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Abstract

Settlement of nomadic pastoralist groups follows both excessive poverty and excessive wealth. In the former case, loss of livestock forces pastoralist people to settle among agriculturalists and start cultivation for subsistence as a result of which they tend to lose their ethnic identity.

When sedentarization follows excessive wealth, however, pastoralists settle permanently, continuing to own livestock tended by hired herdsmen, while their economy shifts to a larger exploitation of agricultural resources supplied to them by their slaves, serfs, sharecroppers or hired laborers. Being freed of both pastoral and agricultural physical work, but controlling the resources of both, they tend to occupy themselves with administration, justice, military pursuits and religious learning. Such a tendency occurs on a large scale when pastoralists are involved in state-formation and reach ruling positions. On the whole, those who sedentarize under these circumstances have better chances of preserving their ethnic identity and even of spreading it to other groups under their dominance. There are, however, some notable exceptions where settled pastoralist groups have lost, or significantly altered, their ethnic identity even though they have kept their economic and political dominance.

The Fulbe form a very appropriate case to test these trends, as they have lived in a variety of ecological, political and socio-economic settings. Looking at the examples of Futa Toro, Futa Jallon, Massina, Adamawa, and the Hausa areas of Sokoto, we analyze how the formation of such states has affected the patterns of sedentarization among the Fulbe, what internal restratification has occurred within the different Fulbe societies, and to what extent different Fulbe groups have kept their ethnic identity.

In the recurrent theme of settlement of nomadic pastoralist groups which has long captured scholars’ attention, the focus has increasingly turned to external whole-societal events which have influenced such processes on a large scale, beyond the adaptive strategies of individual households. The early tendency to concentrate on the inner workings of given pastoral societies has given way to works paying greater attention to the historical socio-political contexts which affected the lives of those pastoral groups. This has led to more comparative work and has brought a very welcome interdisciplinary approach to the study of pastoralist groups, with greater cooperation between anthropologists and historians, sociologists,
economists and political scientists. A good illustration of this trend is Anatoly Khazanov's (1984) comparative study of nomadic pastoralism analyzed from the angle of pastoralists' relations with the outside world.

Studies of pastoralism have, of course, long emphasized general ecological factors, to which we became even more sensitized in the wake of the drought and famine of the last decades in large parts of Africa. However, as Charles Frantz has shown (1978, 1981), important differences in social organization, due to different political, economic and religious developments, have been found among pastoralists living in very similar physical environments and with close cultural ties. Thus, political, economic, or religious external factors are no less important than ecological ones in understanding the changes that occur in pastoralist social organizations. This is, again, prominently displayed in Khazanov's work and has also influenced my own earlier work on the Fulbe (Azarya 1978).

For those interested in studying nomadic pastoralist groups from a comparative perspective and stressing the influence of political factors on settlement, one can hardly find a better case than that of the Fulbe. Not only have the Fulbe spread throughout West and Central Africa, from Senegal to Ethiopia,1) with plenty of opportunities for comparison, but in some of those areas they took part in major Islamic holy wars that led to state-formation in the 18th and 19th centuries. While some came to ruling positions or were closely integrated in those states, others took no part in the state-formation efforts, or failed in their attempts, and remained at the margin or completely beyond those states. We can thus analyze the differential effect of the role the Fulbe played in state-formation on other aspects of their social organization, including sedentarization and ethnic identity.

Studies of sedentarization among nomadic pastoralist groups have not failed to notice that settlement follows both excessive poverty and excessive wealth. This apparent paradox is observed among otherwise very different pastoralist groups. It cuts across cultural and political diversities and the type of livestock raised (cattle, sheep, camels, etc.). In the case of great poverty, loss of livestock forces pastoralist people to settle among agriculturalists and start cultivation for subsistence sake. In the case of excessive wealth, pastoralists establish permanent settlements while continuing to own large herds of livestock which are generally tended by hired herdsmen. At the same time they acquire control over land and agricultural manpower (which can be purchased or obtained by political means) and their economy shifts to a larger exploitation of agricultural resources. Freed of both pastoral and agricultural physical labor, but controlling the resources of both, they have greater leisure and tend to occupy themselves with administration, justice, military pursuits and religious learning.

Philip Salzman (1980: 11–12) has summarized the various approaches to the sedentarization of nomadic pastoralists in a number of models, some of which ac-

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1) See Riesman (1984: 173) for estimates of Fulbe populations in different countries and Frantz (1982: 78) for a skeptical view of such estimates.
count for sedentarization due to poverty while others include also settlement due to wealth. Three of the models are based on the loss of the nomads' basic resource, livestock. In the "drought and decline" model, pastoralists lose their animals to the vagaries of climate, diseases, absence of water and pasture and have no choice but to retire to agricultural villages. In the "defeat and degradation" model the pastoralists are defeated militarily and their stocks taken away from them, thus being forced out of nomadic life. In the "failure and fall away" model, while the pastoralist group, as a whole, remains viable, individual households among them are unsuccessful in maintaining a viable productive unit, cannot support themselves through pastoralism and drop out of the pastoral sector. While these three models all derive from failure, Salzman also indicates a further model, which he sees as the opposite of "failure and fall away" and which is based on excessive success. In this model which he calls "succeed and surpass" individual pastoralists build such large herds that they can convert some of the wealth in livestock into wealth in land. "These individuals too are 'dropping out' of the nomadic sector and moving into the settled sector but rather than 'going under' they are 'going over' becoming land owners and part of the local elite" (Salzman 1980: 12).

As we shall see below, settlement due to wealth is not necessarily a result of the conversion of surplus livestock into land. Wealth can be generated also by other means, such as political office and military force. Nonetheless the "succeed and surpass" model points to settlement that results from expanded opportunities whereas the first three derive from contracted opportunities. It is interesting to note, however, that Salzman proposed "success and surpass" as a counterpart to "failure and fall away" which is an individualized response and does not involve a larger group, but did not suggest analogous counterparts to the first two which are more related to larger group action. In other words, the only model of sedentarization that Salzman attributes specifically to economic success involves individual household response and does not include larger groups or macro-societal change. This article will provide the missing link between economic success and macro-societal change. The final model that Salzman suggests, the one he calls "adaptation and response" is more open-ended. It may include individual households or larger groups and it may derive from both expanded and contracted opportunities. Its main purpose is to show that sedentarization is not irreversible, and that it is not over-burdened by cultural restrictions and that it is a more instrumental and voluntaristic response to perceptions of changing constraints and opportunities both internal and external to that society (Salzman 1980: 14).

How is state-formation related to the patterns of sedentarization discussed above? The various models put forward by Salzman do not seem to shed much light; they do not specify the political conditions under which the various types of settlements take place. The only hint is found in a negative sense, in the defeat and degradation model which may apply to those who lost out in a bid for state-formation. With regard to politically victorious groups, however, it may be expected that state-formation would generalize the tendency to sedentarization out of expanding
opportunities. We shall see below if and how such tendency occurred among the various Fulbe communities and what effect it had on their ethnic identity.

Sedentarization and Wealth among the Fulbe

Despite its very low esteem in Fulbe culture, agriculture has been a part-time occupation of most Fulbe households, undertaken mainly by women and children, as the exclusive reliance on cattle and other smaller livestock products was generally insufficient to ensure their subsistence. It is, of course, common knowledge that most pastoralist societies depend, to various degrees, on agricultural crops and that their diet includes vegetable food which they either have to cultivate themselves or obtain from agriculturalists. This need is even stronger among the pastoralist Fulbe, since, unlike some East African pastoralists such as the Maasai, for example, they do not drink the blood of their animals, and though at certain times of the year they may live on milk alone, agricultural products, mostly millet, are a staple of their diet almost everywhere in West Africa (Riesman 1984: 174; Monod 1975: 49). Nomadic, or semi-nomadic Fulbe generally grow crops which come quickly to maturity in order not to immobilize a large part of their labor force for long periods and not to disrupt the transhumance of their herds. Many pastoral Fulbe families also maintain permanent hamlets for their sick and aged, around which some agriculture can be undertaken (Forde 1945: 201; Dupire 1962a: 38–39).

There are, of course, many intermediate possibilities between full nomadism and full sedentarism. The Fulbe, like other pastoral groups, practice various forms of semi-sedentarism in which households combine settlement, agriculture and cattle movement. Some of the household members, mainly young males, take the cattle on the transhumance cycle rather than keep them under bad grazing conditions near settlements while the rest of the family settles in a central location on the transhumance cycle and takes up some agriculture (Stenning 1959: 6–8; Scott 1984: 56). In some areas herds are sent to graze in dry pastures around wells in the dry season. In Massina herds spend the dry season on the burgu grasses created by the flooding of the Niger and its branches. In Futa Jallon seasonal movement is between high altitude and low altitude areas (Riesman 1984: 176; Diallo 1972: 87). Studies of Massina also draw attention to a division of cattle between those remaining in villages where part of the family live and those sent on transhumance (Vincent 1963: 82–83; Gallais 1967: 362–365).

When a Fulbe household did not have enough cattle to ensure its subsistence even with the addition of part-time agriculture, it could be forced, with great reluctance, to give up its pastoral life, settle in or near villages inhabited mostly by non-Fulbe and start more diversified and intensive farming. From this perspective Hopen (1958: 30) classified the Fulbe of Gwandu into three categories: 1) those Fulbe who do not farm; 2) those who have enough cattle to maintain a subsistence level only if they grow small plots of quick growing crops; 3) those who have so few cattle that they must grow a diversity of crops. He adds on this third group that
“the necessary diversity means that they are not free to follow the cattle, they must acquire a compound and live more or less permanently in a village and either send their cattle off with friends and kin or keep them near their village under relatively unfavorable growing conditions.” Agriculture was clearly undertaken out of necessity and was seen as an unworthy occupation for a self-respecting adult Pullo male. As Saint-Croix noted:

The great majority of typical Nomadic Fulani do not farm, except, as a rule through poverty of cattle, or prefer, if cash is available, to hire others to do the work. In saying ‘I have never used a hoe and God willing I never shall,’ the speaker indicates that it would only be through misfortune and loss of cattle that the necessity to farm would arise (1945: 15).

A similar picture is portrayed by Dupire who studied the nomadic Fulbe of Niger:

The greater part of the Njapto’en who have decided to cultivate a few meager fields at the beginning of the wet season complain bitterly of having been forced by poverty ‘to scratch the earth’ in order to feed their families (1962b: 340).

Similar observations can be made in virtually every Fulbe inhabited area in Africa. In many cases, such sedentarization due to poverty was temporary as the family managed to earn enough to rebuild its herd. Some members of the household offered their services as herdsmen to richer owners and, being paid for their service in cattle, could later resume their pastoral life (Stenning 1959: 7–8; Dupire 1962a: 139). If temporary, such sedentarization did not have long lasting cultural effects. If, however, sedentarization and agricultural occupation were prolonged, especially beyond one generation, the Fulbe in question risked losing their ethnic identity. Being despised by their pastoralist kinsmen for having to engage in agriculture as their main occupation, they tended gradually to be cut off from their group of origin and instead forged stronger ties with the sedentary agriculturalists among whom they lived. They intermarried with them, adopted their language and culture and gradually were absorbed in their ethnic identity or at least formed a new identity, not totally integrated in that of the surrounding agriculturalists but different from their pastoralist origin. Examples of this last case include the Khassonke in the Kayes region of today’s Mali and the Wassulonke of Upper Guinea, sedentary Fulbe who mixed with Malinke and Bambara and adopted the Mande language. Such were also the Fulakunda, people of Fulbe origin who engaged in agriculture but also kept cattle and received Mande influences. They lived at the northern fringes of Futa Jallon, across today’s Guinea-Senegal border, were despised by the Fulbe and did not speak the Fulbe language (Brasseur 1968: 204, 249; Suret-Canale 1970: 60, 65).

Sedentarization due to loss of livestock could reach large-scale proportions and affect an entire region or community beyond individual households as a result of

2) For similar examples of changing ethnic identities among other pastoralist groups see, for example, Galaty (1982: 2–9), Huntingford (1953: 108–110), Spencer (1965: 282–285).
drought or disease epidemics that periodically ravaged Africa. Entire stocks could be wiped out and nomadic pastoralists could be forced to sedentary agriculture, manual labor of other sorts or pauperization near relief centers, which could lead in each case to a loss of ethnic identity, assimilation among sedentary populations or creation of new hybrid identities if stocks were not regenerated soon enough. One of the severest of such epidemics was the rinderpest of 1887–1891 which spread westward from the Darfur region of Sudan through today's Chad, Cameroon, Niger and Northern Nigeria, decimating cattle on its way and reducing by half the herds owned by Fulbe. The rinderpest epidemics of the 19th century are still reported as some of the greatest catastrophes to strike the Central Sudan area and they led to a great extent of forced sedentarization among pastoralists. 

Brackenbury (1924: 211) reports on other epidemics in the early 19th century in Adamawa as a result of which many Fulbe who lost nearly all their cattle were compelled to take to the salt trade, but with the profits of the trade bought back cattle and resumed their pastoral life. Lately, a similar widespread loss of cattle has struck the pastoralist populations of the Sahel (not only the Fulbe) as a result of the extended drought of the 1970s and 1980s.  

The poorest Fulbe were not the only ones who tended to become sedentary: so did the wealthiest among them! As Hopen reports on Gwandu “there is no clearcut correlation between the size of a man’s herd and his disposition to farm.... Obviously if a man has only a small number of cattle he will have to farm but a man with more than a hundred head of cattle may also farm” (1958: 29–30).  

The crucial difference, however, is that a wealthy Pullo would own a farm, but hardly engage in agricultural work himself. He would rather have slaves or hired laborers do the work for him. Similarly, his cattle would be tended by hired herders, usually poorer Fulbe. Thus in Niger, “un enrichissement en bétail donne à certaines familles les moyens financiers de libérer leurs enfants de la garde des troupeaux confiés à des bergers remunérés” (Dupire 1962a: 39). On the Jos plateau in Nigeria, as reported by Stenning (1959: 8–9), some Fulbe families were so wealthy that they did not have to engage in any economically productive work but rather could manage the work of others. They established permanent households around which their cattle moved under hired hands. They surrounded their settlements with gardens in which corn was planted, tended and harvested by pagan laborers. Similarly Marty (1921: 154–157) reported on the rich Fulbe of Futa Jallon who permanently settled; their cattle were herded by hired or dependent poorer Fulbe and agriculture was undertaken by their slaves. The rich Fulbe themselves engaged

3) For a vivid description of the misery caused by the epidemics among the Fulbe see Saint-Croix (1945: 12–13). On a similar effect among the Boran in East Africa see Baxter (1975: 221).

4) A similar drought in Afghanistan in 1970–71 led to an interesting case in which nomadic pastoralists became itinerant hired agricultural workers, thus remaining migrant even though they engaged in agriculture (Balland and Kieffer 1979: 85).
mainly in religious learning, social activities and politics (see also Vieillard 1940: 180–181 and on Massina see Gallais 1967: 91–92).

It should be remembered, of course, that it is rather difficult to save, or otherwise create a surplus, when leading a nomadic life. Upon settlement the surplus would go both to the enlargement of herds entrusted to hired hands and in investment in land, manpower and agricultural products. Settlement also enables a significant improvement in one’s material comfort and makes it easier to invest in cultural resources, such as learning. Sedentarization is thus both a result of wealth differences and further sharpens them and makes them more visible in lifestyle (Baxter 1975: 224).

Unlike settlement that followed impoverishment, however, when sedentarization followed excessive wealth, there were greater chances that the Fulbe would preserve their ethnic identity (with some notable exceptions to be discussed later). This settlement was a sign of success, a model to emulate and not a failure to avoid. As a high status group they were interested in keeping their distinction. They did not stop owning or showing interest in cattle. On the contrary, they invested much of their earnings in enlarging their herds. Nor did they engage themselves in agriculture. They could thus continue to live up to the requirements of Fulbe culture. Their attachment to cattle and pastoralism was as great as ever. They stopped being nomads but did not stop being pastoralists and hence in their own eyes, did not stray away from their ethno-cultural distinction. Perhaps we have an illustration here of what has lately been strongly advocated by scholars of pastoralism, namely that the nomadic way of life, unlike pastoralism, is only a response to economic opportunities and is not necessarily related to a “cultural complex.” A nomad, given the opportunity to settle without relinquishing his livestock would readily do so and rarely would see in that a cultural betrayal. A loss of livestock on the other hand, would be a greater blow to one’s culture and ethnic identity (Baxter 1975: 208; Khazanov 1984: 221; Frantz 1982; Salzman 1980).

Some other aspects of the Fulbe mode of conduct such as stoic reserve, pride, self-control, and inhibition from revealing feelings could also be maintained under sedentary conditions. Furthermore, the greater opportunity for Islamic learning strengthened their Muslim identity which in many regions differentiated the Fulbe from the non-Muslim or less Muslim other populations. It is true that lifestyle did undergo perceptible changes and their Fulbe-ness was heavily tainted with Islam. From a purist’s point of view this might indeed be a Muslim rather than Fulbe identity, but they still called themselves Fulbe, spoke Fulfulde or Pulaar (the two names given to the Fulbe language), and rather than being cut off from other Fulbe, main-

5) Pastoralism refers here to an economy based on livestock raising which would be undertaken by sedentary, semi-sedentary or nomadic groups. Nomadism, on the other hand, refers to the extent of spatial residential movement of the groups in question. It is generally acknowledged today that the question of pastoral production is conceptually distinct from that of stability or instability of residence (see Frantz 1982: 58; Monod 1975: 32–33).
tained very close ties with them. One thing that did change, however, was the color of their skin, which became much darker following intermarriage with, and especially taking concubines among, non-Fulbe women (Gallais 1967: 91–92; Saint-Croix 1945: 5).

The Fulbe Jihads: Some Background Data

The discussion of patterns of sedentarization has proceeded, so far, in a “timeless” fashion, without reference to a specific historical event. This was not only a function of the analytical level of generalization adopted here. We also assumed that the types of settlement mentioned so far, whether following impoverishment or enrichment, occurred among various Fulbe households throughout history, and in the present, in widely different geographical areas; they were part of the constant flow of Fulbe, as well as other, pastoral life. Our discussion was, therefore, peculiarly ahistorical. We should now correct this impression: there were, of course, certain turning points in Fulbe history that broke this general flow. Such were the jihads of the 18th and 19th centuries and their concomitant state-formation. They created new conditions; they brought about macro-societal changes, beyond their effect on individual Fulbe households. They completely rearranged the social order and inter-group relations in the societies involved. Their impact on Fulbe sedentarization was to generalize the process of settlement due to wealth as discussed above, though interesting differences were found with regard to their influence on the preservation of Fulbe ethnic identity.

I will not give here any detailed background data on Fulbe history and dispersion as such topics are well documented elsewhere.6) The origin and early history of the Fulbe have always intrigued historians and have been subject to various speculative theories, none of them reliable. It is generally agreed that sometime in their history, probably around the 10th century, the Fulbe started a slow eastward migration from today's eastern and northern Senegal and have by now reached as far east as Sudan and Ethiopia.

Parallel to their migration, the Fulbe also gradually adopted Islam. A small group of them, called Toorodbe, mixed with other Muslims in towns, and together with Arab and Moor clerics formed the most learned layer of Muslim religious leaders in West Africa. Other Fulbe, and especially those who remained far from centers of communication and commerce adopted Islam later and more superficially. The Fulbe were generally subjected to local non-Fulbe to whose areas they migrated. In Futa Toro and Massina where they concentrated in relatively large numbers, they were ruled by their own pagan or superficially Islamized kinsmen. The subjection of Muslim Fulbe to pagan rulers created an inherently unstable situation as the former deeply resented their dependence on people whom they despised.

and to whom they had to pay heavy tribute. The more the Fulbe became Muslim, the greater was their resentment at their subjection even when the non-Muslim chiefs ruling over them were themselves Fulbe. The Toorood6e were often the catalysts of the Fulbe discontent. They gave it religious justification, broadened the opposition to pagan Fulbe rulers as well as to non-Fulbe and were in contact with both the centers of Islam and the nomadic populations, thus being optimally situated to bridge the two and mobilize the latter under a religious Islamic banner (H. F. C. Smith 1961: 171-173; Trimingham 1962: 161).

In the 18th and 19th centuries West Africa was rocked by a series of military uprisings spearheaded by Muslim clerics and carried out in the name of Islam against infidels, i.e. pagans or superficially Islamized rulers. The Muslim Fulbe, led by their Toorood6e branch and other clerics (not all Fulbe clerics were Tooroodbe) played an important role in instigating these revolts and large groups of Fulbe pastoralists were mobilized in their support, provided crucial military assistance and spread the uprising to areas yet untouched by strong Islamic presence (such as Adamawa, for example). Not all the jihad movements succeeded nor were all led by Fulbe. In the few places where jihads did not occur, Fulbe took no part in them, or attempted but failed, such as in Mossi inhabited areas (in today’s Burkina Faso) and in Bornu (Northern Nigeria), the Fulbe remained subjected to the local non-Fulbe population (Stenning 1959; Riesman 1977: 44). When the Fulbe-led jihads did succeed, however, they led to the formation of new states which radically altered the Fulbe’s position vis-à-vis non-Fulbe and created a new basis of stratification among the Fulbe themselves.

The wave of jihads and subsequent state-formation started in 1725 in Futa Jallon (today’s Guinea) where a confederation of nine Muslim Fulbe families led by the cleric Karamoko Alfa rose against the Djallonke and pagan Fulbe (Pulli) chiefs who ruled over them. After long and protracted battles they were finally victorious in 1761 and established a confederated state ruled by the Alfaya and Soriya families (Azarya 1978: 19-26; Demougeot 1944: 13-14; Diallo 1972: 30, 41-55, 204-208). In Futa Toro (in today’s Senegal) the jihad was instigated by the Toorood6e, led by Suleyman Bal, who in 1776 rose against the Denyanke dynasty, the descendents of a pagan Fulbe state established by Koli Tenguela in the 16th century, which in the past had also ruled over part of Futa Jallon. As the jihad was directed against a non-Muslim Fulbe ruling class it was more of an internal affair between Muslim and non-Muslim elements and involved also a class struggle which included disputes over land rights and grievances over loss of security in the face of Moor attacks (Robinson 1975: 11-15; Oloruntimehin 1972: 9; H. F. C. Smith 1961: 173-174).

In Massina too, the jihad erupted more as an internal feud between Muslim and non-Muslim Fulbe. The area was ruled, long before the jihad, by pagan Fulbe chiefs, called ardo, who paid tribute first to the Songhay and later to the Bambara kingdom of Segou. In 1805, a Muslim cleric named Shehu Ahmadu led the uprising against the ardo ‘en and in the wake of its success created a strongly theocratic state which freed the area from Bambara tutelage and also came to dominate the im-
important urban centers of Jenne and Timbuktu (Brown 1969: 18, 34–38, 49–50; Ba and Daget 1962: 17–59; Gallais 1967: 78–96). In Hausaland, in 1804, the Tooroodo (called there Toronkawa) cleric Othman dan Fodio rose against the superficially Islamized Hausa state of Gobir. Between 1804 and 1810 his followers or flag-bearers overran most of Hausaland including the states of Kano, Katsina and Zaria and formed the great empire of Sokoto which also extended beyond the Hausa cultural zone into such areas as Ilorin, Nupe, Gombe, Muri, etc. (Last 1967: 3–39; Azarya 1978: 20–23). In 1806, one of Othman Dan Fodio’s flag-bearers, Modibbo Adama, spread the jihad to a vast area most of which is now located in Northern Cameroon. He established a vassal state of Sokoto which was named Adamawa after him, and ruled over a multitude of pagan or very superficially Islamized populations such as the Bata, Fali, Dourou, Guidar, Mboum, etc. His state spread beyond the Benoue and Diamare valleys where the Fulbe had already established a presence prior to the jihad in the course of their eastward migration, and reached the hilly areas to the south, such as Tibati, Banyo, and Ngaoundere where the Fulbe had not yet penetrated (Lacroix 1952: 21–40; Kirk-Greene 1958: 126–135; Azarya 1978: 19–20).

Finally, in the mid-nineteenth century, another Tooroodo by the name of Umar Tal, a native of Futa Toro, returned to the region after having gone on pilgrimage to Mecca, and on his return stopped for prolonged periods in Sokoto, Massina and Futa Jallon before settling in Dinguiraye for a few years. El Hajj Umar brought to the area the Tijani creed of Islam and embarked upon a jihad to spread his belief. In 1857 he arrived at Futa Toro which had never distinguished itself by a strong political system and was, by then, further weakened and all but disintegrated under French pressure. El Hajj Umar advocated a return to the principles of the early jihads, evoked the example of Suleyman Bal and made a strong impression on the local population. However, realizing the futility of confronting the French directly, he turned eastward in his holy war and state-formation efforts. Preaching war against the infidel Bambara, he led a great exodus of followers (taalibe) which shook Futa Toro to its foundations. He soon established a vast state, which on its way to expansion conquered also the fellow Fulbe state of Massina (Robinson 1975: 37, 46–49; Robinson 1985: 3–4, 320–329; H. F. C. Smith 1961: 180–183).

El Hajj Umar’s movement represented a renewed wave of jihad, directed as much against earlier jihad states as against non-Muslims. It was also more occupied with conquest than with stabilizing political and economic structures in areas under its control. The clash with Massina which led to Umar’s death, and the increasing pressure of the advancing French colonial forces on his successors did not enable the institutionalization of the state. It will therefore be left out of our discussion of the possible impact of state-formation on Fulbe sedentarization and ethnic identity.7)

The Fulbe jihads and the states that they formed brought revolutionary changes in the societies affected. The change was not felt only at the political center
but reverberated throughout the society and had deep economic and cultural, as well as political, consequences (Rodney 1968: 230). They created completely new bases of social stratification and normative legitimation. They reversed the subject-ruler relationship between Fulbe and non-Fulbe and between Muslim and non-Muslim. They also created a new differentiation among the Fulbe according to differential participation in the jihad. The families who led the war thereafter became the ruling aristocracy. This led to a much more stratified structure than the Fulbe were hitherto accustomed to as pastoralists (Marty 1921: 442–445; Dupire 1970: 428–429; M. G. Smith 1955: 16). In that sense, the Fulbe experience was more similar to that of the Tutsi, Swazi, or Hima who ruled over strongly stratified societies than to most other African pastoralists, such as the Maasai, Boran, Turkana and others who had not created states and lived in more egalitarian structures or to Tuareg who were strongly hierarchical but did not develop united state organizations (D'Hertefelt 1966: 410–411, 421–427; Kuper 1952: 35–39; Taylor 1962: 95–114; Jacobs 1975: 414–416; Gulliver 1975: 373; Lewis 1975: 433; Bernus 1975: 233–236).

The jihad movements also led to the incorporation of the great majority of the Fulbe in much larger and more bureaucratized political units than before. The typical Fulbe migration unit was quite small, consisting of some ten to twenty households, which kept its political and economic autonomy within societies to which they were loosely related. Their decentralized structure and tendency to disperse in small units were similar to those of many other nomadic pastoralist groups (see, for example, Dahl 1975: 279 and Spencer 1965: 6–7) and those Fulbe who did not take part in the political and religious movements of the 18th and 19th centuries and kept their distance from the new states and maintained their more segmentary structures (Brasseur 1968: 147; Forde 1945: 201). The pre-existing states and chiefdoms that the jihads replaced also consisted of smaller, more fragmented units. As Rodney wrote on Futa Jallon, “certainly on the eve of the jihad there were no large-scale political units so that one of the most obvious changes that took place in Futa Jallon during the eighteenth century was the creation of a single polity” (1968: 270). This new polity was admittedly a very decentralized confederation but it was still a united polity compared to the multitude of small chiefdoms that it replaced. The same was true in Adamawa in which Fulbe

7) Questions as to whether El Hajj Umar’s movement could be called a Fulbe jihad are given a firm answer by Robinson (1985: 89, 320–323), who states that the vast majority of Umar’s followers were Fulbe, descendants of the pastoralists who migrated throughout the Western and Central Sudan and prized loyalty to clan and cattle more than attachment to land. This explains perhaps how easily they could be aroused for a long migration. “They belonged to the societies of Futa Jallon, Bundu and Futa Toro where recent Islamic movements had altered the basis of government and education. Now they responded to Umar Tal, the pilgrim who spoke to their Fulbe consciousness, evoked their sense of Islamic obligation and called them to Jihad against the ‘pagan’ Mandinka and Bambara” (Robinson 1985: 16).
rule, though allowing large autonomy to provincial chiefs, replaced a much more fragmented variation of small chiefdoms, village communities and segmentary systems. Indeed, it introduced completely new forms of organization to those societies (Lacroix 1952: 29–30). In Massina, the state was notably centralized and interventionist, much more so than the preceding rule of the ardo’en (Johnson 1976: 481–495; Azarya 1979: 157–190). Even in Sokoto where the Fulbe inherited an already well-developed Hausa state structure, they further strengthened it and institutionalized it (M. G. Smith 1960: 299–305). Only in Futa Toro the jihad did not bring about a stronger state than the one that existed under the Denyanke dynasty, and this perhaps explains the rapid decline of the state and the fertile ground laid for the subsequent jihad of El Hajj Umar (Robinson 1975: 165–166; Robinson 1985: 65, 72).

The Impact of State-Formation on Sedentarization

How did the political events described above affect sedentarization? The clue to the discussion was already provided in the section where we discussed settlement due to increasing wealth. We have seen that when Fulbe families had the opportunity to employ others who would herd their cattle and cultivate the land, they tended to settle permanently and occupied themselves with religious and political activities. This process was generalized in the new states as many Fulbe became part of a ruling aristocracy and achieved control of land and slaves.

The acquisition of slaves was the greatest tangible reward that motivated many Fulbe to join the struggle and spread the jihad to their region. Large numbers of slaves were obtained from subjected pagan populations and from captured enemy forces and distributed among the victors. Slaves were also sent as tribute to political superiors and were sold in markets. Most of them were established in special villages called duumde to cultivate the land for their owners (Lacroix 1952: 32; M. G. Smith 1955: 81; Richard-Molard 1956b: 86). They became the most important source and measure of wealth. Lovejoy (1978: 343–344, 351–353) has called such slave villages plantations and has analyzed how the economy of the Sokoto empire evolved toward a plantation economy with the inflow of slaves. The origins of the plantation sector could be traced to the heart of the empire, the Sokoto-Rima river basin where the twin capitals of Sokoto and Gwandu were established. As the empire grew they became the major recipients of slaves sent as tribute from outlying areas which were war zones and where the establishment of border settlements (ribats) helped colonize the area and expand the empire’s territory. A territorial division was thus created, between outlying or frontier areas whose economy was based mainly on the capture and sale of slaves and more central areas which bought them or received them as tribute and installed them in plantations. As the empire expanded, areas which were once frontier settlements became more central and shifted to the plantation economy (Lovejoy 1978: 363–365).

The full economic value of the slaves could only be realized together with in-
creased control over land. As a result of the jihad, land became the possession of the new ruling group in keeping with the tenets of the Maliki Law which allowed the faithful to arrogate to themselves conquered land (Azarya 1978: 36; Forget 1963: 174). Thus in Futa Toro “opponents of the regime lost their lands and these territories were given by the Almamy to his victorious warrior chiefs and marabouts. In this way, the Denianke aristocracy was supplanted by the new aristocracy of the Torobe who even today constitute the ‘landed gentry’ owning the larger part of the valley lands” (Suret-Canale 1971: 429). In the Zaria emirate of Sokoto, after his victory Mallam Musa, the flag bearer of Othman dan Fodio allotted lands to the Fulbe kinsmen who had helped him. On these lands were built the duumde slave-villages of the families concerned (M. G. Smith 1955: 81). In Futa Jallon, “from being the guests and tribute paying subjects of the Djallonkes, the Fulani became the possessing class owning the land and being in a position to exploit the labor of the agriculturalists. The most important social institution which emerged was the ronde—a village of conquered Djallonkes often referred to as a slave village” (Rodney 1968: 277).

Some of the lands allocated to the victors were non-inheritable title land linked to certain political offices while other plots were more freely used inheritable possessions (Smith 1955: 105-106; Dupire 1970: 387–391; Gallais 1967: 94; Vincent 1963: 128–130). The exploitation of manpower also varied. Some of the slaves worked directly for their masters. Others worked for their own sake in plots allocated to them by their masters but transferred to the latter a certain amount of the product or worked on their masters’ other land (M. G. Smith 1954: 264–265; Frechou 1965: 460). The non-captive subject population paid taxes in crop to those controlling the land. Slaves were also owned by the state itself and worked on state-owned land. As Marion Johnson wrote on Massina “slaves derived from booty were put to work on cultivable land. The arrangement was in practice more akin to serfdom, the slave owing a fiscal payment (diangal) to the state assessed either in grain or in cowries” (1976: 486). In any case, the result was the same: control of land and manpower reinforced each other and became the cornerstone of the new Fulbe economy.

Land and slaves not only rose in economic value and were used together, but one was used to acquire the other. Slaves could be used to clear the bush, thereby enlarging the cultivable land on which their masters could claim legitimate right of control. Similarly, surplus agricultural products could be sold to buy more cattle, hire herdsmen and thus continue the pastoral occupation for its cultural or prestige value even if economic diversification necessarily reduced its economic value (Vincent 1963: 130; M. G. Smith 1955: 105). Besides agriculture, slaves could also be used as personal servants tending to household chores. Some engaged in construction works; many were trained as soldiers or as craftsmen. Household slaves of rulers and state officials were generally their most trusted councillors and, as such, held considerable power. Some of them, especially in Sokoto, were appointed to top executive positions. Ownership of slaves, by freeing the clergy from economic tasks
also led to a proliferation of Islamic teachers. Clerics who instructed children of wealthier families received slaves or equivalent property and could devote more time to instruction and scholarship. Finally, many slave girls were taken as concubines, their children were considered free Fulbe and were entitled to succeed their father (Dupire 1970: 431; Robinson 1985: 58; Azarya 1978: 34).

Under these circumstances, it is not surprising to see that the number of slaves increased rapidly in the Fulbe states following the jihads. By the end of the 19th century the slave population in Futa Jallon amounted to about one third of the total population and in some parts the proportion rose to one-half (Vieillard 1940: 89). Vieillard characterized Futa Jallon as a vast enterprise of slave trade and reproduction for the profit of noble Fulbe (1940: 153). In Zaria, similarly, nearly half of the population consisted of slaves (M. G. Smith 1954: 241). One emir of Zaria was reported to own 9,000 slaves whom he amassed between 1846 and 1860. Still, ownership of slaves was so widespread that according to Lovejoy (1978: 359-360) most plantation owners were private citizens and not government officials. Hausa tales and traditions attribute more slaves than freemen to Sokoto as it was the recipient of slaves from all the emirates under its rule (Skinner 1969: 193). As for Adamawa, it was the greatest supplier of slaves for the whole empire of Sokoto and emerged as the center of the largest concentration of slave-villages in the eastern emirates. Visiting Adamawa in 1851, the European traveller Barth wrote:

Slavery exists on an immense scale in this country and there are many private individuals who have more than a thousand slaves.... Muhammed Lowel had all his slaves settled in Runde or slave villages where they cultivate grain for his use or profit.... I have been assured that Mohammed Lowel (the Emir) receives every year, in tribute, besides horses and cattle, about 5000 slaves (quoted in Hodgkin 1960: 265-266; see also Lovejoy 1978: 364 and Lacroix 1952: 34).

Only in Futa Toro, following the jihad, did a slave-based economy fail to develop to the same extent as in the other states and indeed Robinson (1985: 65) attributed to this fact one of the major weaknesses of the state. However, a landed Fulbe aristocracy had been installed already during the pre-jihad Denyanke rule and indeed the jihad had been in part a revolt of commoners against this landed aristocracy (Oloruntomimhin 1972: 9; Robinson 1975: 10-11).

The new opportunities available to the Fulbe following state-formation and restratification may explain their accelerated trend toward sedentarization. With agricultural products supplied by captive labor, cattle tended by hired hands, housework carried out by women helped by domestic slaves, the remaining specialized goods and services supplied by craftsmen and traders consisting mainly of non-Fulbe groups, most Fulbe, especially those belonging to the ruling class, established themselves in permanent settlements where they could dedicate themselves to learning, religion, political and military activities and active interest in cattle which helped them keep their superiority and distinction from the rest of the population.
They lived what could be called a life of “gentlemen” (Richard-Molard 1956a: 121; Last 1974: 25; Vincent 1963: 129–130). The following quote from Demougeot, referring to the situation in Futa Jallon, perhaps best describes the great change that occurred in the lives of the victorious Fulbe following the jihad:

Ayant vaincu poullis et diallonkés, ils en font leurs serviteurs, ils les contraignent à travailler pour eux. Le Peuhl pasteur et nomade par nature, le Peuhl qui a horreur de tout travail manuel, le voilà devenu maître de riches contrées et possesseur d’une abondante main d’œuvre qui ne coûte rien, qui se charge de cultiver des champs et d’y faire venir le riz, le fonio, les arachides. Comment ne renoncera-t-il pas à sa misérable vie errante, lui qui n’a jamais pu manger à sa faim et qui se voit permis de mener désormais une vie oisive, faite de rêveries et d’intrigues pendant que d’autres travaillent pour le nourrir? Les Foulah ne s’y tromperont pas et aussitôt qu’ils se virent les maîtres à la fois du sol et des serviteurs, ils renoncèrent à leur vie errante millénare (1944: 14).

By contrast, those Fulbe who did not take an active part in the state-formation and did not gain a share of its spoils were less tempted to forsake their nomadic or semi-nomadic life, as existed prior to the holy wars. Some of them were employed as herdsmen by the settled Fulbe, thus being integrated in the new economic system (Gallais 1967: 127; Rodney 1968: 278). Others kept their distance and continued their traditional pastoral practices at the margin of the state. Thus developed an increasingly sharper distinction between the settled Fulbe, more negroid in physical traits, more devout Muslims and well integrated in the new political systems, and the less Muslim, less negroid nomadic pastoralists organized in loose segmentary units. The latter were called Mbororo which increasingly became a separate designation, different from Fulbe. They were despised for their superficial Islam and bush manners and remained at the periphery of the society while they, in return, despised the settled Fulbe for having forsaken some of their original traditions. The general value framework of the new societies being set by settled Fulbe, however, there is no doubt that the latter enjoyed in the eyes of the general population, including non-Fulbe, a higher status than their nomadic Mbororo kinsmen. Also, numerically the Mbororo became a small minority compared to the settled Fulbe (Mohammadou 1966: 263–265; Gallais 1967: 127–128; Scott 1984: 56).

There were, of course, important differences in the extent of Fulbe sedentarization after the jihad in the different states. It was very advanced, and by now is virtually complete in Futa Jallon. In Futa Toro it resulted from the first Fulbe state (that of the 16th century) and by the time of the jihad in the 18th century the majority of the Pulaar speakers were already sedentary. In Massina and certain emirates of Sokoto sedentarization had partly started prior to the jihad but greatly accelerated after it. In Adamawa, sedentarization mostly took place after the jihad and was still less advanced than in the other states by the time the colonial rule was
established. Also, for ecological reasons the Fulbe of the Benoue and Diamare valleys were more sedentarized than their kinsmen of the Adamawa hills to the south (Suret-Canale 1970: 32-33; Robinson 1975: 10-11; Froelich 1954: 17-18). But on the whole, these differences did not change the general picture of widespread sedentarization following state-formation, as could be seen by a comparison with the Fulbe of today's Niger and of Bornu where the jihad did not succeed, Fulbe-rulled states were not formed and Fulbe sedentarization remained much more limited.

In Massina large scale sedentarization of the Fulbe followed Muslim state-formation for another crucial reason: it was forced on them by the Shehu Ahmadu regime. On pain of losing grazing and water rights for their cattle, every Fulbe household was required to have a fixed residence (Gallais 1967: 94, 119). The reasons for the forced sedentarization (which was imposed also on non-Fulbe populations such as the itinerant fishermen of the Niger, the Somono) were both political and religious. Sedentarization simplified basic administrative functions such as taxation and military conscription. It enabled the establishment of a new village structure. It also helped the enforcement of religious orthodoxy and the provision of religious and educational services. It enabled population of sparsely inhabited regions and raising the proportion of Fulbe in areas inhabited mostly by non-Fulbe of dubious loyalty to the state, such as Tuareg and Bambara (Vincent 1963: 53-57, 122-127; Johnson 1976: 484). Most Fulbe complied with Shehu Ahmadu's edicts regarding sedentarization; only a few hardcore nomads refused and preferred to move away to the margins of the state or beyond.

The state-directed sedentarization of the Fulbe in Massina also entailed a radical shift in cattle raising patterns. Livestock was divided into those kept near the village and those sent away on transhumance. Instead of each household herding its own cattle, the sedentary Fulbe now had to entrust a large part of their cattle to professional herdsmen who would take them to state-owned grazing areas and wells. Herds were organized in caravans commanded by state officials who were also in charge of the state's own stock. Their route was precisely determined by the state which also provided armed escorts to protect them from marauders (Forget 1963: 179-180; Azarya 1979: 181-182).

We have thus seen that control of non-pastoral means of production, particularly slaves and agricultural land obtained by political means strongly reinforced social differentiation and stratification within the pastoralist Fulbe society and led to the emergence of a ruling aristocracy which in turn reinforced trends toward sedentarization. Similarities to the Fulbe case could be found in some other

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8) We have not discussed in this article the general sedentarizing trends exerted by Islam, such as the necessity to be present at a fixed location for the Friday prayers. In Futa Jallon, for example, a large number of mosques (misiide) were established throughout the territory and the population gathered in them for the Friday prayers. Not surprisingly, they soon became the basic administrative unit of the state and attracted permanent residence around them (Vieillard 1940: 118; Demougeot 1944: 14).
African pastoralist groups who, like the Fulbe, were involved in state-formation. Reports on the Swazi portray a very similar land owning (though, apparently not slave owning) sedentary ruling class which still keeps large herds of cattle as most valued possessions and maintains a strong cultural attachment to pastoralism (Kuper 1952). The Tutsi in the kingdoms of Rwanda and Burundi were similarly pastoralists who came to ruling positions following state-formation and maintained a keen interest in cattle while they settled permanently and lived off the products of the subjected agriculturalist Hutu and the hunter-gatherer Twa (Botte 1979: 403-413; D'Hertefelt 1966: 404-411, 424-433). The Hima of Ankole, on the other hand, did not settle though they ruled over a sedentary majority and their state's economy was based on the agricultural labor of the subject population (Taylor 1962: 95-114). The degree of integration between the different strata in these societies also varied, from a clear separation between Tutsi and Hutu in Rwanda to much greater integration, ethnic unity and fusion between agricultural and pastoral occupation in the case of the Swazi, the Fulbe holding a middle ground between the two.

The Somali were an interesting middle case both in the extent of political structure and social stratification and in sedentarization. They were politically more centralized than the Turkana, Rendille, Maasai etc., but did not form states. The larger political units and more formally institutionalized systems of authority were found among the more sedentary southern Somali than among their more nomadic northern kinsmen thus supporting the link between political centralization and sedentarization (Lewis 1966: 324; Lewis 1975: 433). As for the Fulbe's northern neighbors, the Tuareg, they broke many of the patterns found among the Fulbe. They were strongly hierarchical but still politically very fragmented; they did control the land and exploited the manpower of slaves and other tributary subject people who engaged in agriculture for them, but they did not settle themselves and continued their nomadic pastoralism (Grandet 1958: 31; Bernus 1975: 233-236). The same was true of the Toubou who, like the Tuareg, installed their slaves, the Kamadjas, in agriculture but did not take up permanent residence themselves (Chapelle 1957: 122, 195).

Finally, looking at examples outside Africa, one can see many cases of large-scale sedentarization of nomads following state-formation. One such example was the settlement of nomads associated with the rise of the Islamic caliphate in the 7th century. Another case was the settlement of Turkic tribes who invaded Anatolia between the 11th and 13th centuries (Bulliet 1980: 267; Khazanov 1984: 267). There have also been other cases, however, in which state-forming nomads have stubbornly kept their nomadic way of life as a sign of superiority and distinction from the subjugated people. The 'great yasa' (constitution) of Genghiz Khan indeed forbade the Mongols to adopt a sedentary life in towns (Khazanov 1984: 241), but their kinsmen who reached China did sedentarize after they dominated the local population. Clearly, the relationship between state-formation and sedentarization is far from being universally valid but it is generally borne out in the case of the Fulbe rul-
ed states. In any event, in many cases the nomads in question invaded and conquered new territories. Even though their sedentarization followed their achievement of politically dominant positions over local populations it was still basically a response to their movement into a new ecological zone that favored agriculture. In most of the Fulbe states, however, with the possible exceptions of certain areas of Adamawa and some other outlying emirates of Sokoto, sedentarization was not so much the result of a movement into a new ecological zone but rather the outcome of a reversal of power relations within the same ecological zone.

**Permanent Settlement and Fulbe Ethnic Identity**

We have maintained earlier that when Fulbe settled out of poverty and failure to continue their pastoralist occupation they tended to lose their ethnic identity whereas when they settled out of wealth and diversified their economic resources without relinquishing the ownership of cattle they tended to preserve their Fulbe identity. We also contended that state-formation generalized the process of sedentarization due to wealth and expanded opportunities. Was Fulbe ethnic identity preserved then, as expected, under these circumstances? In most areas it was, but a few important exceptions were also observed in the states discussed in this article.

Generally speaking, the sedentarization that followed Fulbe state-formation, as it was undertaken from a position of strength, led not only to the preservation of the Fulbe identity but also to its spread to other populations who saw in it a status symbol. Thus in Futa Jallon the non-Fulbe captive or subject population adopted the Fulbe language, customs, religion and after a while started calling themselves Fulbe, a process which was strengthened even more in the colonial period. Similarly in Massina Fulfulde became very widely spoken, by Fulbe and non-Fulbe alike, and Fulbe customs and identity spread to subjected non-Fulbe people (Diallo 1972: 18; Gallais 1967: 115). This process was even more striking in Adamawa where the proportion of Fulbe to non-Fulbe was smaller than in Massina and Futa Jallon at the outset of the jihad. There too, following the jihad and Fulbe sedentarization, not only were Fulbe culture and identity maintained but they became models for others. Fulfulde became the lingua franca of the region; the pagan populations who fell under Fulbe rule increasingly adopted Fulbe customs and soon after their adoption of Islam, started to call themselves Fulbe. These processes were, again, strongly accelerated during the colonial period and have continued up to the present (Schultz 1984: 48–55).

It is true that Fulbeization in these cases was closely related to Islamization and that the people involved did not distinguish between religious and ethnic identity. As Santerre noted, "C'est au nom de l'islam que s'est faite la conquête peule au 19e siècle et le terme pullo (peul) dans l'esprit des gens est souvent coextensif, interchangeable avec celui de jualdo (croyant)” (Santerre 1969: 158). To become Muslim meant to act like Fulbe, to dress like Fulbe, to speak the Fulbe language, to send one's children to Koranic schools taught by Fulbe. These were all ways to
achieve greater respectability, higher culture, more refined living and hence upward social mobility. By blending together Islam with certain aspects of the Fulbe way of life, the sedentary Fulbe became cultural models for the whole population. Fulbe identity became a more cultural-religious identity than a purely ethnic one, but the special designation as Fulbe was maintained. Interestingly, it was the nomadic pastoralists more faithful to the original pulaaku, who by being called Mbororo seemed to be getting a special designation, separate from Fulbe, whereas the word Fulbe was reserved for the settled, Muslim group. Indeed, the Mbororo themselves were regarded as undergoing “Fulbeization” when they adopted a more sedentary and urban life (Schultz 1984: 51).

Futa Toro represented one of the exceptions to the tendency of preserving Fulbe identity among the settled Muslim population who ruled the jihad states. During the long reign of the pagan Fulbe Denyanke dynasty which had preceeded the jihad, an increasing gap had developed between the Denyanke rulers (called Satigui) and the nomadic pastoralists on the one hand, and on the other hand, the more sedentary and more fervently Muslim sections of the population who formed the Islamic opposition to the Denyanke rule. By the time this opposition culminated in the jihad of Suleyman Bal this latter group was so differentiated from the former that they were no longer identified as Fulbe but rather as Tokolor. Even though the word Tokolor is derived from the ancient Takrur kingdom of the 11th century, its widespread use to denote the sedentary inhabitants of Futa Toro emerged only in the 1880s and was especially publicized by the French. Most of the people simply called themselves Haalpulaar’en, speakers of Pulaar, the name given to the Fulbe language in the area (Robinson 1985: 82; Dupire 1970: 41).

The Tokolor may perhaps be regarded as a subdivision of the Fulbe: they spoke the same language, had similar names, referred to similar clanic ancestors as the Fulbe and gave rise within themselves to the Toorod6e who were active in other Fulbe communities as well. However, in the Senegambian context Tokolor came to denote the sedentary Pulaar speakers (who also engaged in agriculture, perhaps one of the reasons for their forsaking the Fulbe name) whereas Fulbe indicated the nomadic pastoralists. Thus in the jihad state of Futa Toro the Fulbe language and culture was widely spread but the ruling class did not call itself Fulbe. The term Fulbe was relegated to the nomadic pastoralists, similar to Mbororo in other areas; it came to characterize those Pulaar speakers who did not take part in the jihad or actively opposed it and continued their pastoral occupations at the margin of the new state and of Islam. It had a connotation of lower status and uncivilized manners in contrast with Tokolor and especially with Toorod6e (Robinson 1975: 5–8).

In contrast with Futa Toro where the sedentary ruling class kept the Fulbe language and culture but were no longer called Fulbe, in the Hausa inhabited emirates of Sokoto, the sedentary Fulbe still kept their name, as Fulbe, but adopted the Hausa language, architecture, political titles and system of government. In the words of M. G. Smith, “After 1804 the Fulani rulers of Hausa states progressively adopted the sedentary habits of the subject population together with their language
and other cultural elements" (M. G. Smith 1960: 5). The Hausa on their part adopted Fulbe traits, such as the inhibition of emotional display and public self-control which they identified as Muslim traits. Thus one could speak of two parallel processes, the gradual Muslim Fulbeization of the Hausa and the Hausaization of the Fulbe (Barkow n.d: 13–14, 25). Despite their cultural and linguistic closeness to the Hausa, however, most Fulbe regarded themselves as superior and referred to the non-Fulbe by the pejorative term of haaɓe which often included both Muslim Hausa and pagan groups (Skinner 1968: 253; M. G. Smith 1959: 239–241).

With the rapid spread of the Hausa language the term "Hausa" increasingly became a linguistic designation comprising all those who spoke Hausa as their mother tongue. Still, special efforts were made to distinguish the Fulbe from that group even if they did speak Hausa as their first language. Thus, according to the 1952 census "The Hausa are simply a linguistic group consisting of those who speak the Hausa language as their mother tongue and do not claim Fulani descent [the emphasis is mine], and including a wide variety of stocks and physical types" (quoted in Paden 1968: 200–201). The attempt to use non-linguistic criteria in defining the Fulbe while linguistic criteria were used for all the other populations illustrated the threat to Fulbe identity that existed and the great efforts made to preserve it. Generally speaking, the higher one's socio-political status, the easier it was to trace one's ethnic line; hence the Hausa-Fulbe distinctions were kept more clearly among Fulbe of higher status than among commoners. Also, as most ruling elements were of Fulbe background the Fulbe-Hausa division became principally a class distinction. Thus, even though they lost most of their separate culture, their language and their physical traits, the Fulbe still distinguished themselves from other groups as being the ruling class. They drew sharp distinctions not only between the dominant Fulbe and subject Hausa but also between members of ruling families and other settled Fulbe, and, of course between settled Fulbe and their nomadic kinsmen (M. G. Smith 1955: 3, 92).

As Fulbe identity was specifically related to aristocratic status or nomadic pastoralism, the bulk of the Muslim commoners were Hausa, and the Hausa language was the dominant lingua franca. Islamization in this area usually led to Hausaization and not to Fulbeization as it happened in Adamawa. It is interesting to note, therefore, that while Fulbe identity contracted and was more specifically defined in the Hausa inhabited emirates of Sokoto, it was more generally defined and spread to non-Fulbe groups in other emirates of the same state such as Gombe, Muri and Adamawa, which were located beyond the Hausa zone (Hogben and Kirk-Greene 1960: 428–429). There, it was the Fulbe language, culture and identity that spread to the whole area, including to non-Fulbe who adopted Islam. In the Ilorin and Nupe emirates which also lay outside Hausaland, however, the Fulbe rulers adopted the local Yoruba and Nupe languages (Udo 1970: 119; Whitaker 1970: 123), thus showing that the adoption of local culture was not limited to the Hausa regions. It seems that in those areas of the Sokoto empire where Fulbe took over existing state structures such as in Hausaland, but also in Ilorin and Nupe, they tend-
ed to adopt the local language and culture. Where they built a new state structure out of a variety of loosely organized smaller units, as in Adamawa, Gombe and Muri, their own culture and language spread to the local population. Still, this does not explain why, in a place such as Massina which was so close to major historical, political and economic centers, the ruling Fulbe did not adopt the local language and culture but preserved their own. Admittedly, on this point, we can provide only partial explanations to persisting interesting differences.

Conclusion

I have tried to show in this article the relationship that could be found between state-formation, sedentarization and ethnic identity in various communities as distant from each other as Senegal from Cameroon. The great unity as well as diversity of the different Fulbe groups, the similar social changes that they underwent, the ties that they kept among each other as well as the different environmental and historical conditions that they faced made them an almost ideal case for comparative study. With some exceptions in Hausaland and Futa Toro, we have seen that the relationship between state-formation, large-scale sedentarization and preservation of ethnic identity held together, largely mediated by the restratification that was caused by the success of the jihad movements. While this article refrained from dealing specifically with the colonial and post-colonial periods, we could venture the hypothesis that the same trends which started prior to colonialism were maintained and even strengthened in the colonial and post-colonial periods. If true, this would show, of course, what strong and lasting effects the jihad movements of the 18th and 19th centuries have had on the different societies in question.

We do not claim, of course, that the relationships detected here hold true in the case of most pastoralist groups. We have seen that they are not universally true even in the Fulbe case. They point, however, to interesting new directions of inquiry which scholars have only recently started to explore. This study strongly supports the attempts to understand pastoralist groups through their relations with external forces, mostly of a political nature, and it reinforces stratification as a potent explanatory factor. We have stressed an approach to sedentarization that is rather “voluntaristic” or instrumental and is strongly based on perceptions of changing economic opportunities, perhaps at the expense of more constraining cultural factors. This article has also strengthened the conceptual distinction between nomadism and pastoralism by showing that sedentarization has a completely different impact when accompanied by conditions that enable continued pastoral interest through the ownership of large herds of livestock than when it follows the forced loss of such interest because of loss of livestock.

It should be noted, however, that our focus has been limited mostly to settlement in rural settings. We have not dealt specifically with pre-colonial urbanization even though many of the ruling aristocracies that we did discuss lived in towns.
Nor did we stress enough the role of commerce. Finally, as we did not deal with the colonial and post-colonial periods, we did not investigate the possible movement of pastoralist groups into the modern industrial and service sectors in terms of the effect of such movements on their collective identity and status. These phenomena, important as they are, were clearly beyond the scope of this article, but would, hopefully, arouse scholarly interest for future studies.

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