post at Clyde River [WENZEL n.d.] show virtually no polar bear entries until 1943, the year after an American military weather station was established adjacent to the HBC. But, from that year onward, the annual HBC trade inventory includes increasing numbers of polar bears, with as many as 55 being taken in trade at Clyde by the mid-1960s.

While polar bear had become, by at least the 1940s, an item of some economic value in Inuit-European commerce, polar bear sport hunting, at least in any organized form, developed much more slowly. While it is undoubtedly the case that members of the RCMP, HBC employees and other non-Inuit may have hunted the occasional polar bear, there is no evidence of recreational hunting being conducted in any organized fashion.

Again, unpublished records from Clyde River are useful. They refer to only one "sport hunt" as occurring between 1955 and 1970, and that by an American military officer visiting the U.S. Coast Guard station at nearby Cape Christian. Moreover, from 1969, the year of the aforementioned hunt, until 1983, it would appear that only four polar bear sport hunts [GOVERNMENT OF NUNAVUT 2002] occurred in the whole of the Baffin Bay polar bear region. Archival data (ibid.) mirror a similar situation regarding recreational hunting for polar bear in the Lancaster Sound area, noting only one contracted hunt before the 1980s. It must also be mentioned that because prior to 1969–70, when a quota-tag system was introduced as a formal aspect of polar management (see LENTFER [1974]), only HBC, RCMP and fur auction records provide a means for tracking polar bear harvesting by Inuit and others. Thus, statements about polar bear hunting, especially as organized recreation, before ca. 1970 should be viewed with caution.

4. THE POLAR BEAR TRADE: 1970–1985

Between the mid-1960s and the mid-1980s, several events relevant to Inuit polar bear hunting, as a specific activity and as an element within the wider framework of the then Nunavut subsistence system, occurred. Two of these were legal in nature. In 1972 the United States passed into law the *Marine Mammal Protection Act* (MMPA) and, in 1973, Canada, Norway, Denmark, the Soviet Union and the United States signed the *Agreement on Conservation of Polar Bears* (ACPB) (see LENTFER [1974]; FIKKAN et al. [1993]).

Canada, like the ACPB's other signatories, assumed responsibility for the conservation and protection of the species within its jurisdiction. But Canada also recognized that it had an obligation to balance the agreement's conservation goals with the socioeconomic and cultural needs of its Inuit citizens. Among the indigenous peoples living in the five signing nations, only Canadian Inuit were provided with subsistence access to bears. The annual quota of about 440 (see Table 1) included the right by Inuit to assign a part of the allocation for use by non-Inuit sport hunters. (In contrast, Inuit-Inupiaq hunters in Greenland and Alaska were, and are, only permitted to hunt polar bears for subsistence.)

The early quota system was based on historic, mainly HBC, records of polar bear hides traded at various locations over the preceding several decades. This information was then averaged to establish a maximum harvest level for each of the Inuit communities in the then Northwest Territories (NWT). Any community with an approved local quota was, in turn, free

Table 1 NWT Community Polar Bear Quotas - 1973¹.

SETTLEMENT	QUOTA	ZONE ²
Tuktoyaktuk	14	24
Paulatuk	11	25
Coppermine ³	2	26
Bathurst Inlet	1	27
Cambridge Bay	10	29
Holman Island	12	
Sachs Harbour	18	30
Grise Fiord	27	31
Resolute Bay	34	
Pond Inlet	13	32
Arctic Bay	12	
Cape Christian ⁴	42 ⁵	
Pangnirtung	8	
Frobisher Bay ³	12	
Lake Harbour ³	7	
Broughton Island ³	16	
Cape Dorset	6	
Port Burwell ⁴	8	
Gjoa Haven	8	33
Igloolik	16	
Hall Beach	7	
Pelly Bay	10	
Repulse Bay	16	
Spence Bay ³	22	
Rankin Inlet	8	34
Eskimo Point ³	10	
Whale Cove	7	
Chesterfield Inlet	5	
Southampton Island ³	65	35
Belcher Islands ³	15	37
TOTAL QUOTA	442	

¹ In 1973 the Northwest Territories included all of what is now Nunavut and the Inuvialuit Settlement Area of the present NWT.

² Designated polar bear administrative sub-divisions; community activities, however, frequently overlapped zones.

³ These communities are now, respectively, Kugluktuk, Iqaluit, Kimmirut, Qikiqtarjuak, Taloyoak, Salliq, and Sanikiluaq.

⁴ Cape Christian and Port Burwell no longer exist as administrative or habitation sites; after 1976, Cape Christian area was renamed Clyde River.

⁵ Clyde's annual quota was increased to 45 animals ca.1976 and remained at that number until ca.1986.

to allocate a portion of its quota for sale to sport hunters. However, as will be discussed below, such activity was almost non-existent in the NWT during this period.

The ACPB, and its associated quota, was at most a partial factor affecting the relationship between Inuit and polar bears. At least as important were spatio-demographic and economic changes that occurred during this time.

By approximately 1965, following the near-complete centralization of local Inuit populations into regional centers, hunters found their spatial relationship to traditional resources considerably altered. As a partial result of these changed relationships, Inuit began to incorporate increasingly expensive imported tools into their hunting inventory. The most notable, and noticed, of these was the snowmobile, which rapidly replaced dog traction for winter terrestrial and marine hunting (see WENZEL [1991]).

The rapidity of this technological incorporation in the late 1960s and early 1970s is illustrated by data from Clyde River and Resolute Bay. At Clyde, the first Inuit-owned snowmobile appeared in 1964 and seven years later all but 10 of the 42 hunters in the community owned snowmobiles; by 1980, none of Clyde's hunters' were dependent on dogs [WENZEL 1991]. Similarly, by 1976, there was just one active dog team in the Resolute area, and this was at the distant outpost camp of Kuganiuk (more properly, Kuvinaluk, located at Creswell Bay, Somerset Island) [KEMP et al. 1977].

The changed spatial demography of Nunavut hunters *vis-à-vis* their wildlife base that made new modes of transport critical also had the effect of making the money needed to acquire these tools a subsistence factor. In this regard, two other changes, one immediate and the other delayed, enlarged the subsistence role of polar bears for Inuit and laid the ground for the commoditization of the species.

The most important of these was that by the mid-1960s, formerly undervalued northern products such as sealskins and polar bear hides became attractive to external markets. Beginning in 1963, prices for ringed sealskins grew from about Can\$1.00 at that time to nearly \$20.00 by 1980 (see JELLISS [1978]).

A similar market-price trend affected the value of polar bear hides, especially in the mid-1970s [SMITH and JONKEL 1975a, b; SMITH and STIRLING 1976]. At the beginning of the 1970s, hides typically were purchased at \$35.00-\$50.00 per foot (anonymous HBC Manager, personal communication 1972). By 1975, however, at the height of overseas demand from Japan and, to a lesser degree, (West) Germany, polar bear hides sometimes commanded as much as \$200.00 per foot [WENZEL n.d.] and the trade in hides became an increasingly important aspect of polar bear hunting. However, by 1980, the auction price of a polar bear stabilized at about half the mid-1970s level (generally \$75.00-\$100.00 per foot, depending on a hide's condition and when during the 'fur year' it was traded).

Non-Inuit interest in furs that formerly had only limited, if any, market gave Inuit access to the money that hunters needed to in order to obtain and operate the technologies which, after centralization, were essential to efficient harvesting. Thus, where the average income of Clyde hunters from combined seal and polar bear sales ca. 1972 was about \$1,400.00, in 1980 this was almost \$2,500.00, or about an eighty per cent increase [WENZEL 1991]. Moreover, hunters who enjoyed multiple polar bear kills in a year (several hunters had two, and even three bears) earned as much as \$4,000-6,000 in one year from the sale of polar bear hides [WENZEL n.d.].

5. THE CONTEMPORARY SPORT HUNT: 1985–2000

That the ACPB from its beginning included a sport hunt proviso for Canadian Inuit (a “Native-guided polar bear sport hunt” [FIKKAN et al. 1993: 100]) suggests that interest existed in such activity as early as the mid-1970s. However, as the available data [GOVERNMENT OF NUNAVUT 2002] show, polar bear sport hunting developed slowly during the 1970s in a few areas of the NWT and, even in the early 1980s, was far from extensive, typically accounting for only a few animals in each region relative to the local quotas. But these data also indicate that sport hunting underwent significant growth around the mid-1980s.

By then (see Tables 2 and 3; also Map. 1), non-Inuit hunting of polar bears as sport grew as both a percentage of community quotas and in overall economic terms. This increase, occurring shortly after the demise of the world sealskin market, suggests that Inuit saw sport hunting as a response to that market’s collapse rather than a sudden desire to “go commercial”.

To understand this, it is useful to ask why what is seen today as the most monetarily rationale use by Inuit of their community/regional polar bear quotas, or at least of a part of these quotas, did not occur before the mid-1980s. Again, a number of factors appear to bear on this. After all, the sport hunt exception for Canadian Inuit was present in the ACPB from its inception.

The most direct factor is that before the mid-1980s few communities in the NWT were routinely accessible via air transportation. Thus, it was virtually impossible for sport hunters (and other visitors) to reach those communities with regularity and reliability. Harvest data [GOVERNMENT OF NUNAVUT 2002] show one exception before the 1980s: the Mackenzie Delta-Beaufort Sea region of the then unified Northwest Territories.

Expectations of an oil and gas economic boom occurring by the mid-1970s prompted improved transportation services throughout the Mackenzie Delta-Beaufort Sea area before many other parts of Nunavut/NWT. Furthermore, because the MMPA had eliminated Alaska as a destination for polar bear sport hunters, the northwestern region of the NWT, as the most accessible area where non-Inuit could legally hunt the species, saw sport hunting develop earliest.

However, the most important action affecting the growth of sport polar bear hunting in Nunavut-Northwest Territories, especially in the Baffin and Kitikmeot regions, came in the late 1980s. The collapse of the sealskin sector of the subsistence economy, coupled with the interruption of narwhal ivory sales, severely disrupted the flow of monetary income available to hunters from wildlife products. As a deliberate effort to alleviate this impact, NWT authorities identified tourism, which included sport hunting and fishing, as one mechanism which would provide non-wage sector income and, thus, enhance local community economic development.

As a consequence, several programs for the training and certification of guides, followed shortly by programs for community-based outfitters, were developed by the NWT Department of Economic Development and Tourism (ED&T) and were even incorporated, albeit briefly, into the curriculum of Arctic College. In addition, the NWT Government, through ED&T, and Inuit business organizations, such as Nunasi Corp., provided start-up funding for sport hunt development. Finally, and perhaps most important with regard to the nature of the industry as

Table 2 Annual Polar Bear Quota and Sport Harvest, 1970–2000¹

Year	Communities	Annual Quota (AQ)	Sport Hunt	SH as % of AQ
1970	30	442	4	0.9
1971	29	"		0.0
1972	"	"	7	1.5
1973	"	"	5	1.1
1974	"	"	3	0.6
1975	"	"	0	0.0
1976	"	445 ²	5	1.1
1977	"	"	3	0.7
1978	"	"	6	1.3
1979	"	"	4	0.9
1970–79 TOTAL	29	4432	37	0.8
1980	"	445	3	0.7
1981	"	"	7	1.5
1982	"	"	17	3.8
1983	"	"	22	4.9
1984	"	"	32	7.2
1985	"	"	22	4.9
1986	"	427 ³	38	9.0
1987	"	"	56	13.1
1988	"	"	54	12.6
1989	"	"	56	13.1
1980–89 TOTAL	29	4418	307	7.0
1990 ⁴	"	427 ⁴	44	10.3
1991	"	"	50	11.7
1992	"	"	34	7.9
1993	"	"	32	7.5
1994	"	"	49	11.5
1995	"	"	86	20.1
1996	"	"	84	19.7
1997	"	"	92	21.5
1998	25 ⁵	400	63	15.7
1999	"	"	75	18.7
2000	"	"	65	16.2
1990–2000 TOTAL	25	4616	674	14.6
SUMMARY	—	13,466	1,018	7.6

¹ Source: Government of Nunavut 2002.² Circa 1976, the annual quota at Clyde River was raised from 42 to 45 animals.³ In 1986, the annual quota at Clyde River was reduced from 45 to 21 polar bears and that of Qikiqtaalruak (formerly Broughton Island) raised from 16 to 21 (see Davis 1999).⁴ From about 1990, NWT authorities responsible for polar bear management instituted a "flexible quota system"; in the absence of exact annual quota information for each community, the annual figure(s) provided should be viewed as being of the 'best guess' variety.⁵ In 1999, the quotas for Tuktoyaktuk, Paulatuk, Holman Island and Sachs Harbour were transferred from Nunavut to the NWT.

Table 3 NWT–Nunavut Polar Bear Zone¹ and Sport Hunts Data, 1970–2000

Year	Population Area, Annual Quota & Sport Harvest ^{2,3}										
	SH [15]	WH [25]	MC [43]	DS [35]	BB [58]	LS ⁴ [86]	FB [115]	SB [25]	NB [30]	GB [10]	VM ?
1970						1			3		
1971											
1972									7		
1973					3				2		
1974					1				2		
1975											
1976								5			
1977								1	2		
1978								1	4		1
1979									4		
1970–1979=37					4	1		7	24		1
1980				1					2		
1981				4			1		2		
1982				5		4	1		4		3
1983					1	4	2		8		7
1984				6	4	8		1	6		7
1985				6	1	10		1	3		1
1986 ⁶				5	2	15	4	1	8		3
1987				6	2	19	4	3	9	2	11
1988				4	4	15	8	1	8	3	11
1989				7	2	18	7	3	8	2	9
1980–1989=307				44	16	93	27	10	58	7	52
1990				7	3	18	4	1	5	2	4
1991			2	3	2	24	7	1	2	1	8
1992					7	21	1	1	3	1	
1993					4	20	4		1	3	
1994					5	25	7	3	2	7	
1995			5	3	9	27	11	14	12	5	
1996			8	7	15	28	3	9	8	6	
1997		2	16		8	28	3	19	12	4	
1998		3	12		6	27		7	3	5	
1999		2	9		7	28	3	16	6	4	
2000			13	2	12	28	2			4	4
1990–2000=674		7	65	22	78	274	45	71	54	42	16
SUMMARY=1,018		7	65	66	99	368	82	88	145	49	69


Source: Government of Nunavut 2002.

¹ The area designations are those presently used to identify distinct polar bear population groupings; these are, respectively, Southern Hudson Bay, Western Hudson Bay, McClintock Channel, Davis Strait, Baffin Bay, Lancaster Sound, Foxe Basin, Southern Beaufort Sea, Northern Beaufort Sea, Gulf of Boothia and Viscount Melville Sound. (N.B. The polar bear zones shown in Table 1 are in many cases today divided into several population areas [i.e., Zone 32, formerly all of Baffin Island, is now divided between Areas BB, FB, DS and LS; likewise Grise Fiord's annual quota is split between three areas: Norwegian Bay, Kane Basin and Lancaster Sound].).

² Annual population area quotas shown (BB/58) have been derived from the sum of the quotas of those communities hunting each area.

³ Population areas may show considerable variation in annual level of sport hunt activity; such change may relate to the “flexible quota” system adopted for management and conservation in the 1990s, or because the biological data suggest the need to reduce or halt harvesting.

⁴ Subsumed here under Lancaster Sound are the Norwegian Bay and Kane Basin areas, both of which are used exclusively by Grise Fiord.



Map 1 Study Sites: Clyde River, Resolute, and Taloyoak

it exists in Nunavut today, contacts with southern big game hunt wholesalers expanded.

As economically attractive as sport hunting may have been, its expansion even after the sealskin crash was slow. Clyde River once again offers an example. There, intense community discussion was conducted from 1985 and 1987 before a majority of the members of the Hunters and Trappers Association chose to allocate two of the 21 polar bears [see DAVIS 1999] in the annual quota to visiting sport hunters. While such reticence was not necessarily the case in every community, it does underscore how deliberate the decision by Inuit in some communities to accept sport hunting was.

It also suggests that Inuit decision making with regard to the consumptive use of wildlife involved cultural, as well as economic and recreational, considerations. That this is the case is of particular relevance with regard to the development of sport hunting as an economic opportunity in at least one of the study communities discussed here. Economics are important, but so is culture.

The present situation in Nunavut is that polar bear sport hunting offers the opportunity for individual Inuit and their communities to obtain considerably larger sums of scarce money than is possible through more traditional (the sale of furs) or "green" (non-consumptive ecotourism) means. As a business, the sport hunt is a fairly recent development. However, for those Inuit whose whole occupation is harvesting, the income obtained through guiding visitor-hunters is critical to their overall subsistence involvement. The most obvious aspect of the sport hunt's economic importance is for the purchase and maintenance of hunting equipment (see below) without requiring the diversion of valuable time to petty wage opportunities. However, these monies are also important to meet the general costs that are now part of daily village life.


The Case Communities

The research upon which this paper is based is drawn from three communities in Nunavut (Map 2) that currently host sport polar bear hunting, or have done so in the recent past. These are Clyde River and Resolute Bay, both in the Qikiqtaaluk (Baffin) Region, and Taloyoak in the Kitikmeot (Central Arctic Coast) Region. Each provides an example of one type or another of the conflicts experienced by Inuit as they attempt to utilize polar bear sport hunting as an element in the local subsistence resource repertoire of each community.

5.1. Clyde River or Kangirtugaapik

Clyde River is located on the east coast of Baffin Island (70°27'N., 68°38'W.), about 750 km north-northwest of Iqaluit. Recent population projections for the community show that some 770 Inuit reside in Clyde. This figure, however, is projected from 1996 Statistics Canada census data; the present population (June 2003) is estimated by the local housing authority [Anonymous, Personal Communication] to be no less than 870.

The main maritime area of importance to Clyde hunters is Baffin Bay (see FREEMAN [1976]; RIEWE [1992]) and it is the Baffin Bay polar bear population that is principally exploited, and shared with Pond Inlet and Qikiqtarjuak, by hunters from the community. Clyde Inuit once ranged for polar bear along some 750km of this coast, from as far north as Cape Adair and Buchan Gulf to Cape Hooper-southern Home Bay. However, following the substantial reduction in the community's polar bear quota - from 45 to 20 animals - in the mid-1980s [DAVIS 1999],



Map 2 Major Canadian Polar Bear Population Areas. (Source: Taylor and Lee 1995.)

most subsistence hunting of bear by Clyde Inuit is now concentrated in fiords and between Eglinton Fiord and Henry Kater Peninsula (or within 150 km of the settlement). The 2000–2001 quota was 21 animals (14 males/7 females).

At present, Clyde has seven active dog teams, three accredited outfitters who book sport hunters, eight trained guides (including two of the outfitters) and a number of other men who have found work in the past several years either as sport hunt guides or as supply assistants. The yearly allocation of polar bear tags to the sport hunt is done through the Namautaq Hunter and Trappers Organization (HTOs have this responsibility throughout Nunavut).

Namautaq maintains the subsistence hunt via a community-wide lottery. However, decisions about sport hunting, to include the percentage of the community quota available to the sport hunt and the number of sport tags to each outfitter, is made through a general meeting of the HTO membership. In 2000–2001, ten of twenty-one tags were distributed among the three outfitters for their clientele. Clyde, unlike either of the other study communities, not only has multiple outfitters, but these outfitters receive their hunt clients from several southern expeditors.

5.2. Resolute (Originally Resolute Bay)

Resolute lies on the southern tip of Cornwallis Island (74°41'N., 94°54'W.). There are 165 Inuit residents who live in the new village (relocated from the original village site ca. 1975) approximately 8 km southwest of the airport-base. Resolute alone among the study communities is accessible by air service directly from southern Canada.

Resolute hunters pursue polar bear within about a 400 km radius from the community, going as far eastward as Radstock and Maxwell Bays on Devon Island, north around both sides of Cornwallis Island into Wellington and Queens Channels, and south across Barrow Strait into Prince Regent Inlet and Peel Sound (see RIEWE [1992]). All of these locales are within the Lancaster Sound bear population area. During the 1980s, when outpost camps existed on Prince of Wales and Somerset Islands, Resolute Inuit ranged even further south and west [KEMP et al. 1977]. Although Lancaster Sound polar bears are shared with hunters from Arctic Bay and Grise Fiord, the population region is so large that there is essentially no overlap in the efforts of the three communities.

Resolute possesses one of the highest community polar bear quotas (35 bears [24 males/11 females] in 2000–2001) in Nunavut. In essence, each Resolute household has the potential opportunity to hunt a polar bear in a given year—a situation almost unknown in other locales.

Resolute has five guides and dog team owners in the community, including its one active hunt outfitter. The HTO executive committee allocates all the polar bear tags through a lottery system open to any individual who is a member of the organization. It also designates the number of tags from the overall allocation that may be sold to the local outfitter for sport hunt use, who then purchases lottery-distributed tags from their individual holders. Until 1998, the HTO was the main polar bear outfitter in Resolute. However, since then, a private outfitting firm owned by an Inuk (the sole active outfitter) receives all hunter clients through an arrangement with a single southern wholesaler.

5.3. Taloyoak (Formerly Spence Bay)

Taloyoak lies on the west side of Boothia Isthmus (69°32'N., 93°32'W.). The community is officially listed (Nunavut Statistics 2000, as projected from the 1996 federal census) as having 747 Inuit residents, but the Senior Administrative Officer [Personal Communication, May 2001] placed the number at about 900. Scheduled air service to the community is available from Yellowknife, N.W.T., and Rankin Inlet-Baker Lake.

Taloyoak in 2000–2001 had a community polar bear quota of 19 animals, which was divided between two population areas—McClintock Channel (4: 3 males/1 female) and Gulf of Boothia (15 bears: 10M/5F). However, the community is not the sole harvester of bears in either area, sharing McClintock Channel with Gjoa Haven (2000–01 quota: 4) and Cambridge Bay (4), and sharing Gulf of Boothia with Kugaruk (2000–2001 quota: 15), Hall Beach (1), Iqloolik (7) and Repulse Bay (3).

Taloyoak's 2000–2001 overall quota of nineteen animals represented a significant reduction from the community's previous official base allocation of 27 bears [GOVERNMENT OF NUNAVUT 2002]. This reduction had its genesis in the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service imposing MMPA sanctions on polar bear products from the McClintock Channel area. Since the MMPA prohibition, Nunavut's Department of Sustainable Development (*ibid.*) has recommended that a moratorium be placed on both subsistence and sport bear hunting from all three communities into the Channel.

There are nine dog teams in Taloyoak. The HTO executive committee makes decisions about the number of polar bear tags to allocate for sport hunting and the HTO acts as the local outfitter and hunt expeditor, contracting for clients with a Yellowknife-based wholesaler. All local aspects of polar bear hunting at Taloyoak are managed through the Hunters and Trappers Organization. By the HTO members decision, prior to the 2000–2001 polar bear season, the community quota was split between the Gulf of Boothia population area, which was hunted only by Inuit, and McClintock Channel, which the community has essentially "reserved" for polar bear sport hunt activity originating from Taloyoak.

5.4. Inter-Community Summary

Table 4 summarizes some of the salient elements of the sport hunt and its products across the study communities. As the table shows, Taloyoak and Clyde River are very similar to each other, primarily because in 2000 each allocated the same number of bears to the sport hunt. The main notable differences between the two are in the price received by local outfitters and in the value of the polar bear meat that enters each community.

This first difference relates simply to the fact that Clyde's outfitters receive a higher price per bear hunt from the wholesale agents they deal with than did the Taloyoak Hunters and Trappers Association the last year that they were permitted a sport hunt. The other principal difference, the monetary replacement value that can be imputed to the bear meat "byproduct" that enters each community, is substantially higher for Clyde than for Taloyoak because at Clyde polar bear meat is a popular human food, while in Taloyoak the main use for bear meat is as dog food (see Table 4, Note 6). Thus, the replacement value of bear meat differs between these two communities because of the higher cost of imported meats that would be used versus the cost of imported dog food in Taloyoak.

Table 4 SUMMARY OF POLAR BEAR SPORT HUNT ATTRIBUTES¹

GENERAL ATTRIBUTES	CLYDE RIVER	RESOLUTE	TALOYOAK
A) Annual Polar Bear Quota	21	35	20
B) Annual Sport Hunts	10	20	10
C) Local Outfitters	3 (private)	1 (private)	1 (community)
D) Wholesale Hunt Price ²	\$30,000	\$34,500	\$34,500
E) Local Outfitter Price ³	\$18,400	\$19,000	\$13,000
LOCAL DISTRIBUTION			
F) Guides/Helpers	10/10	5/9	5/9
G) Total Guides' Wages	\$51,000	\$180,000	\$47,300
H) Total Helpers' Wages	\$41,000	\$100,000	\$38,200
I) Gratuities	ave. \$1,800	ave. \$2,300	ave. \$1,500
J) Equipment Capitalization ⁴	\$42,000	\$ 34,000	Unknown
K) Polar Bear Meat (kg)	2,000	6,400	2,000
L) PB Meat \$ Value ⁵	\$17,000	\$54,400	\$10,000 ⁶

¹ Not factored are fees to polar bear tag holders, additional charter or scheduled airline fares, local purchases of arts and handicrafts, and the cost of hunt consumables (food).

² Total fee paid to southern broker by the individual hunter for his/her hunt (CDNS).

³ Contract fee between southern-based wholesaler and local outfitters.

⁴ These data refer to equipment purchased with sport hunt wages and are only partial.

⁵ Based on \$8.50 per kg of imported meat (averaged across the communities).

⁶ As polar bear meat is generally used for dog fodder at Taloyoak, the value imputed to the meat entering the community is based on the price of imported dry dog food.

There is also another seeming anomaly between these two communities. That is, even though Clyde receives a substantially higher price per hunt (\$18,400 versus \$13,000, a 30 per cent difference), the total of guides' and helpers wages' in each community is similar. This similarity relates to the fact that in Taloyoak the HTO essentially operates the community's sport hunt with the intent of only a small net monetary profit, while in Clyde (and Resolute) the outfitting has been privatized. Stated another way, the Taloyoak HTO seeks to maximize the proportion of hunt monies reaching those who work on the hunt.

Resolute stands out from either of the other study sites for the obvious reason that there, many more bears from the annual quota are designated to the sport hunt (equaling the combined allocations of the other two). Thus, the cash that enters the community is substantially higher than for either Taloyoak or Clyde. In turn, the wages paid to sport hunt workers in Resolute are approximately twice those paid at Clyde or Taloyoak, but, as at Clyde, the local outfitter retains a considerably larger percentage of fees than in Taloyoak.

In most other respects the sport hunts in these communities are much alike. However, there is one other important socioeconomic difference between Resolute and the other two communities. This is that Resolute enjoys a generally lower degree of under/unemployment, a circumstance

that is partly related to its former status as an important transportation node for High Arctic non-renewable resource exploration. Moreover, many members of the Inujjamiut segment of Rolute Inuit were awarded a substantial compensation payment as "Arctic Exiles" (see ROYAL COMMISSION ON ABORIGINAL PEOPLES [1994]).

6. CONTRIBUTION TO SUBSISTENCE

...a subsistence economy is a highly specialized mode of production and distribution of not only goods and services, but of social forms... [LONNER 1980: 5]

A detailed discussion of the economy of modern Nunavut is well beyond the scope of this paper. Suffice it to say that, other than in the Nunavut's capital, Iqaluit, the term "subsistence", as it is used by Lonner, accurately describes the situation for many Nunavummiut.

In general, the economic reality of Nunavut's small communities is that Inuit live in a mixed economy (sometimes less accurately termed a dual one) in which traditional and non-traditional resources—wild foods and money—must necessarily be integrated. This is because traditional foods are relatively plentiful, if demanding, to capture, while money is relatively scarce and, in terms of nutrition, buys very little. On the other hand, money remains important because if traditional resources are to be captured effectively (see WENZEL [1991]), then even the most traditional hunter must have sufficient money to operate and maintain, not to mention periodically renew, a complex and expensive set of tools, including snowmobiles and firearms.

To link the idea of traditional hunting (and hunters) in the same sentence with snowmobiles and rifles, not to mention money, may seem dichotomous, yet a judicious mixing of these resources in fact offers Inuit optimal economic opportunity. In fact, this optimal economy is the mixing of Inuit culture and modern economics and was succinctly and well summarized by Fienup-Riordan [1986: 314] when she observed that "... (monetary income) is... the means to accomplish and facilitate the harvest, and not an end in itself".

As such, the economy of Nunavummiut remains very much a traditional one in terms of its goals (as the quotation from Lonner makes clear). This is not to say that money is as easily or neatly integrated into the subsistence system as traditional foods (see WENZEL [2000] for a discussion of problems affecting the sharing of money). However, as WENZEL and WHITE [2000] point out, to a degree Inuit economic structures have achieved some incorporation, albeit primarily within the central economic unit, the extended family.

However, this appears to be a much less balanced process than with food because of the scarcity of money, the expensive nature of the things (including food) that can be purchased in local stores, and the social costs that almost always affect allocation. Hence, any activity that allows harvesters to access money directly without the opportunity costs associated with typical wage employment or the social tensions that sometimes attend the sharing of cash is important.

The polar bear sport hunt does this without the costs noted above. Essentially, the hunt does two things. First, it injects large sums of new (versus transferred) money into participating Nunavut communities. Second, it places a considerable portion of this new money directly into

Table 5 Sport Hunt Benefits¹

Community	"Workers" ²	Person Days	Wages	Cash Tips	Equipment ³	Country Food ⁴
Clyde	10	178	\$92,000	\$16,845	\$6,000	\$14,000 (10)
Resolute	12	356	\$280,000	\$33,690	\$12,000	\$28,000 (20)
Taloyoak	10	162	\$85,500	\$9,000	???	\$10,000 (10)

¹ These data relate to the Spring 2000 hunt season.

² Includes guides and hunt assistants (N.B.: data on person days, wages and cash and in-kind gratuities include both categories of "workers").

³ Estimate of the value of received items.

⁴ Estimated cost of edible biomass recovered if purchased at \$10.00 per kg.

the hands of those Inuit who are the most intensive harvesters and who also possess fewer of the linguistic skills needed for most modern wage positions.

As Table 5 indicates, the returns to individuals and communities that participate in the sport polar bear hunt are by no means small. In gross terms, a guide from Clyde River can potentially receive up to \$7,250.00 from a hunt and it is not uncommon for a man to guide twice (occasionally three times) in a season.

In Resolute, each guide works four hunts, and in Taloyoak usually two. In addition, the general population of sport hunt communities receives at least some amount of polar bear meat (the Clyde sport hunt provides the community with approximately 2,000kg.) Furthermore, while it is the case that the polar bear hunt itself demands a considerable investment of time away from the community, even a full term hunt (most hunts have a maximum length of ten days) sees a guide earn an hourly wage of roughly \$30.00.

A considerable portion of the money earned by guides and helpers is invested in renewing or maintaining harvesting equipment. After the 2000 sport hunt ended at Clyde River, hunt guides and helpers purchased at least three new snowmobiles (approx. \$23,000.00 total), an all-terrain vehicle (\$7,200.00), a 90 hp outboard engine (\$11,000.00), and a used freighter canoe (\$1,800.00). These purchases both insured the ability of these men to carry out other types of harvesting activities and relieved members of their respective economic networks from having to provide funds for these purchases.

7. CONFLICTS

It is frequently said that the system that has been constructed for the international management and conservation of polar bear through the ACPB is one of the most comprehensive of that for any arctic species in terms of its regulatory coverage, monitoring, enforcement and adherence. While this system has experienced some erosion in the last decade due to lapses in monitoring in the Russian Arctic following the collapse of the USSR, Canada has paid particular attention to creating a regime that balances consumptive use with the larger goal of resource sustainability. In short, when a conflict arises between use and conservation, the latter takes regulatory precedence.

It will come as no surprise that some of the most serious conflicts concerning Inuit and

the polar bear sport hunt (and, to a lesser degree, subsistence use) are inter-cultural, originating in the control exogenous agencies exert in both the policy and economic spheres of the relationship between Inuit and *nanuk*. Problems that have been experienced at Clyde River and Taloyoak relate very much to policy decisions taken by agencies without the engagement of Inuit in those communities in any consultative process.

The degree to which non-Inuit, especially the small group of southern wholesalers who supply clients to Inuit, exert control over the economics of the hunt presents another level of conflict. Further, while the core matter here is how much of the hunt fee charged by these wholesalers actually reaches the Inuit, the situation is exacerbated by conflicts within communities that have no direct relation to inter-cultural issues related to non-Inuit and the sport hunt *per se*. Rather, these have their origin in other outside-induced circumstances. The situation at Resolute, where the community is composed of two socially different sub-groups brought together by politico-historical circumstance (see MARCUS [1992]; ROYAL COMMISSION ON ABORIGINAL PEOPLE [1994]), illustrates this aspect of economic conflict relating to the hunt.

The final conflict level is one that is quintessentially cultural, relating to different perceptions held by Inuit about the relationship between polar bear and Inuit (and, indeed, all humans). *Data from Clyde will be presented to explicate this fundamental level of conflict.*

Before discussing these various conflicts, it should be noted that their identification is based on observations and interviews conducted over a two-year period. Thus, it is possible, and even probable, that none, excepting those that relate explicitly to the exogenous control of polar bears (whether by formal policy decisions or economic arrangement), are constant or endemic. Some are clearly situational and possibly limited to the period of the research.

7.1. Taloyoak and Regulatory Conflict

Inter-cultural conflicts around the sport hunt almost invariably involve issues relating to the way the basic management of the species is conducted. The situation of Taloyoak provides a trenchant example of this type of conflict, although a number of other communities have also had similar experience.

Briefly, Taloyoak, which only undertook polar bear sport hunting in the mid-1990s, had its hunt shut down after the 2000 season. (In fact, the three communities that jointly exploit the McClintock Channel polar bear population, Gjoa Haven, Cambridge Bay and Taloyoak, saw their sport and subsistence hunts halted.) The reason for this was that statistical analysis of the number of survey marked animals appearing as a percentage of the overall harvest from the area suggested that far fewer bears were present than had been assumed when the current quota had been established. On the basis of this analysis, the estimate for the McClintock Channel population was revised downward from 850–900 bears to a ceiling of no more than 250 animals.

These data, when reviewed by the United States Fish and Wildlife Service as part of its periodic review of the status of various species and populations included under the Marine Mammal Protection Act, resulted in that agency excluding McClintock Channel polar bear hides from importation to the United States. As a result, American hunters, who up to 2,000 had formed the whole of Taloyoak's clientele, ceased to book hunts for the area.

The data on depletion and the subsequent United States Fish and Wildlife Services's action

also caused concern within the wildlife section of Nunavut's Department of Sustainable Development, which responded by imposing a moratorium on all polar bear hunting in McClintock Channel. Because Taloyoak, unlike the other affected communities, has no other area in which to shift its sport hunt (sport hunt rights in the Gulf of Boothia are reserved for outfitters based in Kugaruk), the combined effect of the embargo and moratorium for Taloyoak meant the loss of some \$95,000.00 in guide and hunt assistant wages and nearly \$15,000.00 in polar bear meat.

The chief point of conflict in this particular case is that the original analysis that ultimately precipitated the moratorium-embargo was not discussed with the communities before these regulatory decisions were taken. Especially irksome to the Inuit is that no effort was made to incorporate or even elicit their knowledge and observations about trends in the McClintock Channel bear population at any point in the analysis or in the decision process.

Clyde also experienced similar difficulties when it underwent a drastic reduction in its polar bear quota on the basis of a similar analysis [see DAVIS 1999], having its annual quota reduced from 45 to 21 animals. One of the problems in this regard relates to the fact that it shares the Baffin Bay polar bear population not only with two other Nunavut communities, but also with a number of Greenland communities. While Nunavut and other agencies see the Baffin Bay polar bear population as stable, the fact that Greenland has not developed a management plan for its portion of the area has caused the U.S.F.&W.S. to bar polar bear trophies from this shared zone. Clyde still hosts a sport hunt, drawing clients from Europe, the Middle East and Mexico, but is in essence closed to American hunters until some accommodation on management of Baffin Bay bears is reached with Greenland.

7.2. Socioeconomic Relations in Resolute

Resolute developed sport hunting as a major component of its economy in the late 1980s in part as a response to reductions in local wage-labor opportunities. By 2000, nearly sixty percent of Resolute's annual quota was allocated to sport hunting.

While the hunt began as a sporadic endeavour by several community elders circa 1979, it increased gradually but steadily when the Resolute Hunter and Trappers Association (HTA) undertook its management circa 1990. Under this management system, the HTA attempted to spread both the cash and in-kind economic benefits from the hunt across the community. However, in 1998, a change in the executive board of the association, now designated the Resolute Hunter and Trappers Organization (with the Nunavut Agreement, what were formerly termed HTAs were re-designated as HTOs) led to the transfer of control of the sport hunt to an outfitting firm owned by a member of the Resolute's largest extended family.

This move to privatization was prompted by several factors. The first was that the outfitting firm had developed a contract with a southern Canadian wholesaler at a significantly higher rate of remuneration per hunt (\$19,000 vs. \$14,000). A second was that he and the relatives who would guide for him owned all of the dog teams in Resolute. Third, with the higher contract rate, community members who relinquished their polar bear tags (\$2,000 per tag) received greater monetary compensation. This last was (and remains) markedly different than the HTO operation in which part of the quota was directly allocated to the sport hunt and the HTO retained any surplus over costs.

By the end of the second year of the new outfitter-controlled operation, however, a large segment of the community expressed dissatisfaction with the system. On the surface, the stated cause of the resentment was that the outfitter's family members were the recipients of most of the sports hunt monies. However, it also became evident that Inuit descended from Resolute's northern Québec relocatees experienced the private system as one that limited their participation in the sport hunt.

The understood reason for this was that former Inujjamiut had received considerable compensation as a settlement from the "Arctic Exiles" controversy (see ROYAL COMMISSION ON ABORIGINAL PEOPLE [1994]). Thus, they should not be directly included in the sport hunt. Not surprisingly, this situation was, and remains, contentious, with the non-Québec majority group resolved to exclude those who have received compensation, and the minority Québec-derived Inuit threatening to withhold any polar bear tags they acquire through the lottery system from the outfitter.

7.3. Clyde River: Hunting Inuktitut

The final management issue-conflict type relates to the propriety of polar bear sport hunting and, moreover, of overt or interventionist management. This is an issue that has recently surfaced at Clyde River, but has, in fact, underlain internal community discussions since the mid-1980s and was present in the early 1970s. It reflects a perception within a part of the community that sport hunting and indeed efforts at conservation-management are antithetical to the relationship between people and polar bears.

Doubts among Clyde Inuit about the efficacy of management, as it was developed in the Canadian Arctic following the ACPB, were first noted in 1973 [WENZEL n.d.]. At this time, discussion by hunters, and especially elders, about the recently established quota system did not focus on its limit (45 animals when in some years the take was more than 60) and, thus, a consequent reduction in trade income. Rather, the heart of the discussion was about the implied presumption that people could unilaterally influence animal behavior, in this case by taking fewer animals than chose to make themselves available. Secondarily, it was felt that the establishment of a quota—and indeed even a population census—would make polar bears think that hunters were bragging about their own prowess and were being disrespectful to *nanuq*. Such human behavior would cause the animals to move to areas where humans would be respectful.

Despite these expressions of dissatisfaction, over the next decade Clyde hunters adhered, with only the occasional exception, to the polar bear regulations (e.g., open vs. closed hunting seasons, avoiding killing females with cubs less than two years of age, hunting at denning sites). In 1985, however, Northwest Territories biologists determined that the Clyde area had become a polar bear "sink," as evidenced by a harvest that was composed of animals attracted to Clyde because the local bear population was so reduced [DAVIS 1999]. The quota reduction that resulted, from 45 to 21 bears, was seen locally as tacit proof of the concerns that were expressed in the 1970s.

The sharp reduction in Clyde's annual quota also had an economic impact, coming so soon after the collapse of the sealskin market. Accordingly, the community undertook extended discussions, beginning in 1985 and lasting into 1987, about the costs and benefits of a polar

bear sport hunt. At this time, ideational relations were again widely discussed, but in 1987 the community chose to contract for visitor-hunters, with a quota of two polar bear sport hunts that year, and increasing to ten by in 2001–2002.

During much of this time (1987–2002), decisions concerning the numbers of tags allocated to sport hunters and the outfitting of their hunts rested with the Hunter and Trappers Organization. In 1997, however, a Clyde Inuk already established as an ecotourist guide expanded into polar bear sport hunt outfitting, having persuaded the HTO to allocate three tags to his new operation (initially he drew clients through the same southern wholesaler as did the HTO). By 2002, the number of private outfitters (all Inuit run) in Clyde was four.

The presence of so many outfitters in the community and the availability of so few sport tags meant intense competition for clients. This vying for clients, in turn, increasingly came to be seen in the community as potentially offensive to polar bears. Because of this possibility, the HTO membership decided that in 2003 the sport allocation would be reduced to five animals and that the Hunters and Trappers Organization would be the sole outfitter.

The HTO's re-acquisition of the sport hunt is recognized as an economic blow to the individuals who invested energy and capital as outfitters (anonymous Clyde Inuk, personal communication 2002). However, a small number of long-term opponents to the sport hunt (because of the goal of a trophy) and to the regulatory regime (because of its perceived arrogance toward animals), persuaded a majority of HTO members that this economic situation, though detrimental to the outfitters, is preferable to further deterioration of human-animal relations at Clyde.

8. CONCLUSIONS

At first glance, polar bear hunting, and especially polar bear sport hunting, might appear to have little to offer by way of insight about resource co-management. After all, polar bear hunting, as far as it extends, is conducted under an international convention welcomed by all of its signing parties, and as far as Nunavut and Canadian Inuit generally are concerned, within a regulatory framework that has both flexibility and backbone. In no small sense, no species, possibly excepting the bowhead whale, is as intensively managed in terms of its use and conservation in Nunavut or the circumpolar world as is the polar bear. Yet, there are several important "lessons" to be gleaned from the way the sport hunt aspect of the Inuit-polar bear relationship has evolved.

The first is that the kind of maximizing behavior that Inuit might be expected to practice, given their recent economic history, is by no means evident. Despite being highly constrained with respect to their ability to generate and control the monetized component of the modern economy, Inuit have shown themselves to be optimizers with respect to the one activity able to significantly affect this situation.

At present, due in no small part to the way the polar bear sport hunt industry was introduced, Inuit receive barely one-half (<\$1.5 million) of the monies actually paid (approx. \$2.9 million) by visitor-hunters to Nunavut. Still, as indicated earlier, this \$1,500,000.00 for the most part goes directly into the hands of Inuit who lack most other means of accessing "new money," and so has social importance beyond its strict economic effect.

It is germane to note that Inuit, although free to assign 100% should they wish, allocate barely 25% of the legal harvest in any year to sport hunting. This obvious non-maximizing approach to the one “commodity” able to generate significant monetary income from the application of traditional Inuit skills (see WENZEL and BOURGOUIN [2002]) suggests that the cultural value Inuit place on *nanuq* is decidedly more important than the economic return polar bears might provide.

The second point that should be emphasized is that even as highly (and wisely) managed as polar bear are in Nunavut, conflicts arise with disconcerting frequency. Related to this, while the most visible and strident of these disagreements are between Inuit and management agencies, there is also friction among Inuit about polar bear exploitation and use. These range from issues of economic access at the local community level of Inuit involvement in the hunt to deeply felt cultural matters concerning the propriety of such an activity.

That disagreement occurs between Inuit and non-Inuit over polar bear, despite inordinate flexibility in the regulatory system, should not be surprising. As liberally applied, if not necessarily constructed, as this system is, it is one in which Inuit and Nunavummiut neither had original input, nor have significant input. Indeed, because the ACPB is an international accord, decisions of the other signatories, and especially the United States (through the MMPA, but see also Greenland with its lack of management strategy), much to the perplexity of Inuit, affect the relationship between Inuk and bear across Nunavut. Furthermore, the fact that the traditional knowledge of those with by far the longest experience with polar bear is rarely incorporated in any effectively meaningful way into the regulatory system or its science exacerbates conflict at this level.

The social and economic conflict illustrated by the situation at Resolute, while somewhat unique because of that community's particular history, is by no means absent from other communities where sport hunting is in place. And as obvious as the roots of this type of dispute may seem—unequal distribution of a scarce resource—resolution may be far from easy.

This is because family, and more exactly the *ilagiit* or extended family, is, in fact, the traditional unit of economic production and consumption among Eastern Arctic Inuit (see DAMAS [1972]; WENZEL [1981, 1995, 2000]). Thus, even without its particular history, the intra-societal conflict seen at Resolute is often replayed between families in other communities.

Probably the least tractable of the conflicts discussed here is that found in Clyde River. It is also the one that is most difficult to explain, given that its roots are exactly in the kind of ideational-symbolic relations between Inuit and the polar bear referred to at the start of this paper, and which I said were not its subject.

In point of fact, there is no intent here toward explanation, not least because any such attempt is unlikely to do other than trivialize what is clearly an important, if not the most important, issue regarding the polar bear sport hunt. What can be said, however, is that the cultural dilemma described from Clyde River is not one that is of the either-or variety, nor one that will, or even can disappear. Rather it is an ongoing dialogue that rises and diminishes in response to cultural and social, as well as economic, dynamics in the communities.

In closing, it is clear that polar bear management and the conflicts that arise from it are multi-layered and by no means limited to a “simple” Inuit-outsider dichotomization of the resource and its use. Indeed, with regard to use, this is much an issue between Inuit and is

contested in a uniquely cultural realm. (This is not to say that something akin to the anti-sealing controversy of the 1970s and 1980s could not occur, but I suspect that a "Save the Polar Bear" campaign would meet with less success).

Interestingly, if the matter of best, if not wise, use were strictly the province of non-Inuit wildlife managers and economic planners, Nunavut Inuit might be encouraged to take full economic advantage of their quotas. In such a case, better use would mean allocating more, if not all, of an annual quota to the sport hunt, since even at the current overall price per hunt (approximately Can \$35,000), such a practice would inject as much as \$14 million into Nunavut's cash-poor communities. It is thus no small irony that Inuit culture provides something of a brake on even wider economic exploitation of polar bear.

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