Foreign Workers in Cities: A Comparison of Paris and Osaka

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1. INTRODUCTION

It is self-evident that social and cultural systems are able to function normally because of various differences within them. In every society there is a division of labor according to the difference between the two sexes, as well as a differentiation of roles depending on age. There are differences between occupational groups, as well as differences of status within any given occupational group, and these social differences in time produce economic differentiation according to wealth. These differences are finally linked to broader differences, as between in-group and out-group members, and this at various levels.

In the normal condition of a society, order is established by a process of balancing out differences, either through complementary or antagonistic relations. When this balance is threatened by external forces, there results a pernicious process of equalization, whereby the majority group tends to create objects of discrimination out of over-eagerness to restore the original order. The phenomenon of witch-hunting which broke out all over Europe from the late medieval to the early modern era is one example of such a process of discrimination under circumstances of social disorder. One of the key factors here was the Black Death, which must have been viewed with great fear as a source of disequilibrium. Once the epidemic became rampant, then it was sufficient to dissipate all such distinctions as sex, age, status, and wealth—precisely those distinctions which maintain the normal social order.

In other words, I would like to suggest that a normal society is one that recog-
izes various differences, and that a society in which all are equal would be a desolate and lonely one. The problem is whether such differences interact in an active and productive way. It is in this sense that differentiation and discrimination are fundamentally different. Discrimination is a denial of the sort of interaction with others which is essential to healthy differentiation.

In this paper I would like to compare and contrast the forms of civilization in France and Japan by focusing on the problem of the treatment of alien residents in each country. Specifically, I wish to look at the matter of immigrant workers. Of course immigrant workers are not exclusively an urban phenomenon. In rural areas as well, one finds immigrants in the form of seasonal migrant workers, or workers along urban peripheries who supply cities with agricultural products, as in the case of Japanese immigrants in Brazil. But in the case of seasonal migrant workers, even though their movement is regular, it is only temporary, while in the case of immigration to Brazil, it is more a case of "traditional immigration," a pattern I will explain below.

I would thus argue that immigrant labor is a preeminently urban phenomenon, and in this paper I will focus on two cities: Paris, where a large percentage of the immigrant workers in France are to be found, and Osaka, where many of the Korean laborers in Japan reside. In the following analysis, I hope to demonstrate that the general phenomenon of foreign workers shows many similarities in both France and Japan, but that in the matter of the treatment of these workers, there are subtle differences between the two civilizations.

Historically, it is possible to divide the phenomenon of migration into two types, "traditional" and "modern." Examples of "traditional" migration would be the movement of the Germanic tribes in the fourth and fifth centuries, or the group migrations of African peoples before the age of colonialism. These were for the most part situations in which increasing population pressure forced groups outward in search of new lands for settlement. In such cases, the migrating groups would exactly replicate in their new land the social organization which they had known before. In other words, "traditional" migration was essentially an expansion of the settlement area. In the specific case of the movement of the Germanic tribes, there was the direct impetus of the invading Hun tribes from the east, but the more basic reason was the lack of sufficient land in their old area of settlement [HORIGOME 1961: 10]. The case of Japanese immigrants to Brazil as well may be interpreted as a "traditional" type of migration, as implied by their slogan "opening a new land" (shin tenchi no kaitaku).

"Modern" migration, on the other hand, stems from the demand for labor created by industrial development in great cities from the middle of the nineteenth century. In such cases, it is not a matter of an entire people moving from one place to another, but rather of one part moving in search of jobs. Such migrants enter into societies which are already highly structured and organized. This pattern results from the strong "pull" of cities, both through the employment opportunities they offer and through the lure of consumption. These migrants generally constitute
the lower level of the urban society which they enter [AMIN 1974: 4]. The foreign workers discussed in this paper are migrants of this "modern" type.

2. FOREIGN WORKERS IN FRANCE

France is said to be the most ethnically diverse of all nations in Europe. In terms of language, for example, modern French is based on the Francien dialect spoken in the Ile-de-France district of which Paris is the center, but there are five other different languages spoken in the country. Four million Frenchmen speak Breton, four million speak Flemish, and five million speak Oc, while smaller numbers speak Corsican and Basque. French serves as the common tongue of these various ethnic minorities. There is of course no such thing as a French race—only a French people.

Apart from this long history of ethnic mixing, France has the largest number of foreign immigrants (including their descendants) of any advanced industrial nation in the world today except for the United States and Canada. In 1980, 18 million persons out of a total French population of 54 million—a ratio of one in three—were either first, second, or third generation naturalized immigrants. And as of January 1983, there were 4.5 million non-naturalized foreigners residing in France, over 8 percent of the total population [TIJON-CORNILLOT 1983ab].

The movement of foreign workers into France is a phenomenon dating from the middle of the nineteenth century; before that time, the pattern was rather the opposite one, of Frenchmen moving to seek work in Spain and other countries. The resident foreign population of France was a mere 100,000 in 1800, but had increased to 380,000 by 1851, and then in 1911 to 1,160,000, or 3 percent of the total national population; naturalized immigrants accounted for an additional 253,000 persons in 1911. This means that in the period 1800–1911, the foreign population residing in France had increased by a factor of 11.5X (or 14X if naturalized immigrants are included) [TAPINOS 1975: 3–4]. It should be noted, however, that the majority of these nineteenth-century immigrants came from such neighboring countries as Belgium, Switzerland, Germany, Italy, and Spain.

Table 1. Immigrants to France, by Nationality, 1921–1931

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>600,000</td>
<td>30.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>550,000</td>
<td>28.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>200,000</td>
<td>10.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>70,000</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czechoslovakia</td>
<td>70,000</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>60,000</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>50,000</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTHER</td>
<td>350,000</td>
<td>18.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[TAPINOS 1975: 7]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>425,000</td>
<td>754,462</td>
<td>792,000</td>
<td>808,176</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>70,658</td>
<td>694,550</td>
<td>823,000</td>
<td>857,324</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>450,862</td>
<td>589,926</td>
<td>507,300</td>
<td>424,672</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>703,175</td>
<td>588,739</td>
<td>465,900</td>
<td>469,189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>49,653</td>
<td>194,296</td>
<td>299,900</td>
<td>421,265</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>34,443</td>
<td>106,846</td>
<td>147,100</td>
<td>181,618</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>159,581</td>
<td>99,867</td>
<td>97,200</td>
<td>65,594</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yugoslavia</td>
<td>15,038</td>
<td>65,218</td>
<td>74,000</td>
<td>68,239</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French-Speaking Black Africa</td>
<td>？</td>
<td>？</td>
<td>92,600</td>
<td>106,012</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[SUGIMURA and KERVELLA 1983: 230]

Following World War I, in response to the decline in the French labor force as a result of wartime losses and of the decline in the domestic birth rate, France began a policy of actively recruiting foreign workers from her overseas prefectures and colonies. Even so, in the decade of the 1920s, the great majority of foreign workers continued to come from other European countries. As shown in Table 1, the greatest number were from Poland (30.7 percent), followed by Italy (28.2 percent), then Spain, Belgium, and Czechoslovakia.

This pattern changed radically, however, after the 1920s. Immigrants from the French colony of Algeria, for example, numbered only 90,000 in the period 1922–4, but by 1954 the number had increased to about 210,000. Changes in the immigrant laborer population in the past two decades are shown in Table 2, based on statistics compiled by Sugimura and Kervella [SUGIMURA and KERVELLA 1983: 226–227]. Whereas the number of immigrant workers from Italy and Poland have declined, those from Portugal have shown a sharp increase. But the most striking change is the increase in the number of immigrant laborers from former French colonies in Africa, particularly Algeria, Morocco, and such Black African countries as Senegal and Mali. The figures show a decrease in Italian workers in France after 1957, a reflection of the revival of the Italian economy and its ability to absorb the supply of workers from southern Italy. Since economic improvement brought higher wages, the appeal of French wages was reduced [TAPINOS 1975: 59]. Another factor was the decision of the French government as of April 1961 to stop providing allowances for non-resident families to Italian workers who had resided in France for over 3 years [GRANDEJAT 1966: 11]. Italian workers seeking jobs outside of Italy tended after this to go to Germany rather than France.

3. THE DISTRIBUTION OF IMMIGRANT LABOR BY INDUSTRY

Let us turn to the type of industries in which immigrant workers in France have
been employed. It has been said that one in every four automobiles manufactured in France is produced by immigrant labor, and that one out of every three kilometers of French highways are built by foreign workers [PLENEL 1983]. Although it is unclear whether these ratios refer to the percentage of foreign workers in the automobile and highway construction industries, or to the percentage of wages paid to foreign workers by those industries, it is clear that some of France's basic industries could not function normally without the existence of foreign workers.

Let us consider the situation a bit more closely. The sector in which foreign workers have the largest share is the construction industry, in which they accounted for 28 percent of the total labor force in 1979, or 30 percent of all foreign workers in France. The next most numerous sector is automobile manufacturing, in which the 96,800 foreign workers account for 18.6 percent of the total, or 5 percent of all immigrant laborers. These, however, are figures for 1979, following a period of recession in the French automobile industry; in 1974, foreigners accounted for fully 25 percent of all auto workers in France.

Foreign laborers also account for 15 percent of workers in the rubber and plastic industries, for 14 percent in steel and metalworking, and for 9.7 percent in textiles and clothing. Ever since the general recession in the French economy following the "oil shock" of 1973, the number of foreign workers in the tertiary sector (trade and service industries) has shown an increase. It might also be mentioned that 72 percent of all those who work as cleaners in the streets and subways of Paris are foreigners. It should be noted, however, that these are 1975 figures, and that by 1982 the percentage had dropped to 45 percent. In other words, the number of native French workers had increased, although this was largely a reflection of improved wages for subway cleaners in the period 1977–80 following a forty-day strike over the issue of shower use, as well as a mark of improved working conditions thanks to mechanization of cleaning operations [DETHOMAS 1983].

Thus it is clear that in the building, manufacturing, and service industries, the percentage of foreign workers is quite high. It is also important to remember that in these various sectors, the foreign workers tend to take those jobs which ordinary Frenchmen avoid.

As noted earlier, contemporary immigrant workers of the "modern" type tend to be those from developing countries, in many cases from rural areas, who go in search of jobs to cities or to more advanced countries. Hence most of them are unskilled and often illiterate. The lure for them is wages, which are higher in the economically advanced host nations than in their own countries. It is thus natural that they should be willing to accept jobs which normal Frenchmen avoid because of their undesirable nature or low wages. As a result, foreign workers are most numerous in jobs with poor sanitary conditions, involving monotonous and repetitive activities or heavy physical labor. From this emerges a picture of foreigners as the lowest segment of the labor force.

In addition, there is the problem of racial discrimination. This is a phenomenon which inevitably becomes more acute when economic conditions in a country worsen,
so it is no surprise that opposition to foreign workers emerged in the wake of oil shock of 1973 and its negative impact on the French economy. This was formulated in the classic way, in the form of accusations that foreigners were taking jobs away from Frenchmen and hence creating unemployment. In addition, the various benefits such as social security and family allowances which were paid to foreigners were seen as a drain on the French economy. It was also perceived, particularly in the case of North African immigrants, that foreigners had criminal tendencies and hence were responsible for social unrest.

It can be shown that all of these perceptions were based on a misunderstanding of reality. For example, the French government took steps after 1974 to impose broad restrictions on the entry of foreign workers as a way of slowing their increase in the French labor force, but even despite these restrictions, the domestic unemployment rate showed no change. Statistics also show that the average costs to the French government for social welfare programs are 3.82F for French workers, but only 3.25F for foreign workers. For example, even though foreign workers have an accident rate which is 2.5 times that of French workers, accounting for 20 percent of all industrial accidents, they also spend less time in the hospital following an accident, reducing the average cost of compensation. In short, it is simply not true that foreign workers are a burden in terms of welfare costs. The perception of foreigners as prone to commit crime is also fallacious: whereas 8 percent of all Frenchmen have been arraigned of serious crimes such as homicide, the figure is only 7.4 percent for foreigners [PLENEL 1983; LE GENDRE 1983]. For lesser crimes such as theft, however, the rate for foreigners is 14.5 percent, higher than for French citizens, and a reflection of the difficult living conditions in which foreigners find themselves in France.

In regard to these various problems, one may find direct evidence of the positive benefits of attracting foreign workers to France in the 1976 edition of Quid? (an annual report on social problems, the counterpart of Japan's Shakai nenkan). The Quid? editors argue that when French workers are demanding higher wages, their demands can be moderated by the use of foreign workers. Foreign workers are satisfied with low wages, so that by hiring low-cost foreign labor, French businesses can expand, which in turn will prevent the unemployment of Frenchmen. This is particularly true in the automobile and construction industries. Foreign workers are willing to take up jobs that most Frenchmen do not want, as streetcleaners, coal miners, maids, and in jobs involving unskilled manual operations or assembly line work.

Moreover, most foreign workers are young and healthy, hence social welfare costs are low. Whereas the working population is 40 percent among Frenchmen, it is 66 percent among foreigners, and since most of the latter are unmarried or come alone, family allowances are minimal. In addition, social security taxes are deducted from the wages of all foreign workers, but less of half of them remain in France long enough to qualify for benefits, so that their contributions revert to the national treasury. In sum, foreign workers are essential to many French enterprises,
which would be driven out of business if immigrant labor were not available [FREMY 1976: 841].

It should also be noted that immigrant workers tend to counter the general trend of the French population toward stagnation and consequent aging, since most foreign laborers with families tend to have many children, of whom those born in France automatically become French citizens. This is particularly true of North African immigrant workers [TIBON-CORNILLOT 1983ab].

In these various ways, immigrant workers, far from being a burden on the French economy, actually help it. They are the objects of prejudice and discrimination in spite of economic realities.

4. ATTITUDES TOWARDS FOREIGN WORKERS

There is one rather interesting aspect of the ways in which Frenchmen view foreign residents, as revealed in an opinion survey conducted in 1947, not long after the end of World War II. One of the questions addressed the issue of whether, in order to restore the French population after the severe losses in the war, it was better to wait for natural increase or to utilize immigration in order to accelerate demographic recovery. Of the sample, 33 percent were favorable to the idea of immigration and 57 percent were opposed, with no response from the remaining 10 percent. In answer to a follow-up question on what nationality was most appropriate for immigration, attitudes were favorable to Belgians, Swiss, and Dutch, but generally hostile to Italians, Algerians, Moroccans, Spanish, and Germans. But of particular interest is the fact that in those cities where large numbers of Italian and Spanish immigrants already resided, there was very little negative response to further immigration from those two countries. In other words, the characteristic French hostility towards Italians and Spaniards was much weaker among those Frenchmen who had the chance to deal with Italian and Spanish immigrants on a day-to-day basis [TAPINOS 1975: 40].

This should be considered in light of the fact that in Japan, even though it is Koreans for whom there is the strongest antagonism as far as residence in Japan goes, there is nevertheless stronger support for the naturalization of Koreans than for such groups as Indonesians, Philippinos, and Blacks. As WAGATSUMA and YONEYAMA have pointed out, the Japanese tend to dislike the existence of an alien group within their society, and consequently tend to seek assimilation as part of a “proclivity to form a family-like solidarity” [WAGATSUMA and YONEYAMA 1967]. But behind this one may detect an attitude of “willingness to accept anyone who can blend with the Japanese.” In the case of France, even though it does not go as far as a demand for assimilation or naturalization, there is clearly a greater tendency to accept foreigners when there has been opportunity for understanding through daily contact. Here would seem to be a key to understanding the differences in the forms of civilization practiced in France and in Japan.
5. THE CONCENTRATION OF FOREIGN WORKERS IN THE PARIS REGION

It should further be noted, as suggested earlier, that the various problems concerning immigrant workers are particularly noticeable in Paris. The greater metropolitan region of Paris corresponds to the ancient province of Ile-de-France, and includes the surrounding departments (départements) of Ville de Paris, les Hauts-de-Seine, Seine-Saint-Denis, and Val-de-Marne, as well as parts of the further outlying prefectures of Yvelines, Essonne, Seine-et-Marne, and Val d'Oise. The population of Greater Paris is about ten million, or roughly twenty percent of the national population. The population of the central City of Paris (Ville de Paris) is about 2.5 million, but this has been decreasing year by year (the so-called “doughnut phenomenon”). Of French manufactured goods, some forty percent of machine and electrical goods, seventy percent of precision machinery and pharmaceuticals, and sixty percent of automobiles are produced in the Paris region. One-fourth of all commercial activity in France and one-fourth of the entire service sector are likewise concentrated in the Paris region [LACOSTE et al. 1977]. Given these circumstances, the percentage of alien residents is predictably highest in the Paris region, a total of 1,760,000 out of ten million, or over 17 percent. This is considerably higher than the rate of 11 percent in the Rhône-Alpes region centered around Lyon (out of a total population of five million) and 9.5 percent in Provence, with its center in Marseille (of a total of four million) [PLENEL 1983].

6. OSAKA AND FOREIGN WORKERS IN JAPAN

Unlike Paris, Osaka is not the national capital, nor, unlike Nara and Kyoto, has it ever been so in the past. In terms of commerce, however, Osaka has historically served a very important function. The port of Sakai, just south of Osaka, flourished from the mid-fifteenth century as a center of trade with Ming China and with the West, and was of central importance to the Japanese economy until the end of the sixteenth century.

Then in the Tokugawa period Osaka itself prospered as a great center of distribution, in contrast to the function of consumption that characterized Edo, where large numbers of daimyō and samurai lived. But after the Meiji Restoration of 1868, Osaka merchants were dealt a severe blow as a result of forced loans, of the dissolution of the guilds, of the abolition of the domain warehouses, of the conversion of domain assets to bonds, and of the abandonment of the silver currency system on which Osaka relied.

In order to revive the Osaka economy from the moribund state to which it had been reduced, a policy was adopted to convert it into an industrial metropolis, a veritable “smokestack city” (kemuri no toshi). This process began from about 1885-6, and eventually made Osaka into a city in which, as Umesao Tadao has suggested, factories became the counterpart of the rice paddies of a traditional
Japanese village [UMESAO et al. 1983: 17]. And in point of fact, Osaka since the Meiji period seems to have considered industry to be of central importance, and has willingly left the development of higher culture to Kyoto or Kobe. Given this primary emphasis on industry, Osaka naturally had many residents who came from elsewhere, and with the increase in population, the area of the city itself grew in a spontaneous pattern. It is said that the only areas of the city which were consciously planned were the site of Ishiyama Honganji (the great Buddhist temple which was subdued by Nobunaga and which was replaced by Hideyoshi's Osaka Castle in 1583) and the Semba district. The proportion of native Osakans (those families which have lived continuously in Osaka since the Meiji period) is said to be less than ten percent of the current population [UOZUMI 1977: 19–33; OSAKA BUNKA SHINKÔ KENKYUKAI 1974].

In Osaka, so heavily composed of people who have migrated from the various parts of Japan, there are also many foreign residents. As of 1982, the total number of alien residents in Japan was 802,477 persons, or only 0.67 percent of the national population—a considerable difference from the 8 percent accounted for by foreign residents in France. Of Japan's alien resident population, Koreans are by far the most numerous, totalling 669,854, or 84 percent of the total. Next come Chinese and Taiwanese, 59,122 in number, or 7 percent of all foreign residents [SORIFU, TÔKEI KYOKU 1983]. Of this Korean population which so dominates the numbers of alien residents in Japan, fully 28 percent (over 180,000 persons) live in Osaka Prefecture.

The degree of concentration of Koreans in Osaka is shown by the fact that Tokyo, the second largest center of Korean residents in Japan, accounts for only 12 percent of the total (74,400 persons). And if one includes neighboring Hyogo and Kyoto prefectures as well, then the Osaka region accounts for fully 45 percent of the Korean population in Japan. There are 109,509 Koreans living in Osaka City, or 95 percent of all alien residents in that metropolis [OSAKA SHI, SÔGÔ KEIKAKU KYOKU, KIKAKU BU, TÔKEI KA 1982], and of these some 40,000 are concentrated in the single district of Ikaino in Ikuno Ward.

7. KOREANS AS THE BOTTOM OF THE WORKING CLASS IN JAPAN

The growth of this large Korean population in Japan began in the period just before World War I (for the following account, see [LEE 1960]). In 1904, according to Home Ministry statistics, there were only 229 Koreans in Japan, and these were mostly students and pro-Japanese politicians. In 1905, Korea was made a protectorate of Japan, and formal annexation followed in 1910, with Korea coming under complete colonial domination. The seizure of the lands of Korean peasants, together with the growth of manufacturing resulting from the World War I economic boom in Japan, led to the immigration of large numbers of Korean workers to Japan. The Korean population in Japan proper rose from about 40,000 in 1920 to 420,000 by 1930. Table 3 shows the population figures for Koreans in various Japanese
Table 3. Population Increase of Resident Koreans in Japan, by Prefecture, 1915–1930

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Prefecture</th>
<th>1915</th>
<th>1920</th>
<th>1930</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hokkaido</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>3,462</td>
<td>15,560</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tokyo</td>
<td>549</td>
<td>2,485</td>
<td>38,355</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kanagawa</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>13,181</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aichi</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>35,301</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyoto</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>1,018</td>
<td>27,785</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Osaka</td>
<td>399</td>
<td>6,290</td>
<td>96,343</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hyogo</td>
<td>218</td>
<td>3,770</td>
<td>26,121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hiroshima</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>1,173</td>
<td>11,136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yamaguchi</td>
<td>494</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>15,968</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fukuoka</td>
<td>547</td>
<td>7,833</td>
<td>34,639</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saga</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nagasaki</td>
<td>358</td>
<td>2,800</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oita</td>
<td>174</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[PAK 1965: 22, 28]

prefectures in the years 1915, 1920, and 1930. After 1930 as well, Japan continued to recruit Korean laborers in large numbers, and during World War II, they were forcibly drafted as construction workers and miners. The number of Koreans in Japan in 1945 is estimated at two million persons.

The defeat of Japan in 1945 led to the liberation of Korea from colonial rule, and many Koreans who had been living in Japan returned home. It is estimated that by March 1946, over 1.3 million Koreans had been repatriated from Japan. It is the descendants of those who remained that constitute the present Korean population of Japan, of whom 85 percent are now second-, third-, and fourth-generation residents. With the partition of Korea in 1958 into the Republic of Korea (South Korea) and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea), the Korean population of Japan likewise became divided into two groups, the Daikan Minkoku Kyoryumin Dan (Korean Residents Association in Japan, known as “Mindan”), which supports South Korea, and the Zainichi Chosenjin Sorengō Kai (General Federation of Korean Residents in Japan, known as “Sorens”), which supports North Korea. This split has resulted in a complex political situation for the Korean population of Japan [LEE and DeVOS 1981; MITCHELL 1967; PAK 1957; SATÔ 1971, 1975].

As this brief historical account makes clear, the Koreans in Japan came less of their own accord than because they were compelled by conditions in Japan itself, but until 1952 they were considered Japanese citizens. From that year, however, they became legal aliens, subject to the Immigration Control Law and to the Alien Registration Law. But since they had been virtually forced to come to work in Japan, they did not carry regular passports like other foreign visitors. This anomalous position of the Koreans (and Chinese) who had resided in Japan since before the
Foreign Workers in Cities

Table 4. Occupations of Resident Koreans in Japan, 1928 and 1934

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Overall (in percentages):</th>
<th>1928</th>
<th>1934</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>laborers</td>
<td>71.8</td>
<td>48.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>self-employed</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>commerce</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>agriculture</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>students</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>7.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>prisoners</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>unemployed</td>
<td>18.4</td>
<td>35.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Laborers, by type (in percentages):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1928</th>
<th>1934</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>construction workers</td>
<td>57.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>manufacturing workers</td>
<td>26.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>menial workers</td>
<td>5.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mine workers</td>
<td>7.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>transport workers</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dockworkers</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTHER</td>
<td>15.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(PAK 1965: 33)

As mentioned earlier, the Korean population in Japan has constituted the lowest level of the Japanese labor force. In 1928, some 63 percent of the Korean population of Osaka City was composed of men and women between the ages of 20 and 40, from which we may assume that most of them were in the labor force. As for their actual occupations, the most numerous were construction workers, followed by workers in glass manufacture and textiles (the latter largely female). The employment situation of all Koreans in Japan before the war is shown in Table 4.

A 1930 report of the Social Welfare Section of Osaka City explained the distribution of Korean factory workers in the city as follows (PAK 1957: 47-48):

Those [Koreans] engaged in factory labor are employed for the most part in the glass, textile, and chemical industries, the sort of factories which require unpleasant and extreme physical labor and which because of their unpleasant nature are disliked by Japanese workers. The fact that Koreans are found predominantly in these industries suggests that there is little demand for them except in labor-intensive factories producing such items as glass, enamels, metal-plated ware, fertilizers, medicines, and knitwear, all of which involve simple tasks and low wages but demand arduous labor. Japanese laborers of course avoid such unpleasant work, but the Koreans seem not particularly to mind, and from the employers' point of view they are quite useful even if they cannot speak Japanese and are unskilled. For this reason, Koreans are gradually replacing Japanese in these kinds of factories.

The percentage of Korean laborers in various Japanese industries in 1930 is shown in Table 5. They "performed a supplementary role, as the 'outsiders' of the
Table 5. Korean Workers in Japanese Industrial Labor Force, 1930 and 1940

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total workers, 1930 (a)</th>
<th>Korean workers, 1930 (b)</th>
<th>b/a (%)</th>
<th>Korean workers, 1940</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>coal miners</td>
<td>77,647</td>
<td>7,681</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>32,789</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>quarry workers</td>
<td>13,067</td>
<td>1,750</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gravel workers</td>
<td>11,113</td>
<td>3,551</td>
<td>31.9</td>
<td>7,443</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>glass workers</td>
<td>19,093</td>
<td>2,476</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>7,814</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rubber workers</td>
<td>27,387</td>
<td>2,887</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>2,761</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ditchdiggers</td>
<td>165,393</td>
<td>58,458</td>
<td>35.3</td>
<td>81,879</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Japanese labor force" [PAK 1965: 33]. They were also forced to put up with low wages.

Such were the conditions in the 1920s and 1930s, but after the Pacific War, the employment situation of Koreans in Japan changed radically. Because of the sudden increase in the Japanese labor force through repatriation and because of the stagnation of Japanese industry as a result of war damage, Korean workers were squeezed out of those kinds of factories in which they had previously been concentrated. Many of them had no choice but to turn to petty merchandising, black market activities, or work for Korean employers. In this way, they have come to perform a miscellaneous variety of functions at the lowest levels of the Japanese economic structure, in small manufacturing and retailing and in the service industries.

According to statistics for 1969, Koreans in Japan were engaged principally in the following occupations: skilled construction workers, production workers, menial laborers, 45.5 percent; retail trade, 20.9 percent; clerical workers, 9.8 percent; motor vehicle drivers, 8.7 percent; service industry workers, 4.4 percent. In addition, it must be remembered that many are unemployed. According to 1974 statistics, 148,517 Koreans had jobs, out of a total population at the time of 638,806. This is an employment rate of less than 24 percent, in contrast to a rate of 50 percent in the general Japanese population [MIYATA 1977: 259–262].

8. DISCRIMINATORY ATTITUDES AMONG THE JAPANESE

At this point it is necessary to touch on the matter of Japanese attitudes of ethnic discrimination and prejudice. In 1951, just before the San Francisco Peace Treaty Conference, Izumi Seiichi conducted a survey in Tokyo of Japanese attitudes towards other ethnic groups. The findings showed that whereas Japanese have positive feelings towards Americans and Europeans, they have negative attitudes towards Koreans and Black Africans. In the case of Blacks, the majority of those surveyed had seen them but had never had direct social contact, so it was largely a matter of prejudice based on external appearance. This means that Koreans are really the people least liked by the Japanese. Many Japanese feel that Koreans are unclean and shabby in appearance, and that they tend to be sly and crooked. In short,
a highly stereotyped negative evaluation of Koreans emerged from the survey [IZUMI 1963: 80-89].

It is also very interesting to compare surveys conducted in 1939 and 1949 concerning Japanese student attitudes to various ethnic groups. In 1939, the most disliked were Americans and English, the despised wartime enemies, while Koreans were viewed favorably. After defeat in the war, however, there was a complete reversal of these attitudes [SUZUKI 1969: 125-127]. This suggests how inseparably ethnic attitudes are bound to changes in the times.

Since the early postwar period, prejudice towards Koreans in Japan has persisted strongly. In a survey of 270 people conducted by Wagatsuma and Yoneyama in about 1965 among different social classes in Tokyo and Nara, it was found again that the most disliked groups were Koreans and Blacks. In general, Koreans were seen as unclean, dishonest, mean, and ill-mannered [WAGATSUMA and YONEYAMA 1967: 115-140].

9. THE RIGHT TO BE DIFFERENT IN A HOMOGENEOUS SOCIETY

In this review of the problem of foreign workers in France from the mid-nineteenth century to the present, and of Korean laborers who were brought into Japan over a period of about four decades until World War II and who have continued to suffer from ethnic prejudice and discrimination, there has emerged on the surface a very precise correspondence between the two phenomena. In both cases, foreign workers were brought in at the lowest levels of the labor force in a period of labor shortage resulting from the rapid growth of industry, and these foreigners, while making a major economic contribution, became the targets of prejudice and discrimination. And yet at the same time, there is a fundamental difference in the character of the two host societies, France and Japan.

As a country on the European continent, France from the very start has experienced much ethnic mixing, and linguistically as well is a “multi-ethnic” nation founded as a union of various different elements. The existence of autonomous cities in medieval France also suggests the way in which the nation emerged on the basis of the recognition of diversity within a single state. The individualism of the French is thus closely linked with their history.

Japan on the other hand, at least with respect to ethnicity, appears as a society in which homogeneity is greatly emphasized. As an island nation, and particularly one which was isolated during the early modern period under the Tokugawa shoguns, Japan is a society which has minimized contact with the outside world.

This reveals itself in the differential treatment of foreigners in the two countries today. To be sure, even in France there has been a trend to anti-foreignism ever since the “oil crisis” of 1973. But at the same time, as symbolized by the phrase “droit à la différence” (the right to a difference), there has been a willingness to live as one people while recognizing differences as differences. The expression “droit à la différence” may primarily indicate a willingness to recognize regional differences.
within France, such as Brittany versus Corsica and so forth, but it becomes naturally linked as well to a recognition of the cultural distinctiveness of foreign workers from other countries. And in fact, foreign workers have come to occupy their own recognized place within French society. As indicated earlier, immigrant workers to France have become essential in terms of the structure of the French economy, and certain sectors of industry could not function without them [VILLEY 1981: 49-50]. It has also been noted that since foreign workers have entered in large numbers into such sectors as construction, automobile manufacture, and steel, in which the union movement has traditionally been strong, they have come to constitute a distinct political force within French society [GRANOTIER 1976]. In fact just recently, in January 1984, it was foreign workers who were the leading element at a large-scale demonstration at the Talbot automobile plant in suburban Paris.

Of course, for all the talk of “the right to a difference,” there remain many difficult problems at the day-to-day level. For example, Islamic immigrants create problems by demanding time off for prayers during work hours, while other foreign workers from North Africa or Turkey, for example, sometimes engage in the festival slaughter of sheep in the courtyards of apartments in which they live together with Frenchmen, leaving the stairs fouled with blood. These are real problems if quite particular ones. But because of the rule of *jus soli* in the nationality law, by which the children of foreigners who are born in France automatically acquire French citizenship, assimilation does proceed, and there are many who are active in the political and financial worlds whose foreign origins are clearly indicated by the retention of their family names. French civilization has in this way always worked to unify and assimilate diverse elements, and will doubtless continue in this direction in the future as well.

In the case of Japan, the fear is that if Japanese society continues in the future to stress ethnic homogeneity, there is a real danger, as suggested at the beginning of this article, that in the event of a crisis triggered by external factors (or possibly as a result of the intensification of the drive for homogeneity from within), the problem of discrimination within the country could become acute, and a situation might occur in which Japan found herself isolated in the international arena.

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