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Doxography and Perspectivism in Premodern India: How is it Possible to be Neutral?

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1. Introduction

This paper elucidates the notion of neutrality held by the people of premodern India, which is attested in Jain philosophical texts, characterized as “doxography.” First, I must explain why the problem of neutrality was chosen as this paper’s subject. When I first heard of “peaceful development,” I had extreme doubts about the topic, thinking that development is unlikely to be peaceful. Are not peace and development two contradictory concepts? This skepticism might not be difficult to understand for those familiar with Indian thought, particularly its ancient form. It is the *pravṛtti-nivṛtti* contradiction that comes to mind when hearing of the “peaceful development” concept. As Greg Bailey (1985: 17) observes, “The ancient Indians considered the words *pravṛtti* and *nivṛtti* to refer both to a distinctive ideology and the life-style informed by that ideology.” Moreover, Bailey presents the following description taken from the *Mahābhārata* 13,129.16–28, which includes “the central features of both ideologies”:

The norm characterized by *pravṛtti* is intended for householders. It is auspicious for all beings, therefore I will speak about it.

For one who is desirous of prosperity, gifts should repeatedly be given within the limits of one’s capacity. And one should sacrifice repeatedly and perform the rite of prosperity. The supreme *dharma* must be enacted zealously by humans. In conformity with *dharma*, wealth should be collected and that money which is obtained in accord with *dharma* can be distinguished in three ways. With one portion [of the money] the person desirous of prosperity should cultivate the interests of *dharma*, with another portion the interests of sense indulgence (*kāma*) and one portion should be made to accumulate.

Another norm is characterized by *nivṛtti* and it is called «liberation» (*mokṣa*). I will tell you about its associated life-style... For those who desire liberation, the *dharma* of loosening the bonds of desire is approved, as also [the practice] of not residing in the same village [every night] and compassion towards all beings. Nor should there be attachment to a bowl, to water, nor to the three staves [of an ascetic], nor to a bed, nor to a fire, nor to a place of refuge.

He [the ascetic] is one whose intellect is always directed towards the soul, is one who

is absorbed in Brahma, intent upon Brahma and continually occupied with *yoga* and the analysis of matter (*sāmkhyā*). Always sleeping at the base of a tree, camping in deserted houses and resting on sandbanks in rivers, he holds no fondness for river banks.

[Hence] that twice-born one is freed from all attachments and the bonds of affection. He is wholly occupied with the nature of the self and wanders around [absorbed] only in the self. He becomes motionless, fasts in accord with the ritual appropriate for liberation and wanders around controlled. He is the eternal *dharma*...

Such is the *dharma* of the knower of *mokṣa* which is described in the Vedas...¹⁾. (Bailey 1985: 19–20)

The literal meaning of *pravṛtti* is “act of going forward.” The noun derived from the verb *pra-vṛt-*, which implies “activity oriented towards external attempts.” Contrary to *pravṛtti*, *nivṛtti* is an “act of returning and stopping,” derived from *ni-vṛt-*. It implies “abandonment or cessation of all activity.”²⁾ As Bailey summarizes:

The description of *pravṛtti* centres on the value and uses of wealth and it connects wealth with the sacrifice. Wealth is not acquired merely for the sake of accumulation as in the West, but to sustain the universe via the custom of gift-exchange, *Nivṛtti* here is quite the opposite of this. Its ideology and associated life-style is quite simply attuned to the attainment of *mokṣa*. Everything is rendered subservient to this one goal.” (Bailey 1985: 20)

It therefore follows, as a matter of course, that “development” falls into the category of *pravṛtti* and “peace” into the category of *nivṛtti*. Peace and development are clearly contradictory, and “one cannot adhere to the one without abandonment of the other” (Bailey 1985: 20). Put in the strongest terms, then, peace cannot be achieved without abandoning development, and development cannot be accomplished without abandoning peace. Were this the conclusion of my paper, I could regrettably contribute no more to this topic.

Anyway, I should discuss why I chose to consider neutrality. By attentively reading the above -quoted passage taken from the *Mahābhārata* by Bailey, one might notice that *pravṛtti* and *nivṛtti* are construed as alternatives: *pravṛtti* is intended for householders who desire prosperity and *nivṛtti* for ascetics who desire liberation. That the two terms are alternatives means not only that they are mutually exclusive but also that each can be neutral when regarded from the different perspective of the other. Indeed, householders and ascetics, holding mutually different perspectives, live together harmoniously in India. Thus, a householder’s perspective and an ascetic’s perspective coexist. Furthermore, people thus regard their own proper goals as prosperity or as liberation based on their life stage – *Brahmacarya* (student life), *Grhastha* (household life), *Vanaprastha* (retired life), *Sannyāsa* (renounced life) – in the Āśrama system.

It should be possible to treat relativizing one’s own perspective and regarding it as neutral as a unique Indian argumentative style. Texts in this style are necessarily introduced here as “doxographies,” although the term might be considered somewhat

strange.³⁾ If “historiography of philosophy” is a genealogical description of doctrines’ historical development – as in Aristotle’s description of philosophy, from its beginnings to Plato, in Book I of *Metaphysics* – then “doxography” is an approach showing almost no interest in doctrines’ historical spread and development. Rather, it treats the doctrines of each school as closed, ahistorical systems, and attempts to find a place for them amid contrasts between ways of thinking and viewpoints held by other parties. First, I introduce representative examples of such doxographies and clarify the unique perspectives found in them. Then, I consider perspectives related to neutrality, devoting attention to Jainist perspectivism as the background to such perspectives’ formation. Here, I employ the texts of Jain monks Mallavādin (5th/6th century), Haribhadra (8th century), Guṇaratna (14th century), and Yaśovijaya (17th century) to clarify the special characteristics of these perspectives.

2. On Doxography and Perspectives

The Sanskrit term *Bhāratīya darśana* is used in India today to mean “Indian philosophy.” *Bhāratīya* means “of *Bhārata*,” which is an ancient name for India, while *darśana*, directly translated, means “seeing” (a noun derived from the verb root “*drś-*,” meaning “to see”). I have the word “*darśana*” in mind when using “viewpoint” in this paper. “Among Western historians of Indian philosophy,” however, “the terminological and conceptual correlation between philosophy and *darśana* is not normally accepted” (Halbfass 1988: 263). The reason, perhaps, lies in the fact that *darśana*, a term corresponding with “view,” carries a strong nuance of intuitive insight; of enlightenment. There is, consequently, no clear separation between this concept and a religious view. Therefore, the term is thought to lack logic and objectivity, which are essential elements for Western philosophy. Indian scholars, however, have been known to appreciate this as a peculiarly Indian “viewpoint” that while differing from Western “philosophy” rivals or surpasses it, taking up this term deliberately and imbuing it with worth.

The term *darśana* can be found in the titles of several sources referred to in this paper as “doxographies.” Among the most important, the oldest text of its type, is the *Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya* (meaning “Compilation of Six [Major] *Darśanas*”) by Haribhadra (8th century). The *Sarvadarśanasamgraha* (meaning “Compendium of All *Darśanas*”), written by Mādhava (14th century), might be designated as another particularly famous text. The important chapters of the latter became famous when a German translation by Paul Deussen (1845–1919) introduced into his *Allegemeine Geschichte der Philosophie* (1894–1917, 6 vols). However, an earlier translation into English exists. The text was probably used by Henry Thomas Colebrooke (1765–1837) as a systematic introduction to Indian “philosophy” for western readers. Consequently, the nature of the “Indian philosophy” first introduced to Europe principally relied on the *Sarvadarśanasamgraha*.

Here, I wish to first examine Haribhadra’s *Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya*. Haribhadra was a scholar-monk who belonged to the Śvetāmbara (White-clad) sect of Jainism (a religion that arose simultaneously with Buddhism, around the 6th century BC). According to later Jain tradition, he composed as many as 1400 works in his life. The extant works that can

be traced to him alone number around 90. Although some disagreement arises over dating his period of activity, the 8th century apparently prevails among the field's scholars.⁴ The *Anekāntajayapatākā* (“*The Victory Banner of Non-One-Sidedness*”) is regarded as his main work. The “Non-One-Sidedness (*anekānta*)” of the title manifests the Jainist attitude to abstain from establishing a one-sided doctrine and to treat other schools’ views without refutation by admitting the existence of multiple viewpoints. Haribhadra, himself, alternately refers to this attitude as “accumulation” (*saṃhāravāda*) or “mixed” (*saṃkīrṇavāda*), exhibiting intention to integrate multiple opposing philosophical perspectives. The *Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya* arguably has the same intent: formatted as a digest or list of the doctrines of multiple contemporary philosophical schools, it attempts to present an integrated view based on “Non-One-Sidedness.” This work comprises 87 verses. Almost at the work’s beginning, Haribhadra states the following:

The wise should know that there are only six *darśanas* to be treated in this text, out of regard for the fundamental difference between deities (*devatā*) and principles (*tattva*). Buddha, Naiyāyika, Sāṃkhya, Jain, Vaiśeṣika, and Jaiminiya (Mīmāṃsaka)—these are the names of the six *darśanas*.⁵

As for the *devatā*, the personified deities that are the subjects of faith in each school or sect, Sugata is *devatā* for the Bauddhas, Śiva for the Naiyāyikas, Īśvara for some Sāṃkhyas (some others are atheists), and Jinendra, i.e., Mahāvīra, for the Jains. The Vaiśeṣikas, like the Naiyāyikas, take Śiva as their deity. Regarding ontology, however, the Vaiśeṣikas classify all things that exist into six categories (*padārtha*), whereas the Naiyāyikas enumerate 16 *padārthas*. Therefore, these two schools differ. In contrast, the Mīmāṃsakas do not accept the existence of a personified deity: as atheists (*nāstika*), they differ from the other schools.

Within the book as a whole and this specific quotation, *darśana* might be taken to mean the “viewpoints” or “systems” of the various schools. By discussing the distinctions between theoretical systems – indicating the standards for classification – and seemingly assigning no special position to the doctrine of his own (Jain) philosophical position, Haribhadra’s philosophical approach arguably admits the multiplicity of perspectives. This does not mean, however, that no problematic points exist throughout the text. For instance, the Yoga and the Vedānta are not included in the six systems. Moreover, the systems taken up by Haribhadra in his book do not add up to only six; at the end of the text, the Lokāyata system, which developed as a materialist philosophy in ancient India, is added.

If the purpose of Haribhadra’s text is, as indicated in the first verse, to “present summaries of the doctrine of each school,” then omitting to mention the ancient Yogic and Vedāntic doctrines, which carried on the Upaniṣad tradition, can only be regarded as strange. In fact, not only this work but also later texts created within Jainism, which is classified within the “doxography” genre, do not treat either as independent systems.

Within the text, however, verses 78 and 79 explain the reason for separately

summarizing Lokāyata doctrines at the end: Vaiśeṣika and Naiyāyika are sometimes treated together as one school. In such cases, the Lokāyata system may be presented as separate. Why, then, is Lokāyata not treated from the beginning as a seventh theory? An answer to this question may lie in the text: all six original *darśanas* might be classified as *āstika* (orthodox), whereas Lokāyata is *nāstika* (heterodox), insisting that “there is no Self (*jīva*), no liberation (*nirvṛti*); there is no *dharma* and *adharmā* (both being regarded as imperceptible causes of transmigration by the orthodox), and no retribution for good and evil deeds (*puṇya-pāpa*).”⁶ Therefore, this doctrine is incompatible with a classification method in which the existence of deity (*devatā*) and principle (*tattva*) are standard. Although it is not yet clear why the separation of the Lokāyata system is seen, I will proceed with my examination. For purposes of comparison, I wish to examine here another “doxography” described earlier: Mādhava’s *Sarvadarśanasamgraha*.

Mādhava is widely known to have been Advaita-Vedāntin. His work comprises 16 chapters, the first three of which contain views related to (1) the Cārvākas (or Lokāyatas), (2) the Bauddhas, and (3) the Jainas, which are all anti-Vedic, heterodox schools from the Vedāntic perspective. The next two chapters explore (4) Rāmānuja’s and (5) Madhva’s systems, which are Vedāntic schools, but not Advaitan. Next, four systems of sectarian Hinduism are discussed: those of (6) the Nakulīśapāśupatas, (7) the Śaivas, (8) the Pratyabhijñās (the Śaivas of Kāsimīra), and (9) the Raseśvaras. Subsequently, the views of the six classical schools are treated: (10) the Vaiśeṣikas, (11) the Naiyāyikas, (12) the Mīmāṃsakas, (13) the Pāṇinīyas, (14) the Sāṃkhyas, and (15) the Yogas. Finally, Mādhava describes his own school’s view: (16) Śaṅkara’s Advaita-Vedāntic philosophy.

Chapters (1)–(3) consider anti-Vedic, unorthodox schools. Chapters (4) and (5) cover two schools of thought that belong to Vedānta, yet simultaneously oppose Advaita. Chapters (6)–(9) concern Tantric Hindu sects, while chapters (10)–(16) consider classical schools. In discussing each school’s systems, the author’s uniqueness clearly lies in distinguishing religious sects from the schools preserving classical systems. Although Mādhava places his own sect’s teachings last, he places the theories of Rāmānuja (11th century) and Madhva (13th century) before the various Hindu sects, and near the unorthodox sects. He then places Sāṃkhya and Yoga immediately before Advaita, perhaps because they are not substantially opposed to it, even though they insist on a dualism (*dvaita*). One cannot fail to notice the strong subjectivity in the ordering of each school’s views. Although it is also a “doxography,” the previously examined *Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya* summarizes the various sects’ doctrines from a very different perspective. Though Mādhava summarizes the various sects’ doctrines with intent to treat them comprehensively, he places his own school (Advaita) at one extreme and ranks other schools’ teachings by their degree of conflict with his own system. In contrast with this method of ordering, Haribhadra, in the *Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya*, writes from a circumspensive position, attempting to view all systems, including his own (Jainism), as mutually equidistant.

After making such a clear distinction, we should not proceed without first checking if such a perspective is actually possible and, if so, how it could have been practiced by

the Jains.

3. On Neutrality

One commentary on Haribhadra's *Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya*, called *Tarkarahasyadīpikā* ("The Lamp Illuminating the Secrets of Logic"), was written by Guṇaratna, a figure who was active in the 14th century. His period of activity overlaps that of Mādhava, author of *Sarvadarśanasamgraha*. In his commentary, Guṇaratna often emphasizes the importance of "not being partial to one's own *darśana* and maintaining neutrality" (*svadarśanapakṣapātam parihr̥tya mādhyasthyam avalambamānaḥ*). For example, in the third chapter (completing his discussion of the Sāṃkhyas) and immediately before the beginning of the fourth chapter (on his own Jainism), Guṇaratna states the following.

We must always examine every view repeatedly by hundreds of modes of reasoning, abandoning partiality and maintaining neutrality. The wise should respect only the view that seems to conform to reason and that does not have the faintest whiff of inconsistency. As has been said [by Haribhadra]:

"I do not favor Mahāvīra [founder of Jainism], nor do I hold any dislike towards people like Kapila [founder of the Sāṃkhya system]. What is important is to have confidence in the person whose statements are in accord with reason."⁷⁾

This verse of Haribhadra is also cited in the preface of *Tarkarahasyadīpikā* (p.8, ll. 17–18). It is explicitly stated there that the citation is from the same author's *Lokatattvanirṇaya*. The idea of "being neutral" (*mādhyasthyam*) is repeated in the commentary on the 58th verse, at the end of the fourth chapter on Jain teachings (p.256, ll. 17–19), and at the end of the text itself (p.310, ll. 10–12).

This is certainly an expression of perspectivism that sees all views, including one's own, as equidistant. More than anything, this notion is apparently given clear expression through "neutrality" (*mādhyasthyam*),⁸⁾ described by Yaśovijaya (1624–1688) as the 16th of the 32 moral and intellectual virtues in his *Jñānasāra*.

1. *sthīyatām anupālabhaṃ madhyasthenāntarātmanā /*

kutarkakarkarakṣepais tyajyatām bālacāpalam //

Keep no reproach by the neutral spirits. Abandon a childish rash act by renouncing pebbles of irrational arguments. (16.1)

2. *manovatso yuktigaviṃ madhyasthyānudhāvati /*

tām ākarṣati pucchena tucchāgrahamaṇḥkapiḥ //

The calf of mind of the neutral runs after the cow of logical reasoning. The monkey of mind, being attached to worthless, draws the cow towards it by its tail. (16.2)

3. *nayeṣu svārthasatyesu mogheṣu paracālena /*

samaśīlam mano yasya sa madhyastho mahāmuniḥ //

Viewpoints that are true for their own position are useless for others' acts. One whose mind is always even on such viewpoints is the neutral and the great Muni. (16.3)

4. *svasvakarmakṛtāveśāḥ svasvakarmabhujō narāḥ /
na rāgaṃ nāpi ca dveṣaṃ madhyasthas teṣu gacchati //*

People are attached to the results produced by their own acts and enjoy their own retribution. The neutral goes with having neither attachment nor aversion to them. (16.4)

5. *manaḥ syād vyāpṛtaṃ yāvat paradoṣaguṇagrahe /
kāryaṃ vyagraṃ varaṃ tāvan madhyasthenātmbhāvane //*

Even when the mind is engaged in the vices and virtues of other people, the neutral should concentrate solely on his own soul. (16.5)

6. *vibhinnā api panthānaḥ samudraṃ saritām iva /
madhyasthānāṃ paraṃ brahma prāpnuvanty ekam akṣayam //*

As the different routes of the rivers stream into one and the same ocean, the ways of the neutral, although different, reach the one and indestructible absolute Brahman. (16.6)

7. *svāgamāṃ rāgamātreṇa dveṣamātrāt parāgamam /
na śrayāmas tyajāmo vā kintu madhyasthayā dṛṣā //*

It is not only because we love our traditional doctrine that we depend on it. It is not only because we hate others' doctrine that we reject it; but it is because we adopt a neutral attitude. (16.7)

8. *madhyasthayā dṛṣā sarveṣv apunarbandhakādiṣu /
cārisaṅghīvinīcāranyāyād āśasmahe hitam //*

We adopt a neutral attitude in the hope that this will lead to well-being (*hita*), just as someone who knows that one among a group of herbs is restorative but does not know which one it is, acts reasonably if they swallow the entire lot. (16.8) (Ganeri 2008: 4)

Yaśovijaya Gaṇi was born in Gujarat in 1624 and died there in 1688. The Gujarat of his day was “home to a diverse trading population, including Arab, Farsi, Tartar, Armenian, Dutch, French and English mercantile communities” (Desai 1910: 54). He considered himself Haribhadra's successor. According to Dundas (2004: 131), “it was Haribhadra's reputation for being influenced only by the logical cogency of doctrines and viewpoints (*anekāntavāda*) that appears to have shaped Yaśovijaya's irenic but also critical attitude towards other sects and traditions.”

Jonardon Ganeri elucidates the verses presented above as follows:

Neutrality is explained in terms of the dispassionate use of reason: a person who embodies this virtue follows wherever reason leads, rather than using reason only to defend prior opinions to which they have already been attracted. Yaśovijaya stresses that neutrality is not an end in itself but rather a means to another end. ... As we can see from this example (16.8), philosophy is thought of as a medicine for the soul, the value of a doctrine to be judged by its effectiveness in curing the soul of its ailments. That is why it can be reasonable to endorse several philosophical views simultaneously, just as one can take a variety of complementary medicines. (Ganeri 2008: 4)

However, is it possible to see all views, including one's own, in a neutral or objective way? Is it not impossible for a sect's proponent to maintain neutrality on its

teachings from inside the sect itself, making this either mere paraphrased egocentrism or mere rhetoric? Such criticisms are readily conceivable.

In fact, Haribhadra orders the chapters of *Ṣaddarśanasamuccaya* as Bauddha–Naiyāyika–Sāṃkhya–Jain–Vaiśeṣika–Mīmāṃsaka–Lokāyata, thus placing the Jain system directly in the middle, with three systems both before and after. It seems that “being neutral” means “standing in the middle,” with the Jain sect at the center. It must be said that this neutrality, even if it cannot be called egocentrism, occupies a gray area, such that it is eventually impossible to hold one truly objective position towards all other views. Still, the Jain tradition offers a perspective that might make such a position possible.

4. On Perspectivism

Mallavādin was a scholar-monk of Śvetāmbara in the 5th or 6th century, preceding both Haribhadra and Guṇaratna. His *Dvādaśāranayacakra* (“*The Twelve Spoked Wheel of Perspectives*”) does not survive today as an independent work, but we can understand its general contents from the text of Siṃhasūri’s 7th century commentary, the *Nyāyāgamānusārīnī* (“*Logical Investigations*”). The text is extremely important for understanding the beginnings of the ancient Indian philosophical tradition. The 6th century was a time when the various schools’ traditions had just begun to form. Early commentaries on each of the basic scriptures (*sūtras*) were just being created. Mallavādin describes the thought of Bhartṛhari (5th century), of the grammarian school, and Dignāga (c. 480–540 AD), originator of the Buddhist logical school.

As its title indicates, the *Dvādaśāranayacakra* attempts to systematize perspectives or viewpoints. Mallavādin was the first to formulate the so-called *naya*-system – the viewpoint-system through which judgments are made – and applying it to the various doctrines of the other schools. If the previously examined “doxographies” attempted to summarize and holistically grasp each school’s teachings, then this text systematically classifies “viewpoints” as structures that underlie and produce each school’s statements, seeking to explain how these engender each school’s teachings. “Even if what is seen is one, there are various ways of seeing”⁹⁾ are the words of the grammarian-scholar and linguistic philosopher Bhartṛhari. Mallavādin apparently envisions this text as continuing the Indian “perspectivism” tradition this thought inspired. Wilhelm Halbfass, who seems to have held Mallavādin’s thought in high esteem, comments as follows:

Mallavādin’s scheme systematizes and radicalizes the traditional Jaina perspectivism, evaluates views of other schools as relative and valid in a limited way, and accepts all of these as equally legitimate and limited approaches to reality. Instead of trying to establish the sheer falsity of individual doctrines, Jainism attempts to expose them in their one-sidedness and interdependence and to relegate them to their position in a totality of complementary perspectives. It does not negate them; it claims to include and transcend them in its own comprehensive framework. Mallavādin’s “ontology” is thus inseparable from his inclusivistic and perspectivistic doxography. This implies that it is often difficult

to distinguish between doxographic presentation and systematic reconstruction and extrapolation. (Halbfass 1992: 171)

The traditional Jain perspectivism Halbfass describes here is generally designated as “Jain relativism.” Their ideological approach of “Non-One-Sidedness,” described previously as the Jain approach, is also called *syādvāda*. Matters might be viewed from diverse perspectives, and judgments towards things might only take the form of statements, such as “when viewed from perspective *p* (*syād*), *x* is *y*,” a notion upon which Jainism has insisted since its founding by Mahāvīra. Mallavādin enumerates and systematizes 12 possibilities for this “perspective *p*,” advocating their concrete application to the beliefs of all schools and the statements of thinkers prevailing at the time.

There is insufficient space here to thoroughly explain Mallavādin’s discussion of these various perspectives. Therefore, this brief explanation of its basic framework must suffice. Mallavādin insists that, in this world, some things change and diversify whereas others remain perpetually unchanged. The notion of the “twelve perspectives” is an attempt to explain this claim’s formation based on one’s perspective. Mallavādin first presents ideas of *vidhi* (affirmation) and *niyama* (restriction) as two fundamental means of appropriately adopting perspectives from which to view things. The question of how best to understand these two is quite complex; for present purposes, it suffices to see the former as a “substantive” and the latter as an “epistemic” means of handling things. According to Mallavādin, there are three perspectives from which things might be viewed: the *vidhi* perspective (V), the *niyama* perspective (N), and a perspective for which *vidhi* and *niyama* coexist (W). These three perspectives are, in fact, three types of epistemological perspectives towards particular things. Nevertheless, when they are transformed into ontological perspectives, three more perspectives become possible for each. Consequently, a list of all twelve perspectives would comprise V, VV, VW, VN, W, WV, WW, WN, N, NV, NW, and NN (See Figure 1).




Figure 1 Twelve Perspectives

For instance, the judgment that “things exist as they are commonly understood” is a view that appears when perspective V, i.e., *vidhi*, is taken. This view can be taken to represent the Lokāyata, i.e., materialist, view. However, if one recognizes that some cause

of existence underlies the phenomenological world, for instance, substantive time, one has taken on the *vidhi-vidhi* (VV) perspective. Furthermore, Mallavādin asserts that claims formed from the NN perspective represent Buddhist “emptiness.” Mallavādin discusses each perspective in detail, along with the various claims that arise from each of them. His text is superbly “philosophical” in including extremely subjective reflections on the conditions under which ideologies are produced.

5. Conclusion

In concluding his commentaries, Siṃhasūri counts the exact number of possible assertions that might be made from these twelve perspectives. The total is 16,769,025, produced through a simple calculation method. These perspectives present twelve ways to grasp one thing if twelve perspectives exist. So how many ways of grasping one thing are presented by two simultaneous perspectives? There are 66 possible combinations in all (${}_{12}C_2 = 66$). Three perspectives present 220 combinations altogether (${}_{12}C_3 = 220$). In sequential order: 495, 792, 924, 792, 495, 220, 66, 12, and finally 1, which is of course the quantity that gives rise to all 12 perspectives. Consequently, there are, in all, 4,095 combinations of grasping one thing. However, in practice, one statement comprises a subject and a predicate, and 4,095 perspectives are possible for each subject and predicate. Therefore, there are $4,095 \times 4,095 = 16,769,025$ possible views. In short, this is Jain perspectivism. In Siṃhasūri’s view, Jain teachings are “correct” precisely because they are based on understanding these perspectives’ composition and possibilities. Given the subjectivity offered by viewing any one thing from so many viewpoints, it is clearly worthy of considerable thought.

Returning to the final question: How is it possible to be neutral? – Think *all* possibilities, all the perspectives that could possibly be a part of the world view, like Haribhadra. In my view, we should understand that, to quote a fundamental principle of Wikipedia, “the neutral point of view does not mean exclusion of certain points of view, but including all verifiable points of view which have sufficient due weight.”

APPENDIX

Question from Prof. Mio, the session convener: Akamatsu has discussed Jain perspectivism, generally designated as “Jain relativism,” in his main text. According to him, the Jain thinkers use the concept of neutrality (*mādhyasthya*) and non-one-sidedness (*anekānta*) as the basis for an impartial and pacific attitude towards (philosophical or religious) others. Then, a question arises: do the “others” include not only the indigenous others, like Hindu philosophers and Buddhists, but also the Moslems and the Christians?

Answer: As I have discussed, the term *mādhyasthya*, the state of “being in the middle,” is presumed to represent the basic Jain virtue of intellectual relativism and respect for others. In fact, throughout its history, Jainism has always placed the other Hindu philosophical schools within systematic frameworks, within which alternative intellectual

perspectives (*naya*) can be classified. As Halbfass observes, “the Jaina doxographers sometimes claim a complete and uncompromising neutrality, an attitude *sine ira et studio*,¹⁰ for their way of dealing with the various philosophical views” (Halbfass 1988: 266). To answer Prof. Mio’s question, I will consider the idea of neutrality (*mādhyasthya*) in greater detail by discussing towards whom and how the concept has been used historically.

I. The Development of Yaśovijaya’s Idea of *mādhyastha* in *Dharmaparīkṣā* and *Adhyātmopaniṣad*

As noted earlier, in the *Jñānasāra* (“*Essence of Knowledge*”), Yaśovijaya describes neutrality (*mādhyasthya*) as one of the 32 moral and intellectual virtues constitutive of a virtuous people. The ‘other’ (*para*) is mentioned in the text (vv. 3, 5, 7), but is only used in its general sense. Yaśovijaya expresses his own view on the others, being followers of the other philosophical or religious traditions, in the *Dharmaparīkṣā* (“*Examination of the Jain Doctrine*”). Written in the 1660s, the *Dharmaparīkṣā* consists of 104 Prakrit verses with a Sanskrit autocommentary. At the beginning of the text, Yaśovijaya affirms principled neutrality as the basis for proper consideration of *Dharma*, the Jain doctrine.¹¹ In his autocommentary on the text, Yaśovijaya mentions Patañjali, founder of the Yoga-school, Kapila, founder of the Sāṃkhya-school, and Bhadanta Bhāskara, most likely a Buddhist, etc., as “partial adherents of Jinās (*deśārādhaka*).” He writes:

Even though the statement appears in the other school’s doctrine [such as that of Patañjali, etc.], if it is advantageous to mankind and is identical to Jain doctrine, it can be based on the scriptural tradition (*śruta*) of the Jinās. Anyone who follows such a statement, even if he belongs to the other party, can be regarded reasonably as partial adherent of Jinās.¹²

Paul Dundas (2007) discusses Yaśovijaya’s *Dharmaparīkṣā* in detail. He concludes: “Yaśovijaya invokes throughout the *Dharmaparīkṣā* the centrality of principled neutrality as not so much a form of non-commitment as the *sine qua non* for Jainism: those whose minds are purified by it can be nothing other than Jains and thus cannot be at variance with the teachings of the Jinās” (Dundas 2007: 165). It is easy to find the inclusivistic tendency of Jainism. Yaśovijaya advances this in *Adhyātmopaniṣad* (“*Hidden Teaching about the Self*”). He refers, in vv. 45–51, to several philosophical schools, such as Sāṃkhya, Vijñāna(-vāda) Buddhism, Yoga, Vaiśeṣika, Guru (Prabhākara of the Mīmāṃsā), Bhaṭṭa (Kumārila of the Mīmāṃsā), Murāri (of the Mīmāṃsā?), and Vedānta. He, then, concludes that *syādvāda* is a doctrine accepted by all these schools (*sārvatāntrika*). The schools described here, however, are all indigenous to India. He never mentions Moslems or Christians. Yaśovijaya was writing in the days of Dara Shukoh (1615–1659), great-grandson of Akbar and the heir apparent of the Mogul Empire. In 1656, Dara Shukoh assembled, in Vārāṇasī, a team of the most renowned Sanskrit scholars to translate Sanskrit scriptures into Persian. As Ganeri observes: “That Yaśovijaya would have had a keen interest in Dara Shukoh’s inclusivist project, had he

known about it, is certain. And it seems hard to imagine that he could not have known about it given the high status of the project, which gave employment to a great number of the most celebrated Sanskrit intellectuals of the day” (Ganeri 2014: 37). However, there is no mention of Moslems in his works. We should search other texts for knowing the relationship between Jainas and Moslems in those days.

II. Hīravijaya and Akbar

Saiyid A. A. Rizvi describes Jain activities in Akbar’s court as follows:

Jainism left an indelible impression on Akbar’s mind. As early as 1568, Buddhi Sagar of Tapa-gacha is seen disputing with another Jaina saint in Akbar’s presence. Swetambara Jainas and other Jaina hermits participated in religious discussions when they were thrown open to the members of other religious. Early in 1582 Akbar extended an invitation to Hirvijaya Suri, then the outstanding scholar and saint of the Swetambara sect in Gujarat. On June 1583, he arrived at Fathpur with sixty-seven monks. He was asked to stay with Abu’l Fazl until Akbar was free to pay attention to his conversation. He had already obtained considerable celebrity because of his commentary on *Jambudvipaprajnapti* and highly impressed Abu’l Fazl with his learning and saintly life. He stayed at Akbar’s court for two years, and was awarded the title of *Jagat Guru*, or the World Teacher. In Abu’l Fazl’s list of scholars, Hariji Sur, mentioned among those who understood the mysteries of both worlds, was none other than this celebrated Jaina sage. (Rizvi 1975: 137)

Related to the life of Hīravijaya Sūri (1527–1595), the 58th leader of the Tapā Gaccha lineage of the Śvetāmbara, we have a poetic biography written in Sanskrit. Titled the *Hīrasaubhāgya*, it was composed by the Śvetāmbara Jain poet Devavimala, accompanied by his autocommentary. Dundas (1999) examines this text in his article “Jain Perceptions of Islam in the Early Modern Period.” He notes: “It appears to be not until the very end of the sixteenth century with the *Hīrasaubhāgya* that there is substantive evidence expressed in Sanskrit of some sort of familiarity with Islam” (Dundas 1999: 37). Recently, Audrey Truschke published her book titled *Culture of Encounters, Sanskrit at the Mughal Court*. In its fifth chapter, “Writing About the Mughal World in Sanskrit,” she considers the *Hīrasaubhāgya* with five other works composed by Jains between 1589–1652, which recount the lives of the Jain leaders of the Tapā Gaccha from the late 16th to the mid-17th centuries. She observes:

Devavimala penned his *Hīrasaubhāgya* (*Good Fortune of Hīravijaya*) in the early seventeenth century and therein discusses the Mughals at considerable length. The work traces Hīravijaya Sūri’s life from birth until death and includes an authorial commentary. In this biography, Devavimala recounts many events set at the Mughal court, including a conversation between Hīravijaya and Abū al-Fazl [that] involves one of the few open descriptions of basic Islamic beliefs in Sanskrit. This exchange took place during the Tapa Gaccha leader’s first sojourn at the imperial court in 1583–1585. While many Jain writers

divulge details of this extended visit, including that Hīravijaya met with Abū al-Fazl, Devavimāla alone recounts their debate about the merits of Islam versus Jainism. The historical accuracy of the reported dialogue is dubious. However, this section is noteworthy because it constitutes a striking and unprecedented sketch of Islamic religious ideas in Sanskrit. Moreover, Devavimāla uses the exchange to glorify Hīravijaya as able to counter the particular theological challenges of Mughal-backed Islam.” (Truschke 2016: 170)

In opening his description of the debate between Hīravijaya (a Jain monk) and Abū al-Fazl (also known as Abu’l Fazl; a representative of Islam), Devavimāla introduces the latter as follows:

There was a sheikh (*śekha*), whose name is Abalaphaija (Abū al-Fazl), and who had completely known the ocean of scriptures of Islam (*turuṣka-śāstra*). He was the third shining eye of the king Akbar, the son of Humayun (*hamāuṃ-sūnu*).¹³ – *Hīrasaubhāgya* 13.120.

Devavimāla later closes his description of the debate as follows:

This Hīravijaya Sūri, having thus through his words of incontestable doctrine enlightened the sheikh who had doubts [about Jain teachings], planted the *dharma* [of compassion (*dayā*)] in his mind, as a farmer sows seed in the ground.¹⁴ – *Hīrasaubhāgya* 13.151.

In concluding, I wish to quote another passage from Truschke:

First, in this anecdote, Devavimāla portrays Jain and Islamic theology as comparable, although highly unequal. Devavimāla departs drastically from his predecessors and contemporaries in allowing Islam to permeate the boundaries of Sanskrit literature at all, much less as an alternative to a Jain understanding the world. He even allows Islam a fairly full hearing, equivalent in length to Hīravijaya’s winning rebuttal. Here Devavimāla invokes theology as a primary mode of expressing cross-cultural encounters. (Truschke 2016: 173; Truschke 2015: 1323)

Notes

- 1) *MBh.* 13,129.16–28: *pravṛttilakṣaṇo dharmo grhastheṣu vidhīyate / tam ahaṃ kīrtayiṣyāmi sarvabhūtahitaṃ śubham // dātavyam asakṛc chaktyā yaṣṭavyam asakṛt tathā / puṣṭikarma-vidhānaṃ ca kartavyaṃ bhūtim icchatā // dharmenārthaḥ samāhāryo dharmalabdhaṃ tridhā dhanam / kartavyaṃ dharmaparamaṃ mānavena prayatnataḥ // ekenāṃśena dharmārthaś cartavyo bhūtim icchatā / ekenāṃśena kāmārtha ekam aṃśaṃ vivardhayet // nivṛttilakṣaṇas tv anyo dharmo mokṣa iti smṛtaḥ / tasya vṛttim pravakṣyāmi śṛṇu me devi tattvataḥ // sarvabhūtaḍayā dharmo na caikagrāmavāsītā / āśāpāśavimokṣaś ca śasyate mokṣakāṅkṣiṇām // na kuṇḍyāṃ nodake saṅgo na vāsasi na cāsane / na tridaṇḍe na śayane nāgnau na śaraṇālaye*

// adhyātmagatacitto yas tanmanās tatparāyaṇaḥ / yukto yogaṃ prati sadā pratisamkhyānam eva ca // vṛkṣamūlāśayo nityaṃ śūnyāgāraniveśanaḥ / nadīpulinaśāyī ca nadūtīraratīś ca yaḥ // vimuktaḥ sarvasaṅgeṣu snehabandheṣu ca dvijaḥ / ātmany evātmano bhāvaṃ samāsajyātati dvijaḥ // sthāṇubhūto nirāhāro mokṣadr̥ṣṭena karmaṇā / parivrajati yo yuktas tasya dharmāḥ sanātanaḥ // na caikatra cirāsakto na caikagrāmagocaraḥ / yukto hy aṭati nirmukto na caikapulineśayaḥ // eṣa mokṣavidāṃ dharmo vedoktaḥ satpathaḥ satām / yo mārgam anuyātīmaṃ padaṃ tasya na vidyate //

- 2) See Biardeau (1969: 80). She paraphrases the two terms as «*activité tournée vers les entreprises extérieures*» and «*cessation de tout activité.*»
- 3) The term “doxography” was coined in 1879 by the German philologist Hermann Diels. It has been adopted to refer to a category of texts produced in premodern India, most, but not all, of which are written in Sanskrit. This category of texts is generally called the Sanskrit Doxographies. I believe that the appropriate Japanese translation of “doxography” is *gakusetsushi* (学説史; see Nōtomi 2005: 54). However, the sources examined here do not provide simple outlines, merely classifying and enumerating the doctrinal systems of prominent Indian schools of thought. Rather, they are texts that, to a greater or lesser extent, have a reflective consciousness, attempting to locate various viewpoints within a mutual relationship with other groups. Therefore, I have used *tetsugakushi* (哲学誌) as the Japanese translation.
- 4) For the life and works of Haribhadra see Chapple (2004); Granoff (1989); Qvarnström (1999).
- 5) *Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya*, 2–3: *darśanāni ṣaḍ evātra mūlabhedavyapekṣayā / devatātattvabhedaṇa jñātavyāni manīṣibhiḥ // bauddhaṃ naiyāyikaṃ sāmkyam jainaṃ vaiśeṣikaṃ tathā / jaiminīyaṃ ca nāmāni darśanānām amūny aho //*
- 6) *Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya*, 80: *lokāyatā vadanty evaṃ nāsti jīvo na nirvṛtiḥ / dharmādharmāu na vidyeta na phalaṃ puṇyapāpayoḥ //*
- 7) *Tarkarahasyadīpikā*, 110, 12–17: *sarvathā svadarśanapakṣapātaṃ parityajya mādhyasthyenaiva yuktīśataiḥ sarvadarśanāni punaḥ punar vicāraṇīyāni, teṣu ca yadeva darśanaṃ yuktīyuktatayāva-bhāsate yatra ca pūrvāparavirodhagandho 'pi nekṣyate, tadeva viśāradaīrādaraṇīyaṃ nāparam iti / tathā cōktaṃ / pakṣapāto na me vīre na dveṣaḥ kapilādīḍu / yuktīmadvacanaṃ yasya tasya kāryaḥ parigrahaḥ //*
- 8) The Sanskrit term *mādhyasthyam* translates as “to stand (*stha*) at the middle (*madhya*).” It means “to be impartial.” It is not unusual to translate it as “neutrality,” but it can also sometimes convey being in an independent and self-reliant state, in which absolutely no attention is devoted to other things.
- 9) *Vākyapadīya* II 136: *ekasmīn api dṛśye 'rthe daśanaṃ bhidyate pṛthak.*
- 10) *Sine ira et studio* is a Latin term meaning “without hate and zealousness.” Roman historian Tacitus used this terms in the introduction to his *Annals* 1.1. Jain thinkers contend: “there is neutrality (*mādhyasthya*) when one is located between strong attachment (*rāga*) and aversion (*dveṣa*).” Cf. *Gurutattvaprādīpa* 1.3ab: *yad rāgadveṣayor madhye tiṣṭhatīty ucyate budhaiḥ.* Yaśovijaya asserts the same in the *Jñānasāra*, verse 4, quoted and translated above.
- 11) Autocommentary on *Dharmaparīkṣā* v. 2: *so dharmo bhagavatpraṇūtaḥ śrutacāritra-lakṣaṇas, tasya parīkṣāmūlaṃ madhyasthatvam eva jinoktam.*
- 12) *anyatrāpi yad abhinnaṃ arthapadaṃ taj jinendraśrutamūlam / anyo 'pi tadanusārī tato deśārādhako yuktaḥ //* (Sanskrit version of *Dharmaparīkṣā* v. 24).

- 13) *samasti śekho Abalaphaija-nāmā turuṣkaśāstrāmbudhipāradrśvā / Hamāuṃ-sūnoḥ kṣitisītabhānor dr̥ṣṭis tr̥ṭīyeva parisphurantī // Hīrasaubhāgya* 13.120.
- 14) *śekhaṃ tam itthaṃ kṛtapūrvapakṣaṃ saṃbodhya siddhāntavacobhir eṣa / dharmam nidhatte sma tadīyacitte kṛṣībalo bījam ivorvarāyām // Hīrasaubhāgya* 13.151.

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