表1　著作[英] "汚染・純粋・聖なる：ヒンドゥー社会の理想構造"

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What does pollution signify for man? Although this is my ultimate concern, answering that question requires intensive ethnographic investigation in a wide range of societies as stepping stones toward a general theory of pollution. My intention in this article is, therefore, to clarify the dynamic structure of concepts of pollution in the South Asian context mainly by reviewing the literature on Hindu societies and also by consulting several general theories or materials from outside the Hindu context.

Concepts of pollution are highly problematical. Although various terms connoting pollution are encountered frequently in anthropological studies on South Asian society, there remains a confusing usage of concepts with vaguely defined meanings. Consequently, authors' intentions are sometimes misunderstood and research criticized unreasonably. Despite considerable material on concepts of pollution, there has been little direct attempt to overcome this confusion, with the notable exception of the invaluable but still partial contributions such as those of Platenkamp [1979], Das [1976], Meigs [1978], Das and Uberoi.

* Faculty of Humanities, Gakushuin Women's Junior College.
[1971], and Hershman [1974], among others. For this reason I attempt here to present a more workable structure for understanding the concept of pollution. As a result, I discuss the significance of a "bottom-up" point of view, i.e., I attempt to complement the prevailing but inadequate accumulation of "top-down" studies by an examination of the culture (subculture) of peoples of lower social status. This is crucial to overcome the present rather tautological research situation generated by an unchanging top-down perspective.

Needless to say I am deeply interested in defining concepts of pollution, since concepts themselves are not only tools for investigation but also the conclusion of this work. Thus concepts and contexts must be interwoven. In this respect, it would not be wrong to say that to clarify the concepts of pollution is to understand Hindu society itself. At the outset it should be noted that I generally use pollution to represent various other expressions such as impurity, defilement, contamination, uncleanness, dirt or adulteration, and the like. However, other expressions could be adopted sometimes, depending on context.

During my fieldwork among the Jaffna Tamil of northern Sri Lanka, I learned from several Vellālar (the dominant caste in Jaffna society) persons that the word tutakku generally connotes not only the pollution arising from birth, death, puberty and menstruation but also that which lower castes are said to have (hereafter called "caste pollution," vide infra). This led me to question how and why tutakku is applied to caste pollution, since tutakku is originally associated with events marking life processes, namely, birth, death, puberty and menstruation.1) This basic question can be reconfigured into a more general form: can we actually identify life process pollution with caste pollution? If so, how are both types connected structurally and historically? Who makes this connection? If they cannot be so identified, what differentiates between life process pollution and caste pollution?

In this connection, Ryan's intensive work on pollution in Jaffna [RYAN 1980] and Sanmugadas' study from the local point of view [SANMUGADAS 1984] are useful with reference to these questions. Ryan notes that "Currently in Jaffna the term tutakku (pollution) is not used in reference to castes with the single exception that some Tamil speakers refer to the unclean state following a haircut as "barber tutakku". In general, the term used to describe low castes is unclean (tupparavillai)" [RYAN 1980: 152, n.28]. Moreover, according to Ryan, tutakku is by and large seen as group pollution [RYAN 1980: 112-3, 120, 143] which almost corresponds to the "relational pollution" of [ORENSTEIN 1968]. On the other hand, "although not spontaneously mentioned, when questioned villagers

1) For example, "The word tutakku is associated with three important events in Jaffna Tamil society, namely, child birth, puberty and death" [SANMUGADAS 1984: 2-3], and "tutakku (the inauspicious state associated with birth, death, and menstruation)" [RYAN 1980: 108].
said that low castes are *tupparavillai* and that eating food or intermarrying with a lower group could make one *tupparavillai* [RYAN 1980: 126]. So *tupparavillai* seems rather to refer to the “act pollution” of [ORENSTEIN 1968] and shares the characteristics of the transactionalism sense of pollution that construct hierarchical caste relationships. Furthermore, Ryan summarized some contrasts between *tuṭakku* and *tupparavillai* as follows [RYAN 1980: 150]. *Tuṭakku* usually “just comes” and is a necessary part of social life for everyone. In contrast with this, *tupparavillai* often involves an act of will in which various degrees of pollution take place depending on individuals and caste groups. From this it is fairly clear that *tuṭakku* does not innately connote caste pollution. We can cite several pieces of circumstantial evidence supporting this assertion. Firstly, *tuṭakku* seems to be an absolute concept lacking an antonym, since people express the end of *tuṭakku* as *tuṭakku-k-kālivu* (pollution dispelling) [SANMUGADAS 1984: 16]. Secondly, Ryan also notes that “While the Jaffna villagers are quite explicit and give detailed descriptions of the qualities and characteristics of pollution and uncleanness, they have much less to say about the nature of purity” [RYAN 1980: 138]. Both suggest that *tuṭakku* has another quality which the pure-impure dichotomy in Dumont’s sense cannot cover. Thus the actual implications of *tuṭakku* and its cognates must be complicated.

If *tuṭakku* did not inherently imply caste pollution, as shown above, how should we understand some Vellālars’ usages of *tuṭakku* for expressing pollution in general, including caste pollution (eāti-t-tuṭakku)? In this respect, Sanmugadas’ statement that “the high caste which was heavily influenced by the Aryan culture preferred the term āsusam to tuṭakku” [SANMUGADAS 1984: 19] is highly suggestive. Needless to add, āsusam (impurity) is an antonym of susam (purity) and this dichotomous notion represents Brahmanical ideology which justifies the hierarchical caste order. Therefore the replacement of *tuṭakku* by āsusam itself demonstrates the penetration of Brahmanical ideology into the Jaffna Tamil society. This tendency also prompts a change in the meaning of the traditional word *tuṭakku* itself. So it could be said that the generalized usage of *tuṭakku* by high caste Vellālar is the extention or transformation of the meaning of *tuṭakku* toward āsusam.

In sum, it can be said that under the influence of the Brahmanical word āsusam (which I translate as impurity rather than pollution, *vide infra*), *tuṭakku* and *tupparavillai*, which have ontologically different connotations, could have been ideologically connected. Since more detailed information is required for this discussion, only an outline is provided here. Nevertheless, it is sufficient to supply a fruitful and basic motif to the whole context of the present paper.

There are two main trends of studies in terms of pollution on the basis of the pioneer works of functionalists, such as [SRINIVAS 1952], [STEVENSON 1954] and [HARPER 1964]. That is, one is the society-oriented study, as represented by the Dumontian type of work or Marriott’s work of transactionalism, and the other is
the pollution-oriented study, led by Douglas’ remarkable work [DOUGLAS 1966].

2. THE LIMITATION OF SOCIETY-ORIENTED STUDIES

Dumont’s works, especially his outstanding and polemic work “Homo Hierarchicus” [1966], may be regarded as society-oriented studies. Dumont uses the religious terms of ritual purity or ritual impurity to analyze social systems. That is, he unwittingly combines religions and social factors within the rubric of the pure-impure dichotomy. The pure-impure dichotomy for understanding Hindu society was not new in Dumont’s work, since the earlier works of Srinivas [1952], Stevenson [1954] and Harper [1964] are largely constructed on the basic principle of purity and impurity. However, the decisively different point between the Dumont’s work and these is that Dumont presented the pure-impure dichotomy as an “ideology” of Hindu hierarchical society. There can be no doubt that his adoption of the concept of ideology was epoch-making for South Asian studies. Nonetheless Dumont himself has not been able to develop the implication of ideology, mainly because his idea is imprisoned by conventional structuralism. In this sense, Dumont’s intention of using the concept of ideology was to show clearly that the most central principle is penetrating a whole society as “structure”. Therefore, if I made an extreme argument, Dumont need not necessarily be using the concept of ideology; even if he adopted the term cosmology, it would make little difference to his argument.\(^2\) In other words, it is revealed that Dumont was not conscious of the concept of ideology which is dealt with in the movement of post-structuralism, especially in the line near to Marxist Anthropology. The statement that an ideology is a cosmology of a particular class well reflects their position, because it suggests key concepts such as “subjectivity” and “the ideological usage”.

When reflecting on the historical circumstance in which Dumont wrote “Homo Hierarchicus”, and imagining that he objected to Redfield, Srinivas and Marriott, who posit a disjunction between the little tradition and the great tradition within a single civilization [KEYES and DANIEL 1983: 8], it may be unjustified to demand much from Dumont concerning his concept of ideology. But Dumont should still be criticized for his ambiguity, that is, the contradiction between the presentation of the concept of ideology and its conventional application, or lack of the viewpoint of “the ideological usage”. This contradiction or limitation results in the implicit but actual assertion that the dichotomy of pure and impure is fused with Brahmancial “authority”. Consequently his theoretical differentiation between status and power, or the ideological and the non-ideological, becomes meaningless for his argument. Thus Dumont after all, consciously or unconsciously, provided the static view of Hindu societies by simply reducing

\(^2\) Adrian Mayer agreed to this point in a personal communication.
Hindu ideologies to the Brahmanical ideology.

Among a number of critics, Marglin, for example, obviously notices Dumont's implicit assertion and notes that "the power of brahman is the greater power; and 'greatest' is expressed through its superiority of access—to women, occupations, and wealth—as through its superiority purity" [MARGLIN 1977: 264]. This recognition of "power of purity" marks an important advance, but Marglin is unfortunately bound by his lack of the ideological point of view and a limited consideration based on textual materials. In this respect, McGilvray emphasized more consciously the ideological standpoint as follows. "We should instead view South Asian symbols and theories of society in the light of the specific historical factors which gave rise to regional caste systems in the first place and which subsequently conditioned the tone and content of indigenous thinking about local caste hierarchies" [MCGILVRAY 1982: 35]. This statement suggests "...to consider, for example, (a) who generated, codified and transmitted the ideas and why; (b) who had exposure to the ideas and who did not; (c) what degree of selective emphasis, scepticism, apathy, of ignorance may have been entailed in this process; and (d) why these ideas may have been congenial to certain groups and not to others" [MCGILVRAY 1982: 96]. From this, it is not difficult to find the concepts of "subjectivity" and "the ideological usage". Anyway the naive Dumontian theory of ideology ought to be overcome by the developed, objectified and dynamic point of view of "the ideological discourse". In other words, we must clearly recognize that in the first place the dichotomous notion of pure-impure is the ideology originated by the particular subject of Brahman, but that this Brahmanical ideology is manipulated mainly by the dominant people of a society grasping politico-economic power to legitimate their position. This means that the symbolic producer is not always identified with the symbolic user.

Thus, the identification of life process pollution with caste pollution by Dumont (for example, we can imagine a funeral drummer who touches death pollution) is not naturally produced but is basically determined by the Brahmanical ideology. In this connection when Dumont claims that "ancient literature confirms that temporary and permanent impurity are identical in nature" [DUMONT 1980(1966) : 47], he does not pay attention to the ideological character of Dharmaśāstra. In connection with this, Glucklich's stimulating work [1984] criticizes the simple acceptance of the identification between karma and pollution in the Hindu conception of dharma, which is found in Dumont's or Marriott's studies. Even within the restriction of textual studies, Glucklich concludes "Though the two structures often intersect, since the Vedic conception of sin was supplanted by the karma theory, karma and pollution have been kept conceptually separate at all times, with the qualified exception of Samkhya" [GLUCKLICH 1984:

3) Dumont notes that "it is specialization in impure tasks, in practice or in theory, which leads to the attribution of a massive and permanent impurity to some categories of people" [1980 (1966): 47].
41]. In other words he sees that *dharma* consists of two ontological dimensions, such as nature (pollution) and law (*karma*) [GLUCKLICH 1984: 40-41]. Here, for the present argument, we cannot overlook the point of the replacement of the Vedic conception of sin by *karma* theory in his statement, because the expansion of *karma* theory directs toward the ideological identification between two ontologically different dimensions of nature and law. In this sense we can read Glucklich’s work as a valuable reference to clarify the ideological character of Dharmaśāstra. This ideological identification of *karma* and pollution takes place in the arbitrary idea of caste pollution (permanent impurity by Dumont), because if we look beyond Brahmanical ideology we need not accept the equation such that low castes are impure. So there are cases of arbitrariness in the application of the Brahmanical ideology. The notion of appropriation of the object in the recognition of pollution is a typical example of this. For example, although a well dug by low caste people is free of their impurity, a well once used by a low caste man must be polluted. Needless to say this example reveals the instrumentality of the ideological usage. Another example is found in the dialogue between a Brahman called Dash Babu and an Untouchable youth called Muli, provided by Freeman. Dash Babu said, “...If my father had not been here, you could have eaten on our bell-metal”. I (Muli) said, “No, I don’t want that, if I eat with you I’ll get sin” [FREEMAN 1979: 156-157]. This again suggests that a considerable freedom in the exercise of their ideology is possessed by the Brahman and, on the other hand, in this case we notice the deep penetration of the Brahmanical identification between pollution and sin into the mind of the Untouchable youth. This contrasting behavior realistically depicts the difference between the people operating the dominant ideology and the dominated, who are given no room to operate it.

These cases expose, in a sense, an aspect of the crude application of the dominant ideology, that is, the high caste is clearly divided from the lower castes and the higher people subordinate the lower under the logic of the superiority of purity. I call this explicit aspect “the direct apparatus of ideology”. However, not only that but also another more skillful and implicit device can be found in the Brahmanical ideology. Both the explicit and implicit aspects and their articulation are very well examined in Tambiah’s work [1973] which deals with Dharmaśāstra. The main point argued by Tambiah is the contrast between the approved *anuloma* (hypergamous unions) and the disapproved *pratiloma* (hypogamous unions). According to Tambiah, although in so far as people observe *anuloma* the purity of higher castes is maintained without serious contradiction, on the other hand, *pratiloma* generates an irreversible confusion of caste order, namely, pollution. Therefore, “the classical Dharmashastra texts generate a grammar of ‘ungrammatical’ (i.e., immoral/unlawful/disapproved) conduct” [TAMBIAH 1973: 215]. That is, śāstric theorists as symbolic producers “...were more concerned with the generation of castes and occupational groups through the unsanctioned and repudiated forms of intermixing” [1973: 207]. Tambiah
sees through this paradox as follows: “It seems to me that pratiloma is a convenient intellectual device for generating various disapproved categories, assigning them degraded positions...” [1973: 207]. Furthermore, he touches on the crucial point that the higher extent of participation of Brahman varna for producing such a confused mixture provides effective reasons to mythically relate the degraded people to Brahmanical ancestors [1973: 207–208]. This exactly shows the mystification power as the central character of ideology. It works as the paradoxical power connecting two socially opposite poles (the Brahman and the lowest castes) in mystified ways. It could be called “the indirect apparatus of ideology”.

It is these dual apparatuses of the direct and the indirect that give the enormous encompassing power to the Brahmanical ideology. In this respect, Tambiah points out that “Dumont has given us a formulation of the Indian social hierarchy in terms of the dialectical opposition and combination of the Varna categories” but “the relation between varna and jati...is never actually systematically demonstrated” [1973: 192]. That is to say, Dumont’s argument rests on rather the explicit and direct aspect of dividing hierarchical order which is constructed on the pure-impure dichotomy depending on the ideal varna theory, that is, the “anuloma” ideology or the “direct” apparatus of the Brahmanical ideology in my sense. Therefore Tambiah’s contribution here is in his emphasis that boundary-making work is very central for the ideology.

Although so far I have concentrated on Dumont’s work and the related works of others, we can raise the so-called transactional (monist, substance-codes, etc.) theory as another important society-oriented study. Transactional theory literally emphasized transactional strategies for maximizing each group’s interests (for example, [MARRIOTT 1976(1973)]). According to Marglin, who much owes to Tambiah [1973], it is in the descending order of castes (the anuloma type of order in Tambiah’s sense) into which fit the transactions described by such authors as Marriott and Inden [MARGLIN 1977: 268]. If this point is combined with the criticism by Barnett, Fruzzetti and Ostor, that “Marriott and Inden endow their genera with an unexplained voluntarism and freedom of will” [BARNETT et al. 1976: 633], we can see that their approach cannot undermine Dumont’s dualistic view, which, indeed, is a requisite for their own work as the stage where transactions take place. Of course we recognize Marriott’s contribution that the notions of divisibility of the person and constant circulation of particles challenged Dumont’s static pure-impure hierarchical “structure” from the viewpoint of flexibility. However, it is unfortunate for us as well as for Marriott that the very significant question in terms of the existence of the gap between attributional theory and interactional theory, which was presented in his early work [MARRIOTT 1959], has not been deepened since then. I believe that one of the main reasons

for Marriott's failure is again a lack of the ideological point of view, as with Dumont. In other words, Marriott could not construct his theory from the actual interactions at the village level. In this sense, despite appearances, Marriott's theory is again very much textual and "reductionist" [McGilvray 1982: 88]. According to Glucklich, "The Samkhya guna theory provides the conceptual basis for identifying substance and code ..." [Glucklich 1984: 38]. If we consider that Sāṃkhya refuse to make an ontological distinction between 'mind' and 'body' we would notice that Marriott's substance-codes theory is the direct reflection of this Sāṃkhya guna theory, which is inclined to identify pollution with karma, that is, life process pollution with caste pollution. Here we not only confirm Marglin's statement but are also strongly impressed that, by naively following the Brahmanical ideology, Marriott shares a number of points with Dumont.

In sum, 1) both Dumont's theory and Marriott's theory remain within the Brahmanical ideology or dharma, more precisely within the formal and "direct" aspect or "anuloma" aspect of the ideology; 2) but as both lack the point of view of ideology in a post-structuralist sense, they unconsciously extend their theories to the domain beyond the field of dharma; 3) as a result, although the application of their theories within dharma, namely, within the relationship between man and man is to some extent effective, when they are used toward and in the domain of mokṣa they confront the fatal limitation. However, many students still do not recognize the problem clearly, thus the negative influence of these society-oriented studies continues, especially in works on religious problems. In this connection, Glucklich's work [1984] is again regarded as invaluable. Glucklich clearly notes, "Mokṣa was a later addition to the trivarga of dharma, artha and kāma of Vedic thought and according to many writers, it never did fit in the pravṛtti ('transactional') tradition (van Buitenen 1957)” [Glucklich 1984: 28] and so he is concerned with “non-transferable karma”. Moreover, by stating that "the full implications of Das' observations have yet to be developed” [1984: 27], Glucklich rightly suggests the significance of liminality theory in the study of pollution (vide infra).

3. LIMINALITY THEORY AND ITS CRITICISMS

So-called liminality theory is expected to have an important role in overcoming the limitation of society-oriented studies. In this section I discuss the implications and limitations of liminality theory for the study of pollution.

Liminality theory began with Van Gennep's inspiring classic [1960 (1909)]. After that it was developed as the time (sacred-profane) theory [1961] and as the taboo theory [1972 (1964)] by Leach and as the "communitas” theory [1969] by Turner. However, Douglas [1966] set up the notion of liminality as a key concept for understanding pollution. This gives an impression that a rethinking of liminality theory took place in the 1960s. It appears that Das [1976] then took
over Douglas' theory in the Hindu context, although Das herself states that her work is constructed on the bases of the concept of "sacred" in Durkheim's theory and the concept of "marginality" or "liminality" in Van Gennep's theory. Here I mainly take up the works of Leach, Douglas and Das from the standpoint of pollution study.

The essence of Leach's taboo theory is summarized by Figures 1 and 2 in his work [LEACH 1972(1964): 48]. According to Leach, "We are taught that the world consists of 'things' distinguished by names; therefore we have to train our perception to recognize a discontinuous environment.... Language gives us the names to distinguish the things; taboo inhibits the recognition of those parts of the continuum which separate the things (Figure 3)" [1972(1964): 47]. This is Leach's explanation for Figure 1. Here we come upon the first problem in his theory: viz, is Leach correct in postulating that the world consists of named things? Platenkamp criticizes this, citing Piaget "'the symbolic or semiotic function comprises, besides language, all forms of imitation: mimicking, symbolic play, mental imagination and so on....' (Piaget 1971: 93) Therefore...the complex interaction between the development of logical-operational structures and linguistic structures does not justify the exclusive function that Leach attributes to verbal categories per se in perception" [PLATENKAMP 1979: 174]. I completely agree. But at the same time it is difficult to understand that Leach clings...
to such a static, simplistic view. Probably this manner of thinking is deeply rooted in Western tradition. Another problem is in a sense one of logic, and occurs when Leach identifies Figure 1 and 2, viz, how Figure 1 can be replaced by Figure 2, if in Figure 1 ‘tabooed parts’ is clearly outside ‘named things’ but in Figure 2 ‘tabooed part’ overlaps into a particular verbal category. I suppose that Figure 1 is to some extent a result of the direct reduction of Van Gennep’s model and Figure 2 shows Leach’s own interpretation of Van Gennep’s model, since only the Van Gennep type of diagram, like Figure 1, occurs in Leach’s earlier work [1961] whereas his later work [1976] uses only a Venn diagram twice. If that assumption is correct, it would not be productive to adhere to the contradiction between the two Figures. Therefore I regard Leach’s Venn diagram as a better reflection of his theory, and will shift my discussion to the character of his Venn diagram. The transition from a Van Gennep type of diagram to Leach’s own suggests that Leach’s theory is reductionist rather than an invention from actual ethnographical materials. Ironically it is “generalized” theory resulting from “inspired guesswork” [LEACH 1961: 5], and lacks detailed definitions. This permitted Platenkamp’s insightful criticism that “Leach does not make a consistent distinction between a structural categorical level on the one hand and an empirical level on the other” [PLATENKAMP 1979: 177]. This is a fatal watershed for liminality theory, because the distinction between an empirical level and a structural level clearly recalls the existence of a cultural system of an ideology. Here there is the common characteristic of the lack of an ideological point of view between Leach and Dumont or Marriott (vide supra). Though Leach makes an enormous contribution on the highly metaphorical concepts of ambiguity or anomaly at the theoretical level, in reality he was not conscious of metaphorical usage. This is similar to Dumont’s ideology. As a result, in Leach’s actual taboo theory, the something or someone tabooed is permanently fixed, as if Dumont sees the lower caste people as the permanently or inherently polluted. Something ambiguous must be tabooed automatically for Leach and he never queries who produces it or how it is generated. Needless to say then, Leach never investigates what ambiguity or taboo actually means. Thus Leach’s liminality theory unconsciously fuses with the dominant ideological view which often draws a clear line between tabooed things or people and not-tabooed ones, and which therefore usually justifies the hierarchical system in a society. As Leach could give no positive character to the ‘environment’~p, we cannot find in his theory any consideration in terms of outside of this world any more than the idea of the

5) Platenkamp notes the same point as follows; “How should we conceive of an ‘overlap’ between the categories p and not-p in a semantic universe in which language functions for the very reason to deny this overlap?” [1979: 177].

6) Although we find Van Gennep’s model on page 78 [1976], this is only intended for the explanation of rites de passage. Rather, it should be noted that Leach removes a Figure 1 type of diagram and leaves only a Venn diagram on page 35 [1976].
reversed character of this world.7) This means that Leach’s theory has only the point of view of the verbal side or this world’s side. In this connection, when we imagine that taboo must touch upon ritual or religious domains, namely, the relationship between man and god or between this world and other world, Leach’s this-worldly taboo theory has decisive limitations, despite of its apparent plausibility.

Thus we need to return to Platenkamp’s position by detaching ourselves from naive “generalization” to overcome Leach’s sense of liminality theory. Platenkamp calmly keeps a distance from Leach as well as from Halverson’s radical criticism of Leach [HALVERSON 1976] and examines the taboo on animal names by using ethnographic data from a Scottish fishing community. After clarifying the invalidity of Leach’s model, Platenkamp concludes that “these animal names are tabooed not because they possess marginal, ambivalent characteristics, but because they carry an optimal amount of information concerning the features that mark the category in which they are classified in various contexts” [PLATENKAMP 1979: 179]. This suggests that taboos are tools for constructing cultural cognitive categories from empirical materials. Therefore the kind of categories produced and the materials used arbitrarily depend on cultural options. In other words, anything has a potential possibility to become a tabooed symbol. This coincides exactly with the post-structuralist view of symbolism. Furthermore, the point of an optimal amount of information for categorization in various contents is highly suggestive for the present context. My interpretation or extension from the point is in the recognition that the content of an optimal amount of information shows multi-layered structure. This means that taboo itself is diversified with various levels from the cultural specific one to the universal. Accordingly, arbitrariness is diminishing and the degree of metaphor is also decreasing. This argument touches the content of information carried, namely, the content of the ideologies found in a society. Here I imagine that there is a range from this-worldly ideology (ideology concerning the relationship between man and man) to the other-worldly ideology (ideology in terms of the relationship between man and god).

In a sense, these arguments show the development from Leach’s structuralist symbolism to Platenkamp’s post-structuralist symbolism. A crucial point in Platenkamp’s discussion is the assertion that this world itself is liminal. However, there is the question that Platenkamp did not take up. That is, what is the “environment” or the “background” of this world? In other words, what is the implication of the existence of other world? According to Leach’s Venn diagram (Figure 2), he sees the “environment” as a power suppressing our consciousness and producing tabooed areas. This assertion can be revived in the context in

7) The other world in the Venn diagram for the logic of sacrifice [LEACH 1976: 82] is explained as: “The concept of the Other World is generated by direct inversion of the characteristics of ordinary experience” [1976: 81].
terms of the taboo in the level of the other-worldly ideology. Platenkamp's argument does not touch on this, as I demonstrate in Figure 3. When interpreting by Figure 3, the following points should be noted. (1) Model III is in a theoretical framework developed from model II, not from model I; (2) Model I suggests only the existence of "background" and the idea of overlapping to model III; (3) In this connection, the connection itself between overlapping and taboo is not wrong; (4) Therefore, p and q are quite different in quality. I imagine that the contrast between Models I and III corresponds to the contrast between the this-worldly ideology level and the other-worldly ideology level. This means that Model I can be useful where the dominant ideology artificially defines and fixes the liminal tabooed area within a peripheral part of this world, that is, in the social hierarchical context. In this case the power of ~p would be utilized for legitimizing the fixed taboo. So ~p is a reversed projection of p and must in fact be subordinate to p despite disguising the superiority over p in appearances. In this sense we notice again that Dumont's theory fits to Model I well. On the other hand, Model III implies that the potentiality of taboo or liminal character is shared by all parts of this world, that is, everything and everyone have tabooed elements within them. So this level of taboo is not defined by social context but is produced by the intrusion of ~q, namely, it's potential threatening power. In this sense, ~q exists independently of q and exists through human existence itself, rather than through socially competitive ideologies. Needless to say, it is obvious that both levels of ideologies exist in one society. This hypothetical assertion will be clarified below.

Both Leach's theory and Douglas' theory are often regarded as anomaly theories, since they share a number of features. Here I discuss several points which seem to be different after confirming the shared features with Leach. The essence of Douglas' theory is to some extent represented by the statement that

![Figure 3. Two models of liminality](image)

*Figure 3. Two models of liminality (the parts with oblique lines show taboo areas)*
“dirt was created by the differentiating activity of mind, it was a by-product of the creation of order” [DOUGLAS 1966: 160]. Linking pollution with anomaly, which is regarded as disorder and danger, is of course her major contribution. It is also problematical. The principal problem is in the direct, and in a sense psychological, connection between pollution and anomaly. Hershman [1974: 293], Bulmer [1967: 21], Meigs [1978: 310], Bradförd [1983: 320-321], Uberoi [1967: 90] and of course Platenkamp [1979], all criticize the same point, that the anomaly theory of Douglas and Leach fails to explain clearly how anomaly can be linked with pollution, because it lacks the “extensive body of ethnography” [BULMER 1967] or “social historical context” [UBEROI 1967]. This is caused by the uprooted “generalization”, as already discussed, although Leach is more clear-cut than Douglas.8) Here I should discuss the relationship between taboo and pollution. Although problematical, it seems that in principle taboo and pollution share the same aim of the assertion of avoidance or segregation for which they are marked, although taboo is a more direct expression for avoidance than pollution, which is the more skillful and indirect expression, including a justification. Therefore we can move continuously from taboo to pollution, despite their having distinct connotations.

On the one hand Douglas still perpetuates the defect which is shared with Leach, but on the other her intensive work on pollution goes beyond Leach and succeeds in showing the complexity and the abundance of pollution concepts. The merit of her work is that basically she regards it as a religious rather than a social study, and this makes a fundamental framework for comparative religious studies. For that, Douglas deals with a broad range of religions, from primitive to world religions, as materials in support of her argument. For example, this broadness reflects on the distinction between cosmic pollution and social pollution [DOUGLAS 1966: 73] which is tied up with her reevaluation of Levy-Bruhl, who explored primitive thought for modern westerners. As a result, Douglas’ discussion ranges from socially defined pollution, such as caste pollution [1966: 99, 125], to pollution beyond human controls, such as life process pollution [1966: 113]. In this sense, we can say that Douglas’ argument touches on all the aspects from Model I to Model III (vide supra). When she states “Bringing pollution, unlike sorcery and witchcraft, is a capacity which men share with animals, for pollution is not always set off by humans” [1966: 113], Douglas probably refers to the most basic level of pollution, that is, the anomaly that emerges from the unknown world beyond human capacity for understanding. This, it seems, at least refers to pollution or anomaly caused by the events of birth and death. In this basic horizon the notion of sacred power or danger entering the argument of pollution or disorder and the ambiguous character of sacred power, namely, the destructive

8) Leach’s manner of citation such that “Mary Douglas here borrows Lord Chesterfield’s neat aphorism ‘Dirt is matter out of place’ ” [1976: 61] shows that Leach reinforces the fragmentation and the generalization and becomes increasingly separated from ethnographical context.
and the creative is pointed out. This leads to the introduction of ritual, because ritual formulates our experience or makes us recognize the potency of disorder [1966: 64]. Renewal rites, including sacrificial death, illustrate particularly clearly the relationship between pollution and "death and regeneration". This basic line of discussion takes place at the nearest area to the other world where we encounter the unknown and therefore the fearful. Namely, we experience the intrusion of the other world. This refers to the world of Model III. However, despite the merit of this broadness of argument, a serious problem is a failure to clearly articulate the various levels of pollution, a result, probably, of a lack of a consistent ethnographical context. We again return to the repeated criticism.

In this connection Das [1976], who basically follows Douglas' view, is in a sense very successful, because she returns liminality theory to the particular ethnographical context of Hindu Society. Das combines "sacred" in Durkheim's theory and "liminality" in Van Gennep's theory through her own interpretations. On these conceptual bases Das rejects Dumont's pure-impure dichotomy and replaces it by the religious concept of "sacred", namely, a cosmic order (or purity) as a source of axiomatically legitimizing social institutions. So that Das defines pollution as the liminal (marginal) situations in which "an individual experiences his social world as separated from the cosmic" [Das 1976: 248] and which have a threatening nature. Religion therefore provides the means by which liminalities are positively overcome. Then Das provides the most important dictum that "the paradigm of liminality par excellence is death" [1976: 252]. So the essential meaning of ritual becomes to "convert death (birth) from an accidental, contingent event capable of questioning the entire social order to a part of a design of a cosmic order" [1976: 256]. Therefore a sacrifice or a death ritual (cremation) is the most typical ritual in this sense. Das also doubts Dumont's identification of birth and death pollution with caste pollution, although she refrains from positively discussing caste pollution. Das mainly discuss pollution from the viewpoint of Model III. This means that she attempted to focus on the basic and the broadly shared (probably the "reciprocal" in Das' sense) level of Hindu ideology against Dumont's dominant hierarchical ideology.9)

Thus Das adds two valuable contributions. The first is that she provided a mediating meaning of death between liminality (anomaly) and pollution (vide infra). Secondly, Das is conscious of the distinction of two kinds of ideologies in Hindu society. Unfortunately, however, she is not interested in the articulation between the two ideologies, because she also has little consciousness about ideological discourse. This could be a criticism of liminality theory as a whole, which so far has developed under the strong influence of structuralism. When we seek the dynamic articulation among several ideologies co-existing in one society, this rather static liminality theory reveals its defect. Therefore we need not

9) Das and Uberoi [1971] clarify this point.
simply "Structures" but the interrelationship between "Structures" and "Processes" [OvESEN 1983: 5]. On the same line the view of "symbolic persistence and structural replacement" [BARNETT 1975: 176] is also useful. That is, their discursive views in terms of social change are required for pollution studies as well, because concepts of pollution itself reflect dynamic social formations.

4. IMPLICATION OF ANOMALY: METAPHOR OF DEATH

Why and how is anomaly identified with pollution? There are already three direct suggestions concerning this general question. The first, from Platenkamp, is that anomaly should not be defined simply as the cognition of out of place or disorder by fragmented perception without context, but should be determined in the whole context of the cognitive structure of a particular culture. The second is that pollution itself has various levels, that is, the range from the this-worldly to the other-worldly (from Model I to Model III). The third is Das' dictum that the paradigm of liminality par excellence is death. On these bases, we should go further with the more systematic consideration. For this, Meigs' work [1978] is stimulating and suggestive.

It should be emphasized that Meigs develops pollution theory on the basis of her ethnographical data from the Hua people of the New Guinea Highlands. Meigs doubts Douglas theory; "how can Douglas account for the fact that most anomalous, disordered phenomena are not polluting? Consider, for example, in that same context of the dining room table not shoes but a toy ship, or stationery, or a roll of paper towels, or a new dress. Each of these is as out of place as the shoes. Yet we do not feel them to be dirty or polluting. 'Messy' is the appropriate term" [MEIGS 1978: 310]. Then, we need to ask what makes the difference between pollution and mess. In response, mainly after examining New Guinean data, Meigs defines pollution as: "(1) substances which are perceived as decaying, carriers of such substances and symbols of them; (2) in those contexts in which the substances, their carriers, or symbols are threatening to gain access to the body; (3) where that access is not desired" [1978: 313]. In this definition, "the perception of decaying" is the first key notion. This notion comes from the Hua view that "Anything that is polluting is a form of nu (vital essence)" [1978: 307]. "Nu is viewed as the source of life, vitality, sexuality, youth. Its loss or contamination may result in loss of health, ageing, or death" [1978: 306]. Further, Meigs points out that aune, which may be defined as the animating substance of matter, is nu in its positive, health-enhancing aspect whereas siro na is nu in its negative, health-reducing aspect [1978: 308]. In this sense, menstrual blood and parturitional fluids are the most dangerous and polluting and are at the same time ultimately creative, namely, "the means par excellence of aune transfer". This discussion in terms of ambiguity of nu is developed and connected with a concept
of marginality. That is, this marginality is not Leach's sense (e.g., the body's margins) but is recognized in another connection of between death (decay) and the regeneration of life (growth) [1978: 313]. Meigs adds that a North American's awareness of the creative power of that which is rotten coincides with the Hua view. Here we find the clear answer to the difference between pollution and mess. Pollution is characterized by anomaly or ambiguity between death and life (birth) whereas mess is just identified with "out of place" or "disorder", namely, "anomaly" in Douglas' and Leach's sense. This answer is highly significant, but on the other hand, it appears to me that Meigs' statement that "at best pollution could only be a particular kind of marginality or ambivalence, a subclass of the larger class of ambivalent things" [1978: 317, n.9] underestimates the value of her own work. I doubt whether Meigs' concept of pollution is encompassed simply by Douglas' concept of pollution. We must recall here Platenkamp's suggestion. That is, the concept of anomaly must be found at the cultural cognitive level so that anomalous things as "symbols" would be found in this cultural context. From this point of view, pollution defined by Douglas and Leach lacks reality. In other words, it is a result of abstract construction of generalization, although I accept their idea of anomaly or overlapping. Therefore it is obvious that we cannot compare "reality" with "not reality". Meigs' humble misstatement might have occurred mainly because the viewpoint of ideology is again lacking in her argument. The second suggestion comes into this point. As explained above, Leach's taboo theory coincides with the dominant ideological view, even though Leach is not aware of it (Model I). Douglas' theory also principally shares this characteristic. In this respect anomaly in their theory does not have reality but can consequently be worked into the dominant ideology. In contrast, anomaly which Meigs deals with is mainly related to life process so that it is the more basic one which is broadly shared in a society. The fact that this level of pollution emerges between death and birth implies that Meigs' argument directly corresponds to other-worldly pollution (Model III).

To further clarify this point, I consider more the implication of anomaly between death (decay) and the regeneration of life (birth, growth). First, we should confirm that death comes first in the paradoxical relationship between death and the regeneration of life, because, although death and birth are inevitable, the notion of regeneration is already a kind of ideology as a cultural interpretation of these events. In this connection, Das was right in her dictum that the paradigm of liminality par excellence is death. However, in the Hindu context, Nicholas demonstrates the opposite view, at least in appearance, that "the inauspicious and the impure are so often thought to be coordinate that death rather than birth has come to appear as the very type of Hindu impurity. But, in the śrāddha rites for the departed, the paradigmatic action is birth, or rebirth" [Nicholas 1981: 378]. Hershman also emphasizes the symbolism of birth, "the ceremony of Mātā (a ritual preceding marriage) seems to use the symbolic idiom
of the physiology and ritual of birth" [HERSHMAN 1977: 287]. Sahi, who investigates the child motif as the centrality of a popular religious culture, again focuses on the birth aspect by saying that "there is a constant relationship between womb and tomb, and the child hero has to encounter the forces of death in the very act of coming to birth" [SAHI 1980: 3]. These pieces of evidence undoubtedly claim that birth is the paradigmatic idiom of liminal occasions, such as rite de passage in the Hindu context. But this assertion is not problematical for the present discussion, because it is the very interpretation of the most basic ideology of Hindu society, which stresses the regeneration of life. Therefore there is no contradiction between this Hindu ideological interpretation and Das' statement, for the very existence of uncontrolled death behind the ideology continuously induces reproduction of new life. Thus death can be seen as the most fundamental fact on which various ideologies are constructed. Death is not an after-life but the dynamic process of losing life. The transition of dying or decaying unto death is perceived as the most fearful and threatening power by people in the first place. Subsequently this archetypal perception of death begins to be used as a symbolic meaning in the ideological context. I call this the "metaphor of death". This means that the "metaphor of death" penetrates the whole range of pollution from Model III to Model I. In other words, the degree of metaphor corresponds to the elaboration of ideology. Now we can understand the relationship between Douglas' pollution (Leach's pollution) and Meigs' pollution from the point of view of ideology. That is, both pollutions can be set on the common ideological ladder, and the difference between the two is in the degree of the "metaphor of death", although they should not (could not) be compared without the ideological viewpoint.

Supplementally I want to touch a little on the notion of "foreignness", for, according to Khare, in the phase of social change people so often see the manner or things having a "foreign" origin as ritually polluting. Khare raises several examples. The Western manner of sitting on chairs and placing food on a table is thought of as polluting by old people. Tomato and carrot were treated as non-vegetarian (ritually polluting) because of a "foreign" origin. This point can be related to the second condition of Meigs' definition of pollution, that is, "foreignness" implies the unknown threatening character from outside as it causes confusion in a conventional system. These evidences in appearance support Douglas' theory of pollution as the perception of out-of-place. However, from the ideological position these examples could be seen as the result of the application or the usage of the "metaphor of death" to the things having "foreign" origin. We can find here the analogy that inside a society is "this world" and outside is "the other world". Hence the notion of "foreignness" is to be included in the concept of the "metaphor of death". In this connection, Cantlie's psychoanalytic statement that "Hindu asceticism represents an expression of the death instinct in a disguised and qualified form" [CANTLIE 1977: 265] is highly suggestive. This
statement corresponds to the ideological argument of the “metaphor of death”, because Hindu asceticism as an institution can in a sense be seen as the most elaborated ideological apparatus, that is, the highest degree of metaphorical usage of death (vide infra).

So far we can distinguish qualitatively different phases of pollution, which can, however, be ideologically continuous through the mediation of the concept of the “metaphor of death”. That is to say, one is the most basic pollution in the ideological sense which is the first direct perception to things themselves giving out fear of death (dying) in the very liminal situation between life and after-life or between this world and other world, and another is the ideologically elaborated pollution whose substance is not intrinsically polluting but which is as the result of the application of the “metaphor of death” determined according to ideological contexts in the dynamic socio-cultural formations. I would like to assign the terms “pollution” to the former and “impurity” to the latter, because the word pollution seems to be the more dynamic and therefore suitable for expressing the process of radiating death fear, whereas the word impurity implies a more static or fixed state. Even so, it must be noticed that dynamism is implicated in both terms. “Pollution” connotes the dynamic struggles against inevitable life processes outside human control, that is, the struggles between this world and the other world. While the ideological struggles within a society, such as caste restrictions and food transactions, is associated with “impurity”. “Pollution” is the ceaseless paradigmatic source for producing “impurity”. I repeat that both “pollution” and “impurity” are not generated simply because of the fragmented perception of out-of-place but are the persistent cultural constructs. We can further point out that the more elaborated “impurity” is the more culturally specific so that the sharedness of “impurity” is diminishing. In contrast, “pollution” is not only culturally defined but also is broadly shared in a society in the first place and sometimes even shared beyond the boundary of a society.

5. SYMBOLISM OF WOMAN: MEDIATING CHARACTER

The previous extensive discussion has considered a resconceptualization of liminality theory. From here I will focus the discussion on the Hindu cultural context, following Platenkamp’s aphorism.

As discussed, penetration of the symbolic idiom of birth, that is, the basic ideology of death and the regeneration of life, is clearly found in Hindu societies.11

10) Hershman vaguely touches as in this distinction between two kinds of pollution by saying that “The pollution of caste and eating is something which can be kept under control, but the events of birth and death are outside human control and therefore they bring with them pollution” [1974: 290].

11) In this respect, Bloch and Parry [1982] is a very useful attempt to see the sharedness and at the same time the limitation of the ideology of death and the regeneration of life.
This ideological device is a direct interpretative response to the threatening power of death, or, generally speaking, life process. This cognitive response itself is the Hindu "pollution". In this ideology that death in a negative sense is positively reinterpreted by the idiom of birth (rebirth), the reproductive ability of woman becomes central as a mediator between death and birth. Thus puberty or menstruation as a symbol of a reproductive ability is connected with birth and death. Krygier notes that "In India there is the remarkable notion of embryo murder" [KRYGIER 1982: 77]. This notion includes the view that menstrual blood is associated with conception and a child is formed from menstrual blood so that a woman's menstruation must be rendered fruitful [1982: 77]. Menstrual blood as the most dangerous "pollution" paradoxically has creative power. In this "pollution" plane, birth, death and menstruation are linked as one set. However, the implication of menstruation (puberty) is not exhausted only in this plane. This is indicated, by the unclear position of menstruation pollution, which is classified by Orenstein as an independent category of "self pollution" and different from other categories of "relational pollution" (pollution of birth and death) and "act pollution" (compare Orenstein [1968] with [1970]). This means that menstruation pollution is vaguely separated from pollution of birth and death in Dharmashastra as a corpus of highly ideological sacred laws.

The ambiguous character of Hindu women is commonly expressed stereotypically in various social contexts. Expressed simply, Hindu women possess both aspects of "purity" and "danger" or of "compassion" and "sexuality (passion)" [TAPPER 1979: 1]. Allen clearly lists the dual character of Hindu women such as pure/impure, sinister/benign, creative/destructive, ally/opponent, goddess/witch [ALLEN 1982: 1]. More precisely, according to Hershman, "Virginity and motherhood are both highly esteemed states in Punjabi society but wifehood and sexuality are those aspects which devalue a woman and make her the inferior of a man" [HERSHMAN 1977: 275]. These descriptions of Hindu women are not incorrect but still there remains vagueness and confusion. This is caused by the nebulous view that the distinction of two levels of ideologies in terms of symbolism of Hindu women are not clearly recognized. We must notice not only the differentiation between them but also the dynamic relationship between the two ideologies in one society. In this connection the conclusion of [ALLEN 1982] is suggestive, despite its just juxtaposing several views of women and not showing the relationship among them. According to Allen, "the orthodox renouncer avoids women as dangerous distractions; the seeker after high social status controls them in order to maintain his status through their purity ...; the low status worker values them as providers of material satisfaction ...; while the Tantric uses them as a necessary means of attaining spiritual liberation" [1982: 18]. This in its own way provides the perspective of ideological formations in Hindu society. Allen's four categories can be reduced to two major ideologies. These latter two categories could be seen as the ideology of affirmation of female
sexuality, which corresponds to the “pollution” level of ideology, while the first two are opposites—the ideology of negation of female sexuality which means the dominant Brahmanical ideology, namely, the “impurity” level of ideology. The “pollution” level of ideology of women, then, is constructed on the basis of the very concept of “pollution” which within itself carries the ambiguity between life (birth) and after-life (death) or production (creation) and destruction. So women’s ambiguity in this level is inclined to be seen as uncontrolled or otherworldly. This is what I explained in the plane of life process “pollution”, where menstrual pollution is united with pollution of birth and death. In this ideology women’s productive (reproductive) power is emphasized. This sort of ideology is explicitly found among lower caste people. Allen notes that “It is only the Sudra and untouchable who realistically evaluate their women folk by reference to their erotic, reproductive and productive contributions to life” [1982: 18]. This therefore is why the autonomy of women among the lower castes is higher than among the higher caste. On the other hand the “impurity” level of ideology on women, which is produced by the dominant Brahmanical ideology, contains the idea of the “pure-impure” dichotomy, in Dumont’s sense. Therefore, the ambiguous character of women in this sense, which is obviously different from the “pollution” sense of ambiguity, is strictly controlled so that the life processual “pollution” from women, especially menstrual “pollution”, is labelled as “impurity” and is eliminated. However, not only the elimination of “impurity” but also the emphasis on the “purity” aspect of menstruation must be attempted to serve for maintaining hierarchical power relations. In this respect, according to Orenstein, the code-writers as typical symbolic producers of the dominant ideology touch the “pure” as well as the “impure” aspect of women [ORENSTEIN 1968: 122]. In his discussion on Draupadi’s hair Hiltebeitel notes that “conventional notions of menstrual blood as defiling are somewhat one-sided. To the women, at least, menstrual blood is also purifying”. Furthermore, “There are numerous statements in the Dharmaśāstra Sāmihiśās to the effect that women are cleansed by the menstrual flow” [HILTEBEITEL 1981: 203]. Outside textual sources, Hershman reports that “Punjabi women do not look upon menstruation as a curse but rather see it as a necessary bodily process in order to purge themselves of pollution and make clean their wombs” [HERSHMAN 1974: 286]. All of these focus on the “purity” aspect of women or on the purifying power of women through menstruation.

We find here two levels of interpretation in terms of menstruation as a notable symbol of women, that is, menstrual “pollution” and menstrual “purity-impurity”, which correspond to the contrast between affirmed sexuality and negated sexuality. As shown by Allen, this contrast exists most explicitly between Untouchables and Brahmans. This means that a Hindu society simultaneously has at least two distinguished ideologies in terms of women. In this connection, Ortner’s general argument [1978], in which the parallelism between the significance of virginity
and state societies is dealt with, fits quite well in the present discussion. According to Ortner, "In an extraordinarily wide range of societies in the world ... ideologically it is held that the purity of the women reflects on the honor and status of their families" [ORTNER 1978: 19]. And "Most of the societies concerned with female purity are involved in so-called great traditions, especially Christianity, Islam and Hinduism ... in conjunction with the emergence of states" [1978: 23]. On the contrary, no pre-state societies have "the ideological linkage of female virginity and chastity to the social honor of the group" [1978: 23]. In the process of the replacement of pre-state societies by state societies, "there is a great shift in the ideology concerning women" [1978: 26]. Before they were "dangerous" or polluting, but now they are said to be "in danger" or pure, justifying male protection and guardianship [1978: 26]. In the ultimate, through the discussion on hypergamy, Ortner claims that "the women are not contrary to native ideology, representing and maintaining the group's actual status, but are oriented upwards and represent the ideal higher status of the group" [1978: 32]. Firstly, we can grasp the clear point that "purity" of women is a strategic tool for the seeker after social status to struggle in a competitive arena of a stratified hierarchical type of society, namely, a state society. Secondly, we find that Untouchables share the same ideology concerning women with pre-state society while needless to say Brahmanical ideology is itself equated to the ideology of state society.12) Third is the suggestion that the development of male dominance under the guise of protection of women would accompany the emergence of a state society. Thus, it is not unreasonable to say that a Hindu stratified society is a dynamic complex in which there are at least two fundamentally different and contradictory ideologies.

Here I return to the "pure-impure" dichotomy in the dominant ideology to clarify the relationship between two levels of ideologies. I repeat that "impurity" is the label attached by the dominant Brahmanism to "pollution" through the "metaphor of death". In other words, in this case the relationship between "impurity" and "pollution" is ontologically the same but ideologically different. The implication of the "pure-impure" ideology is that "purity" must overcome, control and eliminate "impurity". Hershman's statement, mentioned earlier, should be read in this context. That is, wifehood and sexuality as a negative side are opposed to virginity and motherhood as a good side. This clearly shows the ideology of negated sexuality. In this respect, a widow must be the most "impure" being. For example, "a common term of abuse in Kannada is randi, a word which means both widow and whore" [BRADFORD 1983: 316]. This implies that a widow is "impure" not only because of the effect of death "pollution" but also because of her sexuality which has lost its controller (her husband), as Stutchbury also points

12) Stutchbury [1982] deals with this topic directly by comparing satt (the custom of Hindu societies) with meriah (the custom of a tribal society).
Therefore this dangerous, sexual, and therefore "impure" widow is to be eliminated or controlled. There are two main ways of doing this. One is simply to isolate "impure" elements and not to touch them, so a widow is forced to pass her life in mourning and isolated from normal social relations. Another, sacrifice, is the more high-handed way of changing "impurity" to "purity". In this sense, sati, sacrifice, is the most radical way. Ideologically through sati, "the widow, extremely polluted by her husband's death is transformed into the purest of wives of sacrifice" [1982: 62]. In this way, the threat she presents to the patrilineage is completely removed and the honor of the purest wife makes her lineage prosperous.

Thus there are two ways of controlling "pollution" as "impurity" in the ideology of "pure-impure" dichotomy. The concept of "impurity" therefore works as a two-way apparatus both for maintaining "purity" and for generating "purity". In this framework, sacrifice is a method for generating "purity" par excellence. Sacrifice is seen as a highly conscious manipulation of the "metaphor of death" and therefore it is the most ideological device. In this sense, we can say that two levels of ideologies (the "pure-impure" ideology and the "pollution" ideology) are articulated by the concept of "impurity", i.e., the "pure-impure" ideology that on the one hand represses (or rejects) "pollution" but on the other hand absorbs or transforms "pollution". Thus, the enormous potential energy of "pollution" is the constant source for animating the "pure-impure" ideology, despite separate appearances. In this context, women embody the symbolism of the "metaphor of death" and play a main cast in the mystification drama of the transformation from "pollution" as "impurity" to "purity". It is obvious that this symbolic mediating character of women emanates from their deeper involvement in life process compared with men. Thus, it seems to be what Ortner wanted to say when he described women as mediators between nature and culture. Thus "impure" women have both the polluting power and the purifying power (Figure 4). However, it should be noted that Figure 4 presenting one-sided articulation from the dominant "pure-impure" ideology. This should be balanced by a investigation from the "pollution" side (vide infra).

It is important not to confuse the two dimensions in the dichotomous character

![Figure 4. "impurity" and "pollution"](image-url)
of Hindu women. One dimension is the relation between two different ideologies, namely, the “pollution” ideology (affirmation of sexuality) and the “pure-impure” ideology (negation of sexuality). The other is obviously found within the “pure-impure” ideology itself. Without this distinction we cannot rightly and adequately analyze women’s ambiguous character, because overlooking it would commit the serious mistake of the uniform extension of the dominant “pure-impure” view over other ideologies existing in Hindu society. This was Dumont’s error. Thus the conscious distinction of two dimensions of the dichotomous relationship is significant for seeing the real view of the lower castes as another ideology.

The clear recognition of the distinction clarifies the symbolic character of women. Women carrying the symbolism of the “metaphor of death” function not only as a mediating device for generating the productive value within each ideology but also as a mediator for mystically bridging between the different ideologies.

Lastly the topic of wifehood should be discussed briefly, since it seems that in Brahmanism the devalued and relatively “impure” wifehood, in which widowhood can be included, paradoxically shows a transcendental characteristic against virginity and motherhood which directly serve “this-worldly” social interests. From the viewpoint of the “pure-impure” ideology, the “purity” of virginity is to be protected and maintained by isolation whereas the “purity” of wifehood must be generated (created) by conscious effort. Therefore, in Figure 4 the way of maintaining “purity” corresponds to virginity and another generating “purity” fits wifehood. In this context, it is said that the devotion of a wife to a husband has a renunciation value in this world [OJHA 1981: 255]. More simply, a husband is a God to a wife [HARPER 1964: 181]. So Brahmanism forces a wife to thoroughly herself devote to a husband in order to generate “purity”, because devotion is a kind of self-sacrifice in everyday life. In this sense, sati is a devotion par excellence for a widow. Through it she could reach the purest state of salvation. In this connection, we notice that the relationship between wife and husband is similar to that between man and God [FULLER 1979: 471]. We notice that though the giver is higher in status than the taker in the transactions of food and marriage, this rule cannot be extended to apply to both the wife-husband relation and the man-God relation. For a husband takes food from a wife but maintains his purer and superior position to a wife. God is also given offerings by an inferior man but is still completely pure. I am reminded here of Fuller’s statement that “the gods themselves cannot be polluted” [1979: 459]. From the perspective of this logical contradiction, when reexamining two ways of controlling “pollution” in Figure 4, two ways of controlling corresponding to these two different logics of interaction emerge. The maintenance of “purity” is ruled by the logic of transactionalism in Marriott’s sense (this-worldly logic) whereas the way of generating “purity” is based on the logic of sacrifice (other-worldly logic). This means that Brahmanism simultaneously adheres to at least two different logics. Thus, the
logic of sacrifice could be seen as a conscious metaphorical replication of the "pollution" ideology, namely, death and the regeneration of life.

In this connection, there could be the question of the kind of relationship existing between the ideology of renunciation and "pollution" ideology. Are both ideologies identified with each other or not? Is the logic of sacrifice one or many? In the first place, what is the relationship between the Brahmanical ideology and renunciation? Wifehood, which is severed between sexuality and purity, presents these basic problems. On the contrary, the implications of wifehood must be grasped in this wider framework and not simply in the this-worldly "pure-impure" ideology. This is taken up below in terms of the bhakti movement.

6. RENUNCIATION AND BRAHMANICAL IDEOLOGY

This section aims to understand the relationship between the Brahmanical "pure-impure" ideology and the ideology of renunciation through the role of "purity" as a part of an overall study of pollution.

Dumont presents the contrast between the renouncer as an individual-outside-the-world and the Brahman as a socially embedded man-in-the-world [Dumont 1980(1966): 275]. It is obvious that one and probably the main aspect of the usefulness which Dumont has in his mind for this construct is to make a comparison with the modern western societies. That is, he imagines the contrast between an individual-outside-the-world of the Indian renouncer and an individual-in-the-world of the western thinker. However, this understandably urgent requirement leads to the mistake of the careless application of the western concept of the individual to the Indian renouncer. For it seems that an individual-outside-the-world falls in a kind of a word-play, because a sort of boundary-making concept of the individual cannot logically exist in the non-discriminating horizon of outside-the-world. Therefore even if we can accept Dumont's view of a sort of dialogue between the socially involved Brahman and the individualistic renouncer, we cannot naively follow his framework of the contrast between the man-in-the-world and an individual-outside-the-world. Dumont himself seems to notice this problem and says "the relation between thought and action is different" [1980(1966): 275]. By this notion he tries to make a connection at the action level to the world which is separated from outside-the-world at the thought level. (Dumont's view in terms of the relationship between the Brahman householder and the renouncer is found in these statements.) That is, "In fact the man-in-the-world, and particularly the Brahman, is given the credit for ideas which he

13) Dumont notes that "He (the renouncer) thinks as an individual, and this is the distinctive trait which opposes him to the man-in-the-world and brings him closer to the western thinker" [1980: 275].
may have adopted but not invented.... Not only the founding of sects and their maintenance, but the major ideas, the 'inventions' are due to the renouncer ..." [1980(1966): 275]. We find here the adopter-inventor relationship between them. Dumont also points out the significance of the sects, which are intimately connected to the institution of renunciation, as a means by which the thought of the renouncer penetrate into the great mass of men-of-the-world [1980(1966): 284].

In this connection, through his rather historical examination of the Buddhist bhikkhu, Tambiah not only well illustrates Dumont's point but also enlarges the argument on the renouncer which is limited to individualism by Dumont. In outline his theory is as follows. The early Buddhist movement against the Brahmanical ritualism advocated a sober life in this world. However, Śaṅkarācārya, on the one hand, opposed Buddhism and regarded the ascetic renouncers as the guardians and enforcers of the layman's life on the basis of Vedic tradition. On the other hand he borrowed the Buddhists' organizational structure and their disciplinary code. Through Śaṅkara's synthesizing work, the heterodox renouncer's innovations were incorporated into the Hindu framework. This encouraged the development of the Hindu monastic institutions, namely, the sects. As a result, many *sanyāsīs* of the Hindu sects came to be rated as the highest religious achievers and as the guardians of *varṇāśrama* values [TAMBIAH 1981: 318-319]. Firstly, Tambiah emphasises the positive and harmonious relation of the renouncers to the householders as the religious achievers and guardians more than does Dumont's adopter-inventor relationship. Secondly, the aspect of the renouncers as being-in-the-society is clearly pointed out by the development of the sects (the Hindu monastic communities). With the latter point, in particular, Tambiah tends to break out of Dumont's limitations of individuality and outside-the-world.

Heesterman's criticism of Dumont undermines the more basic point, since he regards Dumont's view of a dialogue between householders and renouncers itself as problematic. In this sense, Tambiah is also to be criticized. According to Heesterman, "if we stay within the limits of the opposition and interaction between the vedic and the renunciatory positions, we may miss the point of the vedic tradition itself" [HEESTERMAN 1981: 253]. He concludes, "The institution of renunciation, then, can be seen to have arisen orthogenetically within the vedic tradition as a result of the inner logic of that tradition. In the process the vedic *śruti* sets itself apart from society as a sovereign sphere embodying transcendence. But at the same time it encompasses the human world" [1981: 269]. Heesterman's textual study, needless to say, constitutes a complete negation of Dumont's dualistic view. In this respect, his statement that "the renouncer does not reject vedic sacrifice, he 'internalizes' it" [1981: 252] is a very simple but key point. It would seem that in a sense this radical but natural criticism by Heesterman that the Brahman and the renouncer is continuous or united on the
same basis of the vedic tradition is reasonable in order to properly understand the situation on the periphery of Brahmanism. Moreover, we can easily discover why the renouncers could be the religious guardians of the householders (the Brahmans). The logic of sacrifice is an indispensable factor for this. As discussed previously, sacrifice is the most paradoxical method for generating “purity”. The implication that the renouncer internalizes vedic sacrifice can be interpreted as the social death of the renouncer, so that to become the renouncer is itself a sacrifice, at least in principle. This means that the renouncer as a ceaseless performer of sacrifice must be a constant producer of “purity”. So we can rightly take up the meaning of Dumont's view of the renouncer as the ‘creator of values’ [DUMONT 1980(1966): 75] in this context, but not in the dichotomous interaction. In South Asian ethnographies one often encounters the description that ascetics (renouncers) and priests while performing ceremonies are not polluted (cf. [RYAN 1980: 146]). However, it is not difficult to understand this situation if we looked upon them as the ongoing performers of sacrifice who are not just maintaining but also generating “purity”. Therefore, a sort of fixed “purity” of renouncers and of priests performing ceremonies again cannot be explained by the logic of the this-worldly “pure-impure” ideology, but can be understood by the logic of sacrifice (vide infra). If this fixed “purity” or the state of generating “purity” had a different logic from that of the “pure-impure”, we should distinguish it terminologically to avoid confounding it with “purity” in the “pure-impure” ideology. Thus I used the term “sacred” for expressing the state of “purity” generated through sacrifice. By this definition we can clearly illustrate the situation under discussion via Figure 5. “his (an ascetic’s) corpse is pure ... many of the most powerful temples on Ceylon are samadhis, tombs of ascetics.” [1980: 146]. This means that temples are “sacred”, according to the present argument. What I wish to confirm here by citing Ryan is that we certainly have several “sacred” states (time and space) elements in-the-world which come in contact with the other world. I return to Figure 5 and try to explain the position of the Brahman. As with the relationship between “pollution” and “impurity”, so we can say that “purity” is the label of “sacred” attached by the “pure-impure” ideology. Needless to say, “purity” has value only in the hierarchical “pure-impure” ideology. Then the “pure-impure” ideology again

Figure 5. “purity” and “sacred”
uses two ways; viz, maintaining “purity” and generating “purity”. So that the Brahman as the top of the caste hierarchy on the one hand maintains his “purity” by avoiding “impurity” and on the other generates “purity” by performing sacrifice. This situation can be seen as the two ways of controlling “purity” by Brahmanism, as Heesterman saw. However, in addition it is also not impossible to regard it as the crossing of two different ideologies, namely, the “pure-impure” ideology and the “sacred” ideology. This does not mean a naive return to Dumont’s dichotomous position. The situation is not amenable to easy description, because we cannot escape the problem of “subjectivity” in the argument of ideology. What makes the difference between Heesterman and Dumont is the location of the edge to which Brahmanism can reach. Heesterman thinks that Brahmanism includes the idea of renunciation because the method of sacrifice is shared by both Brahmans and renouncers. Unfortunately Heesterman’s discussion does not cover the “pure-impure” ideology in my sense, so that he fails to touch on the social interaction of renunciation. While Dumont limits Brahmanism within the this-worldly “pure-impure” ideology when he compares Brahmans with renouncers, we should say that both views are wrong and right. For from the viewpoint of subjectivity, both have the limitation that they throw light upon the situation of renouncers only from the Brahman’s side. This is caused by their lacking of an ideological point of view. But Heesterman’s contribution is, as already discussed, to clarify the continuity penetrating into both Brahmans and renouncers by their sharedness of sacrifice. It is to his merit that Dumont, as a result, pointed out at least the existence of two different ideologies, despite the different and misleading context, and the aspect of interaction between Brahmans and renouncers, namely, the adopter-inventor relationship, which was more clarified by Tambiah. In reflection of this, I would like to claim that the “sacred” ideology should be differentiated from the “pure-impure” ideology and that the articulation between both ideologies be investigated from both sides, namely, from the Brahman’s perspective as well as that of the renouncer. In this respect, like Figure 4, Figure 5 is not enough, because it does not well illustrate the view of the renouncer. So far what we can at least say from the Brahman’s point of view is that the Brahman is protected by the renouncer, that is, “sacred” ideology supports and animates the “pure-impure” ideology as a certain source of “purity”. Therefore, at least in principle, the Brahman can maintain his “pure” position without directly exposing himself to the other world. In this connection, Brahmans perform the ritualized sacrifice on the sure guarantee of renouncers and draw “purity” from it. So they could be seen as mediators between the “sacred” ideology and the “pure-impure” ideology, such as women of the Brahman caste in the custom of sati mediates between the “pollution” ideology and the “pure-impure” ideology.

As I have demonstrated, Dumont, Tambiah and Heesterman all lack the point of view of the renouncers themselves as well as ideological thinking.
this connection Burghart’s recent work [1983] is highly important for both points. He notes that “anthropological theories of Hindu asceticism have been based, for the most part, on perceptions of ascetics from the point of view of the world which they have renounced”, and moreover “the prescriptive texts which were compiled by Brahman householders, or possibly eremitic householders” have confirmed this tendency [BURGHART 1983: 635]. So Burghart claims the necessity of analyzing renunciation from the ascetic’s point of view. According to Burghart, “there is at present sufficient material to indicate that two different conceptual universes are in operation—the Brahman householder’s interdependent system of caste and the ascetic’s temporal cycle of individual rebirths” [1983: 650]. By this he clearly asserts the existence of two different ideologies, the “pure-impure” ideology and the “sacred” ideology, in my sense. Further, Burghart continues that “Each universe contains a description of itself as well as the possibility of reinterpreting the terms of the other; thus one can not on conceptual grounds at least claim that anyone scheme is the more fundamental” [1983: 650]. We clearly see here his ideological thought. Moreover Burghart does not neglect to point out that “ideologically both models are grounded by their proponents on the everpresent and eternal reality of Brahma”. This recalls the shared basis of Vedic sacrifice discussed by Heesterman. Thus we can grasp the situation as the struggles (interactions or debates) of interpretation and reinterpretation between two different ideologies which share the recognition of “universe” (the worlds which are a manifestation of Brahma) but differentiate in the direction of interpretation. However, in this situation the interpretations from the renouncer’s side or from that of “sacred” ideology have not been investigated enough. In this context, Burghart tries to deal with the entire field of intra- and intersectarian relations as well as the different sectarian definitions of the ‘real’ ascetic and non-ascetic. He suggests that the former relations, “for the ascetic, may be a more important arena of discourse than his relationship with non-ascetics” [1983: 641]. Actually there are constant interactions among various interpretations depending on diversified sects within the “sacred” ideology itself. On the upper edge of the society these struggles are performed by the renouncers who attempt to hold the entire “universe” inside themselves, even in the world. Thus the struggles are the source from which permanent “purity”, namely “sacred”, is generated. Here we find the different directions of concern between the “sacred” ideology and the “pure-impure” ideology. The concern of the “pure-impure” ideology is to draw “purity” from “sacred” and to use it for social control, while the “sacred” ideology is intent on producing “sacred” for its own sake. Therefore, we can again confirm that the interpretation that the renouncer is a protector of dharma is in principle drawn from the Brahman’s side.

Even though the “sacred” ideology in theory has its own concern, the actual sects in the world are not a little influenced by the “pure-impure” ideology. In other words, they are often reabsorbed into the world of caste. The typical
case is the fact that the sects which in theory negate the caste system in reality open their doors only to twice-born people and especially take precedence over Brahmans. Consequently, the discrimination between orthodox renouncers and heterodox renouncers is in fact produced. This means that there are a number renouncer-like people (or groups) on the fringes of the orthodox renouncers (or sects). In this respect, Tantrism, which rejects ascetic renunciation but accepts ideas which derive from it, is not simply seen as a heterodoxy but shows a sort of heterodox character by its tendency to be connected with folk religions, such as cults of goddess (śakti). The ascetics in bhakti movements are inclined to be marginal in another sense. In Hindu theory, there are three paths to reach mokṣa: (1) through jñāna (knowledge); (2) through karma (action); and (3) through bhakti (love, devotion). However, it is said to be almost impossible via karma. Besides, without the guidance of guru, the first way is also difficult. This means that for Śūdras and Untouchables, who are really rejected from the recruitment of sects, the third way, bhakti, is the only available path.

Though the path through bhakti is already located as a part of orthodoxy in the textual sources, when its historical development is reexamined a strong connection with popular religion from the bottom of society also emerges. Both the women in Tantrism and the lowest people in the bhakti movement are inferior in everyday life. Thus these religious movements provide the paradox whereby their repressed position is reversed to that of the dominant. This recalls the paradox of sati that transforms the most “impure” widow to the “purest” wife. These arguments suggest that in certain phases the “sacred” ideology has some relation to the “pollution” ideology.

In this connection, the contrast between the shaven head and that with uncut and uncombed hair (often matted) is suggestive. According Hershman, to completely shave a man’s head indicates rejection of all worldly pollution and absolute control over bodily functions, whereas unkempt hair is regarded as the very stuff of divinity [Hershman 1974: 289]. The former typically indicates the orthodox renouncer and the latter refers to the sādhu type of renouncer. In the latter, the “polluting” thing, which is thought of as the “impure” in the former’s context, paradoxically carries divinity, that is, “sacredness”. Again we see some sort of affinity between “pollution” and “sacred” (vide infra).

Female-renunciation can be added to this argument. Female renunciation is the very heterodoxy because it is regarded as adharma by the Brahmanical orthodoxy. According to the Brahmanical code, a woman as a wife should devote herself to a husband within dharma. However, as Ojha reports, female renouncers fulfill the same role as protectors of the dharma, as do the majority of male re-

14) According to Olivelle, the definition of renunciation has two parts: “i. the abandonment of rites; ii. the recitation of the praise formula, ... Consequently, the definition has to exclude both the men in the world and renouncers who have not renounced according to the Vedic ordinance, ...e.g., śūdras.” [1975: 77-78]
nouncers, and they are even respected as the possessors of the right knowledge of things [OJHA 1981: 281]. Here again we appreciate the tolerance and the paradox held by the folk level of tradition. [CAPLAN 1973], which deals with female ascetics’ organization (kuti) in West Nepal, obviously shows its this-worldly character. “Kulis are in fact very much a part of the village” [1973: 175] so that they share a number of points which castes have. However and therefore, kuti could be positively chosen by village women as the place which provides “a fuller and more interesting life” [1973: 178], without the very serious decision often associated with negative reasons.

Through these rather marginal materials in terms of renunciation we can appreciate the abundance of village (folk) level of religious life which the top-down view of the Brahmanical orthodoxy cannot discern. Therefore, from the next section I will attempt to focus on the Untouchables’ world as the bottom-up view in order to provide a degree of contrast with this section.

7. THE BOTTOM-UP VIEW: THE WORLD OF UNTOUCHABLES

In the study of caste societies, Mencher’s work [1974] is one which strongly advocates the necessity of seeing caste society from the bottom. However it has a tendency of being reductionist. Mencher clarifies two features through her study in Tamilnadu; “First from the point of view of people at the lowest end of the scale, caste has functioned (and continues to function) as a very effective system of economic exploitation. Second, one of the functions of the system has been to prevent the formation of social classes with any commonality of interest or unity of purpose” [MENCHER 1974: 469]. In her discussion, Mencher points out not only that the idea of dharma, which is embodied by the jajmani system, has been used as an instrument of repression but also that many people at the bottom have been aware of this [1974: 470]. In latter connection, it is her important remark that “Untouchables may accept these notions (dharma and karma) to some extent, but it is important to distinguish between the overt acceptance of such values and the holding of other values usually unexpressed to outsiders” [1974: 476]. This suggestion must be kept in mind when collecting and analyzing data from socially repressed people, especially when the replication is attempted. However, the problem is more basic than Mencher imagines, prior to the problem of expression their consciousness of their own values itself is not always clear. Even though their counter-ideology is so often hidden to outsiders, it can be still seen as rather overt values. Therefore, through intensive fieldwork the roots of their own ideology must be excavated at a deeper level than the rather linear conflict of the opposition between the dominant ideology and the counter-ideology. Then the relation between their own deep-rooted ideology and
the counter-ideology, should be examined. Of course they deeply connected to each other. These relations are easily seen in South India, especially in Tamil areas, where Dravidian culture is overlain by Aryan culture. In this sense Mencher fails to properly take up the meaning of Tamil cultural elements as a consequence of her reductionist tendency, since she remains at the level of the counter-ideology.

Thus I concentrate on an examination of three anthropologists' works dealing with Tamil Untouchables; Moffatt [1975, 1979], McGilvray [1983] and Maloney [1975].

Moffatt classifies the anthropological literature on the situation of Untouchables since 1950 into three categories: (1) outcaste image (lack of culture); (2) models of diversity (other culture); and (3) models of unity (replicated culture) [1979]. This static categorization is itself problematical. Further, in Moffatt's classification Mencher [1974] is underestimated as the first approach because of that weakness (vide supra). It is sometimes unreasonable to fit each work into one of those categories. The static character of Moffatt's categorization stems from the lack of the viewpoint of ideological discourse, namely, the disregard of the dynamics of interpretation. As a result Moffatt himself falls victim to his own classification, for he concludes that “the present analysis of cultural consensus among the very low castes of Endavur is compatible with Dumont's assumption of ideological homogeneity throughout the caste order” [Moffatt 1979: 298], that is, “models of unity”. Thus Moffatt forces himself to locate his view on Untouchables into one of the three categories. I do not claim that his assertion of replication is simply wrong, rather that this static Dumontian approach precludes his fuller appreciation of the implications of his own abundant data. I have two interconnected criticisms of Moffatt's work. First, Moffatt prepares two separate boxes, namely, that for high caste type of elements and another for Tamil elements. He then directly classifies his raw field materials into these two boxes. The remaining elements that do not fit this classification are ignored, with the statement that “these few cultural differences should not be taken as evidence for more total cultural diversity” [1979: 298]. I criticize this interpretation. Raw data themselves are not the important things but the importance resides in their meanings given in the context of the complete cultural system. Harijan's ideology must be reconstructed with their interpretative level of data which are often unexpressed in the field, as Mencher suggested. This defect led Moffatt to ignore his own typical material in which the Harijan's interpretation is reflected, that is, “traditionally they had the right to drive out any high caste intruder by force (from Harijan's colony)—especially a Brahmin who, in an interesting inversion of the order of purity and pollution, was treated as a source of pollution to the colony” [1975: 115]. Moffatt fails to draw any productive implication from it to amplify his conclusion.

Although the second point is included in the first, it deserves separate
treatment. It is related to his two classificatory boxes. For Moffatt, Tamil elements are left as they are and have no positive function to the Harijan's cultural construct. In this respect Moffatt's theory again dismisses the organic meaning of the Tamil cultural tradition. His dismissal is more complete than Mencher's, because Moffatt negates the existence of counter-ideology. According to Moffatt, "the five Untouchable castes of Endavur are excluded from four things: the Sanskritic ritualism of the Brahmin purohit, the auspicious music of Ambattan barber band, and the services of lower-ranking barbers and midwives" [1979: 291]. Then he claims that "Nor do the deletions in themselves represent any real change in consciousness among the Untouchables of Endavur. The Harijans substitute for the first two as best they can, with the Tamil ritualism of the Valluvar purohit on the one hand, and with the pucari band and the code-switching parai band on the other" [1979: 291]. However, I doubt this conclusion because the articulation between the Brahmanical ritualism and the Tamil ritualism is not as simple as Moffatt imagines.

From the standpoint of the Sri Lankan Tamil, McGilvray partly criticizes Moffatt's framework which "emphasizes the Dumontian continuities in Hindu purity/pollution ideology between high castes and untouchables" [MCGILVRAY 1983: 112], because "these Sri Lankan ideals and assumptions seem less Brahmanical and more kingly in nature" [1983: 112]. When I read together with his other book [1982], this is understood as the necessity of having the viewpoint of "ideological usage", which Moffatt lacks. Though McGilvray fails to analyze the Untouchable's view deeply enough, his observation that "the first major permanent temple to be constructed in the village was for Pillaiyar and not for Mariyamman, despite the fact that the cult of Mariyamman remains the most important focus of religious observance among the Paraiyars" [1983: 111] is most interesting. Firstly, this reiterates, as Mencher noticed, the danger of the linear identification that the bigger temple the greater its significance in religious life. Further, this symbolically suggests the intimate relationship between the Tamil element (Mariyamman) and the Untouchables' identity in their actual life as well as their replicatory aspect (the construction of Pillaiyar temple).

[MALONEY 1975] is the most important contribution for investigating the real bottom-up view of Tamil Untouchables in village contexts. Moreover her conclusion is strikingly opposite to the Moffatt's. That is, Maloney carves in relief the subculture of Untouchables and clarifies that the Sanskritic pure-impure ideology can explain only a part of the social domain. Thus she clearly recognizes Tamil society as a complex that consists of plural subcultures (ideologies). According to Maloney, belief systems reflect the trifurcation such as a very few Brahmans, non-Brahmans and Harijans, which she regards as the popularly recognized social division. Through the attentive and multiple examination of religious beliefs, Maloney illuminates the interpretation of each category contrastively. In particular the interpretation in terms of dharma to a considerable extent represents
the essence of the ideology of each social category. That is to say, “Brahmans and many other villagers (the left-handed castes) who value piety define it in terms of morals, behavior, and thought. ... The non-Brahman landowners, merchants, and many farmers (the right-handed castes) define dharma essentially as charity, for they are better at charity than at piety. ... the Harijans, and other lower castes too, can vaunt neither piety nor charity and reject the idea that a donor can acquire merit at the expense of the recipient. For them, real dharma is giving at the temple” [MALONEY 1975: 175]. Here we obviously find three different ideologies corresponding to three social divisions. That is, there are two dominant ideologies, namely, the Brahmanical ideology (purity) and the kingly ideology (dominance), and a third ideology, that of the dominated. As shown above, this means that Harijans oppose two differently directed dominant ideologies. One is opposition to the idea of charity, which comes from a this-worldly materialistic basis, and the other is opposition to the idea of piety, which is related to “purity”. Because Untouchables and lower castes are, needless to say, constrained and have neither physical property nor moral property, they attempt to find the third way by negating or detaching themselves from these this-worldly constraints and by directly devoting themselves to gods in the other-worldly domain. In this sense, it seems as if the lower caste people deny the elements serving the social hierarchical construction while throwing their souls to the gods. I find here the relationship between their counter-ideology in the social constraints and their own ideology which constructively forms their identity.

As a result, the significance of the religious domain for the lower castes and Untouchables is fervent because they lack options for self-realization in the social domain. However, in this religious domain, according to Maloney, “the higher and lower castes are not as far apart as in their views of the social order” [1975: 189]. This means that in the South India context the opposition (the contrast) between the Sanskriti type of religious behavior and the Tamil type of behavior emerges explicitly rather than the difference between the Tamil dominant castes and the Tamil dominated castes. “Many of the ritually purer people, such as Brahmans, prefer to affect the forces of the cosmos by means of piety and purity rather than by compelling the deities through vows” [1975: 179] which is the expression of bhakti as faith [1975: 178]. In this respect, higher castes such as the left-handed castes, can adopt both ways, namely, the Brahmanical and the Tamil, but the lower people, especially Untouchables, have been buried under Tamil tradition. Thus we can more easily find Tamil elements in the subculture of Untouchables.15) In other words, Tamil religious tradition works for Untouchables not only as the well-ground of their identity but also as the symbols of their counter-ideology. This, it appears, is why the Tamil traditional view is radically expressed among them. According to Maloney, the cults of the goddesses called

15) Moffatt [1979: 292] also touches on the same point, although he does not take it up properly.
"amman" is the heart of village religion. Further the gods found in the village are Balamurugan, Aiyánàr and Sástān, the symbols of the Tamil cultural revivalism. Ganesh is the only god of the mainline Hindu pantheon worshipped by villagers. Around these major gods and goddesses are lesser regional deities and sacred places dedicated to ghosts or ancestors [1975: 182]. This picture of village religion provides clear evidence to refute the Harper type of divine hierarchy "ranging from the pure and vegetarian and benevolent gods of the Brahmans to the impure and bloodthirsty and fearsome gods of the Harijans" [1975: 184]. Maloney lucidly claims that this hierarchy must derive from Brahman rather than lower caste informants and she shows as further evidence that "especially the amman goddesses, are essentially benevolent and care for the social groups whose patrons they are" [1975: 184], far from the bloodthirsty and fearful deities. The distance between the Sanskritic Brahmans and Tamil Untouchables is far greater than we imagine. According to Maloney’s description, Tamil villagers have a very limited knowledge of Sanskritic culture. This tendency is strengthened toward the lower castes. So Maloney notes that “lower caste people tend to regard Brahmins mostly as just another ethnic group entitled to its own beliefs and practices” [1975: 170]. In this context, Maloney also points out that “Harijans maintain a self-respect to the extent that they almost seem to think Brahmins pollute them” [1975: 180]. Of course this can be regarded as a typical counter-ideology, but in this case, it would seem that the “foreignness” of Brahman for Tamil Untouchables also encourages their feeling of pollution. Following the definition of the concept of “impurity” (vide supra), we could therefore use the expression “impure” Brahman by virtue of the Untouchables’ reverse-application of the “metaphor of death”.

Through these arguments we have confirmed the existence of the rather independent ideology of Untouchables which the Brahmanical “pure-impure” ideology cannot reach. Moreover, Tamil cultural tradition was an important background that fosters and sustains their ideology. I illustrate my understanding of Maloney’s paper, especially from the viewpoint of Untouchables, in Figure 6.

![Figure 6. The configuration of ideologies in a Tamil village](image)
My dissatisfaction with Maloney's work is that she does not systematically and deeply argue from her own abundant data, and closes her paper with the rather hackneyed phrase that "The genius of the Indian social system is its flexibility" [1975: 189].

Despite her work being removed not only from South India but also from the village context, Searls-Chatterjee [1979], who deals with Benares Sweepers, shares similar points with Maloney. As a result of urbanization the independent character of Untouchables is more reinforced than those examined by Maloney. Searls-Chatterjee points out that "when talking to persons of high castes, Sweepers may suppress mention of customs such as eating pork and drinking. But away from a multi-caste context they express no shame about either of these customs, or about their work as Sweepers .... Sweepers make only half-hearted attempts to modify their behavior to suit the tastes of the higher castes" [SEARLS-CHATTERJEE 1979: 284]. Furthermore, "Sweepers use the word "hindu" to refer to the upper castes rather than to themselves" [1979: 285, n.1]. We can see here a clear distinction of the subculture of the Sweepers from that of the upper castes. Moreover they are very much aware of this distinction. Though Sweepers simply "consider sweeping to be physically dirty rather than polluting" [1979: 284], they rather consciously manipulate their lowness as the polluted to produce "power". Today unionism encourages this tendency on the basis of their occupational and residential homogeneity. In this context, their self-respect is expressed as "honor" which is a central matter in their identity, so that it must be protected by paying any cost. Thus Searls-Chatterjee's work is in a sense regarded as a magnifying glass through which to view Untouchables' ideology. In other words, the things suppressed and unexpressed in the village context emerge more explicitly in the course of urbanization or modernization. In this course the situation in which the negatively expressed or suppressed counter-ideology is rather separated from their identity exclusively projected on the religious domain has been shifted to the more positive situation in which their identity is closely tied up with their more explicit counter-ideology, such as unionism.

I have to some extent emphasized the implication of Tamil cultural tradition as the basis of Tamil Untouchables' identity. However, this naturally requires us to examine the North Indian case. I can do little here, but one example, Sandhu's series of works [1980] [1981a] [1981b] [1981c] on rites de passage of two Scheduled Castes in rural Punjab, to some extent illuminates the North Indian Untouchables' position. Three points can be taken up from these studies: (1) the Scheduled Castes try to reinforce their horizontal social solidarity with their own caste through their reciprocal cooperation; (2) as a whole they are polluting but at the same time they are themselves susceptible to certain categories of pollution, such as that associated with birth and death; and (3) they seek the protection of the beneficent spiritual powers against the malevolent spirits and influence (cf. [SANDHU 1981b: 218–220] ). If we recall the argument of "reciprocity" in [Das
and Uberoi 1971], the strict connections between these three points are understood. However, I wish to emphasize the basic character of life process "pollution" and Untouchables' beliefs, which are directly constructed on the basis of such "pollution". Thus, reexamining Tamil cases from this standpoint of North Indian Untouchables, Tamil culture, despite being one of the elaborated great traditions, maintains a close connection with the "pollution" ideology which is basically shared among all castes. This appears to be why Tamil Untouchable's ideology could be embedded in Tamil culture, without contradiction. In this sense it seems that Tamil "sacred" gods and goddesses have a more intimate relationship to the existence of "pollution" rather than the Brahmanical deities who are enshrined on the hierarchy of the "pure-impure" ideology.

If the deep and direct relationship between the subculture of Untouchables and "pollution" ideology is combined with the equation of the Untouchables' view and pre-state society's ideology (vide supra, Ortner's argument), we can imagine the broad horizon of the "pollution" ideology throughout the Untouchables' world and that of tribal societies. This suggests that to investigate the bottom-up view in Hindu society is one of the approaches to study the broadly shared fundamental frameworks of human societies. From the world of Untouchables various key elements emerge, such as "sacred" goddess (beneficient spiritual power), bhakti, life process "pollution", honor, power, solidarity and egalitarian values. In the next section the bottom-up view through the bhakti movement is examined.

8. THE BHAKTI MOVEMENT: SALVATION OF THE REPRESSED PEOPLE

Even though the path of bhakti to moksa occupies a peripheral or inferior position in Brahmanical orthodoxy,16) it is quite important in popular religion, especially for socially repressed people. For them bhakti is central, not peripheral, thus bhakti is the indispensable element in a bottom-up view. In this connection it is highly insightful for understanding the character of Tamil culture to realize that the cult of Krishna as bhakti (loving devotion) movement first came into prominence in the Tamil lands of South India. This proves that Tamil culture itself is fundamentally characterized by its origin in such a popular religion. This occurred during the eighth century and probably much earlier, and was initiated by persons describing themselves as Alvars (men who have intuitive knowledge of God), who seem to be the Dravidians unaffected by the Upanisads

16) For example, Zaehner notes that "One is conscious the whole time of an uneasy feeling that because bhakti is the easy way to ecstasy, the way of 'knowledge' which in practice means the attainment of moksha by rigorous self-discipline, must be superior and more authentic" [1966: 139].
SEKINE  "Pollution", "Purity" and "Sacred"

[ZAEHNER 1966: 127]. Afterwards it swept the whole of India. In its process, Bhagavata Purana (compiled probably in the ninth century) worked effectively, because the gopis' self-abandoned love for the youthful Krishna described therein had been seen as the symbol of the love of the soul for God. Here we cannot overlook two points in this Krishna cult: (1) the youthful (or child) Krishna is the object of devotion; and (2) God takes the initiative and people (the soul) must be passive. Why are these points important? In this respect Sahi's book [1980] is an invaluable attempt to answer this question. Sahi pays attention to the richness of the popular Hindu idea of a child god throughout India and repeatedly asserts that the divine child is a central motif of various symbols in popular Hindu iconography. What then is the implication of the child? Sahi replies that the child symbolizes the dynamics of death and the regeneration of life and therefore "he has a wholeness" [SAHI 1980: 2]. The title of his book is "The child and the serpent". According to Sahi, the serpent is regarded as a symbol of perennial renewal in folk beliefs. This symbolic meaning comes from the yearly shedding of the serpent's skin which corresponds to a cosmic sacrifice. So, death and life are the binomials of the serpent cult again [1980: 167]. Thus this book's title reveals precisely the author's main assertion. Through Sahi's discussion it is apparent that death and the regeneration of life must be mediated by sacrifice. In this connection Sahi also touches on the significance of the symbolism of fire. So the second point, regarding God's initiative, suggests the necessity of people's self-sacrifice and guarantees success of the regeneration of life. Consequently, Sahi's answer links with the "pollution" ideology (vide supra) in my sense, which is directly associated with the concept of sacrificial death. This means that the horizon of popular Hinduism, including the bhakti movement, is fundamentally penetrated by "pollution" ideology.

In this sense, it is understandable that the bhakti movement started in the Tamil area because Tamil culture has "pollution" ideology as its basic core. Further, the very rapid spread of the bhakti movement proves that there was enormous discontent with the overly elaborated and monopolized Brahmanical ritualism among village people, especially among North Indians, who are more strongly encapsulated in Brahmanism. Although the Vedic sacrifice as the core of Brahmanical ritualism had its origins in the observance of the natural and untamed processes of life and death, later it had become detached from the crude sacrifice and overly elaborated. That increased the distance between its "metaphor of death" and the direct experience of life and death, because the Brahmans as the dominant caste tried to strictly control the procedure of sacrifice, which is dangerous in nature, in order to certainly produce their power of a limited form of "purity". As a result, the fruits of sacrifice by Brahmans were monopolized by the higher castes and were mainly used as their instrument of dominance. Therefore the majority of the lower castes could enjoy none of the fruits. Besides, it was also very difficult for most of them to adopt the orthodox way of renunci-
ation. This apparently demonstrates that the lower and repressed people could find no way out. Therefore it is unquestionable that these people keenly accepted the bhakti movement in this situation. From this context, it seems to me that bhakti movement could be interpreted as their struggle for the acquisition of their own sacrifice in a direct and personal relationship with God. This is their very limited path to salvation.

I will try to clarify the characteristics of the bhakti movement. First its antiparochial, anticaste and antisect features can be raised. According to [ZAEHNER 1966], the language Álvârs used was not Sanskrit but Tamil. This tells us that bhakti started as the parochial phenomenon. But the character of this historical fact does not always explain the content of the movement. Since I saw it as “pollution” ideology, the idea of bhakti itself directly reaches personal rather than social needs in which parochial characters are produced. Thus it is directed toward universality in nature beyond social boundaries, even if people use local languages. As explained, the popularity of the bhakti movement is deeply connected with the features of anticaste and antisect. In short, bhakti could be interpreted as “the salvation in the world (on earth) through the personal experience”. Various categories of repressed people, especially the lower castes, are excluded both from the favor of Brahmanical rituals and from orthodox renunciation. Therefore they must have invented those reversed ways, such as the personal rather than the social, the this-worldly rather than the other-worldly and the simple and emotional rather than the complex and intellectual.

In this connection, Obeyesekere’s distinction between psychogenetic symbols and personal symbols provides a useful framework for understanding the present argument [OBEYESEKERE 1981]. This is logical because his theory is generated from the contrast between the Buddhist monkhood and “sanyasins in Hinduism” [1981: 41] in the Sinhalese cultural context. However, it must be noticed that “sanyasins in Hinduism” in Sri Lanka are not the same as in the Indian context. Rather they are compatible with bhakti ascetics in the popular religion. Therefore the contrast between Buddhist monks and Hindu sanyasins in Sinhalese culture could correspond to the contrast between Brahmans or twice-born sanyasins in sects (the people following the jñāna way) and the repressed people following the bhakti movement. Obeyesekere presents a series of dichotomies, such as, the Hindu view of celibacy—Buddhist view of celibacy, matted hair—shaven head, and personal symbols—psychogenetic symbols. Although I do not accept his flat and a narrow view of Hindu sanyasin, the important thing is the usefulness of his theory, namely, the distinction between two levels of symbols. According to Obeyesekere personal symbols, such as matted hair, symbolize a deep motivation that arose from personal experiences. This is not the case in psychogenetic symbols such as shaven head, which is, rather, institutionalized. In particular he investigates the personal experiences of several female ascetics who have matted hair. Through this, Obeyesekere clarifies the implication of matted hair: matted
hair like a serpent’s coil is regarded as vital force (dhātu), god’s power (śakti) or a woman’s personal guardian deity. These women are motivated purely by personal experiences and eventually become ascetics. Moreover their repressed sexual desire is sublimated as a divine ecstasy. In a sense, matted hair symbolizes this whole process. Hershman’s argument on matted hair can be obviously combined here. That is, the “polluting” hair which directly comes from life process is in itself seen as divine force. This connection of affirmed “pollution” with divine force obviously suggests “the salvation on earth”, which is a key idea of the bhakti movement, whereas psychogenetic symbols could be equated with the Brahmanical “pure-impure” ideology or the orthodox renouncers’ “sacred” ideology which is socially legitimated. Thus, it seems to me that the concept of personal symbols defined by Obeyesekere well illustrates the bottom-up view of the socially repressed people.

Another important contribution by Obeyesekere is his clarification of the interwoven relationship between two levels of symbols, as contrasted with Leach’s clear-cut dichotomy of private symbol and public symbol. Obeyesekere notes that “the Hindu’s experiences are articulated in terms of traditional symbols. ... the Hindu’s consciousness is already influenced by his culture, facilitating the expression of intrapsychic conflict in a cultural idiom” [1981: 21]. Furthermore he suggests “conventionalization of personal symbols” [1981: 50–51]. According to the change of context, personal symbols could be conventionalized. That is, a shift from personal symbols to psychogenetic symbols takes place. As the result, personal symbol is “deprived of its ambiguity, and ipso facto of its capacity for leverage and maneuverability” [1981: 51].

These dynamic interrelations between two levels of symbols can be applied to the relationship between Hindu theology and popular religion, such as the bhakti movement. According to [Zaehner 1966], the Great Epic including the Bhagavad-Gītā “was assuming its final form perhaps in the fourth century A.D.” [1966: 126] and “In the Bhagavad-Gītā three paths to the Absolute are offered to the man who seeks liberation—the path of ‘knowledge’ (jñāna), the path of action (karma) and the path of bhakti” [1966: 125]. The cult of Krishna flourished in the Tamil land in about the eighth century. Then the influential Bhāgavata Purāṇa was “compiled probably in the ninth century” [1966: 126]. So it is not difficult to imagine that there had to be some dialogue between bhakti in theology and the bhakti movement as a popular religion, as Obeyesekere asserts. Zaehner notes, “The (bhakti) movement probably started outside the Brahmanical fold, but like all the subsequent movements that sought to do away with caste it was very soon reabsorbed into the caste system” [1966: 127–128]. We find here the immense power of encapsulation of Brahmanism but at the same time we also know of a number of social and religious reformations on the same line of bhakti tradition which have been repeatedly reproduced. This historical evidence shows the very “symbolic” struggles between two opposing ideologies, namely,
the top-down view and the bottom-up view. This means in the first place that both ideologies have always attempted to respectively reinterpret the symbols shared by both according to each ideological context. Not only this, but also interpretation itself has been exchanged, however, it should not be forgotten that this struggle is not horizontal but vertical. Therefore we notice that the interpretations from the repressed people's side have to be invented under passive and limited conditions so that their interpretations are inclined to be paradoxical, ambiguous, personal, emotional and prompt. Furthermore there remains the unexpressed parts. In other words, the horizon of the bottom-side ideology is not well-articulated and in a sense open-ended. This bottom horizon would not be exhausted by only the bhakti movement, but there is also no doubt that the bhakti movement has been certainly rooted in this bottom, ambiguous horizon and has cultivated a new horizon. The story, however, is not ended. That is, Brahmanical ideology never neglects to reabsorb the essence of the cultivated horizon at the bottom. This must be "conventionalization" in Obeyesekere's sense. Here the paradoxical and ambiguous character of the bhakti movement is again revealed. And this is probably the very character of the "pollution" ideology itself, as we saw in the symbolism of women. The paradox lies in the fact that the bottom people's struggle for claiming their identity after all serves to expand the encapsulating capacity of the dominant ideology. From the standpoint of the bhakti movement, this reabsorption process takes place in parallel with the withdrawal from the outward movement for counter ideology to the inward movement for identity.\footnote{Shulman describes this as follows, "far from being revolutionary in a social sense, bhakti religion...except in its most extreme manifestations...tends toward the preservation of the social order through the sanctification of the present" [1980: 21].} It is the case in Hindu societies.

In looking at the situation today, there can be seen a number of new religious movements comparable with the tradition of the bhakti movement under modernization and urbanization. Moreover, anthropological studies on these religious movements are increasing, especially those linked to urban anthropology. For example, Singer [1966] on the Radha-Krishna Bhajanas of Madras, Singer's generalized argument [1972], Obeyesekere [1978] on the fire-walkers of Kataragama, Carrithers [1979] on a movement of Buddhist ascetics (tapasayo) of Sri Lanka in 1950s, Lee [1982] on the Sai Baba movement in urban Malaysia, Caplan [1985] on Pentecostalism in Madras, and so on can be noted. A common assertion characterizes these works. That is, modernization and urbanization encourage people to sever themselves from traditional cultural contexts. One result in a large up-rooted middle class, especially in urban areas. This most urbanized people are put into a situation in which it is difficult to follow the conventional jhāna path for salvation. Besides, in an urban situation people often confront various unpredictable sufferings or difficulties which cannot be solved by conventional means. Therefore most urban people become somewhat
frustrated and, in a sense, repressed. This is rather similar to the situation of the bottom people in a traditional village context. In short, this expansion of the repressed has produced the circumstance in which bhakti type religiosity is brought about. In this sense, it can be said that the sharedness of the bottom-up view is expanding today.

In summary, three main points have been discussed in the section. The first is that in Tamil culture, the bottom-up view and bhakti religiosity are intimately interrelated on the shared basis of “pollution” ideology. The second is that though there are the continuous symbolic struggles between Brahmanism and the bhakti movement, it has always been encapsulated owing to its religious affirmation of the present. The third is that bhakti movement aims at “salvation on earth”, in contrast with the ideal of orthodox renunciation. These three points and their interrelations can be to some extent analyzed and integrated by Obeyesekere’s theory in terms of personal symbols and psychogenetical symbols.

9. PILGRIMAGE AND TAMIL SHRINE: POLLUTION AND SACRED

My intention here is not to analyze Tamil culture itself, but to clarify the ideological configuration in terms of pollution. However, as discussed above in terms of the bhakti movement, Tamil culture has historically been the impetus that generated influential reformations which are often connected with the bottom people’s needs. Further, Tamil culture has deeply involved the “pollution” ideology. In this sense, Tamil culture is useful in clarifying both “pollution” ideology and the bottom-up view. (Figure 7 attempts to simplify the rather complicated configuration of key elements discussed so far, although it must be modified by the argument presented in this section.) As can be seen, the opposition between the top-down view and the bottom-up view and that between the “pure-impure” ideology /the “sacred” ideology

![Figure 7. The sketch of the arguments in the section 8](image-url)
 tween Sanskrit culture (north) and Tamil culture (south) have different contexts. These different oppositions overlap between the two opposing poles of "pollution" ideology and "pure-impure" ideology/"sacred" ideology.

In this section, I examine pilgrimage among Tamil people and Tamil shrine by rereading mainly Shulman's book [1980] from the perspective depicted in Figure 7.

According to Shulman, "The act of pilgrimage is itself an expression of bhakti for the god in his specific, located home" [SHULMAN 1980: 20] and "we are told that a shrine provides the devotee with both material reward (bhukti) and release (mukti)" [1980: 20]. However, this mukti is not identified with "the ideal of renunciation as proclaimed in the Upanisads and later texts" [1980: 20], because "the myth (Viruttacalam) directs us not to heaven but to earth, which has become the locus of mukti" [1980: 21]. More strikingly it is said that "we forget heaven not because we are reminded of the transience of pleasures and wish to renounce them, but because life on earth is beautiful" [1980: 22]. The Tamil idea of mukti is accompanied by the assertion that "everyone should attain mukti" [1980: 20]. In this context, "the power of the shrine has become an absolute" [1980: 21] and therefore "the shrine is superior to any world of the gods" [1980: 21]. It is more visually described that "The shrine exists as an island surrounded by the chaos of the unredeemed: outside it, evil, death, and the Kali Age persist unchanged" [1980: 25-26]. Furthermore, "The shrine is a microcosmo of the whole of creation" [1980: 26]. Thus, "the Tamil shrines often appear ... as tangible symbols of an other-worldly goal of total independence" [1980: 27]. Therefore pilgrimage as bhakti means an attempt to reach the absolute place of the shrine. Yet, the long, uncomfortable journey to the shrine is "only the prelude to a deeper sense of self-sacrifice" [1980: 18]. "Once the pilgrim is through the gopura the real journey begins" [1980: 18]. "That is the journey into self" [1980: 18], namely, toward garbhagrha (house of the womb). At that heart of the shrine "the pilgrim is conceived afresh, to be reborn without taint" [1980: 19]. Through this contact with the bounded power (concentrated sacred power) or the shrine the pilgrim obtains a new vitality and therefore can return to and face the chaotic world outside. Ultimately, the devotee of a pilgrim achieves "salvation on earth" by the pilgrimage as a kind of self-sacrifice, not by the renunciation of the world. It is appropriate here to recall Maloney's report that almost nobody believes in rebirth [MALONEY 1975: 172].

In these descriptions, we already discover several key factors of Tamil culture, such as the absoluteness of the shrine, the sacred rather than purity, salvation on earth rather than renunciation of the world and bhakti (devotion) as self-sacrifice. The most fundamental factor is the concept of the absolutely sacred shrine. How is it realized? Shulman answers that it is the god's sacrifice. He notes that "the most striking expression of the god's sacrificical role is found in most Tamil shrines in the myth of divine marriage. Marriage is regarded as a sacrifice, in which the


god is slain and revived by his bride, the local goddess” [SHULMAN 1980: 348].
Therefore, most shrines “…insist on celebrating the marriage between the goddess
and the god; in the course of this rite, Śiva accepts the violent consequences of
union. The god dies or is castrated, only to be reborn from the womb of his
virgin bride” [1980: 350]. Here the goddess who is “the black, seductive,
terrifying Kāli” [1980: 348] is sacrificial device itself as well as a source of power.
That is, “This dark bride is a focus of inherent power, potentially dangerous as
well as creative; her womb is the dark earth to which she is closely tied, and in
which she located forever the presence of the god” [1980: 348]. In other words,
this creative process of god’s sacrifice is deeply related to the recognition of the
ambiguous character of the goddess, that is, one dark and still virginal (erotic
attraction) and the other golden and meek (purity). This recognition is expressed
by the double marriage (the black and the golden goddesses) which is widespread
in Tamil shrines. We find the Tamil characteristic that virginity belongs to the
dark side rather than purity. This view is different from the Brahmanical view
that ideologically regards virginity as perfect purity. This means that Tamil
culture does not see the dark aspect of the goddess simply as a negative character
to be segregated. Rather, they see that the dark goddess is indispensable for the
creation of the sacred power of the shrine. This view corresponds to the Tamil
thought (basic Hindu thought as well) that “the creative processes of the universe
are bound up with evil. Evil in its variety of forms (including death, dirt,
unlimited violence) is dynamic and life-giving” [1980: 347]. Therefore the
sacrifice disintegrates a previous existence into the dark chaos, then produces new
life. Shulman inclusively explains that “perhaps from very ancient times the idea
of sacrifice was associated with the worship of the goddess, who is closely identified
with the sacrifice as the source both of death and of new life, and who embodies
basic south Indian concepts of woman and sacred power” [1980: 9]. On the
same line, as Hart III investigated in his work [HART III 1975], “The idea sacred
is dangerous and potentially polluting is undoubtedly ancient in the Tamil area”
[SHULMAN 1980: 10].

Shulman also points out that “within the Brahmin tradition itself there was
a powerful impetus toward freedom from the burden of death, which was an
unavoidable part of the sacrificial ritual in its early form” [1980: 10]. That is,
the prāṇāgnihotra, the “sacrifice of the breaths” substitutes for the original blood-
sacrifice [1980: 10]. This substitution indicates an undertaking that the idea
of “purity” conquers “power”. In my sense, that is the replacement of “pol-
lution” ideology by “pure-impure” ideology. It was a watershed which widened
the difference between Sanskritic culture and Tamil culture. The tendency to
remove the dangerous force also spread to South India. However, this imported
view never succeeded in completely undermining inherent Tamil cultural tra-
dition. This does not mean that Tamil culture has rejected Sanskrit tradition.
Far from it, from the north a number of symbols and interpretations have been
often imported, voluntarily or by force, and utilized as a "unifying, synthesizing, fertilizing force" [1980: 8]. In short, Tamil culture has been enriched by Brahmanical ideology, but it has never been conquered in its fundamental ideology, namely, the affirmed "pollution" ideology.

In this connection Tamil culture itself has a fundamental split "of a clash between the longing for power and the ideal of purity" [1980: 348]. From this point of view the divine marriage in the Tamil shrine itself demonstrates the difficulty of overcoming this split and, in a sense, the compromised solution. As shown above, the virgin goddess embodies the "pollution" ideology, while the slain and reborn god ultimately attains control over the untamed power of the goddess under the ideal of "purity". In the first place the method for realizing the god's control over the goddess is isolation. Insofar as the goddess' power is necessary for salvation on earth, this method is soon ruined. Other methods must be invented. One is to reform the goddess, terrible power "most often by means of the dance contest" [1980: 350]. Another is to chain the goddess "in the idealized domestic role of the Hindu wife" [1980: 350]. These forms are expressed as a double marriage or as the androgyne. The androgyne especially is seen both as the whole process of creation and as "a striking symbol of limitation" [1980: 351].

Though it is not difficult to see the shadow of Sanskrit cultural methods, namely, the rejection of "pollution" in these efforts, the persistence of Tamil inherent (ancient) culture through the ultimate solution of a double marriage or of the androgyne is also impressive. For example, androgyne clearly shows the affirmation of goddess. Although androgyne disguises the tension between power ("pollution") and "purity" by the contrast between female aspect and male aspect, it seems that its actual implication is the goddess itself as a whole, namely, the whole creation process from the dark earth. In this sense, a god could be the another form of a goddess. This point is noted by Shulman as follows: "This conflict within the goddess is not a clash between two contradictory forces, but rather a union of separate stages in a single creative process" [1980: 351]. As already clarified, we now notice that the problem of a clash between power and purity, namely, between two different ideologies has been basically solved within Tamil cultural tradition. Again the goddess itself is sacrifice and therefore the goddess is the wholeness.

Thanks to Shulman's eminent work, we can approach another kind of "sacred", the legacy of Tamil ancient culture presented in the concept of Tamil "sacred" shrine. This "sacred" power paradoxically comes from "pollution". This process is illustrated by the sacrifice of the divine marriage on the basis of the goddess' power. This sacrifice is the direct descendant of blood-sacrifice. The most distinguishing characteristic of this "sacred" is its tangibility, that is, the "sacred" is identified with the "place" of the shrine on earth rather than abstract pure essence, Brahman in heaven (outside the world). The "sacred" could be
also seen as “purity” but it emphasizes more the aspect of power. Provisionally I term this “sacred” from “pollution” “pollution-sacred” to differentiate it from the “sacred” defined earlier. Here I give the term “purity-sacred” for the “sacred” generated by world renouncers, more precisely by the elaborated sacrifice, the prāṇāgniḥotra separated from blood-sacrifice. Sacrifice must be required to generate the “sacred” state. In this sense, there is no difference between the two “sacreds” in using the logic of the “metaphor of death”. Nonetheless, “pollution-sacred” accepts the death of the victim as an indispensable element of sacrifice, whereas “purity-sacred” disguises the rejection of death despite actual usage. Therefore the difference between these two “sacreds” is found both in the relativity of the distance from death and in the absoluteness of ideological direction, namely, the affirmation of “pollution” or the rejection of it. These differences are summed up in Table 1. If we look back Figure 7 we can clarify at least two points. One is that through the examination of Tamil culture the deep connection between Tamil culture and the “pollution” ideology emerges. This also confirms why the bottom-up view comes close to Tamil culture. The other is that distinction of the two kinds of “sacred” requires a modification of Figure 7. Another “sacred” ideology, namely the “pollution-sacred” ideology can be added to the side of the “pollution” ideology of Figure 7, as demonstrated in Figure 8.

10. CONCLUSION

At the outset I presented the relationship between life process pollution and caste pollution, based on field study among the Jaffna Tamil of Sri Lanka. My hypothesis is that the connotation of tutakku, life process pollution in nature, has been extended to caste pollution under the influence of the Brahmani-
tical word āsusam. This suggests the need to distinguish between "pollution" and "impurity". As the first step in clarifying this distinction I discussed the limitations of society-oriented studies as represented by those of Dumont and Marriott, which, since they on the one hand mistakenly regard the dominant Brahmanical ideology of the "pure-impure" dichotomy itself as Hindu ideology, fail to distinguish "pollution" from "impurity". That is, they unwittingly identify caste pollution with life process pollution. On the other hand their theories are revealed as invalid when applied to the religious domain beyond the social hierarchical domain. I have also examined liminality theories. First I criticized the "uprooted generalization" of the connection between pollution and anomaly in the theory of Leach and Douglas. But Douglas' contribution broadens pollution study by seeing it as religious study. Then on the basis of Platenkamp's criticism of Leach I clarified two models of liminality, viz, this-worldly liminality (the more socio-culturally specific: Model I) and other-worldly liminality (the more universalistic or basic: Model III), as shown in Figure 3. From the former to the latter, cultural arbitrariness decreases in taking up anomalous symbols. There are various levels of pollution corresponding to the range between the two models of liminality. Das deals especially with the basic level (Model III) of Hindu pollution, namely, "pollution" in my sense, from the point of view of sacred, then sets her theory against that of Dumont. However, Das is not particularly successful in articulating between Dumont and herself. Though in the Das' theory the significance of sacrifice and the relationship between death and liminality are more clearly pointed out than by Douglas, her theory is still static and lacks the viewpoint of ideological discourse. Even if, as Platenkamp suggested, anomalous (liminal) symbols are determined in the cultural context, we must understand why there is an intimacy between pollution and liminality (anomaly).

I have attempted to supply an answer, for which Meigs' notion of the perception of decaying (death) was suggestive for linking liminality with pollution. It is the "metaphor of death" that penetrates all levels of pollution (from Model III to Model I) as cultural constructs or ideological products. Then I defined the first direct cultural perception emerging from the dying things between this world and other world as "pollution", whereas pollution resulting from the application of the "metaphor of death", especially in the social hierarchical context, was called "impurity". Therefore life process pollution is connected to "pollution" and caste pollution should be called "impurity". This distinction indicates the existence of two different ideologies, i.e., the "pollution" ideology and the "pure-impure" ideology, in Hindu society.

By examining the symbolism of women, I illuminated the contrast and the articulation between those two ideologies. "Pollution" ideology, which claims the affirmation of female sexuality (dangerous and productive), occurs in the Untouchables' ideology and pre-State ideology, whereas the "pure-impure" ideology, which asserts the negation of female sexuality ("impurity" and "purity"),
occurs in the Brahmans' ideology and State ideology. As shown in Figure 4, the mediating power of woman who embodies the “metaphor of death” was pointed out in two spheres, namely, between this world and other world and between two ideologies. In the latter sphere “impure” women exhibit two different logics of interaction, namely, segregation (this-worldly method) and transformation by sacrifice (other-worldly method). They correspond, respectively, to maintaining “purity” (virginity) and generating “purity” (wifehood). There I also emphasized the broad implication (especially the transcendental character) of wifehood by comparing it with the relationship between man and god.

In this connection, renunciation is the institution between this world (man) and other world (God), at least in the upper periphery of this world. I also attempted to reveal the articulation between the renouncer’s universe and Brahman’s one. For this Burghart’s work plays an integrating role going beyond that of Dumont, Tambiah and Heesterman. I set up the contrast and the continuity between the two ideologies, namely, the “sacred” ideology (renouncer) and the “pure-impure” ideology (Brahman), as shown in Figure 5. We should see the dynamic interaction of interpretation between the two ideologies. Burghart’s work suggested that the ceaseless struggle for seeking “sacred” among renouncers or among sects could be interpreted by the Brahmans’ side as the protection of the “pure” position of Brahmans as the top of social hierarchy. However, although I defined the “purity” generated by the orthodox renouncer’s internalized sacrifice as “sacred” for distinguishing from “purity” as the tools of social control, this “sacred” I redefined as “purity-sacred”. It was also pointed out that there are several heterodox renouncer-like people around the orthodox renouncers. In turn that led me to the bottom-up view, especially Untouchables’ view. Moffatt and Maloney hold completely opposite views in terms of the Untouchables’ world. Moffatt emphasizes the replicatory aspect, whereas Maloney clearly demonstrates the existence of the rather independent and conscious subculture of Untouchables, as shown in Figure 6. In the case of the Tamil area Untouchables’ identity is more deeply buried under Tamil tradition than is that of the upper castes. They have a tendency to entreat and devote themselves to gods because they socially have no exit.

Sandhu’s work suggested that “pollution” ideology is familiar to Untouchables and they seek god’s “power” rather than “purity” for eliminating the evil power brought by such “pollution”. In this sense, the bhakti movement that originated from Tamil culture has been greatly welcomed by the bottom people. So that Tamil culture, the bottom-up view and bhakti religiosity are intimately interrelated on the shared basis of “pollution” ideology.

The bhakti movement aims at “salvation on earth,” which contrasts with the ideal of orthodox renunciation. Though there are revolutionary factors (antisect, anti-caste) in the bhakti movement so that we find the continuous symbolic
struggles between Brahmanism and bhakti movement, its own character of the affirmation (sanctification) of the present weakens the revolutionary features.

Through the further investigation of Tamil culture (especially the Tamil shrine), the inherent Tamil view of “sacred”, namely, “pollution-sacred” was clarified. Table 1 shows the contrast between “pollution-sacred” and “purity-sacred”. Both are penetrated by the sacrificial act, but the difference occurs in the manner by which “pollution” on earth is handled. It should be emphasized that “pollution-sacred” is strongly related to the bottom-up view, namely, the identity of the bottom people. Furthermore it must be said that this “pollution-sacred” shown as the persistent character of Tamil culture in itself forms the Hindu basic ideology.

This article examines the topic of pollution from perspective of ideological discourse. Though the topic and the methodology cannot be separated in nature, to clarify my contentions I will divide the conclusion into two parts. The first deals mainly with the results in terms of the content of ideologies, or its configuration, and the second focuses especially on the dynamics, or process of ideological struggles in Hindu societies.

1) Pollution, Purity and Sacred

I have established that the “structure” of a Hindu society consists of three distinguishable ideologies; “pollution” ideology, “pure-impure” ideology and “sacred” ideology. Moreover, the “sacred” ideology encompasses two moments, namely, “pollution-sacred” and “purity-sacred”. These can be synthesized as shown in Figure 8, which is constructed by integrating Figs. 3-5 and Table 1. This diagram permits visualization of the dynamic relations between the different ideologies.

I can clarify the implications of the concluding diagram by examining several important works related to the present topic.

With respect to Figure 8, Dumont’s replacement of the opposition of pure and impure by the opposition of sacred and non-sacred is far from the truth, as Das and Uberoi have criticized [Das and UBEROI 1971: 34-35]. Das and Uberoi suggest that “the pure and the impure far from being absolutely separated and opposed, like Durkheim’s original concepts of the sacred and profane, are in fact interrelated in terms of identity and difference and conjointly opposed to the non-sacred” [1971: 36]. This suggestion is taken up by Hershman and is more clearly presented as [HERSHMAN 1974: 279]:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Profane (non-sacred)</th>
<th>Sacred</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Impure</td>
<td>Pure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impure</td>
<td>Pure</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Though both [Das and UBEROI 1971] and [HERSHMAN 1974] touch upon a significant point, both arguments remain vague and confused since they do not clearly recognize Hindu society as a complex body of plural ideologies. That is, both
still fail to distinguish “pollution” from “impurity”. As shown in my diagram, the Impure of the category Sacred (Hershman) should be called “pollution-sacred”. Further I also hesitate to adopt the distinction of Sacred and Profane (non-Sacred) itself.

For when considering “pollution” ideology, especially the bhakti movement aiming at “salvation on earth”, the adoption of “sacred and profane”, in a Durkheimian sense, misrepresents reality. In short, the most important characteristic of “pollution-sacred” is in the non-discriminating state that pollution itself equals purity or that profane (earth) equals sacred (heaven). In this connection Stirrat [1984], dealing with the concepts of Durkheim and Eliade, on sacred is relevant. According to Stirrat, Durkheimian sacred is associated with the Brahminical dharmic tradition [1984: 210] and “a rejection of the Durkheimian sacred has to involve the individual, and bhakti is, above all, a union of the individual with the absolute, with eternitas” [1984: 211], which is the Eliadean sacred. It seems that he is concerned with my distinction between “purity-sacred” and “pollution-sacred”, by using Durkheim and Eliade. However, I cannot wholeheartedly accept his demonstration, because I doubt whether Eliadean sacred can truly explain the reality of bhakti. Before using the concept, we must clearly understand the process or background in which the concept was
produced. First, Eliade clearly divides the sacred and the profane as two modes of being. Second, Eliade recognizes that in Christian societies the sacred has been replaced by the profane according to the enlargement of historicity, based on which he starts a dialogue with the East. As a result, he finds the sacred in Indian philosophy. This methodology gives rise to my doubt.

Turning to Marglin's distinction of tapas and virya, presented in her argument seeking manifold power in the Hindu context, she asserts that “the power gained by tapas can be used for destructive or constructive ends” [MARGLIN 1977: 267] while “the power associated with birth by contrast is tied to the very maintenance and preservation of order” [1977: 267]. She recommends calling the latter power virya. She observes contrastively that: “the power obtained by the village oracles through possession does not result from birth but from actions in this life [WADLEY 1975: 181]. The power derived from possession may be either benevolent or malevolent, whereas the power which corresponds to purity and derives from birth does not seem to be similarly double-edged” [MARGLIN 1977: 266–267]. When this assertion is compared with Figure 8, it is not clear whether Marglin's dichotomy corresponds to the distinction between “purity-sacred” and “pollution-sacred” or the contrast between Brahman's “purity” and renouncer's “purity-sacred”. For it is almost certain that virya means Brahman's “purity” power, but, despite that tapas is usually seen as renouncer's power, the connotation of tapas in Marglin's description comes close to “pollution-sacred”. It would appear that this unclarity stems from her research methodology, which depends on texts, under the influence of Tambiah. In this respect, while Marglin's criticism of Wadley is not wrong, it is in a sense unjust. By grouping all types of power under the simple rubric of sakti, Wadley failed to appreciate the diversity of power. However, it is important to note that her concept of sakti is based on an intensive village study [WADLEY 1975].

In this article, “pollution ideology” as the basic Hindu ideology and the concept of “pollution-sacred” were deepened by the investigation of Tamil culture. In this I am particularly indebted to Shulman's work. Further, if I extend Marglin's assertion on diversified power, I can add the clear concept of power corresponding to “pollution-sacred”. That is the ancient Tamil conception of anarku. This Tamil conception has been explored as the key term of Tamil culture, especially by Hart III [1975] and by Zvelebil [1979]. Zvelebil clearly states that “The sacred was thought of as a force immanent in certain places, objects, and beings and not as the property of well-defined transcendent gods. The term used for the sacred was anarku, originally conceived of as on impersonal, anonymous power an awe-inspiring supernatural force inherent in a number of phenomena but not identified or confused with any one of them in particular” [ZVELEBIL 1979: 190]. Further, then Zvelebil makes clear two heritages in Hinduism of the ancient (and non-Vedic) conception of anarku, that is, “the immanence of the sacred—a sacred force inherent in certain objects at
certain times” [1979: 191] and “symbolism of being there” [1979: 191]. Needless to say it is obvious that the sacredness of the Tamil shrine investigated by Shulman is the linear descendent of this, the ancient Tamil conception of anäňku. As both Hart III and Zvelebil assert, these Tamil heritages are living in Hinduism as its basic foundation. It seems that such absorption took place on the broadly shared basis of the “pollution” ideology throughout Hindu society. The linking conception of anäňku, which I consider to be a sort of animistic or shamanistic universe, is therefore fundamental to the ideology that Hindu society holds itself open toward the wide horizon of human society in general. From this standpoint, it is not impossible to say that the distance between “purity-sacred” and “pollution-sacred” is comparable with the relationship between World religion and primitive religion. In this sense Figure 8 itself demonstrates the comprehensive character of Hindu society.

2) Ideological Struggle and Untouchables

I was surprised that most of works in terms of pollution and its environment ignore the viewpoint of ideological discourse, with a few notable exceptions such as McGilvray [1982], Burghart [1983], Caplan [1985] and Searls-Chatterjee [1979]. This defect leads to a number of limitations and confusions, as I have demonstrated. To grasp the reality of social dynamics, the perspective of the ongoing process of reinterpretation [COHEN 1974: 80-82] is inevitable. Therborn asserts as well that “We see ideologies not as possessions or texts but as ongoing social process” [THERBORN 1980: 77]. More precisely, “Ideologies differ, compete, and clash not only in what they say about the world we inhabit, but also in telling us who we are, in the kind of subject they interpellate” [1980: 78]. As is well known, the concept of “subjectivity” is deeply related to the problem of identity or self-consciousness. It seems to be more important for repressed people, namely, the Untouchables in this article, to take into account the relationship between their identity and “subjectivity”, because they are more likely to be arbitrarily interpellated at the convenience of the dominant authority. In this connection Feuchtwang’s statement that “The negative category Kuei was a site containing struggle ideologically within the dominance structures described” [FEUCHTWANG 1975: 80] to some extent fits the situation of the Untouchables. Turton [1978] also explores the problem of “subjectivity” of Thai peasants householders. Needless to say, the Untouchables’ case, at least in the village context is more passive than that of Thai peasants who possess nature (land) to be appropriated, because Untouchables are separated from even such a material basis on which they can assert their own “subjectivity”. Turton’s recent work [1984] is more suggestive in the present context. He discusses intensively, the limits of ideological domination and clarifies the view of “the ideological mediation of fear” [1984: 59-62]. Turton touches on not only the fear of the dominated but also that of the dominant. Moreover he notes, “the
menace, the threat is, however, indirectly that of death” [1984: 60]. This calls to mind the concept of the “metaphor of death”. These points seem particularly useful in seeing the relationship between Brahmans and Untouchables. For example, at the metaphorical dimension this fear of death somewhat explains the fact that not only do the Untouchables pollute Brahmans but also they themselves are polluted by Brahmans.

I have briefly reviewed several arguments on ideology to illuminate a couple of concepts concerning ideological discourse. Based on this, I attempt to interpret Figure 8, particularly from the standpoint of the Untouchables. First, we emphasize that the relationship between the ideology and the particular group as its main carrier should not be seen as the fixed, rather ideology is used for establishing their own identity. For example, Untouchables also use “purity” ideology in the sphere of replication and they, of course, adopt “sacred” ideology in their devotion to god. Therefore, it must be noticed that Figure 8 illustrates these dynamic ideological usages of each subject.

As shown, Untouchables are at the bottom of the social hierarchy of the caste system. In this domain of caste hierarchy they are interpellated as the “impure” people by the “purity” ideology as the dominant ideology. This interpellation causes two typical and explicit responses among Untouchables. One is the so-called replication or Sanskritization. That is, as Moffatt [1979] clarifies, they consciously or unconsciously make an effort to replicate the Brahmanical “purity” ideology and produce hierarchical relations among them. At least their subgroups compete with each other to seek the higher status. However, as they have to do that under very limited conditions, it is obvious that their undertakings always stop halfway. It is this point that McGilvray investigated among the Tamil Untouchables of eastern Sri Lanka [McGilvray 1983]. He pays attention to the constrained aspect of the replicatory process.

Another response is, on the contrary, resistance against the “subjectivity” addressed by the dominant ideology. They do not accept the disgrace and instead try to show and protect their inherent power or self-respect (honor) by depending on “pollution” ideology. In this context, their ability for unity or solidarity is also emphasized. Searls-Chatterjee vividly demonstrates this type of response in Benares [Searls-Chatterjee 1979]. However, we must notice that Searls-Chatterjee’s case occurs in a modern urban context. That is, in the usual village situations Untouchables cannot sufficiently express the latter response. In other words, the latter response has to be publicly suppressed. More positively, the dominant group prevents Untouchables from unifying their power of resistance. Mencher clearly points this out and pays attention to the double structure existing but unexpressed in the Untouchables’ mind [Mencher 1974]. We find here the existence of “the ideological mediation of fear”. This latent coercion restrains the appearance of their resistance.18) In this sense, Untouchables in a village lack any exit except subordination in the social hierarchical con-
text (man-man relations). Thus their repressed identity must seek the third way.

It is apparent that Untouchables cannot find the third way in the this-worldly domain of social hierarchy. Therefore their identity must be projected onto the other-worldly sphere, namely, on the man-god relation. This means detachment or withdrawal from the direct ideological struggle in the social hierarchical domain. The bhakti movement and pilgrimage typically demonstrates this way. In this sense, the ideal of “salvation on earth” is the very expression of their acute desire of self-realization. However, (or therefore), as Shulman rightly points out, “the sanctification of the present” itself diminishes the revolutionary character of the bhakti movement [SHULMAN 1980: 21]. The dominant castes rather welcome the prevalence of the bhakti movement, because Untouchables release their suppressed energy of repulsion in the movement. Therefore the governing body itself encourages the movement and is to some extent inclined to strengthen it as a sort of social institution. This is exactly “conventionalization” in Obeyesekere’s sense. These arguments reveal the completely encapsulated situation of Untouchables in both the this-worldly and the other-worldly domains. However, there is no doubt that Untouchables today live under the progress of modernization and urbanization, so that the conditions under which resistance occurs are increasing. In this sense the present ideological formation surrounding Untouchables should be explored further, rather as Caplan’s direct contribution [CAPLAN 1980] has done.

So far I have dealt with three rather explicit (even latent) responses of Untouchables. However, these responses must be an overt portion of the unlimited broad field of their self-realization. If we aspire to understand the real view of Untouchables we realize that observation of their outward responses is just the beginning of a difficult investigation, since the problem how to enter the domain of their inward responses must be confronted. In this connection Obeyesekere’s deep and long fieldwork in his own country, which has already gone beyond the technical and formal field survey, is impressive. Moreover, Obeyesekere’s approach itself has changed as his fieldwork has deepened. Clearly, the excavation of the Untouchable’s inward responses cannot be carried out without deep cooperation between an anthropologist and an Untouchable, and they must both deepen their own self-recognition through dialogue and mutual interaction at the phenomenological horizon. An Untouchable lives in double despair; that of man and the despair of an Untouchable. Consciously or unconsciously, their deep devotion to god must have sprung from this deep despair. This brings to mind Kierkegaard’s phrase that “But the opposite of being in despair is believing” [KIERKEGAARD 1941(1849): 182] and “But in the Christian understanding of it death itself is a transition unto life” [1941 (1849): 150].

18) Lukes systematically examines this point in his work [1974]. He classifies this latent power exercise as Three-Dimensional View of power.
19) For example, we can find this tendency in the recent Kataragama cult in Sri Lanka.
These phrases of that ardent Christian and outstanding philosopher again suggest that beyond the religious difference Untouchables have to live through the "pollution" ideology itself which consists of the iron rule of "death and the regeneration of life".

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to express my deep appreciation to Dr. L. Caplan (SOAS, University of London) for his invaluable support. I also thank sincerely Dr. A. Turton (SOAS) for his kind instruction on ideology. I am grateful to Dr. A. Cantlie (SOAS), Dr. J. Parry (LSE, University of London) and Mr. M. Rodgers for kindly giving invaluable comments to my MA thesis [SEKINE 1984b] in which for the first time I dealt with the distinction between "impurity" and "pollution", which constitutes basic motif of this paper, and which was initially stimulated by Prof. K. Iwata (Otani University). The improvement of my argument on pollution owes much to Prof. Y. Ikari (Kyoto University) who made detailed comments to my first paper [SEKINE 1984a], in terms of the concept of pollution among Jaffna Tamils. Prof. S. Iijima (ILCAA, Tokyo Gaikokugo Daigaku), Prof. S. Tanabe (National Museum of Ethnology), Prof. A. Sanmugadas (University of Jaffna) and Mrs. M. Sanmugadas (Gakushuin University) directly and indirectly provided generous support. I express my heartfelt thanks to them.

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「ケガレ」・「浄」・「聖」
——ヒンドゥー社会のイデオロギー構成とその動態——

関 根 康 正

スリランカのジャフナ・タミル社会での調査を通じて気づいた、生命過程の産み出すケガレとカーストのケガレとの関係はいかなるものかという直観的な疑問がこの小論を貫いている。少なくともジャフナ・タミル社会では、生命過程のケガレをその基本的意味とするトゥッタクタクタクタクタクタク圏が、アースサムとアースサムとアースサムというブラーマン世界の言葉に影響を受ける形で、カーストのケガレを含む方向にその意味をますます拡張してきた。このことかとすでに、「ケガレ」と「不浄」とを区別すべき必要性を示唆している。この区別の意義を明瞭にするために、まずデュモンとマリオットの仕事に代表される「社会中心的研究」の限界を見定める。結局
「静と不静」を元論というプラーマのイデオロギーをそのままヒンドゥー・イデオロギーと同一視することの中に、その限界性をうかがう根があったのである。それは、一方で「ケガレ」と「不静」を区別しないために、生命の過程のケガレとカーストのケガレを無条件に連続させてしまうという誤りを犯し、他方では彼らの理論が、人と人間の関係である社会領域を絶えると人間ののかかわりを示す宗教領域にまで無自覚に延長適用されるとき、その深い欠陥を露呈する。次に、ケガレ論には不可欠と思われる境界性理論を発展させるので、そこは、リーチやダグラスにおいてケガレと変則との対応が文化的な脈絡を無視して一般化されている点が強く批判されなければならない。しかしながら、ダグラスがケガレを宗教研究という枠組において扱っていることは、一つ重要な貢献である。リーチに対するプラットンの批判を採用することで、2種の境界性すなわちこの世的境界性（社会文化的固定性の高いもの）とあとの世的境界性（基層性及び普遍性に向かうもの）の区別が導かれる（図3）。境界性をなった（変則的な）シンポルの選びとそれ方における文化の意志性は前後から後に向う程度減少することになる。こうして、2種の境界性を整としてその間に多様なケガレのレベルが存在することに気づく。ダスが扱うケガレは、ヒンドゥー社会のケガレの中でも特に基層のレベルのもの、筆者のいう「ケガレ」にあたるものである。「静と不静」よりも「聖」の概念に依ることで、ダスはデュモンに反論を試みるが、自身の視点とデュモン理論とを適切に分野配置する展開はみられない。報・性の重要性や死と境界性との深い連動でもダグラスにも増して明白な点で大きい貢献をなしているが、イデオロギー的ディスクルスという視点はなお欠如している。

さて、プラットンの言うように、境界のシンポルは文化的な脈絡で決定されるとしても、尚もわれわれのケガレと境界性（変則性）とが何故結びつけるのかは間違えならない。この点でメイクスの取り上げる腐敗していく（火でいいく）知覚という見方は、ケガレと境界性をつなぐ論理に示唆するところが大きい。その論理とは「死の隠喰」である。それが文化ないしイオドロギーの所産であるケガレのあらゆるレベルを貫いている。そこで、まず、この世とあの世の狭間に死にゆくものに対する直接知識からなる最基層の文化的反応としての「ケガレ」を「ケガレ」と呼び、それに対して、特に階層性のある社会文脈において「死の隠喰」が適用されその結果生ずるケガレを「不静」と定義しうると考えることをした。また、生命過程のケガレは「ケガレ」、カーストのケガレは「不静」と呼びうることになる。更にこの区別はそれを生み出している2つの異なるイオドロギー、つまり「ケガレ」イオドロギーと「静と不静」イオドロギーの存在を示している。これら2つのイオドロギー間の対照と分野のあり様を、ひとつにヒンドゥー女性のシンボリズム、とりわけその媒介性を見ることで検討しうる。その結果、女性のセクシュアリティを肯定しそれを危険と生産の両義性でとらえる「ケガレ」イオドロギーは、不可触民の間及び前国家階級に認められ、他方女性のセクシュアリティを否定し「静と不静」の枠組の中に押し込むイオドロギーはプラーマンの、あるいは国家階級のものと言えよう。ここで、女性の媒介性は「死の隠喰」を体験する形で2つの場面、つまり「ケガレ」イオドロギー内のこの世とあの世の狭間、及び2つのイオドロギーの間において発揮される。後者の場面において、「不静」なる女性を媒介に「静と不静」イオドロギーは「ケガレ」に対して2つの異なる論理を展開する。すなわち、この世の方法としての隔離とあの世の方法としての義性による変換であり、前者が彼女を守るような「静」の指導に、後者がサティーに象徴されるような彼女の献身が生み出す「静」の創出にかかわっている。この彼女の献身の問題はその超俗性によって人と神との関係に匹敵する広がりを内包する。
SEKINE  "Pollution", "Purity" and "Sacred"

している。

こうして、まさに人と神との接点に立つ現世放棄論 sanyōsin はこの世の上辺を描く人々であり、その世界をプラーマンとの関係において把握する必要がある。この点で現世放棄者の内面の目の着目するバーガードの仕事はデュモンやタンバヤアやハースターマンのもと限界を超えて統合的な位置を占める。ここで、「浄と不浄」イデオロギーを保有するプラーマンに対して、現世放棄者は「聖」イデオロギーと呼ぶる固有的意味世界を保有している。これらのイデオロギーの間にも動的な関係がみられる。つまり、現世放棄者の間やセクト間にみられる「聖」を求める断絶の競争は、結果としてそこから「浄」というプラーマンの社会的地位を正当化する論理を生産し続けているのである。この種の正統な現世放棄者の保有する「聖」を「浄の聖」と呼んでおきたい。これら正統の周辺には異端の現世放棄者らしき人々が様々にある。この事実が社会の底辺にある人々、特に不可触民の視座の探究に導く。これに関して、モァットとマロニーとでは、同じ南インドのタミル村落研究にもかかわらず全く正反対の議論が発見されている。すなわち、モァットは不可触民によるプラーマン主義の模倣の側面を強調するが、マロニーは逆に不可触民のむしろ独立的自覚的なサブルチャーの存在を浮き彫りにする。そこでは、上層クラスよりも不可触民においてそのアイデンティティが伝統的なタミル文化の中に深く埋め込まれていること、また不可触民はこの世の社会空間の中での自己表現を望まれているが故に、献身と熱愛という神々の直接交渉の世界に生きようとする傾向のあることが指摘されている。この不可触民は神の「浄」性よりもその「力」に依存しようという点で「ケガレ」イデオロギーに生きていると言う。こうして、タミル文化と、底辺の人々の視座と、バクティ bhakti 運動の精神とは、「ケガレ」イデオロギーを基軸に深く入り組んでいる。

バクティ運動のめざすところは、正統な現世放棄者の理想と対照をなして、「この世での救済」である。バクティ運動はその内に反転されないい反転という革命性を持ち、プラーマン主義との間に絶えざる象徴的闘争を展開してきたにもかかわらず、現在あるいは現世の肯定ないし神聖化という社会的特性によってその革命性は弱化させられることがある。 「この世での救済」はもう一つの「聖」化への途であり、「ケガレ」の歴史の中に立ち上がる類のものである。シュルムランのタミル寺院をめぐる議論は、この種の「聖」の概念はタミル文化に深く根ざしたものであることを明らかにする。筆者はこれを「ケガレの聖」と呼ぶ。こうして2つの「聖」が見出されたわけである。両者ともに犠牲的行為に支えられている点では共通であっても、「ケガレ」に対する姿勢（受容か排除か）において基本的相違を示す（表1）。言うまでもなく、「ケガレの聖」は底辺の人々のアイデンティティに強く関係づけられるが、それだけでなく実はそれがヒンドゥー社会の基底のイデオロギーをも形成しているのである。

以上の議論によって、ヒンドゥー社会を「浄」イデオロギー、「ケガレ」イデオロギー、「聖」イデオロギー（「ケガレの聖」、「浄の聖」）に分化という3層のイデオロギー構成をもつものと把握し、それらの闘争の場と申論する（図8）。注意すべき点は、各イデオロギーを醸成した主体とそのイデオロギー自体との関係は固定されたものでなく、各主体のアイデンティティ（主観性）獲得基盤の中で、主体からすでに出立してしまったイデオロギーが新たな読み解かれる変化を含んでいるのである。この意味で、社会空間において封じ込められていく不可能性を秘めていると言えよう。