In this paper I will present an overview of anthropology in Japan as it was during the wartime situation of the 1930s and the early 1940s. This is not a simple survey of anthropology in Japan in those years; I will survey the practices of Japanese anthropologists in those years primarily from the point of view of their negotiations with the social situation in which they lived their life. The social situation in Japan in those years was in its totality integrated into the war efforts of Japan’s autocratic regime, so that the situation can be characterised as a wartime situation. To rephrase the objective of this paper; it will survey anthropological practices conducted by Japanese scholars in the 1930s and the early 1940s in their negotiation with the wartime situation.

The first task for this objective is to make clear what the wartime situation in the 1930s and 1940s was, and particularly what it was for anthropology. The war that Japan fought in those years was a total war, for the sake of which the Japanese central authority transformed itself into a totalitarian autocracy, which in turn mobilised almost all aspects of social life in Japan and its colonies into the empire’s total war. The wartime situation that was meaningful for anthropology was only a part of this system of total mobilisation. In order to clarify what the wartime situation for anthropology was, it is necessary to obtain an overall idea of the regime’s system for total mobilisation. Since it is not a specifically anthropological task, I will summarise what historians have presented on the history of Japan in the years between the two world wars.

Once an overall understanding of the system of total mobilisation is obtained, it is possible to specify what the wartime situation was for anthropology. Anthropologists either positively or passively responded to the wartime situation. External agents, including scholars of other disciplines in social science, also made approaches to anthropology and tried to mobilise anthropologists into their projects. Both anthropologists and scholars of other disciplines proposed innovation and re-definition of anthropology. Those scholars who were mobilised in one way or another into the wartime situation could not remain innocent scientists at all, but they more or less survived the wartime situation politically. It was also the case with their efforts of survival in the post-war years when the standard of ethical values was almost entirely reversed from that of the wartime years.

The wartime situation which the present paper addresses was, in an overall view, really
excessive in the virtual coercion of co-operation and in the brutal suppression of criticisms and resistances. The two factors of the situation were so sharply contrasted that, during the tightest years of the war, it did not appear simple to find whether people were either vehement supporters of the regime’s war efforts or passive resisters. The topic of the present paper does connote much on the ethical issues of anthropology and anthropologists, but the excessive nature of the wartime situation makes it entirely difficult to consider on those ethical issues. I will conclude this paper with an attempt of some discussions on these difficult issues.

I. Mobilisation for the state’s war

War and wartime situation

After the war with Russia (1904-5), Japan stationed an army troop, known as the Kantō-gun (関東軍) or the Guandong Army, in Manchuria. The objective was to protect Japan’s colonial rights and interests that were primarily managed by Mantetsu (满鐵, 南滿洲鐵道株式會社) or the South Manchurian Railway Company. But, after World War I, the Guandong Army began to intervene in the civil war in China, expanded its imperial desire to rule whole Manchuria and finally initiated Japan’s war with China. In this history, it is more or less artificial to distinguish wartime from peaceful periods. According to a commonly accepted view, Japan entered into wartime when the Guandong Army occupied Manchuria in 1931. Since then until 1945, Japan fought a war with China, a war that is often called the Fifteen-Year War. If we accept this view, the fifteen years in the 1930 and 1940s shall be demarcated as wartime.

To look at anthropology, that wartime was a period of special gravity for the development of anthropology in Japan. As a modern academic discipline more or less pursued by specialists, anthropology in Japan had already had a history going back to the 1880s, when an association of anthropologists was created and a small institute of anthropology was added to the Imperial University of Tokyo (SHIMIZU 1999). Before those years, investigations of anthropological interests had been conducted in Hokkaido, Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands since the early nineteenth century (see SASAKI’s essay in this volume). In this historical perspective, the 1930s is distinguished as one of the most important turning points. In 1935, almost three hundred academic people, both professional and non-professional, who shared interests in ‘ethnology’ established their own association, the Japanese Society of Ethnology, which has since been the largest integrative organisation for socio-cultural anthropology in Japan.

Although it was named in terms of ‘ethnology’ (minzokugaku, 民族学), the idea of ‘ethnology’ still remained vague and far from being distinctively defined. The Japanese journal of ethnology (JJE), the society’s official journal, published articles on the topics of folklore, geography and history as well as ethnology. This was particularly the case in early decades in the journal’s history (see SEKIMOTO in this volume). In contrast to this external relation with neighbouring disciplines, the society demarcated a rather exclusive border in its internal relation to anthropology in general. Although the Society made no official statement about the definition of ‘ethnology,’ the people who joined the Society were mostly
specialists of social science and humanities. No article of physical anthropological interest was published in the journal. In this sense, the ‘ethnology’ may rightly be considered a counterpart of socio-cultural anthropology. Thus, the creation of the Japanese Society of Ethnology was doubly meaningful, in the external and internal contexts of socio-cultural anthropology in Japan.

Although it is too mechanical a view, the temporal coincidence with wartime may support a view that ethnology was separated as an independent discipline from the more general anthropology in Japan in a wartime historical context. However, even if a country’s army begins military invasion to a foreign land, like Japan’s Guandong Army did in Manchuria in 1931, it does not automatically mean that the country and the society in it altogether enter into a state of war. In order to observe how anthropologists commit themselves to, or get involved in, a war, it is necessary to perceive the war in a broader perspective. In this sense, the wartime situation, rather than the war, is the more appropriate issue to be addressed.

The whole state general mobilisation

The form of warfare incessantly developed in the modern age. World War I was different from preceding wars, and from the Japanese-Russian War (1904-5) for instance. World War I had different features from country to country. It is not appropriate to recognise war and wartime situation in general terms. On the other hand, we are addressing here a particular case of wartime situation, that of the 1930s and 1940s in Japan. It is appropriate to approach our subject of investigation from an intermediary perspective that is neither too distant from, nor too close to, the subject. The Japanese government and military authorities elaborated their own perception of war and wartime situation in order to design their war efforts. It is expected that their ‘folk’ model, so to speak, of wartime situation provides a cue to analytically conceptualise the wartime situation for anthropological practices.

World War I was entirely new in that the major countries fought it as a ‘total war.’ Although the winning countries eventually won the military victory, their superior military power was the integrated product of their industrial, technological and social abilities. Japan joined World War I only partially; it dispatched a fleet of warships and easily occupied the Garman colony in Micronesia through old style military action. Japan’s military authorities, however, did not fail to recognise the entirely new feature of World War I and, no sooner than the war broke out, began to study how Western countries developed, and responded to, the new feature of the war. The notion of kokka sōryoku-sen (國家総力戰, the war of the state’s total power) was coined and the necessity of kokka-sōdōin (國家總動員, the whole state general mobilisation) was recognised. As early as 1920, the Imperial Army drafted a synthetic report on the whole state general mobilisation as observed in the major countries that joined World War I (Rinji Gunjichōsa linkai 1920). The report explained the whole state general mobilisation for the state’s total war under five categories:

1) National mobilisation (meaning the mobilisation of the human resources within the state for military and industrial sectors),
2) Industrial mobilisation,
3) Mobilisation of transportation and communication systems,
4) Financial mobilisation, and
5) Others.

As for the last category, the report distinguished 5a) the mobilisation of scientists and scientific research for the sake of technological application, 5b) the mobilisation of the public educational system, and 5c) the mobilisation of communal spirit through propagation. Atsushi Kōketsu (轡vrir), who traced the political development of the whole state general mobilisation during the inter-war period in Japan, analyses that this report provided the framework according to which Japan’s military authorities, particularly the Army, reiterated the whole state general mobilisation in the 1930s and 1940s (KōKetsu 1981: 27-46). If this was the case, then the same framework can be adopted as a pertinent guide to overview the actual development of the whole state general mobilisation.

The idea of a total war means that the war in modern years is not only the matter of military actions in the battlefield. The military efforts for the war are sustained by the general economic and social prowess of the country that carries on the war. In this context, the wartime situation is appropriate to indicate the relationship of the people, economy and society to the war of this particular type, a total war. Even if the war is fought in a battlefield far from the home country, the people, society and economy of that country are involved in a wartime situation to the extent that they are mobilised by the country’s policy of whole state general mobilisation. The wartime situation for anthropology should be defined in the same context: to the extent that the discipline of anthropology – its human, organisational and institutional resources – is influenced by the country’s policy of whole state general mobilisation, and particularly involved in the scientific, educational and ‘spiritual’ mobilisations in category (5), anthropology is placed in a wartime situation.

As this definition of the wartime situation for anthropology is obtained, it becomes clear that a survey of the development of the whole state general mobilisation in the 1930s and 1940s in Japan is necessary before we can proceed to an examination of anthropology in Japan in the same context of war in the 1930s and 1940s.

The development of the whole state general mobilisation in the 1930s and 1940s in Japan

Japan’s Army intensified its military actions in China in the 1930s and 1940s which eventually developed into the Pacific War with the Allied Nations. This process was accompanied by two other processes: the appropriation of the governing power of Japan by the military authorities, and the transformation of the Japanese economy and society into the system of the whole state total mobilisation for war purposes. The three processes altogether eventually lead to what is often described as Japan’s imperial, autocratic, totalitarian regime, a contemporary counterpart of the German Nazi and Italian Fascist regimes.

Japan’s military authorities ceaselessly expanded military actions of intervention and invasion into China, Mongolia, Southeast Asia and the Pacific: the interventions into Shandong (山東, 1927 and 1928), the assassination of Zhang Zuo-lin (張作霖, 1928), the occupation of Manchuria (1931), the interventions into North China and Inner Mongolia (from 1933), the Japanese-Chinese War beginning with the Marco Polo Bridge Incident in 1937, the Shanghai and Nanjing Incidents (1937), the Nomonhan Incident (1939), the
occupation of the northern part of French Indochina (1940) and finally the Pacific war with
the attack of Pearl Harbour (1941). The military authorities at the same time took over the
governing power of Japan and established itself as an autocracy over the Cabinet, the
Emperor’s senior advisors and the Diet. They claimed the tōsuiken (統帥権) or the Emperor’s
prerogative to directly control the Navy and Army as the legitimate basis of their being free
from the control by the Cabinet and the Diet. Terrorist attacks of political, industrial and
academic elites – Congressman Senji YAMAMOTO (山本宣治, 1929), Prime Minister Osachi
HAMAGUCHI (浜口雄幸, 1930), Ex-Minister of Finance Junnosuke INOUE (井上満之助, 1932),
Takuma DAN (園琢磨) of the Mitsui Conglomerate (1932) and Tatsukichi MINOBE (美濃部達
吉, 1936) – and several attempts of unsuccessful coup by military personnel and ultranational ideologues – the Sangatsu (March) Incident (1930), the Jūgatsu (October) Incident
(1931), the 5.15 Incident (1932) and the 2.26 Incident (1936) – effectively assisted the
military authorities in attaining autocratic power.

When the Guandong Army initiated military action in Manchuria, rejected the Cabinet’s
control and eventually occupied all Manchuria in 1931, the Cabinet recognised that Japan
entered into a higari (緊急時, emergency period) and it introduced some measures of general
mobilisation. In 1936, after the 2.26 Incident, the military authorities demanded huge
increases to expenditures for the Army and Navy, and the Cabinet intensified its direct
control of industry in the name of jūn-senji (軍需時, semi-wartime system). In 1937, the
Army waged a total war against China, then represented by CHIANG Kai-shek’s (蔣介石)
government. The war in China rapidly expanded industrial needs and the government
established the Kikaku-in (企画院, Planning Board) in charge of planning industrial
mobilisations. In 1938, the government introduced a comprehensive measure, the so-called
‘Whole State General Mobilisation’ (国策大戦, Kokka-sōdōin), and intensified control of almost all
aspects of the national economy – finance, trade, production industry, distribution of
resources, recruitment of labour force, distribution of foods, etc. – for the sake of the war.

Referring back to the framework drafted in 1920 for the whole state general mobilisation,
the measures of 1937 can be seen as an attempt to restructure the whole national economy
according to the four major categories (from 1 to 4) of general mobilisation. Since the final
objective of those measures was the war that the state and the state’s army carried on in the
continent, it can be said that the measure of the whole state general mobilisation involved the
whole economy and society into the wartime situation. Even if a majority of the people in
Japan and its colonies had not yet directly been involved in the war, either as aggressive
agents or casualties of military actions, they had already lived their life in a wartime situation
to the extent that their life was restricted and controlled by the measures of the whole state
general mobilisation.

The ideological mobilisation

The measures of 1937, as mentioned above, were planned and enacted in response to the
initiative and demands made by the military authorities. The fifth category of general
mobilisation, however, was promoted by a broader variety of agents. The category consisted
of the mobilisation of science, public education and communal spirit, among which the last
two may be grouped here as the ideological mobilisation. Despite being assigned a marginal
position in terms of the remainder, the scientific and ideological mobilisations deeply
influenced, and narrowly restricted, people's lives during wartime; these two kinds of
mobilisations were no less important than the economic mobilisations.

The ideological mobilisation itself was a broad movement, involving a variety of agents.
It is possible here to present only a general sketch of it. The ideological mobilisation was
started earlier than other aspects of general mobilisation by a starker coercive force. If the
economic mobilisation was planned and reiterated according to functional reasoning and
calculations for the sake of military purposes, the ideological mobilisation was accomplished
more extensively and intensively than what might be functional necessities for military
purposes.

The ideological mobilisation was developed in two aspects, one provocative and the
other suppressive. The autocratic authorities advocated the deified Emperor-centred national
ideology, which made a hegemonic call addressed to the Emperor's subjects, or the Japanese
nationals, of all generations. The Ministry of Education issued a textbook on the Kokutai no
hongi (True meaning of the Emperor's Regime) in 1937. The Cabinet decided
the Kokumin seishin sōdōin jisshi yōkō (the action plan for the
general mobilisation of the national spirit), also in 1937. Activating the ideological
mobilisation, the government and military authorities tried to integrate people, both in Japan
and in the colonies, and mobilise them towards the war purposes. As those authorities
successfully promoted the ideological mobilisation, more agents — the Diet, political parties,
ideological activists, intellectuals, school teachers, news media, the publishing industry, etc.
— joined and accelerated the movement, and the central authorities intensified its autocratic
and totalitarian character. The success of the ideological mobilisation of Japanese people,
which was at the same time a political mobilisation, was represented by the Taisei-yokusankai
(The Association for Participation in the Emperor's Rule), which was
established in 1940 by the proposal of Prime Minster Fumimaro Konoe. Most
political parties joined the Association. Satellite organisations, mostly in the name of
Hōkoku-kai (an association for contributing to the country), were created in terms of
tonarigumi (neighbourhoods), companies, unions and professions (such as intellectuals,
journalists, artists, film-makers, novelists, poets, stage performers and the like, all divided
into minute genres). News media and the publishing industry were regularly censored.
Moreover, as resources were becoming controlled more severely towards the end of the war,
the publication of magazines and books other than those that emphatically endorsed the war
purposes became virtually impossible.

As military personnel and ideological activists developed their imperialist ideas, the
national ideology gained broader geo-political perspectives. When the military actions were
targeted at China and its neighbouring areas in Mongolia and Siberia, the anti-Western
ideology, an element implicit in the national ideology, was emphasised and formulated in
terms of the alliance of major East Asian peoples that was to counteract the Western
imperialism under the leadership of Japan. This anti-Western element, called ajia-shugi (アジア主義) or Asianism, was later elaborated as the slogan of the 'Five Peoples in Co-
operative Alliance' (五族協和) and was also advocated as a leading policy of Manchukuo.
Japan extended its military actions to French Indochina in 1940. The USA began to sanction
Japan, first diplomatically and economically. Pressed by the heightened necessity for new sources of basic resources, Japan directed its military imperialism towards the Western colonies in Southeast Asia. Hence, the *nanshinron* (南進論, the southbound imperialism) was highlighted and incorporated into the national ideology. This revised version of the national ideology was formulated into the policy of the Dai-tōa kyōei-ken (大東亜共榮圈) or the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, first advocated by Minister of Foreign Affairs Yōsuke MATSUKA (松岡洋右) in 1940. Those different versions of the national ideology appeared attractive to the general public to the extent that they were expressed in the language of Japan’s reformulation, the restructuring of the world order, the Japanese and Asian superiority, the elimination of modern Western vices, and the restoration of Japanese and Asian (or Oriental) aged virtues.

The suppression of freedom of thought had had a long history since the Meiji Era, and in this history the Chian iji-hō (治安維持法) or the Law for Maintenance of the Public Peace (1925) provided an accelerating moment. As the government intensified autocratic policies, *kiken shisō* (危険思想, dangerous thoughts) that were supposed to be rebellious against *kokutai* (國體, the Emperor’s regime) were broadly suppressed. Anarchists, communists, socialists and ultra-nationalists were under regular surveillance and suppression by the police. A variety of organisations and persons were suspected of advocating communism and violently suppressed: political parties, labour unions, ideological activists, intellectuals, university academics, students, military officers and even career bureaucrats in the government. Even liberal academics such as Tatsukichi MinoBE, member of the House of Peers who had been the most authorised interpreter of the Meiji Constitution, and Tadao YANAIHARA (矢内原忠雄), professor of colonial policy at the Imperial University of Tokyo, were accused and ousted (in 1935 and 1937, respectively).

In the early stage of their history, the agents in charge of public peace – the special political police, the military police and the procurators of thought – simply worked for the prohibition of dangerous thoughts. But, finding that public statements of *tenkō* (転向, ideological conversion or apostasy) made by leading communists induced their supporters to state their own *tenkō*, the agents of public peace expanded their role and endeavoured to transform those suspects of dangerous thoughts into active advocates of the national ideology. In the final phase of their history, these agents elaborated a five-stage formula according to which they classified the suspects and pressed them to advance to a higher stage and to finally become feverish anti-communist national ideologues. The agents of negative sanction for ideological mobilisation turned into most efficient agents of positive sanction. According to the recent studies of *tenkō*, the suppressive situation around 1937, the year when the Army instigated an all-out war with China, was such that the agents arbitrarily expanded their interpretation of ‘dangerous thoughts.’ Those intellectuals and academics who were suspected of dangerous thoughts by the agents of public peace could not survive without stating *tenkō*. In such a serious situation, stating a fake *tenkō* and camouflaging one’s *hi-tenkō* (非転向, non-conversion, an attitude loyal to one’s own thought) could be a best possible way to maintain *hi-tenkō* (non-conversion). In the situation in which a statement of *tenkō*, no matter whether it might be a true or a fake one, could be the only possible strategy for survival, the notion of *tenkō* further ramified in such a complicated way that it could be a
proof of 'true' tenkō to expose other's (often comrade's) 'fake' tenkō (Iida 2001).

I mentioned here the development of the bitter situation of tenkō during wartime in Japan, because I like to attract more attention to the term 'complicity,' which is often used in historical reviews of colonial anthropology, without being exactly defined, to indicate the relationship, often unconscious, of anthropologists with colonial rule. As with Japan of the 1930s and early 1940s, a totalitarian regime could be imperialistic externally in relation to other countries and at the same time a coercive autocracy internally in the control of the domestic society. Even though few Japanese anthropologists were driven into such a serious situation of open suppression, most of them experienced tenkō to a lesser degree and in various directions. Recognition of complicity, that inevitably connotes ethical implications, should be made upon a deliberate analysis.

II. The scientific mobilisation and anthropology

There is a difficulty specific to the pursuit of the scientific mobilisation. The inquiries into this topic have mostly been made from a perspective of criticising complicity with, and praising resistance to, the autocratic policy of general mobilisation. The pursuit of data and analysis of mobilisation used to be guided by the ethical preoccupation implicit in the perspective. Hence, we have only a few studies of scientific mobilisation that are conducted in a comprehensive perspective and make a fair academic as well as ideological assessment of works presented in the process of scientific mobilisation. Probably the work of Kakuten Hara (1984) represents those rare studies on the humanities and social sciences mobilised for East and Southeast Asian studies in the 1930s and 1940s.

For my objective, it is appropriate to approach the scientific mobilisation along two axis lines located in two arenas, the military forefronts and the logistic hinterlands. The military authorities in the forefronts organised research institutes and research projects in response to their own needs, and the central government established a series of research institutes and mobilised scientists for research. The former axis started in Manchuria and extended to the South as the military forefronts moved southwards. In the forefronts, the military authorities needed information on the battlefields, which after a successful operation turned into newly occupied areas to be administered. In the logistic hinterlands, the government took initiatives to mobilise scientists and scientific knowledge for the sake of war purposes. It created a series of research institutes in Tokyo on its direct initiative. Both axis lines were accompanied by secondary developments of scientific mobilisation, enacted by public and private initiatives in the forefronts and in the hinterlands (including the colonies of Taiwan and Korea).

The scientific mobilisation in the forefront: China

In the battlefields and the newly occupied areas, the military authorities needed scientific knowledge, particularly that provided by social sciences and humanities, for their military and administrative operations. The kinds of knowledge that the military authorities in the forefront needed evolved from a comprehensive to a more specialised one. First, comprehensive information on a target area was needed. As military gaze became more
focused on a narrower area, more detailed information on that particular area and the local people was requested. In Japan’s Army, that kind of comprehensive information had, in theory, to be collected and compiled into what were called *heiyō-chisi* (兵要地誌) or military topographies before military actions were actually taken. As military actions developed so as to necessitate administration of the occupied areas, a more actual recognition, based on updated information and sound analysis, was necessary. The administration required basic information on the social life of the local people; that of customary laws was typical of such information. The administration needed to constantly negotiate with the volatile situation of the occupied area and the local people, who could be both co-operative and rebellious. Analytical recognition of administrative and military difficulties – such as the forms, abilities and causes of the local people’s resistance – was indispensable. The need for scientific mobilisation developed typically along this line of evolution in the military forefronts in China.

As the Guandong Army expanded its imperial desire to Manchuria in the late 1920s, the need for accurate information on Manchuria was increased. Once the Army created Manchukuo in 1931, it had to hastily develop an overall policy for domestic administration and industrial development, for which systematic research was an urgent necessity. Mantetsu, upon the Guandong Army’s request, took charge of the task of providing information on Manchuria or Manchukuo. For the company’s Research Department, which frequently changed the official name and the organisational position within the company, the request was a challenge. The staff members of the department found that the methods by which they had collected and compiled information of the kind of military topographies were no longer useful; more sophisticated theories and methods of Marxist social sciences were introduced by new recruits, quite a few of whom had had personal histories of suppression and tenkō. For several years until the hastily organised bureaucracy of Manchukuo acquired sufficient ability to conduct necessary research, the Mantetsu Research Department conducted research on a variety of issues concerning the Manchurian economy in general, agriculture and forestry, transportation, commerce and finance, the legal system (including old customs), labour and migration. As Japan expanded its military invasion towards south of Manchuria in the late 1930s, the Mantetsu Research Department also shifted their research area to North and Middle China. Since the war in China was protracted, the agendas of research consisted of a mixture of those for administrative and military purposes, both of which were related to the difficulties confronted by Japan in its war efforts (ISHIDO 1978; HARÁ 1984: 327-73; ISHIDÔ et al. 1986; NONOMURA 1986).

As one of the largest projects for administrative purposes, Mantetsu Research Department investigated, in collaboration with the East Asia Institute, customs of agrarian villages in North China, which Nie in this volume reviews and examines. In recognition of the heightening urgency of the situation of the war in China, the research department by its own initiative started several Sōgō Chōsa (綜合調査, Comprehensive Research Projects). Among the research agendas were the ‘resisting abilities of China against Japan’s military rule’ and ‘inflation in Japan, China and Manchuria.’ The reports on the two issues that the research department made to the military and government authorities in 1940 and 1941, respectively, pointed that despite the damages of the war Chinese people had managed to make a substantial economic development to increase their resisting abilities; that in resisting Japan’s military rule Chinese people had been changing the class structure among them; that the Communist Party had more successfully promoted the change, particularly in rural areas in North China, to gain more popular support than CHIANG Kai-shek’s government had; that the worsening inflation in Japan
WARTIME JAPANESE ANTHROPOLOGY IN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

and China was a natural result of imbalance in the economy due to the destruction of industrial infra-structure by the warfare, the total mobilisation of industrial powers for war purposes and the excessive supply of currencies; that the economic difficulties in Manchuria and China had been partly due to the excessive exploitation of peasants and labourers by Japanese conglomerates on the one hand and by dominant feudal classes among the local people on the other; and that the contemporary situation of China suggested that Japan had not enough military and economic abilities to attain a decisive solution to the war (Mantetsu Research Department 1970, 1982). It is interpreted that the reports implicitly advised the military and government authorities to withdraw the military forces from China and seek a political or diplomatic solution of the war (San’itsu-shobō 1970; Anonymous 1982: 53-84; Ishidō et al. 1986: 53-84). Although impressed by the findings of the reports, the military authorities did not tolerate the criticisms implicit in the reports. The military police of the Guandong Army, which had noted communist tendencies among the department’s personnel, arrested the main body of Mantetsu researchers in charge of violating Manchukuo’s Law for Maintenance of the Public Peace in 1942, which eventually killed the Mantetsu Research Department (San’itsu Shobō 1970; Ishidō 1978; HARA 1984: 383-403; Ishidō et al. 1986).

The scientific mobilisation in the forefront: the South

As for the nanpō (南方, the South), a rubric that comprehensively indicated the areas aimed at by Southbound expansionism in Southeast Asia and the western Pacific, the scientific mobilisation by the military authorities was delayed, and there existed no counterparts of the Mantetsu Research Department in charge of the South. As Japan’s military forces occupied British, Dutch and U.S. colonies in the South, the Army and the Navy found the need for research abilities. The government requested, or eventually forced, five research institutes to dispatch groups of scientists to the military governments in the South.

Tōa-keizai Kenkyūjo (東亞經濟研究所, the Institute of East Asian Economies) of the Tokyo University of Commerce sent a group of twelve researchers to Singapore;
Tōa Kenkyūjo (東亞研究所) or the East Asia Institute sent a group of about sixty members to Java;
Mitsubishi Keizai Kenkyūjo (三菱經濟研究所, the Mitsubishi Economic Institute) sent a group of about twenty members to the Philippines;
Mantetsu sent two groups, each consisting of about fifty members, to Sumatra and Burma;
Taiheiyō Kyōkai (太平洋協會) or the Institute of the Pacific sent a group of about twenty members to North Borneo.

The cited numbers of dispatched people, if not specified as researchers, include those of secretaries.

The six recipient military governments were those of the Army. The Army and the Navy divided the occupied areas in Southeast Asia between them to take charge of administration. The anthropologist Hisakatsu Hiijkata (土方久功) was recruited as the Army’s associate (陸軍嘱託) for the military government of North Borneo (Institute of the Pacific 1942b). OKAYA in his biography of Hiijkata mentions Hiijkata’s words saying that he was recruited by Dr. Kiyono, an associate of the Institute of the Pacific (OKAYA 1990: 180-6). Tadao Kano (鹿野忠雄), a natural historian and anthropologist, who was lost in North Borneo in the last days of the war and never returned, was recruited in place of Hiijkata after the latter’s early retirement (Institute of the Pacific 1944d). Thus, the recruited researchers bore responsibility
to the military governments as being incorporated in the staff members of those governments.

Besides the cases of scientific mobilisation for the South that HARA mentions, the Navy established Makassar Institute in Celebes and recruited researchers including the anthropologist Tōichi MABUCHI (馬越東一), the subject of NAKAO's investigation in this volume. The military authorities also mobilised individual scientists in a more *ad hoc* way. The anthropologist Seiichi IZUMI (泉靖一) went to the former Dutch New Guinea as a member of the research expedition organised by the Navy in 1943 (see below).

*The scientific mobilisation at the logistic centre*

The government of Japan was another centre for the scientific mobilisation. A series of research institutes were created, first on the initiatives of different sections in the government, and later on the more integrated initiatives of the government. The primary institutes created in this line were:

In 1932 the Monbushō (文部省) or the Ministry of Education established the *Kokumin Seishin-bunka Kenkyūjo* (国民精神文化研究所, the Institute of the National Spirit and Culture) for the sake of research on the *kokutai* (the Emperor’s regime) and the national spirit. Ichirō Hori (堀一郎), a specialist of religion including primitive beliefs, and Tarō WAKAMORI (和歌森太郎), a folklorist, joined the institute. The ministry issued the afore-mentioned *Kokutai no hongi* in 1937. The Cabinet decided ‘the action plan for the general mobilisation of the national spirit’, in the same 1937. In 1943 the institute was reformed into the Kyōgaku Renseijō (教育練成所, the Educational Training Institute) as the centre for formulating the educational programs for the ideological mobilisation (GOTÔ 1988: 879-84).

In 1938, the Cabinet officially started to introduce the policy of the Whole State General Mobilisation. As part of this policy, the Planning Board created the *Tōa Kenkyūjo* (東亞研究所, the East Asia Institute). Although its legal status was a juridical foundation, it was financially supported by the government and controlled by the military authorities, both in terms of initiative and personnel. The stated objective of the institute was to respond to the necessity of scientific knowledge and wisdom about East Asia and the world for the sake of the Empire’s overseas development. The institute mobilised numerous scholars and researchers either as its staff members or as members of its research projects. This institute will be considered in more detail below.

In 1940, the *Sōsenryoku Kenkyūjo* (總戰力研究所, the Research Institute of Total War Abilities) was created under the direct control of the Prime Minister. The stated mission of the institute was: 1) to conduct basic research on the state’s total war; and 2) to train and educate government officials and others in the matters concerning the state’s total war. The East-Asiatic Economic Investigation Bureau co-operated with the institute (HARA 1984: 471-2). The stated agendas of research were directly concerned with the war – physical forces, political strategies, ideological war and economic war (ŌTA 1977), but as a research institute it was not productive and influential. Mobilising numerous historians, it compiled a sourcebook on the administration and post-war construction of the occupied areas, but it was only issued as a mimeographed document and delivered to a limited number of sections in the military and government authorities (ŌTA 1979). The institute was rather functional as a training organ. Every year from 1941 to 1943, it recruited thirty-five young or middle-aged high officials from major sections in the government and military authorities and trained them according to a one-year curriculum. The curriculum for the first year contained a large-scaled practice concerning a possible scenario of a war between Japan and the USA (ASHIZAWA 1972). In this respect, the
institute could be seen as having functioned as a think tank. The institute was closed in March 1945, earlier than the end of the war.

In 1942, the Kōa-in (興亞院, the Asian Development Board, a government office created in 1938 to take charge of Chinese and Southeast Asian affairs in general) organised the Shina-kankai Chōsakikan Rengōkai (支那関係調査機関連合会, the Union of Research Organisations on China), in which the East Asia Institute participated and with which the East-Asiatic Economic Investigation Bureau co-operated. HARA analyses that it was too late for such a network of research organisations to initiate a new project for practical application in China (HARA 1984: 166-7, 470-4).

When Japan was apparently losing the war, the government established the Chōsa Kenkyū Dōin Honbu (調査研究動員本部, the Headquarters for Research Mobilisation) in 1944. The stated missions were to co-ordinate and integrate on-going research projects conducted by existing research institutes, as well as to promote new research projects. The East Asia Institute was placed under the direct control of this organ (TSUGE 1979: 209-24; HARA 1984: 168-70).

The Wartime Headquarters for Research Mobilisation had an advisory body of seventy renowned people, among whom Yūsuke Tsurumi, the manager-director of the Institute of the Pacific, and Yasuma Takata, the director-general of the Ethnic Research Institute were included (TSUGE 1979: 218-9; HARA 1984: 169). In my scheme of analysis, the two institutes are classed in the secondary development of scientific mobilisation; their status was marginal in relation to the research organs in the axis lines. But, the two institutes were the most important agents of the wartime mobilisation of anthropology and anthropologists. The fact that Tsurumi and Takata joined the advisory body of the Wartime Headquarters for Research Mobilisation implies that the mobilisation of anthropology got authorised, even though in the final phase of the war, as a constituent element of the general scientific mobilisation.

The East Asia Institute

Among the research institutes in the axis line at the logistic centre, as outlined in the former sub-section, the East Asia Institute was one of those rare institutes to which anthropology was closely related, so that it deserves a detailed description.

The institute had, besides a general affairs department, four research departments that were devoted to area studies of the Soviet Union, Outer Mongolia, China, Manchuria and Inner Mongolia, the South Seas, Oceania (i.e. Australia and New Zealand), India and Burma, West Asia, and major Western countries. A section of natural science was assigned to the general affairs department. The institute, at the height of its activities, employed about 250 research staff members, among whom were a couple of anthropologists (Asahitarō Nishimura 西村朝日太郎 and Jōji Tanase 田瀬朝二).

HARA (1984: 102, 108) classifies the research conducted and organised by the institute into three categories: 1) research conducted by the staff members, 2) research conducted by the research committees and 3) research commissioned to outside specialists. The research by the staff members (category 1) consisted mostly of deskwork and depended heavily on foreign literary sources. According to HARA’s review, the productivity of the staff members roughly reflects the expectations expressed by the government and other authorities to the
institute; the sections of natural science, Soviet, China (politics and economy), India-Burma and Western Asia were very productive. Area studies comprised natural science and meteorology, technology and transportation, life, resources, politics, economy and industry, society-culture-people, administrative policy, international relations and trade, among which publications on the topics of social sciences (politics, economy, industry, and society-culture-people) were the most numerous (HARA 1984: 113-6).

The research in category 2 meant that the institute itself was a mobilising agent of scientists. The research in this category represented the institute both in terms of academic accomplishment and in terms of practical complicity with the wartime situation. Nine projects were organised altogether in this category: four on topics of social sciences, three of natural sciences and two for collecting data on the concurrent war. The topics of research in social sciences suggest what kinds of scientific information the central authorities expected of the institute. Those topics were: ‘Japanese and foreign investments in China’ (the First Research Committee); ‘Overseas Chinese in the South’ (the Third Research Committee), including such an issue as ‘the anti-Japanese and “Save country” movements of Overseas Chinese’; ‘Chinese customs’ (the Sixth Research Institute); and ‘the demand and supply of food in Japan, Manchuria and China’ (the Fifth Research Institute). Scientific credibility was emphasised for those projects, so that empirical data were collected by fieldwork and by local agents. Each was itself a big project conducted by committee members and researchers, who amounted to more than two hundred in the case of the First Research Committee. The headquarters of each project consisted of one or a couple of committees, with members recruited from the Institute itself and other institutes (TSUGE 1979: 58-60, 90-108; HARA 1984: 124-58).

The project of the Sixth Research Committee was planned as a three-year program and divided the subject matter, Chinese customs, into two topics, customs in rural villages and commercial customs in urban areas. The headquarters of the project consisted of two committees, managerial and academic. The Faculty of Law of the Imperial University of Tokyo and the Faculty of Economics of Kyoto Imperial University sent members to the academic committee, the former in charge of rural customs and the latter of urban commercial customs. The Mantetsu Research Department, which was commissioned the role of collecting empirical data through fieldwork for both topics, also sent members to the academic committee. As for rural customs, the Mantetsu Research Department had been formulating a large-scale ten-year program as its own project. Hence, when it received a commission of fieldwork from the East-Asia Institute, the Mantetsu Research Department accepted it as the initial part of its own project. Nie in this volume reviews that part of the research on rural customs and assesses the outcome of the research by comparing it with the works of Chinese scholars who conducted their research in China almost in the same years. The committee members for rural customs made brief visits to north China only twice; the collection of data through fieldwork was conducted from 1940 to 1944 by staff members of the Beijing branch of the Mantetsu Research Department (NOMA 1977; HARA 1984: 136-45, 761-96; NOMA, FUKUSHIMA et al. 1996).

The East Asia Institute was created when Japan wholly entered into a wartime situation. The expanded and protracted war enlarged the need for academic research, but it at the same
time reduced and worsened necessary resources and conditions for research. The fieldwork on rural customs, for instance, was conducted literally in battlefields, where Mantetsu researchers had to be always guarded by Japanese military forces (NOMA 1977; HARA 1984: 773). Many of the research projects organised by the institute, including those in category 2, are evaluated today for their high scientific level and for their contribution to the post-war development of Asian area studies in Japan. But, there were also many that ended without being fully completed.

The status and position of anthropology in the general scientific mobilisation

So far I have approached the development of the scientific mobilisation along the two axis lines, one in the forefronts and the other in the logistic centre. The survey was made from a comprehensive perspective covering the whole scientific mobilisation. The survey, however, has not yet been completed. Responding to the call of the government for scientific contribution to the country, lots of academic organisations, publishing companies and even individuals joined the mobilisation upon their own initiatives. At the same time, the scientific mobilisation, together with the ideological one, provided them with chances to expand their own businesses. It is necessary to trace those secondary, subsidiary developments of the state-wide scientific mobilisation. This, however, is a grand, difficult task, too. I am not ready to comprehensively survey those secondary repercussions in the social sciences and humanities. I can trace here only those responses of academic organisations that had in either way or another to do with anthropology and anthropologists. In this context of my survey, it is meaningful to consider the status and position of anthropology in the whole academism in Japan in those years.

The survey of the whole state general mobilisation, as has so far been described in the previous sub-sections, reveals that anthropology was a minor participant. I have mentioned the anthropologists who had whatever relations with the research institutes and research projects that were under the direct control of the government and military authorities. They numbered very few.

This is indicative of the position anthropology occupied in the whole academism in Japan in those years. The research projects that were undertaken by the central agents along the axis lines of the scientific mobilisation, either in the forefronts or in Japan, were mostly carried out by the major branches of social science, particularly law studies and economics. Even sociology was peripheral from the point of view of the government and military authorities. Anthropology was known as minzokugaku (民族学, literally meaning the study of ethnos or peoples, explained as the counterpart of ethnology) or even in an older name of dozokugaku (土俗学, literally meaning the study of vulgar customs, explained as the counterpart of ethnography). Both names strongly implied that anthropology was the study of primitive and barbarous peoples. Anthropology was apparently one of the most peripheral sciences in the subject of research, in the number of scholars and in the institutional position within the academism in Japan in those years. Among the research institutes and/or the research projects that were situated in either axis line (in the forefronts or at the logistic centre) of the scientific mobilisation, anthropology obtained only a couple of seats in those areas in charge of the South, but not in those of China and its neighbouring areas. For the
same reason, anthropology tended to be more spotlighted in what we call the secondary developments of the whole state scientific mobilisation, because the research institutes and research projects that belonged to those developments supplemented the research conducted in the axis lines, by paying more attention to peripheral areas, both in the continent and in the South.

III. Anthropology and the wartime of the 1930s and 1940s

The general mobilisation and the wartime situation for anthropology

The next step of my investigation shall therefore be to trace the secondary developments of the scientific mobilisation in relation to anthropology, which will provide more clues for the analysis of the relationship of anthropology with the wartime situation. In order to take this step forward, however, it is necessary to switch the point of view from that of the mobilisation agent to that of anthropology.

I have so far traced the development of the scientific mobilisation, which was a part of the more comprehensive development of the whole state general mobilisation. In this survey, I adopted the framework of the general mobilisation, with a few modifications added to the original presented by a military authority (Rinji Gunjichōsa linkai 1920), as a guideline and traced the development of the general mobilisation in the 1930s and 1940s in three categories: the economic, ideological and scientific mobilisations.

The framework of the general mobilisation, however, was originally conceptualised from the military point of view, which eventually became the viewpoint of the government. The general mobilisation is not automatically the same thing as the wartime situation for anthropology. In the idea of the general mobilisation, the mobilising agency is the military authorities, and anthropology is no more than a mobilised object. When it comes to a consideration of the wartime situation as meaningful to anthropology, however, anthropology should be the subject that is to be examined in the context of wartime. What was supposed to be the objects of mobilisation must be re-interpreted from the perspective of anthropology. The general mobilisation in the 1930s and 1940s, as summarised above, should be translated, so to speak, into the language of anthropology.

The economic mobilisation, no matter how important it may be from the military point of view, can be neglected from the anthropological perspective. It actually had circumstantial effects on anthropology, but had few intellectually. As noted previously, anthropology was in the position to be targeted for the ideological mobilisation; hence the ideological mobilisation should be considered part of the wartime situation for anthropology. The scientific mobilisation, however, is ambivalent. On the one hand, anthropologists were involved in the projects and the organisations that mobilised scholars in inter-disciplinary perspectives; in this sense, the scientific mobilisation constitutes part of the wartime situation for anthropology. On the other hand, leading anthropologists, in response to the authorities' call for the scientific mobilisation, endeavoured to transform their discipline into a more practical science. This attempt, when seen from the point of view of the military and government authorities, should be part of the scientific mobilisation. But the same attempt is no longer an object of mobilisation but a matter of the very self when seen by
anthropologists; in this sense it is no longer part of the wartime situation for anthropology. On the other hand, the military and government authorities, which formulated the framework of the general mobilisation and which therefore remained invisible in that framework, now should be considered part of the wartime situation for anthropology.

In summary, by translating the military plan for the general mobilisation into the language of anthropology, a framework for observing the wartime situation and anthropology is obtained, which consists of: 1) the situation of the ideological mobilisation, and 2) the situation of the scientific mobilisation. Both 1) and 2), as factors introduced and led by the military and government authorities, constitute the wartime situation for anthropology. Related with these two is 3) anthropology as the practicing subject in that wartime situation.

**Ideological contributions of anthropology**

Before proceeding to a survey of the participation of anthropologists in the scientific mobilisation, the contributions of anthropology to the ideological mobilisation will be reviewed briefly. The national ideology, in the early phase of its creation, incorporated knowledge and wisdom from a broad variety of humanities and social sciences: the origin of the Imperial family and that of the Japanese, for instance, were imagined and authorised by history, mythology, linguistics, folklore studies and anthropology. Ideas on Japan's geopolitical policy, mostly in various forms of Asianist imperialism developed since the Meiji era, provided anthropology with a large possibility of participation. Despite those favourable conditions, anthropologists made very few contributions. Only Ryūzō Torii (鳥居龍藏) is well known for his contribution to the Asianist ideology, particularly to the ideology of 'the common root of the Japanese and the Koreans' (see Ch’oe in this volume). In those years, anthropology as a specialised discipline had been so premature that what appears today as anthropological contributions were made in the name of other, closely related disciplines.

Coming to the 1930s and 1940s, anthropology does not seem to have made any substantial contributions in advocating the national and Asianist ideology. In 1942, Shinji Nishimura (西村真次) published a book titled *The Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere*, in which he simply recapitulated the ideology, already firmly established with public authorisation, in opportunistic terms (Nishimura 1942). Anthropologists were more active in a narrower perspective of providing empirical knowledge on Southeast Asia and Oceania for the sake of the Asianist ideology. For instance, Kenji Kiyono (清野兼次), academically known for his contribution to physical anthropology, joined the Institute of the Pacific and published numerous articles and books that applied anthropological knowledge of Southeast Asia and Oceania to what he understood to be the policy of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere (see below).

The whole state general mobilisation was not simply a matter of naichi (内地) or Home-Japan; it was also intensely promoted in the colonies. Ch’oe in this volume describes how Takashi Akiba (秋葉隆), a renowned anthropologist for his study of shamanism in Korea, contributed to the ideological mobilisation in the context of the colony of Korea.

On the negative aspect of the ideological mobilisation, too, no anthropologists were openly suppressed by the official sanction of the national ideology. Eiichirō Ishida (石田英一
K), then a student of Kyoto Imperial University, was arrested and imprisoned in charge of violating the Law for Maintenance of the Public Peace. Even after being released from imprisonment, he was under regular surveillance by the Special Higher Police. In this oppressive situation, he turned his interests first to Kunio Yanagita’s (柳田國男) folklore studies, and then to anthropology. Yanagita is known as having provided those people who had been prosecuted for ‘dangerous thoughts’ with a sort of refuge. Tokuzo Omacchi (大間知三) was one of those people. He conducted folklore studies under Yanagita and later went to Manchukuo and expanded his research to shamanism in Manchuria. They turned to anthropology after they were ideologically suppressed.

In respect to the educational mobilisation, another aspect of the ideological mobilisation, very little is known about anthropologists’ contribution. Probably because it belongs to personal engagements, sufficient attention has not been paid. Ch’oe mentions Takashi Akiba’s educational commitment to the recruitment of military personnel in Korea (in this volume).

Secondary developments of the scientific mobilisation

As noted before, the general scientific mobilisation was not simply promoted by the government and military authorities. I noted that there existed secondary developments responding to the call of those authorities for scientific contribution. Leading academic organisations established research institutes that were specifically devoted to the state’s urgent necessities. I also noted that anthropology found their niches, so to speak, in those secondary developments rather than in the research institutes and projects in the axis lines directly controlled by the government and military authorities.

In the following, those secondary developments that were closely related to anthropology are reviewed:

Mantetsu had a research institute, the Tōa Keizai Chōsa-kyoku (東亞經濟調查局) or the East-Asian Economic Investigation Bureau, in Tokyo. According to Hara (1984), the Bureau was created as early as in 1908 as a branch of Mantetsu. The primary mission of the Bureau was to conduct research on East Asian affairs, particularly the economy of the area, from a general, global perspective. In 1929 the Bureau became an independent juridical foundation, and at the same time Shūmei Ōkawa (大川周明), a leading proponent of radical Asianism, was appointed as the Director. He was arrested in 1932 for his engagement in the 5.15 Incident, but Hara considers that, even after he was ousted, he maintained his influence to the Bureau. During the years under his leadership, the Bureau conducted research on a broad variety of practical topics that were more or less focused on the geo-political situations of Asia. Hara considers that Ōkawa lead the Bureau to shift the focus of research to the South (1984: 461-6). Hara mentions the publication of numerous separate books, the publication of the monthly journal Shin-ajia (新亞洲, New Asia) and the publication of three series of books – the Nan’yō sōsho (南洋叢書, the Series on the South, 5 volumes, 1937-39), the Nan’yō kakyō sōsho (南洋考察叢書, the Series on the Overseas Chinese in the South, 6 volumes, 1939-41) and the Shin-ajia sōsho (新亞洲叢書, the Series on New Asia, 5 volumes, 1942-3) – as the primary attainments of the Bureau during Ōkawa’s years. In 1939 the Bureau was again annexed by Mantetsu. As for the Bureau thereafter, Hara reports the Bureau’s co-operation with the Research Institute of Total War Abilities, created in 1940, and to the Union of Research Organisations on China, created in 1942. The three organisations could not afford to conduct substantial research (Hara
The research conducted by the Bureau had much to do with anthropology in terms of areas and topics. The topics that were apparently anthropological, however, were not automatically assigned to anthropologists. Only two anthropologists – Kiyoto Furuno (古野清人), a specialist of religious beliefs in Southeast Asia, and Tōichi Mabuchi (馬渕東一), a specialist of society and religion of Taiwanese Aborignals and Indonesia – worked for the Bureau for some time, as detailed by Nakao in this volume.

The Taiheiyō Kyōkai (太平洋協会) or the Institute of the Pacific was created as a juridical foundation on the initiative of Yūsuke Tsurumi (鶴見鶴輔) in 1938, who directed the institute as the manager-director thereafter. The stated objective of the institute was to build and reiterate proposals on the state’s policy on problems concerning the Pacific. The institute’s constitution plainly stated imperialist interests and specified the agenda of solutions to be sought: Japan’s demographic issues, policies on emigration and exploration, trade barriers, fair distribution of resources, peaceful change of territories, etc. The constitution also stated that the institute should conduct research on issues from both sides of the Pacific concerning politics, diplomatic relations, culture, national defence, economy, trade, transportation, industry, finance, resources, land use, races, social conditions, etc., in order to resolve these issues. Tsurumi continued to be a prominent politician during the war, and it is said that the institute was financially supported by the military through his personal connections (Kugai 1981). The institute was very active in publication. In contrast, the institute has remained almost un-addressed by post-war reviewers of wartime science and thought. The institute attracted many anthropologists. The institute will be discussed in more detail below.

The Imperial University of Tokyo reorganised the small Institute of Anthropology into a department in the Faculty of Science in 1939. The Institute of Anthropology was established as early as in 1893, but it had only been giving classes in the Departments of Zoology and Geology. Taihoku Imperial University also had the Dozokujinshugaku Kōza (土俗人種学講座) or the Institute of Ethnology in 1928. Thus anthropology had exploited a small position in universities, but the Department of Anthropology at the Imperial University of Tokyo was the first department that anthropology obtained in the history of universities in Japan and its colonies. The document that explained the object to establish the Department mentioned the contemporary situation of Japan, as a colonial empire intensifying relations with peoples of Manchuria, China and Russia, and emphasised the timely importance of anthropological studies of those peoples (University of Tokyo 1987: 556-71). The Department was primarily oriented to physical anthropology. Among the staff members, only Ken’ichi SugiuRA (杉浦健一), a research assistant, was considered a specialist, not of minzokugaku (ethnology), but of dozokugaku (ethnography).

The Teikoku Gakushin (帝國學士院) or the Imperial Academy created the Tōa Shōminzoku Chōsa Inlkai (東亞諸民族調査委員會, the Research Committee on East Asian Peoples) in 1940, for which about twenty people, including Enkū Uno (字野園空), Eiichirō Ishida, Hiroshi Oikawa (及川宏) and Ichichi Oguchi (小口一) worked. The stated mission of the committee was to conduct research and compile encyclopaedic data on the Asian minzoku (民族, ethnics, peoples and/or nations) in the geographical extension from Siberia southward to Indonesia and from Micronesia westward to Xinjiang and Tibet (Gōrō 1988: 945). The committee published a gazetteer of peoples’ proper names (Imperial Academy 1944). The committee sent out Eiichirō Ishida to Sakhalin to conduct research on the peoples living there. Sasaki in this volume examines the ethnographical report he wrote on the basis of this research.

The Minzoku Kenkyūjo (民族研究所, the Ethnic Research Institute) was created under the auspices of the Ministry of Education in 1943. The government’s decree, issued on 18 January 1943, simply stated, ‘The Ethnic Research Institute shall conduct research on peoples in order to contribute to the minzoku seisaku (民族施策, the ethnic policy)’ (JJE 1(2): 117, 1943). The
initial staff members consisted of twenty-one people. In 1944, another fourteen were recruited, among whom were Eiichirō Ishida and Kinji Imanishi who later worked for the Northeast Institute (see below). Academic backgrounds of the staff members were varied, and their styles of study were more or less inter-disciplinary. To identify their specialties according to the primary disciplines in which they worked in post-war years, we find:

In sociology: Yasuma Takata (高田保馬, also known as an economist, the director-general), Eizō Koyama (小山嶋三, the head of the Second and Fourth Departments), Tatsumi Makino (牧野繁, also known as historian), Hiroshi Oikawa (丸川卓, rural sociology), Kanji Naitō (内藤織織, rural sociology) and Seiichi Nakano (中野清一).

In anthropology: Masao Oka (岡正雄, the head of the Administrative and Second Departments), Kiyoto Furuno (杉本宜夫, the head of the Third and Fifth Departments), Ken'ichi Sugihara and Jirō Suzuki (鈴木二郎).

In history: Namio Egami (江上波夫), Shinobu Iwamura (岩村忍), Tōru Suguchi (佐口透) and Satoshi Nakajima (中島敏),

In archaeology: Ichirō Yawata (八幡一郎),

In folktales studies: Yasumoto Tokunaga (徳永康元) and Keigo Seki (関敬吾),

In linguistics: Takeshi Shibata (柴田武),

In religious studies: Shōkō Watanabe (渡邉照宏).

For other fourteen persons their primary disciplines are unidentifiable (JJE 1(7): 73, 1943; JJE 2(45): 71, 1944).

As already noted, this classification is rather artificial, but it roughly indicates the interdisciplinary nature of the institute.

The institute dispatched staff members abroad for field research:

Namio Egami and Yasumoto Tokunaga to North China and Inner Mongolia for one month in 1943,

Eizō Koyama, Chikayuki Hattori and Tōru Suguchi to Manchuria and North China for one month in 1943 to collect data on ethnic policy (JJE 1(8): 76, 1943),

Tatsumi Makino and Kanji Naito to Hainan Island for two months (by commission of the Navy) and then to South China for one month (JJE 1(10): 85, 1943),

Kiyoto Furuno and Hiroshi Oikawa to the Malay Peninsula, Sumatra, Java, Celebes, French Indochina and Thai from the end of 1943 (or the beginning of 1944) for six months (at the commission of the Army),

Masao Oka and Motomu Matsuura to Manchuria (at the invitation of Manchukuo) and to North China, for one month altogether in 1944 (JJE 2(23): 66; Minzoku kenkyū 3(1/2): 40, 1945),

Masao Oka to Manchukuo, North China and Inner Mongolia for forty days for the sake of coordination among related research institutes in those areas (Minzoku kenkyū 3(1/2): 40, 1945),

Shinobu Iwamura, Shinobu Ono, Tōru Suguchi and Masami Kawanishi to North China and Inner Mongolia for three months in 1944 for Muslim studies,

Namio Egami to Inner Mongolia for three months in 1994 for research of Lama Buddhism, Shōkō Watanabe and Kōichirō Kohima to Tibet and Chinhai for three months In 1944, Tadamitsu Asano to Yunnan, etc., for two months in 1944 for research on the tusi (local chief) system,

Eizō Koyama to Manchuria and North China for one month in 1944, and

Minoru Asano to Xinjiang for three months in 1944 (Minzoku kenkyū 3(1/2): 40, 1945).

The journal that the Society of Ethnology published under the title of Minzoku kenkyū had only one number issued, with the indication of 'vol. 3, nos. 1/2,' on 30 August 1945, i.e. the end of the month in the middle of which Japan had surrendered to the Allied Powers. This issue announced the decision that fourteen staff members were to be sent to Manchuria, Inner Mongolia and North China for six months (Minzoku kenkyū 3(1/2): 42, 1945). They actually went to their destinations in July 1945 in the midst of chaotic turbulence.
All research teams except one were dispatched to the areas in and around China, Manchuria and Inner Mongolia. Numerous though the occasions of field research was, each research team spent only a brief period compared with a standard field research conducted in later years such as the 1980s and 1990s. This institute will be further discussed below.

In the colonies, Taihoku Imperial University had the Nanpō Jinbun Kenkyūjo (南方人文研究所, the Institute of Southern Cultures) in 1943. The staff members of the institute were recruited from the Institute of Ethnology (Dozoku-jinshugaku Kōza) at the university: Nenozō Utsushikawa (移川子之蔵) and Nobuto Miyamoto (宮本延人). Tōichi Mabuchi and Tadao Kano also joined the institute (see Nakao in this volume).

The Tairiku Sigenkagaku Kenkyūjo (大陸資源科学研究所, the Research Institute for the Continental Resource Sciences) was established in Keijo Imperial University in 1945. It was in July of that year when the Institute sent Seiichi Izumi out to Mongolia for research (Izumi 1972).

After Manchukuo was created by the Guandong Army, several research institutes were established in Manchuria and neighbouring areas. The Mōko Zenrin Kyōkai (蒙古書籍協会, the Mongolian Friendship Association) was created with an aid from Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1934. Some sources on the Association mention the Chōsabu (調査部, the Research Department) and the Mōko Kenkyūjo (蒙古研究所, the Mongolian Research Institute). It is not clear whether the two were one and the same. The research function of the Association was later restructured into the Seihoku Kenkyūjo (西北研究所, the Northwest Institute), with several anthropologists among its staff members, such as Kinji Imanishi (今西錦司), Eiichirō Ishida and Tadao Umesao (梅津忠夫) (Minzoku kenkyū 3(1/2): 40-1, 1945). The Inner Mongolian Government, a local government supported and controlled by the Japanese Army, had the Mōko Bunka Kenkyūjo (蒙古文化研究所, Mongolian Cultural Institute). The Ethnic Research Institute conducted its last research project by dispatching a group of fourteen researchers to Mongolia, Manchuria and North China in July 1945. It was reported that the project was to be conducted with the aid from the Northwest Institute and the Mongolian Cultural Institute (Minzoku kenkyū 3(1/2): 42 1945). Manchukuo established Kenkoku (Jiangu) University (建國大學), which had a Department of Ethnology. This can also be considered in relation to the wartime situation in Manchuria. Tokuzō Ōmachi, who had worked under the folklorist Kunio Yanagita, was a leading figure of the department (Nakao 1994).

Anthropologisation of the needed knowledge in the developing war

The various institutes, which I have surveyed either along the axis lines or the secondary developments of the scientific mobilisation, recruited anthropologists among their staff members. In most cases, the mobilisation of anthropologists and/or anthropological knowledge was conducted by the initiative of agents external to anthropology. Anthropologists passively responded to the request from the mobilisation agents. The only exception to this general trend was the Ethnic Research Institute that, according to the idea broadly held by Japanese anthropologists today, was established in response to an active request made by anthropologists. Another feature discernible in the way anthropologists were mobilised was that most mobilisation agents incorporated anthropologists into the scientific frameworks they had already formulated. As noted before, anthropology was generally considered a special discipline on primitive peoples and cultures. There were, however, two exceptional agents that tried to give a new, enlarged definition to anthropology into which to incorporate anthropological knowledge. One of the two was the Ethnic Research Institute; it was exceptional both in making a positive approach to the scientific
mobilisation from within anthropology, and in that it tried to innovate anthropology. The other agent that tried to encourage a substantial change in anthropology was the Institute of the Pacific. In contrast to the Ethnic Research Institute, the Institute of the Pacific approached anthropology from without and tried to re-interpret anthropology in terms of new missions. Chronologically, the project of the Institute of the Pacific preceded the establishment of the Ethnic Research Institute.

To look back upon the scientific mobilisation in humanities and social sciences in general, the kind of knowledge that was urgently needed was basically anthropological in that the knowledge was concerned with peoples of exotic cultures in foreign lands, particularly the local peoples in the battlefields whose military forces Japan was fighting against, and whose civilians Japan had to govern. It was all the more important when the needed knowledge was sharply focused on a particular people of a particular place in a particular situation in the process of war. As was noted above, when a body of encyclopaedic knowledge could answer the request of information, as was the case with early publications of the East-Asiatic Economic Investigation Bureau (the series of publications on the South, for instance), anthropology used to be assigned the classic role of the provider of information on primitive culture of minority peoples in the peripheries. Specialists of other disciplines could collect such anthropological knowledge from literary sources. The necessity of anthropological knowledge did not immediately mean the necessity of anthropologists. When the developing war urged social scientists to provide more practically reliable knowledge on the areas where actual battles and administration had to be conducted, responsible social scientists could turn to anthropology, not only as a source of knowledge but also as a pertinent, empirical method for obtaining the needed knowledge.

IV. Approach to anthropology from without: Yoshitarō HIRANO’s Ethno-Politik and the Institute of the Pacific

Yoshitarō HIRANO

Yoshitarō HIRANO (平野義太郎), who lead the academic research and publications of the Institute of the Pacific, was typical of those social scientists who approached anthropology from without. Before examining HIRANO’s contributions to and impacts on anthropology, it is necessary to have a look at his life as a whole, since several commentators have published critical reviews of his academic works, but uniformly ignored his approach to anthropology. In the context of social sciences in Japan at the beginning of the twenty-first century, it may appear entirely strange to try to examine the wartime HIRANO from the perspective of his relationship with anthropology, which is exactly what I am going to do here. The commentators concentrated their attention to the tenkō (conversion or apostasy) he made in the late 1930s and to the contrast, or the contradictions, found between the theories and philosophies he expressed in his publications before and after the conversion. A brief summary of his life is helpful to understand why the current attempt in this chapter may appear strange in relation with the preceding reviews of his life and works.

HIRANO lived a dramatic life marked by a conversion he made in the 1930s and by another he made just after the war. In the late 1920s, he made a brilliant debut as a promising
scholar with his Marxist interpretation of civil and labour laws. In 1930, he met with a
sanction by the Special High Police and was ousted from the Imperial University of Tokyo,
where he had been associate professor at the Faculty of Law. Then as a free scholar out of
office in any university, he joined the group of Marxist social scientists that edited and
published the series of books known as the *Nihon shihonshugi hattatsu-shi kōza* (Standard
lectures on the developmental history of the Japanese capitalism) (NORO et al. 1932-33). The
publication of the series provoked a heated controversy between the editors and their
supporters, named after the series as the Kōza-ha (講座派, the Standard Lecture School),
and another group of Marxist economists known as the Rōnō-ha (労農派, the Labourer-Peasant
School). HIRANO lead the Kōza-ha in that controversy. The primary issues of debate were
how to define the politico-economic class-structure of the Japanese imperial regime that had
been maintained since the Meiji Restoration, and how to formulate the programme of
revolution for reiterating a socialist regime in Japan. Most social scientists of the Kōza-ha
were closely associated with the then unlawful Japanese Communist Party, and they
accepted the theoretical instructions given by the Communist International. The controversy
continued for several years until 1936 when it was forcibly terminated with the arrest of the
primary Kōza-ha discussants, including HIRANO. Soon after that incident, the leading
discussants of the Rōnō-ha were also arrested. HIRANO was released without being indicted;
it was publicly propagated that he had stated tenkō (NAGAOKA 1984, 1985).

Then HIRANO transformed himself into a vehement Asianist ideologue. In 1939, he joined
the Institute of the Pacific as the head of the Planning Department (later as the head of the
Research Department) and lead a large part of the research projects and publications of the
institute until the institute ceased to function in 1946. Under his leadership, the institute was
evertheless productive in disseminating practical information on Southeast Asia and the South
Pacific (see below). In the early years when he worked for the institute, he also participated
in the research on rural customs in North China, a project of the Sixth Research Committee
at the East Asia Institute (FUKUSHIMA 1981). Besides those contributions to the projects of
the two institutes, he published numerous articles and books and presented his own Asianist
philosophy on the one hand and his ideas on the colonial and military administration of the
South on the other. It is through the projects of the Institute of the Pacific that he made an
active approach to anthropology. No sooner than the war ended, however, he successfully
managed to recover his academic authority at least in a Marxist circle of intellectuals and
socio-political movements. He apparently made a second tenkō to survive the drastic change
in the academic sector of society, which was brought about by the occupation administration
of the Allied Powers. He lived the rest of his life as a prominent figure in numerous
organisations, both international and domestic, that worked for democracy-promoting, anti-
imperialist and peace-seeking movements, all closely associated with the Japanese
Communist Party. Academically he was extremely productive, too, although he regained no
position in universities until he was appointed professor at Ryūkoku University when he was
sixty-nine (Biographical note, HIRANO Yōsitarō Hito To Gakumon Henshūinikai 1981).

Thus HIRANO's life consisted of three periods distinguished by two times of conversion.
In the first period, he was a leading Marxist social scientist and categorically critical of the
autocratic imperial regime. In the second period, he was an active advocate of the Asianist
ideology and gave his enthusiastic support to the same regime. As the war ended, he made a second conversion in the exactly opposite direction to the first. The two conversions altogether make his whole life appear like this (which accords to the view commonly presented by the reviewers of his life and works): with the first conversion, he made a "deviation" from the initial course, but with the second he abandoned the 'deviated' course and made another start along a course that was in the same line as his own initial course. This is an extremely simplified summary of his life, which should actually have been full of dramas accompanied with interpretations and re-interpretations. It is inferred that he should have struggled strenuously with the circumstances in which he strived for retaining or recovering authority through his second conversion, because any organisations in which he attempted to obtain a position of authority accused, at least in appearance, any agents, both individuals and organisations, that could be suspected of complicity with the wartime autocratic regime. He had to join the accusation of complicity and at the same time he had to avoid being blamed by the same accusation. He was not alone in that struggle, so that he could be a source of political turmoil within the circle to which he sought affiliation. He eventually managed to recover his authority in Marxist-wing academy, social movements and political organisations. Once he succeeded in this, his authority in turn suppressed the memory of his past complicity with the wartime autocratic regime, at least among his fellows and followers. When he passed away in 1980 at the age of eighty-two, quite a few journals of law dedicated special issues to his memory, but none of them frankly mentioned his works in the early 1940s. Very little has been written, either by himself or by others, about his life during the years of complicity with the wartime regime and his life during the years immediately after the war.

The unique life of HIWARANO attracted several commentators, who commonly reviewed his life and works out of an ethical interest in social responsibilities of intellectuals in the wartime situation. Hence, only the first of HIWARANO's two conversions was highlighted; with that conversion, he betrayed, so the commentators criticised, not only himself, the prominent Marxist theorist HIWARANO, but also the roles that the commentators expected Marxist intellectuals to have played in pre-war years in criticising and resisting Japan's imperial autocracy. In their views, HIWARANO's works in the second period of his life scarcely deserved a serious examination; it needs to be referred to only in order to ascertain how contradictory the ideology he presented in the second period was to that of the first period. The reviewers found only one clue that might possibly interpret his first conversion: his discussions about moral solidarity of rural communities. HIWARANO insisted in the second period that communal solidarity was one of the moral principles upon which the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere should be based. He continued to intensively study Chinese society during his years at the Institute of the Pacific and argued that both Japanese and Chinese rural communities were integrated upon a similar kind of familial or fraternal solidarity that should be the common moral basis for Japan's project of constructing the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. Some commentators found that, in his early works as a Marxist scholar, he had argued for the Germanic tradition of law in Europe as a better model to be applied to Japanese society; that tradition comprised the communal title of land in contrast to the Roman tradition comprising the private title. HIWARANO was, so the reviewers concluded,
among those left-wing intellectuals who converted from Marxism to Japanese or Oriental communalism. Thus, even if the reviewers tried to probe into Hirano’s works in the second period, they only referred to his works on China (Nagao 1984, 1985; Ishida, T. 1984; Ogura 1989; Akisada 1996). Because of the implicit assumption that they shared, the reviewers commonly failed to examine Hirano’s works in the second period of his life as a whole. My interest in Hirano is primarily focused on his positive approach to anthropology, which he made while carrying out his project at the Institute of the Pacific. In order to examine this aspect of his project, it is indispensable to make an entirely different approach to Hirano than that of the reviewers. Moral implications of the whole trajectory of his life, comprising two times of conversion, are a matter of secondary concern in this paper. First, it is necessary to analytically separate the second period of his life from other periods and to examine what he academically conducted through his affiliation with the Institute of the Pacific.

Hirano’s project on the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere

With those preparatory considerations, I can now proceed to an examination of Hirano’s works that had to do with anthropology. As noted before, he joined the Institute of the Pacific in 1939. What is conspicuous with the works he conducted at the institute is that from the beginning he appears to have had a well articulated programme for his project and attempted to reiterate it even until the last months of the war when it was undoubtedly apparent to informed people, including himself, that Japan had no other choice than to surrender to the Allied Powers. In 1940 he made two trips to the South, first to Hainan Island and then to Japanese Micronesia, the Philippines, and Celebes in Dutch Indonesia. He was accompanied by Kenji Kiyono on the second trip. At the beginning of the next year, and soon after Japan started the war against the USA and the Allied Powers, Hirano together with Kiyono published a book that, according to the epigraph, was supposed to be the report of their joint fieldtrip to the South (Hirano and Kiyono 1942). It was the first book he published after he joined the institute. In his part of the book, Hirano presented his ideas on a variety of topics that altogether constituted a sort of general outline of the whole works that he was to conduct in the following years at the institute. In the consecutive years until 1945, he published three separate books (1943d, 1944b, 1945b), each containing freshly written papers as well as those papers already published elsewhere. The last of those books, in which he presented his grand ideology of Great Asianism most comprehensively, was released in June 1945. It means that he publicised his ideological complicity with the imperial regime in a most conclusive form only two months before Japan surrendered. In two other books, he elaborated his arguments on ethnic government (or policy) in more detail, but he eventually gave no substantial change to the ideas he had presented in the first book. This is why I noted that from the beginning he had a well-articulated programme for his project at the institute.

According to this programme, Hirano’s ultimate purpose was to provide the autocratic imperial regime with scientific endorsement for the regime’s project of constructing the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. Hirano interpreted the project in terms of the following tasks (the numbers are added):
1) Japan shall be the leading super-power to the whole Co-Prosperity Sphere;
2) The nations and ethnicities in the Pacific region shall be induced to positively co-operate with Japan in the construction of the Co-Prosperity Sphere;
3) The Co-Prosperity Sphere shall establish a broad and self-sufficient regional economy;
4) The natural resources in the Western colonies that the American and British imperialism has wilfully left neglected shall be exploited;
5) Any attempts of international invasion made by the USA and Britain shall be responded with the allied military defence of member nations;
6) The nations and ethnicities that have been exploited by the USA, Britain and other [Western] powers shall be liberated;
7) The nations and ethnicities within the Co-Prosperity Sphere shall develop trade relations with one another;
8) The fraternal nations and ethnicities neighbouring with each other in the Co-Prosperity Sphere shall be united spiritually and culturally, through good-will friendship relations; and
9) Thus the nations and ethnicities in the Co-Prosperity Sphere shall attain the development of the whole of East Asia. (HIRANO’s ‘Introduction’, HIRANO and KYONO 1942: 1)

Those issues can be further grouped into the following three agendas. In order to construct the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere (task 9),

A) Culturally and spiritually, Japan has to unite the supposed member nations through a unique, communal and fraternal solidarity (tasks 1, 2 and 8).
B) Militarily, Japan and the member nations have to communally defend themselves against, and liberate themselves from, the imperial invasion and domination by the Western countries, and the USA and Britain in particular (tasks 5 and 6).
C) Economically, Japan and member states have to develop a self-sufficient regional economy through exploitation of so far intact natural resources and organising internal trade (tasks 3, 4 and 7).

In theory, those agendas should be equally pursued throughout the supposed Co-Prosperity Sphere, but were further ramified by another factor, the regional division of the Co-Prosperity Sphere. HIRANO adopted the then commonly accepted idea to conceive the Co-Prosperity Sphere in terms of two sub-divisions: the so-called Japan-Manchuria-China Block in the north and the Southern Co-Prosperity Sphere in the south, i.e. the tropical area comprising Thailand and the Western colonies in Southeast Asia and the Pacific. The former was supposed to constitute the core of the whole Co-Prosperity Sphere under the auspices of Japan. In respect to the latter, HIRANO shared the stereotypical conception of the tropical South: the natural environments in the South are so fecund that tropical peoples have failed to advance towards civilisation but stayed in a low level of social and cultural evolution. HIRANO thought it necessary for them to make a huge spiritual advancement by their own endeavour if they were to be accepted into the Co-Prosperity Sphere as independent member nations. Otherwise, they should only be induced to willingly co-operate with Japan on the construction of the Co-Prosperity Sphere (task 2). Hence, agenda A was not so much concerned with the Southern Co-Prosperity Sphere as with the northern block of Japan, Manchuria and China. On the contrary, agenda B, particularly tasks 4 and 7, were more concerned with the South. Agenda C was also a matter of the South.
Great Asianism on the North

Hirano approached the northern part of the Co-Prosperity Sphere in respect to agenda A and only speculated about the grand philosophy of Japan’s project. He tried to legitimise Japan’s policy of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere by elaborating his argument for what he called Dai-ajia-shugi (大アジア主義) or Great Asianism. By the Great Asianism he meant a category of political philosophy that advocated for a democratic alliance of East Asian peoples, particularly the Japanese and Chinese. His conception of the Great Asianism was based on a conceptual construction of the ideological genealogy from Nobuhiro Sato (佐藤信潤) of the early nineteenth century, through Tōkichi Tarui (樽井藤吉) and Kentarō Ōtani (大井憲太郎), both of the middle Meiji Era, to the contemporary ideologues, including himself, who advocated for the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. He presented an outline of this idea of Great Asianism in the first book he published after he was affiliated to the institute (Hirano and Kiyono 1942: 13-30). He then elaborated it in the last book he published during the war (1945b). He interpreted that Sun Zhong-shan (孫中山), the leader of the 1911 revolution that overthrew the Qing dynasty, advocated the same Great Asianism and attempted to attain Chinese revolution through an alliance of the Chinese and Japanese people (Hirano and Kiyono 1942: 24, 173-9, 224-5; Hirano 1945b: 1-135). This interpretation later aroused great anger from Yoshimi Takeuchi (竹内好), a prominent scholar on Chinese literature, who criticised Hirano as deforming Sun Zhong-shan’s philosophy (1993).

As another effort of arguing for the project of Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, Hirano tried to place that project on a sound moral base common to Oriental societies, and he found it in a familial and/or fraternal solidarity integrating rural communities. Although he mentioned rural communities in Java and the Philippines (Hirano 1943c: 174-83; 1944b: 21-5), he primarily analysed the fraternal integration of rural communities in China as an empirical endorsement of his argument (1945b).

Indirect rule on the South: Ethno-Politik and anthropology

In contrast to China, he expected Southeast Asia to be an abundant source of vital resources, but the local peoples were not partners with whom Japan should jointly construct the Co-Prosperity Sphere. As already noted above, Hirano represented tropical peoples in terms of innate inability to advance towards civilisation; they should at best be guided to voluntarily devote themselves to the victory of Japan. The most pertinent approach to them should be what he called minzoku-seiji (民族政治, ethnic government or policy), which in later years he rephrased in more authoritarian terms as minzoku-shidō (民族指導, ethnic instruction). Hirano’s conclusion on the Japanese policy for the South was the ethnic government of indirect rule, a form of domination which he thought should be based on anthropology and what he called ‘ethno-politics.’

When Hirano started his project at the Institute of the Pacific, Japanese military forces were still fighting with Chiang Kai-shek’s Government (and the Communists) in China, but the largest military target had shifted from that government itself to the several routes of international aid supporting that government. It was for the sake of blocking those routes that Japan advanced its military front towards south, first to Guangdong, then to Hainan Island.
ANTHROPOLOGY AND THE WARTIME SITUATION OF THE 1930s AND 1940s

(1939) and to the northern part of French Indo-China (1940). Concomitantly, the USA, Britain and Dutch Indonesia began to sanction Japan with a broad range of economic embargos, in response to which Japan further intensified its military expansionism towards the whole area of the supposed Southern Co-Prosperity Sphere. Therefore, in reference to the South, agendas B and C, particularly tasks 3, 4, 5 and 6, were closely related to each other.

In order to formulate the Japanese policy for the South, HIRANO heavily relied upon two realms of scientific research, which he indicated in German (as well as in Japanese) as Geo-Politik and Ethno-Politik. Probably agenda B was too specialised a matter for HIRANO to try an original formulation. Instead, the Geo-Politik provided HIRANO with a framework and vocabulary in terms of which he identified the areas of military and strategic importance, where he then concentrated intensive investigations. He learned from Haushofer’s geopolitical outlook on the Pacific (1942) that was published in the same year as HIRANO’s first book was. As mentioned above, soon after he joined the institute, he made two trips to the South: from January to February 1941, he travelled Xiamen, Guangdong and Hainan Island in South China. He then made another trip in May and June 1941, this time with KIYONO, and visited Palau in the Japanese territory in Micronesia, South Mindanao in the Philippines, and Celebes in Dutch Indonesia. He interpreted the two routes of his trip as cross-cutting the strategic line that connected Manila, Hong Kong and Singapore, a line demarcating the Asian area dominated by the Western powers of the USA, Britain and Dutch Indonesia (HIRANO and KIYONO 1942: 33-43 et al.). By the first trip, HIRANO traced the route along which the Japanese military forces had advanced to North Indo-China, where HIRANO had once been. By the second trip, he made a hasty survey of the Western colonies that were to be occupied by the Japanese military forces within half a year. When he made the second trip, informed people like him could probably foresee a development of Japan’s war towards Southeast Asia in a near future. HIRANO might have simply shared a commonsensical view on the war, but his knowledge of Haushofer’s (1942) geo-politics enabled him to recapitulate the commonsensical view in a well-articulated perspective, in which he situated his future projects at the Institute of the Pacific.

HIRANO’s trips to the South, as well as his former trip to China, gave him occasions of directly experiencing local situations – climatic, environmental, material, economic, social, political, religious and whatsoever – of the visited areas (HIRANO’s part of HIRANO and KIYONO 1942: 33-214). It is inferred that he learned through those experiences the importance for Japanese, who might have to do with local peoples in foreign lands, to know the local situations in concrete terms. He tried to formulate an area of research that he thought indispensable for making a practical approach to the local situations in the Co-Prosperity Sphere and coined the word Ethno-Politik.

The objectives of the current volume is to deepen our recognition of those peoples with whom the future policies of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere should be concerned and, on the basis of such recognition, to make the policies scientific. [...] Since seiji (政治, government or policies) always have to be directed at a particular minzoku (people, nation or ethnicity), we can add the term minzoku to seiji-gaku (political science) and conceptualise minzoku-seiji-gaku (民族政治學) or Ethno-Politik. We [the authors] think, it is the time to establish Ethno-Politik as well as Geo-Politik; this is why our book is titled ‘Ethno-Politik.’ (HIRANO and KIYONO 1942: 2-3)
He dedicated a chapter in the book to the topic of minzoku-seiji (ethnic government or policy), in which he presented his idea on anthropology (then called minzoku-gaku or ethnology) and Ethno-Politik in more detail.

What we mean by ethnic government is a basic consideration for the policies of how Japan can get together the peoples (or nations) inhabiting in the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere and guide those native peoples to voluntarily wish to be active members of the Co-Prosperity Sphere. [...] In order to construct [Japan as] a highly defensible state and to construct a self-sufficient economic block, there are important issues to be solved concerning the exploitation of indispensable natural resources, economic and trade issues, etc. At the same time, it is the local native peoples that work for resource exploitation, production and transportation. If we fail to recognise the significance of their culture, life style and customs, and if we don’t know how to mobilise those local peoples, then we shall fail in resource exploitation, too. Moreover, the government of East Asia for the sake of the East Asian peoples shall finally be in the hands of those native peoples themselves. Therefore, the ethnic government [...] shall be paid more attention than before, and we need to establish it firmly, [...] without which the true Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere cannot be constructed (ibid.: 217-8).

The peoples [in the Co-Prosperity Sphere] are extremely various and complicated in their race, culture and polity, so that we shall adopt the policies that are fully customised to the actual situations of those peoples [...]. Ethnology and sociology, which shall be in charge of observing those people’s contemporary situations, investigating their unique cultures, and recognising their history, traditions, folk customs and social organisations, shall now inspire themselves and, in collaboration with each other and with human geography, provide pertinent data for constructing our ethnic policies. Moreover, those disciplines should positively propose a guideline for the construction of our ethnic policies (ibid.: 220).

Although he mentioned sociology as well as ethnology in this citation, he elaborated his discussion about ethnology in more detail and, mentioning a rising interest in practical ethnology in Australia (the source of this information was SUGIURA, see below), he wrote:

Now at the present point of time, the political philosophy, including those cultural policies, shall be constructed on the basis of ethnology. Then we can for the first time have scientific ethno-politics (ibid.: 220).

The formulation of concrete policies for each particular people [...] should be conducted separately from an axiomatic study of principles and final objectives of government [...]. Concrete policy planning shall be conducted in close collaboration with Angewandte Ethnologie (applied ethnology), which in turn should be fully informative of the folk culture and life customs of the peoples (ibid.: 222).

While ethnic-politics is imagined as a comprehensive scientific approach to the minzoku seiji (ethnic government or policy), anthropology as ‘applied ethnology’ is expected to be a scientific medium for articulating ethnic government of indirect rule with the cultural conditions of the ruled peoples. Almost everywhere in his discussion of ethnic government, HIRANO mentioned a broad variety of topics of applied ethnology (1943d, 1944b, 1944c). A comprehensive understanding of the local peoples under Japanese rule – their social
structure, customs, economic life, religious conceptions, hygienic and medical conditions, etc. – is necessary, according to which specific policies should be formulated to placate, administer and mobilise them. He even mentioned every detail of how Japanese should approach local peoples: how local peoples were different in their characters and customs (1942: 62-91; 1994b: 93-102), how Japanese could maintain authority over local peoples (1943d: 42-3), how to control local people’s rebellion through a judicial system (1944b: 76-87), how to court primitive people’s favour through gift-giving (1944b: 164-8; 1944c), etc. To develop cultural, medical and technical devices to assist Japanese in their adaptation to the tropical environments of the South was another important task he expected from ethnology and other sciences (HIRANO and KIYONO 1942: 49-50). He apparently assigned applied ethnology the task of providing detailed technical advices, whereas the philosophy of ethnic government was considered a matter of ethnic-politics.

**HIRANO’S project for his own publications**

As noted above, HIRANO thought that the most pertinent approach to the peoples in the South should be ethnic government or ethnic instruction. In his argument for the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, he categorically denounced the Western imperial domination of Asia and the Pacific. Nevertheless, he found a model for Japan’s approach to Southeast Asia in the Dutch colonial administration of Indonesia. According to his summary, the Dutch colonial government thoroughly controlled Indonesian peoples through a system of indirect rule, consisting of a couple of strategic policies: to maintain the absolute authority of Dutch colonial officers over any native peoples; to appoint native chiefs and let them control their subjects in accordance to the native system of law and order; and to thoroughly restrict external intervention into native affairs as far as native peoples are effectively controlled by the appointed native chiefs. The first policy was reiterated by constructing a caste-like distance between the Dutch officers and the native chiefs, and also by severe punishment of native revolts by the use of military forces. The third policy consisted of such measures as a thorough neglect of providing natives with facilities of high education, a restriction of forcing natives to speak Dutch, and discouraging economic development of native peoples. Comparing it to the French policy of assimilation in Indo-China and the American cultural policy of the Philippines, he found the Dutch style of indirect rule the most recommendable for the coming rule of Indonesia by Japan. Hence he described the administrative system of Dutch Indonesia in detail (HIRANO and KIYONO 1942: 88-116). The book in which he presented this idea of ethnic government on Southeast Asia was released in February 1942. He victoriously gave the date of finishing his introduction to the book as the 8th of December 1941, the day on which Japan’s naval air force attacked Pearl Harbor (ibid.: 3). Japanese military forces invaded Western colonies in Southeast Asia during the period of the two dates. It is fairly inferred that he should have surely arrived at the idea before the Japanese military forces took charge of governing Western colonies in Southeast Asia.

In his consecutive publications, HIRANO recurrently addressed the Dutch colonial administration of Indonesia (HIRANO 1943d: 22-65, 137-214; 1944b: 54-75). Though he expanded his reference to Dutch sources of colonial policies in his later publications and even mentioned a Dutch scholar who advocated a pro-independence policy, he always
WARTIME JAPANESE ANTHROPOLOGY IN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

returned to his original idea of indirect rule, presented in 1942, which he thought the Dutch colonial administration reiterated in an ideal form. He then interpreted the policy of the Japanese military governments in Indonesia as conforming to his idea. Ironically, he was getting more conservative as the political situations of the South changed drastically. From his point of view, the peoples of the Philippines were entirely premature to have an independent nation-state (Hirano 1942). Even though the Philippines gained nominal independence in 1943, he did not change his recognition of the Philippines and interpreted its independence as solely due to the generosity granted by the Emperor (Hirano 1944b: 46-8).

Symbolic of the tendency that Hirano was getting behind the times is his reference to the Old-Custom Research Committee that the Japanese military government of Java created. He mentioned the membership of the committee, the majority of which consisted of most influential Indonesian political and religious leaders. He interpreted the role of the committee solely in terms of the academic research of old customs that should be conducted for the sake of the Japanese military administration (1943d: 198). In reality, the committee was not created for academic research, but as a political body in the process of tactical inter-plays between the Indonesian leaders and the Japanese military government. By this body, the military government expected to control the Indonesian leaders who sought full independence of the whole of Indonesia as early as possible (Waseda University 1959: 403-5). Hirano's conservatism is also indicative of the fact that the Japanese military authorities in Indonesia, and probably in other areas, were far better informed of the volatile situations of peoples under their rule, and therefore more plastic in designing their policy of administration, than uninformed scholars staying in distant Japan. It may be argued that, to that extent, the Japanese military authorities in the South were more realistic than conservative ideologues like Hirano in revising their programme for the war efforts. The rise of nationalism under Japanese military rule in Indonesia, as well as in Brunei, can be understood in this perspective (see Hussainmiya in this volume).

Within the framework of indirect rule, Hirano made approaches to more practical issues concerning ethnic government. The most practical objective for which Japan militarily occupied Western colonies in Southeast Asia was to secure abundant sources of vital natural resources. Exploitation of those resources should at best be conducted with voluntary cooperation of the local peoples, who should be governed and mobilised effectively. As already noted above in reference to his idea of ethno-politics, Hirano thought that Japanese organisations and individuals should be well informed of the actual situations of local peoples in concrete terms. From this perspective, he extensively organised academic research on Southeast Asia and the Pacific; he himself published numerous articles and volumes on related topics; and he contributed to the publication of numerous books as a general editor.

In his own publications on ethnic-politics for the Southern Co-Prospertiy Sphere, Hirano addressed a broad variety of topics, among which were those issues directly related to the military government of the occupied areas: the plural social structure, adat law and customs, the judicial system of Islam, judicial concerns of security and order, as well as the colonial history and the colonial administrative system, of Dutch Indonesia; economic restructuring of Indonesia under the Japanese rule; and policies of resource exploitation and trades in the South (1943d, 1944b). Moreover, he even ventured to discuss anthropological topics such as:
the ethnic characters of major *minzoku* (peoples) in Indonesia in their industrial and political lives (1944b: 93-102); a theoretical survey of primitive economy and subsistence, conducted from an evolutionary perspective (1943d: 215-45; 1944b: 121-96); various forms of beliefs in the sun and heaven in Southeast Asia and China as a possible bridge for guiding peoples of those areas to the worship of the flag of the Rising Sun and to the spirits represented by the flag (1943d: 95-114). His interest in primitive economy was combined with another interest in taxation and labour recruitment in the areas of primitive economy (1943d: 246-58).

Hirano, while discussing those ethno-political topics, never failed to pay attention to the Japanese scientists who had been and were conducting field research, and the scientific institutes established by Japanese agents in the South. He emphasised the necessity of comprehensive and systematic field research on the South and listed research topics such as: geology of petroleum and mining, chemical technology, tropical agriculture, botanical and zoological studies of tropical environments, water supply and hydroelectricity, geography, medical science and Japanese adaptability, and especially ethnology for ethnic government (Hirano and Kyono 1942: 45, 49, 52-3, 75-7; Hirano 1943b: 3; 1943d: 78-85, 289-312; 1944b: 103-20). Hirano himself never went to the South again after the war began. The Institute of the Pacific organised no projects of its own for overseas field research. But, it does not mean that Hirano and the institute were indifferent to field research. When the Navy dispatched an expedition to New Guinea, the institute co-operated with the Navy in recruiting scholars (Hirano 1943a: 3). Seiichi Izumi joined the expedition (see below), but his biographical chronology indicates that he was commissioned the task of research by the Institute of the Pacific (Izumi 1972).

**Hirano’s project for the publications of the Institute of the Pacific**

On the other hand, Hirano was quite industrial in disseminating knowledge about the South in relation to Japan’s war efforts. The Institute of the Pacific itself published the journal *Taiheiyō* (太平洋, The Pacific) and books; the institute also had numerous books published by commercial publishers under the editorship of the institute. Hirano’s contribution to those publications as a general editor is ascertained either by his contribution of introductions to them or by the colophons having his name. Among the publications edited by Hirano are found the following books:

*French Indo-China: Government and economy,* edited by the Institute of the Pacific, October 1940. A general sourcebook with emphasis on government, industry, trade and immigrant Chinese. This volume was broadly accepted and the seventh printing was issued within two years after the initial release.

*South Sea Islands: Its [sic] geography and its resources,* edited by the Institute of the Pacific, December 1940. A collection of academic papers on miscellaneous topics of natural sciences, each authored by a specialist. The physical anthropologist Kotondo Hasebe (長谷部言人) contributed a chapter on the physics of the Para-Micronesian Islands.

*Great South Seas: Its [sic] culture and its soil,* edited by the Institute of the Pacific, May 1941. Also a collection of academic papers on miscellaneous topics, each authored by a specialist. The anthropologists Ken’ichi Sugiuira contributed an essay on colonial administration.
**Nature and peoples of the Philippines**, edited by the Institute of the Pacific, June 1942. A sourcebook on natural geography, peoples and cultures, economy, and political status. Each chapter is authored by an identifiable person. When this volume was issued, the Philippines had already been under Japan’s military rule. Tadao KANO, Tomokazu MIYOSHI (三吉朋十), Ichirō YAWATA and Kenji KIYONO contributed chapters on biology, dominant peoples and primitive cultures.

**New Guinea: Peoples and natural environments**, edited by the Institute of the Pacific, May 1943. Of twenty-three chapters, only four were contributed by Japanese, including KIYONO on the ethnography of West New Guinea. The rest were all translations of Dutch sources.

Kenji KIYONO, *The Pacific ethnology*, edited by the Institute of the Pacific, May 1943. An ethnographic overview of Southeast Asia and the Pacific, written in the old style characteristic of colonial anthropology. Although this volume was published as authored by KIYONO, it was a summary compilation based on a German sourcebook. Soon after this book was published, a reviewer seriously doubted KIYONO’s academic morality (KOJIMA 1943).

**The Solomon Islands and adjacent islands: Geography and peoples**, edited by the Institute of the Pacific, August 1943. A collection of papers on natural geography, ethnology, ethnography, religion and culture change, covering a broad area comprising the Solomons, New Hebrides, New Guinea, and some parts of Polynesia. HIRANO in his introduction admitted that this volume was planned as the military forefront had extended to the Solomons (HIRANO 1943b: 5). When this volume was published, battles were still fought in the area. Kenji KIYONO contributed a chapter on Melanesian ethnography and geography and another on the New Guinean ethnography, SUGIURA on the natives of the Solomons, and Michio AOYAMA (青山道夫) on the customary law of the Trobriands. HIRANO himself wrote a long chapter on Melanesian primitive society and economy (HIRANO 1943b). The volume contains three translated chapters of R. C. Thurnwald, H. I. Hogbin and M. Mead on Bougainville, the Ontong Java and Samoa, respectively.

Kenji KIYONO, *Sumatran studies*, edited by the Institute of the Pacific, August 1943. Only one among the three parts of this volume was KIYONO’s work. The other two parts consisted of ethnography on major peoples in Sumatra, all translated anthologies of Western sources.


**New Caledonia and adjacent islands**, edited by the Institute of the Pacific, May 1944. An encyclopaedic sourcebook on the New Hebrides, the Torres Strait Islands, Uvea and Futuna, in addition to New Caledonia. Although those islands were on the other side of the forefront of Japan’s Navy, HIRANO explains that the area deserves scientific studies because of their geo-political importance (HIRANO 1944a). Kenji KIYONO contributed a chapter on ethnography of New Caledonia and the Royalty Islands. The majority of chapters were authored by ‘Research Department, Institute of the Pacific,’ i.e. actually by anonymous writers.

**The Pacific Region: Peoples and cultures**, vol. 1, edited by the Institute of the Pacific, May 1944. A collection of academic papers, each authored by a specialist. As anthropological essays, Tadashi ŌI (大井正) contributed a chapter on ‘The Islam among primitive peoples in Indonesia,’ Nobuhiro MATSUMOTO (松本信廣) on ‘The origin of the Annamese,’ Tadao KANO on ‘The Yami of Botel Tobago and flying fish,’ and Hisakatsu HIRAKATA on ‘The Palauans in their legends and ruins.’ This volume may be seen as edited in a way entirely free from practical considerations of academic knowledge.

**For those who volunteer for service in the South**, edited by the Institute of the Pacific, June 1944. A small sized book providing practical know-how to adapt to the environments in the South, particularly to the tropical climates, diseases and native peoples.
Edward H. Man, *The Nicobar Islands and their people*, edited and translated by the Institute of the Pacific, September 1944. Hirano’s introduction emphasises the geo-political importance of the Nicobar and Andaman Islands, mentioning the symbolic implications of the Andamanese penal colony for the Indian independence movement. Moreover, he details what is expected of ethnology in the context of military approach to primitive peoples like the inhabitants of the Nicobars and the Andamans (Hirano 1944c).

Seiichi Fujihara, *The New Hebrides Islands*, edited by the Institute of the Pacific, November 1944. Hirano in his introduction to this volume emphasised the geo-political importance of the New Hebrides Islands, foresaw that they could be a Japanese military base in a near future, and explained that this volume was meant to be a military topography, although not fully complete (Hirano 1944b).

Seiichi Izumi and Makoto Suzuki (鈴木誠), *Peoples in West New Guinea*, edited by the Institute of the Pacific, November 1944. Ethnography based on the authors’ field research. They joined the Naval expedition to West New Guinea (see below).

Hiroshi Kobayashi (小林宏志) and Bin Hattori (服部敏), *Hygienic conditions in West New Guinea*, edited by the Institute of the Pacific, February 1945. The authors joined the same Naval expedition as Izumi and Suzuki did. This book was written as a practical guide for the emigrants, containing information on local hygienic conditions, endemic diseases, climates, food and the necessary goods to be carried.

Sadao Mitumori (三森定男), *Burma and Shan: Peoples and natural environments*, edited by the Institute of the Pacific, February 1945. In his introduction, Hirano mentioned the three main routes connecting Burma and Yunnan, all running through the area addressed in this volume (Hirano 1945a). When he wrote the introduction in June 1944, the Japanese Army was still fighting in the area.

**Hirano as a producer of ethno-politics and anthropology**

The list of publications is in itself impressive. The volumes edited as collections of academic papers are all voluminous, consisting of original works. On the other hand, the majority of the sourcebooks on particular areas were hastily produced and may be doubted for their academic level and practical usefulness. Probably the quality of the information provided in those sourcebooks was mixed and remained to be of a kind of military topography at best. The information on local society, economy and culture in particular was mostly extracted from published Western sources, and inevitably had to do with past affairs. The sourcebooks could not provide the kind of information that was concerned with the on-going affairs in each area, with which the Japanese agents, military and civil, should negotiate. In this respect, Hirano and the Institute of the Pacific could not be compared to the Mantetsu Research Department in China. In terms of timing, most sourcebooks were published too late to be actually used by military people on site. Some of them were released even after Japanese troops had already retreated from the areas. But, some of them were concerned with the areas where Japanese military forces could not afford to reach. Thus those volumes emphatically attest Hirano’s endeavour to foresee or follow the geographical development of the war in Southeast Asia and the Pacific, and publish sourcebooks on the areas that turned out to be of crucial geo-political significance for Japan’s military operations. His attention to the practical value of anthropology and related sciences is well represented in the publication of manuals for tropical life, too.

Very little is known about the internal organisation of the Institute of the Pacific. It does
not appear to have had a large body of staff members. Kenji Kiyono was a regular associate of the institute; he was a close partner of Hirano in the latter’s project, particularly in respect to ethnographic information. Perhaps Hirano alone was the regular member of the institute in charge of his project. Several sourcebooks in the list contain anonymously authored chapters. Most chapters in the sourcebooks were based on information from Western sources, which had to be translated into Japanese. It is inferred that Hirano had a large workforce of anonymous writers and translators behind the project. If it was actually the case, Hirano was competent in managing the project of publishing those volumes.

Moreover, the project of publishing those sourcebooks on strategic areas was coupled with his ethno-political speculation on military and colonial administration, and further with his ideology of Great Asianism. In the abilities of allocating intensive area studies within the grand perspective of the Co-Prosperity Sphere, foreseeing or following the geographical development of military operations, designing a set of relevant research on each targeted area, and organising researchers and authors, no anthropologists could have rivalled Hirano. An episode emphatically illustrates how Hirano was different from professional anthropologists. The last wartime issue, released in August 1945, of the journal of the Society of Ethnology contained the record of a round-table discussion, held in September 1944. In that discussion, Masao Oka, the head of the Administrative Department at the Ethnic Research Institute, regretfully stated: ‘If anthropologists had realised the importance of studying the Kachin, then [our] ethnic studies could have sufficiently served in the current war in North Burma’ (Oka in Uno et al. 1945: 27). In contrast, Hirano had published Mrusumori’s sourcebook on the Shan and the Kachin, even as late as February 1945, and explained in the introduction he contributed to the book, dated in June 1944, the strategic importance of the areas inhabited by the two peoples for Japanese military operations (Hirano 1945a).

In summary, Hirano worked as a competent and productive agent of scientific and ideological mobilisation. He recognised the wartime situation of Japan and the alleged Co-Prosperity Sphere in a broad, comprehensive perspective, in which he identified the expected roles of sciences, including anthropology. Standing in this perspective, he designed a well-articulated project of scientific research, although mostly based on literary works. He made an active approach to anthropology and mobilised several anthropologists within his project. He himself obtained and utilised anthropological knowledge in his ideological speculation. In his post-war years, he did not maintain relations with those anthropologists with whom he had worked together in his wartime project. He never showed interest in anthropology in his post-war academic and political activities. Among the several commentators who reviewed his life and works, no one eventually paid serious attention to his project at the Institute of the Pacific as a whole, and his relations with anthropology and anthropologists in particular. No one, including himself, considered him anthropologist, either. Nevertheless, in respect to an important part of his wartime works, he can be identified as a practical anthropologist. As was the case with his contemporary anthropologists such as Masao Oka (see below), he fell in complicity with the autocratic regime in his endeavour to utilise his academic ability for the sake of the regime’s war efforts. Compared with them, he had much better and sounder comprehension of the relevance of anthropological knowledge – its potential utility and
expected roles — in the wartime situation in concrete terms. He had a full recognition of the
situation in which he found himself located, and he fully recognised, if not fully controlled,
his complicitous project conducted in that situation.\(^4\)

V. Expansion of anthropology from within

The Ethnic Research Institute

As mentioned in a preceding sub-section, the government established the Ethnic Research
Institute as a national institute at the metropolitan centre in 1943. Only a few anthropologists
paid attention to and described it in their post-war writings. The projects of field research
organised by the institute used to be interpreted as anthropological research. The only source
of information on the academic works of the institute was the \textit{Japanese journal of ethnology},
the official journal of the Japanese Society of Ethnology, which was restructured into the
only civil satellite organisation of the institute at the time when the institute was established.\(^5\)
Those circumstantial conditions altogether have made Japanese anthropologists think that the
Ethnic Research Institute was a national institute primarily dedicated to anthropology, or
‘ethnology’ in the vocabulary of those years, and that the institute was a successful
attainment, even though made in the notorious wartime situation, for the discipline that had
scarcely received official support of the government (cf. NAKANE 1984). This understanding
is commonly held even by present-day Japanese anthropologists.\(^6\)

But this understanding is apparently a conceptual construction made by anthropologists
in the post-war social and intellectual situation of Japan. I would argue that the institute was
not an institute dedicated to ‘anthropology’ in the sense of the term as used in post-war
years. However, I would argue that the institute was an institute of ‘anthropology’ in the
sense of the term in which the institute attempted to re-define the discipline. The issue here is
an attempt to change the definition of anthropology made within anthropology in the
wartime situation of the scientific mobilisation, and another attempt made in the years just
after the war to ‘purify’ anthropology from wartime ‘contaminations,’ so to speak, and
rehabilitate the discipline.

Present-day Japanese anthropologists commonly believe, partly due to OKA’s own
writings (1979: 481-9), that he led the lobbying activities of anthropologists who approached
the government authorities for the sake of the establishment of an institute for ethnic or
ethnological research. In order to understand OKA’s activities for the institute, a brief survey
of his life in the 1930s is suggestive.

In 1929, after a conflict, personal and also philosophical, with YANAGITA, he left Japan for
Austria to conduct research on the archaic Japanese culture at Vienna University. He re-
constructed the historical composition of the archaic Japanese culture by synthesising materials
of Japanese folklore, comprising what YANAGITA and his followers had collected, in a
diffusionist framework of the Viennese style.

But, no sooner than he completed the study into his Ph.D. dissertation in 1933, he
considered his style of ethnological study already obsolete. Then, he travelled through Central
Europe and the Balkans several times within a brief period (Biographical note in OKA 1979). It
is inferred that the rapidly growing turbulences that German Nazi’s expansionism created in
those areas attracted Oka's attention.

In 1935, he returned to Japan and attended the meeting of folklorists celebrating Yanagita's sixtieth anniversary. On that occasion he read a paper on the history of Volkskunde (folklore studies) in Germany, in which he detailed the concept of minzoku (民族, Volk, nation, people and/or ethnicity) and the present-oriented social studies as elaborated by German folklorists (Oka 1935).

He then went back to Europe and witnessed how the German troop made a triumphal entry into Vienna and annexed Austria. He was appointed the head of the newly established Institute of Japanese Studies at Vienna University. Every two weeks he commuted to Budapest to give a lecture on Japanese culture in a university there, which gave him ample occasions to travel Central Europe and the Balkans. Eiichirō Ishida also lived in Vienna in those years and studied ethnology at Vienna University, from where Pater W. Schmidt and Pater W. Koppers, the leading diffusionist ethnologists from whom Ishida most hoped to learn, had exiled themselves.

In 1940, Oka returned to Japan because of the war in Europe. Oka made an appearance in the May issue of the opinion journal Kaizo in a dialogue with Hitoshi Ashida (芦田均), in which he impressed the reader as a well informed expert on the ethnic situation of the Balkans (Ashida and Oka 1941). Soon after that, he contributed a brief article to the August issue of the same journal and appealed for the necessity of establishing research institutes based on a new idea of minzoku kenkyū (民族研究, ethnic research) (Oka 1941). In the paper of 1935, he mentioned a prospect of changes in German Volkskunde due to the Nazi government, but he primarily talked about the development of German Volkskunde up to the 1930s. In the article of 1941, he explained about the new Faculty of Foreign Studies (Auslands wissenschaftliche Fakultät) at Berlin University, in which the old University of Foreign Languages and the new University of Political Science, established by the Nazi government, had been combined. Although he depicted minzoku-gaku (ethnology) as the basic element of minzoku kenkyū (ethnic research), he emphatically argued that the old-styled ethnology (characterised as a historicist study of primitive, non-literate peoples) must be reformed into the new present-oriented ethnic research that should investigate actual minzoku (nations, peoples), including political minzoku (nations) of high culture, through local languages. He also interpreted the present-oriented ethnic research as consisting of the trinity of political science, the reformed ethnology and foreign language studies. He found the afore-mentioned Faculty of Foreign Studies at Berlin University as the ideal case that reiterated the new ethnic research. As conclusion, he pointed out the urgent necessity of establishing research institutes for that kind of ethnic research in Japan where there had been none (Oka 1941).

As a practical step for the establishment of the institute, the government set up a planning committee for the institute in May 1941. The military authorities (the Army and the Navy), major ministries (of education and others), two Imperial Universities (at Tokyo and Kyoto) and the Research Institute of the Total War Abilities were represented in the committee. Yasuma Takata, who was to be appointed the director-general of the institute, joined the committee from Kyoto Imperial University. Oka, Furuno, Yawata, Egami and Iwamura, who were to be employed by the institute, were also appointed as members of the committee. Moreover, the Asianist ideologue Sūmei Ōkawa was one of the members. The chronological order suggests that Oka should have been appointed membership when he contributed the afore-mentioned article to Kaizo. The actual plan was discussed and negotiated among those agents, in which process Oka's appeal should be incorporated. Among the documents produced in this process, there was a report about research institutions of minzoku kenkyū in major Western countries, the Soviet Union and China, which comprehensively enumerated, from country to country, the academic institutions (faculties in universities, research institutes and museums) related to what the reporter considered the minzoku kenkyū (Kikaku-in 1941). The list is compiled basically according to the same idea as Oka's; Germany comes atop of the report and, after a
list of ethnological museums, the Faculty of Foreign Studies at Berlin University is explained in detail. The section on Germany has a sub-section on the institutions for foreign languages. The report listed up not only institutions for ethnology and foreign languages, but also institutes of Oriental, Islamic and colonial studies. This document endorses the leading role of Oka’s initiative. It also implies that, in the context of the planning committee, the minzoku kenkyū was constructed as broad, inter-disciplinary studies of foreign minzoku (peoples or nations), comparable to the area studies that developed in post-war years.

Just after the institute was created, Oka published a paper, ‘The agenda of contemporary ethnology’ (1943). In that paper, he presented the same idea of ethnic research as that of his 1941 article, and appealed for self-innovation of anthropology in order to become the basis of ethnic policies for administering the minzoku (peoples or nations) under Japanese authority.

The content of what the institute considered ‘ethnic research’ can be reconstructed from several series of lectures that the institute offered to the general public. For instance, a series of ‘Lectures on ethnic research’ were given for three days in Osaka in 1945. On the first day, introductory lectures were given under the title of ‘Ethnology and ethno-politics’; the lectures were on the ethnic theory, introductory ethnology, social ethnology, linguistic ethnology, ethnic (or national) movements (their history and theory), colonial policy, and the problems of ethnic (or national) culture. On the second and third days, fourteen lectures were given for minzoku (peoples or nations) of different areas in Asia (Minzoku kenkyū 3(1/2): 42 1945). The topics of those lectures altogether should be supposed to represent the ethnic research as conceptualised by the institute. It is also noted that at that point of time in 1945 minzoku kenkyū (ethnic research) and minzoku-gaku (ethnology) were used interchangeably.

In August 1945, the Society of Ethnology changed the Japanese title of its journal from Minzoku-gaku kenkyū (literally meaning ‘Ethnological studies’; the English title used to be the Japanese journal of ethnology) to Minzoku kenkyū (meaning ‘Ethnic research’) (Minzoku kenkyū 3(1/2): 42 1945).

It may be doubted to what extent Oka’s proposal – the conceptual construction of ethnic research by the Ethnic Research Institute – and the decision of the Society of Ethnology to change the title of its journal were supported by Japanese anthropologists in general. But at least it is reasonable to conclude that the leading authorities among Japanese anthropologists of those years attempted to give a new, enlarged definition to anthropology and innovate their discipline.

Oka’s initiative can be examined in two respects: what he refused and what he tried to create. In terms of the former, Oka was innovative in criticising and abandoning the type of anthropology that had specifically been created and maintained in the colonial situation. As for the latter point, if his proposal is interpreted as an approach to a particular people as they are living their contemporary life in a broader social context, Oka’s proposal was also innovative in the sense that the necessity of such an approach was seriously recognised among post-structural anthropologists of Western metropolitan centres as late as in the 1980s.

*The wartime construction of practical anthropology from without and within*  
As already noted before, no anthropologists have ever paid any attention to Hirano’s
contribution to anthropology. His wartime works were simply abandoned as trash as other numerous, hastily prepared wartime publications on Southeast Asia and the Pacific were. But, if the wartime works of anthropologists deserve a serious consideration, Hirano’s works do for the same reason. In reality, there are several parallels of grave importance between them. First of all, Hirano and Oka expressed their project of innovating anthropology by similar key concepts, ethno-politics and ethnic studies, respectively. Their ideas commonly based on a combination of seiji (政治, politics, policy or government) and anthropology; policies should be based on anthropological knowledge, and anthropology has to be innovated so that it can contribute to policy-making. As a specialist of anthropology, Oka specified in relevant terms how anthropology should be innovated; he proposed to abandon the premises of colonial anthropology, and adopt a new approach to understand minzoku (peoples or nations) as they are imbedded in the contemporary social (colonial or imperial or global) situation. With the combination of seiji and anthropology, the two scholars emphasised that anthropologists should contribute to Japan’s policy towards other peoples in Asia and the Pacific. Thus, they commonly recognised, although in the vocabulary of the wartime situation, the worldliness of anthropology and anthropologists.

The parallels between them cease to exist beyond those points. Hirano had another key concept of geo-politics and a grand ideology of his own, Great Asianism. Even if Oka stated his support of the regime’s policy of the Co-Prosperity Sphere, Oka did not present an understanding of it in an articulate way. He did not indicate in concrete terms what kinds of contribution anthropology as a whole should make in the political climate of the years; he did not even specify how anthropological information could be useful; he simply requested anthropologists to provide information on the contemporary states of the people they studied. The Ethnic Research Institute had numerous projects of field research, for the sake of which staff members busily travelled around. Nevertheless, the impression cannot be erased that the institute had no overall plan to systematically integrate the numerous research projects.

Specialists of anthropology could have passively responded to the call of mobilisation made by external agents. They could have taken advantage of what they were provided with — occupations, topics of research and occasions for fieldwork — for the sake of themselves and anthropology. But, lacking a broader geo-political perspective, they had no ability to interpret their actions towards the circumstantial agents in articulate language. If one looks for practical anthropology reiterated during those wartime years in Japan, it is best represented, not by the writings of Oka or Sugiura, but by those of Hirano. One can obtain a scheme of practical anthropology, although phrased in the vocabulary of complicity with the imperial regime’s policy, in Hirano’s three books (Hirano and Kiyono 1942; Hirano 1943d, 1944b), and in the chapters on ethnic government and ethno-politics, in particular.

Changing methods and epistemology in anthropology

The wartime situation naturally had great impacts on anthropology. In former times, anthropology (in the sense used in this volume, i.e. ethnology or socio-cultural anthropology) had acquired only a few positions in universities, all in the colonies. In the metropolitan centre, it was only in the years when anthropology was getting involved in the wartime situation that Ken’ichi Sugiura was associated with the Institute of Anthropology at the
Imperial University of Tokyo. The institute had been the organisational centre of general anthropology in Japan, in which SugiuRA was unique in the sense that he had neither interests in physical anthropology nor in archaeology. The Japanese Society of Ethnology had been the only institutional basis for ethnology. Now in the wartime situation, anthropology was offered several positions in newly established research institutions. Many of those who were recruited by these institutions were assigned literary works, but there were also many who went out to battlefields or occupied areas and conducted fieldwork. Since field survey had already had a long history in Japanese anthropology, this was a new trend only in a limited sense; if we confine our sight to the ethnologists in the metropolitan centre, it was in the wartime situation that fieldwork became a regular part of anthropological studies. The wartime situation pressed anthropologists to pay attention, no matter how indirectly, to an empirical approach to their research subjects and also to practical applicability of their findings.

To probe into the discipline beyond those external changes, however, it is difficult to identify substantial changes in the methods and epistemology of anthropology. This difficulty is partly due to the brief span of the wartime situation. If an anthropological project starts with fieldwork and arrives at a goal (if not the final goal) with the publication of an ethnographic report, very few Japanese anthropologists completed this cycle within the span of the wartime situation. Ken'ichi SugiuRA, for instance, was one of the rare Japanese anthropologists who discussed, in the 1940s, the colonial administration from the point of view of practical anthropology. While extensively referring to works of Western anthropologists on colonial administration in the Pacific (1941), he analysed certain aspects of the Japanese administration of the Micronesian Mandate, the data of which he himself had collected through fieldwork when the area was still in a peaceful situation (1941, 1942, 1944). SugiuRA's discussion shared the same limitation with his contemporaries in the West; both accepted the domination of the colonies by their countries as an unquestionable framework, within which they tried to specify technically appropriate ways to adjust administrative policies to the political, social and cultural conditions of the native peoples. SugiuRA, as well as his contemporaries in the West, emphasised the importance of accurate anthropological knowledge on the native cultures as the basis of colonial administration. In this context, they inevitably supported the idea of indirect rule. SugiuRA's discussion of practical anthropology could better be interpreted as belonging to colonial anthropology, even though he was pressed by the wartime situation and elaborated his ideas on practical anthropology.

On the other hand, most anthropologists who went abroad to do fieldwork in the wartime situation had not enough time to have their ethnographic reports published before the war ended. During the period of several years after the war, they were entirely deprived of the occasion of overseas field research and instead published ethnographic reports based on the fieldwork they had conducted during the war. In the same post-war years, the social circumstances of science were generally critical of any individuals and organisations that could be suspected of participating in, or contributing to, the war efforts of the totalitarian autocracy. When publishing their ethnographic works, most anthropologists deliberately eliminated any remarks that might indicate their positive engagements in the scientific
mobilisation. Anthropological works published in the post-war years, even if they were based on fieldwork conducted in the wartime situation, must be seen as products of the post-war situation.

A survey of wartime anthropology in Japan revealed two works that exceptionally completed the above-mentioned cycle of anthropological works within the wartime situation, Eiichirō Ishida’s work on Sakhalin and Seiichi Izumi’s on (former) Dutch West New Guinea. Ishida was sent to South Sakhalin by the Imperial Academy in one of the Academy’s wartime projects in 1941. He collected ethnographic data on native peoples, and published an ethnographic record on the people then known as the Orokko (currently called Uilta). It was his first experience of collecting data in the field; he worked on that for two weeks, too brief a period even according to the standard understanding of fieldwork held by Japanese anthropologists in those years. His ethnographic report was published in an academic journal issued by the Institute of Ethnology, a daughter organisation of the Japanese Society of Ethnology (Ishida 1941). In that paper, he presented his understanding of the people, particularly of the clan and marriage systems, in a comprehensive way. He compiled literary data on the history of the people, tried to re-construct the history of clans, and mentioned the modern history through which the people became dominated by Russia and Japan. But the contemporary state of the people under the Japanese rule was not among his topics to be investigated systematically (for further detail on Ishida’s work, see Sasaki in this volume). When he was recruited by the Imperial Academy, he had just returned from Vienna, where he studied ethnology in the Viennese diffusionist style. Ishida was not ready to explain the state of the people whom he visited, the Orokko, in the context of wartime Sakhalin or even in that of colonial administration. His approach may be interpreted in terms of colonial anthropology in that he maintained the premise of salvaging primitive cultural traits of the people in an abstract way of extracting the people from the broader social context.

Seiichi Izumi (泉鉄一) was recruited by the Navy and joined the Kaigun New Guinea (Shigen) Chōsa-tai (海軍ニューギニア 調査隊, the Navy’s New Guinean [Resource] Expedition), in which he and an assistant formed the ethnological party. In collaboration with other parties, the two conducted a survey in the area of Geelvink Bay in West New Guinea in 1943. They spent eighty-four days altogether for the survey. Izumi wrote two reports of the survey during the war: a confidential report submitted to the Navy and a volume in the series on the South Pacific published by the Institute of the Pacific. Although he relied on the same body of information, he wrote the two in different styles. In the Navy’s report, which was authored by Izumi and his assistant Inao Nakayama (中山稻雄), the conclusion was placed at the opening section, an allocation apparently reflecting the mission of the expedition. The conclusion consisted of four points of attention for the military government: an estimation of the number of the male and female local people who could possibly be mobilised as a labour force; Koreans and Chinese as a better source of labour force than Javanese and Philippinos to be imported to New Guinea (because of the different adaptabilities of those peoples to the climate of New Guinea); action plans to be taken for the effective suppression of the millennial cult then rapidly expanding in the investigated area; and the urgent necessity of anthropological research to be conducted on the local peoples
under the military administration and the necessity to establish a system of training administrative officers on the entirely different cultures, customs and temperaments of the peoples under the Japanese rule (Kaigun New Guinea Chōsa-tai 1944).

We have already had a look at the other report, as listed among the publications of the Institute of the Pacific that were edited by Hirano. In that book, Izumi wrote all chapters except for one that Makoto Suzuki wrote on physical anthropology (Izumi and Suzuki 1944). The introduction tells that the book is intended to be a practical guide for ‘those people who will work there, having contact with the natives’ in West New Guinea, so that, ‘no matter how anthropologically interesting it may be, any information that is useless from the practical point of view shall be omitted’. [...] In order to attain the self-supply of food on the spot, it is first necessary to have a thorough understanding of the natives’ who were to be ‘mobilised as labourers’ (ibid: i-ii). By the ‘self-supply of food’ the authors meant the self-subsistence to be attained by the Japanese, military and civil, who were to settle the surveyed area. Izumi apparently wrote the chapters of the book out of the same strong motivation as he wrote the report to the Navy. In both writings, he tried to answer the questions finely focused on the sheer necessities of the occupation troops that had to pacify and administer the local peoples, while subsisting without sufficient supply of food from distant Japan.

In the book of the Institute of the Pacific, however, Izumi presented comprehensive ethnographic information covering almost all aspects of the local cultures. The book is far more informative on the local peoples and their life than the Navy’s report. However, the latter presents more detailed information on two topics: the inter-tribal relations of hostility and the pacification of the millennial cult. The book details the tribal societies but does not mention the inter-tribal hostility. It describes the conspicuous features of the millennial cult but only the Navy’s report describes how the naval administration tried to suppress the cult by dispatching a troop that was eventually driven into a retreat by a strong reaction of armed cult members (Izumi and Suzuki 1944: 88-134; Kaigun New Guinea Chōsa-tai 1944: 26-34).

The stated policy on the selection of contents – ‘any information unless from the practical point of view shall be omitted’ – appears to have been more strictly applied to the Navy’s report than to the book. The writing style of the book appears to be more academic in the sense that the information is presented in a more distanced way from the finely focused practical purposes. This apparently academic character may reflect the character of the medium, of which the book was a part. Even if the authors might have intended to write the book as a practical guide for a particular kind of people, the Institute of the Pacific published the book to be bought and read by the general public. The authors eventually adjusted the contents and the writing style of the book to this character of the medium. It might otherwise be the Institute of the Pacific, or the editor of the book Yoshitarō Hirano, to whom the authors paid acknowledgement in the introduction, that lead the authors to control the contents of the book in an academic way.

Even if Izumi’s description in the book appears to be presented in an academic way, the framework of his ethnographic work is markedly different from those of his contemporaries. Ishida, for instance, conducted his work on Sakhalin within the tradition of colonial, salvage anthropology. Izumi was entirely free from the premises of salvage anthropology. He, for instance, wrote his ethnography on West New Guinea in the present tense, but it was not a
hypothesised ethnographic present; he described what he observed at the time of his fieldwork. In this respect, his work on West New Guinea appears to be more suited to the wartime situation, but the characteristic apparent in this work was also found in his ethnographic work on the seaside villages in Cheju Island, Korea (Izumi 1938), a work that he conducted rather in a colonial situation than in a wartime situation. It can be concluded for him that the styles of fieldwork and writing, both internalised from the inception of his academic life as an anthropologist, were suitably responsive to a request for contributions made to anthropologists in the wartime situation as part of the scientific mobilisation.

VI. The maintained and recovered continuity in anthropology before and after the wartime situation

*Anthropology in the post-war order*

As the war ended and the General Headquarters (GHQ) of the Allied Powers took charge of governing Japan, almost all aspects of social situation for intellectuals and scholars drastically changed. The leading philosophy of the government changed from the imperial autocracy to democracy, although it was not immediately clear whether the imperial monarchism could be maintained. Imperialist expansionism should be abandoned and some kind of internationalism had to be imagined. The relentless suppression of anti-autocratic thoughts, as well as the official propagation of imperial nationalism, was abolished and the convicts and suspects of violating the Law of the Maintenance of Public Peace were released from jails. The freedom of thought was, at least in theory, officially guaranteed. For a limited number of intellectuals, those changes meant not only liberation from the suppressive autocracy, but also a freedom of pursuing their ideals in academic and socio-political activities. But, those many intellectuals, who had managed to survive the wartime situation by stating tenkō and giving some kind of co-operation to the autocratic regime, had to make another effort of survival in the post-war situation, because any kind of collaboration with the imperial autocracy during the war could now turn out to be a stigma. They were pressed by the new situation to make another tenkō.

For anthropology, which had benefited greatly from wartime measures of the scientific mobilisation, the new situation meant a variety of hardship. Anthropology lost almost everything vital for its existence as an academic discipline. The research institutes that had been established as part of the scientific mobilisation and that had provided anthropologists with occupations and chances of research, either desk work at home or fieldwork in battlefields abroad, were altogether abolished. Among the only three universities that had some seats for ethnology or related disciplines, two, both in the colonies, were also closed. The only institutional bases left to ethnology – that part of anthropology primarily concerned with socio-cultural interests – were the Department of Anthropology at the University of Tokyo, which was no longer an imperial university, and the Society of Ethnology. The Anthropology Department, however, was not prepared to function effectively as an institutional basis for ethnology. The department maintained the old name of *dozokugaku* (literally meaning the studies of vulgar customs) for ethnology, a fact symbolic of the peripheral position assigned to ethnology in that department. It was also indicative of a
Anthropology and the Wartime Situation of the 1930s and 1940s

Peripheral position of the department in ethnology in Japan in those years. Ken'ichi Sugiyura was once employed as a temporal assistant at the department before he joined the Ethnic Research Institute, and he retained that position soon after the war ended. Hence, he alone worked as an intermediary between the department and other ethnologists. Then, it was the Society of Ethnology that remained the unique basis for (socio-cultural) anthropologists upon which to conduct whatever kinds of academic activity. The general deprivation of institutional bases meant another general deprivation of the occasion of field research to be conducted in foreign lands. In the post-war situation, anthropologists (or ethnologists) had to make a renewed start of their academic works by relying upon the society, which was only able to provide a facility for publication, the official journal. The society began to publish the Japanese Journal of Ethnology as early as in September 1946.

Anthropology was not only deprived of what it had benefited before, but was now to be blamed for the complicity with the wartime autocracy. The complicity of anthropology with that regime was not simply self-evident at the time when the post-war era started. Anthropology was getting stigmatised as the post-war orders in the society at large, and those of academic people in particular, were negotiated and eventually established. Ironically, anthropology was discovered as war criminal in the same process in which Hirano recovered authority among a circle of left-wing movements.

The initial post-war situation for intellectuals

As the post-war era started under the authority of the General Headquarters, many measures that characterised the wartime regime were suspended. In a situation in which everything appeared undetermined, intellectuals started to imagine a variety of new orders to be reiterated in co-operation to, or in competition with, the GHQ and the Japanese government that was under the control of the GHQ. Among various attempts of organising intellectuals and scholars, the earliest and the most influential was the Minshushugi Kagakusha Kyōkai (民主主義科学研究者協会, also called briefly as Minka; Democratic Scientists' Society), which was created in January 1946 on the initiative of those intellectuals who had met with violent sanctions by the wartime autocracy. The Minka made a successful start with about two hundred members, and rapidly increased the membership, which recorded the maximum of two thousand in 1949 and 1950 in its history. Initially a broad variety of prominent scholars, from communists to liberalists and even nationalists, joined it. As the name of the society suggests, it sought to re-construct scientific research and education in Japan according to the principle of democracy. When it came to the task of specifying action plans for reiterating the principle, one of the most serious issues was that of reviewing the wartime regime's policy of scientific mobilisation. The re-constructed scientific research and education in the new age should not repeat the fault of the wartime scientific mobilisation. Then, the same criticism should be directed to those intellectuals and scholars who joined, collaborated with, or benefited from, the mobilisation. In this context, the activities of Hirano and his fellows were meaningful.

Hirano in the post-war situation

As the war ended, Yūsuke Tsurumi, a prominent politician who had always been close to the
core political elite, voluntarily resigned from the director-general of the Institute of the Pacific and handed a large part of the remaining property, estates and facilities of the institute to Hirano. Saburō Kugai (陸井三郎), who worked under Hirano as a research assistant at the institute, wrote in a commemoration of Hirano that even during the war Hirano utilised the rights and authority assigned to him in the institute and assisted quite a few people who had to endure needy circumstances because of having been sanctioned by the special police. He provided them with temporary sources of income by assigning them such works as translating Western publications into Japanese, writing articles for journals, and the like. Thus, Hirano endeavoured to maintain a network of intellectuals and scholars, most of whom had been fellows or supporters of Hirano when he was leading the Kōza-ha school. Towards the end of the war, Hirano also organised a regular seminar on China, by which, according to Kugai, Hirano was preparing for the post-war days that were apparently a near future. Once the war ended and a large share of the property of the institute was transferred to Hirano, the institute became a shelter where quite a few of his friends used to visit on returning from places of refuge, from abroad or from jails. Then the institute became a meeting place for them, where a lot of institutes and organisations were planned and developed into reiteration. Thus, according to Kugai, the institute functioned as a catalyst for lots of important research institutes and academic organisations, and Hirano actively participated as a leader in those constructive processes. It was the case with the Chūgoku Kenkyūjo (中國研究所, the Institute for Chinese Studies), for instance, which was created as early as in January 1946 with Hirano as the first director-general. The Minka was also one of the organisations that developed from the gatherings of intellectuals at the institute (Kugai 1980). Other sources suggest that he was quite influential in the process of re-structuring such major research institutes as the East Asia Institute (TsuGe 1979).

Yasoji Kazahaya (風早八十二), one of his closest friends, wrote in a brief commemoration of Hirano at his death that those people of Hirano’s network who gathered together at the institute initially attempted to ascertain their mutual confidence as comrades that they had once shared; they first recognised their common faults of having betrayed their classes and collaborated with the imperial regime during the wartime years; then, they jointly determined to devote themselves for the democratic revolution of Japan. No one dared to openly criticise Hirano, and Hirano himself neither uttered any words of apology, nor participated in the discussion, but simply sat together with others, silently. Kazahaya, who had witnessed Hirano’s vehement contribution to the autocratic regime during the war, thought that Hirano should have made in his heart a firm decision of devotion for the sake of their joint efforts, a fact which, so remarked Kazahaya, was sufficiently attested by his self-sacrificial practice that characterised Hirano’s life throughout the post-war years until his death (Kazahaya 1981a, 1981b).

**Hirano’s strategy of survival and anthropology**

The first issues of the Minshushugi kagaku (民主主義科学, Democratic science), the journal of the Minka, reported that the Minka demanded the government to purge ‘war-responsible’ scholars from public service. The Minka also decided to make a list of the war-responsible scholars on its own initiative. The second extra general meeting, held in June 1946, passed
the resolution approving the proposed list of the war-responsible who should be purged from any responsible positions and prohibited from any ‘cultural’ activities. The list, published in number four of the journal, enumerated ninety persons altogether, divided in five groups: political science, economics, history and geography, philosophy and ideology, and agriculture. Yasuma TAKATA was included in the list for the group of economists comprising eighteen persons, and Masao OKA and Eizō KOYAMA in the group of sixteen historians and geographers. It is inferred that the three were blamed for their common affiliation to the Ethnic Research Institute. Interestingly, the list did not include the name of Yoshitaro HIRANO. The same issue of the journal contained a report from the History Division of Minka, which announced that the Division decided to continue investigation of the war-responsible and augment the list of the identified scholars ‘in geography and ethnology’ (Minshushugi kagaku 4: 93, 1946).

Those decisions from Minka suggest that HIRANO successfully escaped being blamed as a ‘war-responsible’ scholar, whereas ethnology, as well as geography, was identified as a discipline most suspected of being ‘war-responsible,’ at least in the context of Minka in the middle of 1946. The process in which HIRANO recovered authority in the Minka further suggests how ethnology was stigmatised as a ‘war-responsible’ discipline. Even though a lot of early members of the Minka wrote that HIRANO was one of the most active organisers of the association, he was not elected in the initial executive body of fifty-seven members (Minshushugi kagaku 1(1): 91, 1946). One of the leading members wrote in retrospect that, even though the investigation and accusation of the academic ‘war criminals’ were proposed as an urgent issue in the early years of the Minka, the issue ended without either being thoroughly discussed or arriving at a final conclusion. He suggested a commonly held fear as an important factor that a thorough discussion of the issue should have blamed some leading members of the association (TSUGE 1979: 14-5; 1980: 71-4).

As noted before, very little was written about HIRANO’s struggle for survival in the post-war years, but it is inferred that, while initially he remained an authority behind the scenes, he had his authority openly recognised in the Minka until the middle of 1947. He contributed an article concerning the general principle of cultural policy to the Minka journal, which appeared as the opening article in issue six of the journal (HIRANO 1947). It was based on his report that he, as a representative of the Minka, made at the first general meeting of Zen-Nihon Minshusugi Bunka Kaigi (全日本民主主義文化委員会, All Japan Democratic Cultural Congress) held in July 1947.

Thus, HIRANO started his post-war life as a prominent leader within a Marxist wing, on which KAZAHAYA wrote: notwithstanding his wartime ‘faults,’ he devoted himself straightforwardly throughout his life for the reiteration of the ideal that he had constructed by his pre-war attainments as a Marxist social scientist (KAZAHAYA 1981a). This was apparently a construction of HIRANO’s life that KAZAHAYA represented retrospectively at the time of HIRANO’s death. This was also the design of life that HIRANO himself attempted to reiterate by living his own life. He tried to construct his post-war life in such a way as to graft it to his life in the 1920s and 1930s when he was a prominent Marxist social scientist. As a political leader, he was always in line with the Japanese Communist Party as he was in the 1930s. Among his numerous articles and books published in his post-war years were a lot of reprints
of his publications in the 1920s and 1930s, which remained to be the source of his academic authority until his death.

On the other hand, HIRANO never made any sort of approach to anthropology in his post-war life; he never addressed ethno-political topics again. On a rare occasion on which he mentioned his conduct during the wartime years, he remarked: ‘One of the two trends that opposed our opinion was the power of the police and the military policy, which suppressed our research. [...] I had no other choice than to break my pen’ (HIRANO 1948: 7). The implication was that his abundant publications during his years at the Institute of the Pacific were what he authored with a ‘broken pen.’ So, he never published reprints of those wartime publications in post-war years. In this construction of his life, anthropology was depicted as having no intrinsic values; it was represented as an intermediary of the unique ‘fault’ that he committed throughout his life. As he denied his life of complicity with the wartime regime, he abandoned anthropology as a scapegoat of disgrace. To the extent that HIRANO appeared a renowned scholar in social sciences in his post-war life, anthropology was stigmatised as the source of his hidden complicity with the wartime autocratic regime.

**Conversion of anthropology and anthropologists**

As far as anthropology in Japan is concerned, continuity is more explicit than differences before and after World War II (see SEKIMOTO in this volume). The phase of anthropology just before the war can be represented by ISHIDA. As previously stated, his field trip to Sakhalin was apparently made in a wartime situation; he was dispatched by the Imperial Academy in one of the Academy’s wartime projects. But, ISHIDA was not well prepared to conduct his research with enough sensitivity to the wartime situation of Sakhalin. He still maintained the premise of salvaging a purely primitive culture there, a characteristic of colonial anthropology. In this sense, he was a contemporary of UTSUSHIKAWA, who conducted research on the genealogical relationships among Taiwanese Aboriginals several years before. In the preface of the report, he mentioned the Musha Incident, the largest Aboriginal rebellion in the history of Japan’s rule of Taiwan. He wrote that, if he had not happened to put off his departure for a day, he should have been killed by revolting aborigines (UTSUSHIKAWA et al. 1935: v). Even though the field survey was conducted in such a volatile situation, the report never paid attention to the actual conditions of the Aboriginals living in that situation.

MABUCHI returned from Celebes and re-started his post-war academic activities with what knowledge he learned from the Dutch academic legacy on Indonesia (MIYAZAKI and NAKAO in this volume). He may be seen as representing the point of departure for post-war anthropology in Japan. MABUCHI, in this post-war situation, was a better match for Lévi-Strauss than for Leach. Both MABUCHI and Lévi-Strauss were sharp analysts of the static structure of symbols, but not of social dynamics. In that sense, they revived that old style of anthropology that was more inclined to salvaging pure ethnic cultures.

The apparent continuity between pre-war and post-war anthropology in Japan was never a natural passage of affairs, but was intentionally created. Anthropology attempted to save itself from the assigned stigma of being a ‘war-responsible’ discipline by strategically grafting itself to the innocent anthropology of the years not yet involved into the wartime scientific mobilisation. Ironically, the strategy adopted by anthropology was a double
conversion, an exact parallel with that of Hirano and other communist intellectuals who survived the changing situations before and after the wartime situation. It was Ishida who attempted to lead anthropology along this line.

I have already described Ishida’s project elsewhere (Shimizu 1999). While most anthropologists kept silent about the moral implications of their collaboration with the wartime situation, Ishida alone presented emphatically what he thought ought to be the moral basis for the new age of anthropology. As previously noted, in the initial post-war years, anthropology was deprived of all institutional bases except for the ethnological society and its journal, the *Japanese journal of ethnology*. The journal began publication in September 1946. It was also in the middle of 1946 that Ishida came back from China. Although he did not write about his life in those days, it is inferred that, since he maintained interests in communism (he published Japanese translation of Engels’ *Anti-Dühring [Herrn Eugen Dührings Umwälzung der Wissenschaft]* in 1948), he should have soon recognised the difficult situation for anthropology and anthropologists, particularly a close friend of his, Oka, in the context of left-wing intellectuals. In December 1948, he was appointed the editor of the journal. He contributed a brief article to the first number issued under his editorship. The English title he gave to the article explicitly indicates what he meant: ‘For the sake of ethnology.’

The investigations ethnologists of our country conducted on peoples of the so-called ‘Greater East Asia’ could perhaps be seen as spearheading the militarist invasion. [...] But, the political power which forced (enabled) them to conduct those investigations and the academic value of the investigations should naturally be distinguished. (Ishida 1948: 85)

At the same time, he categorically refused ethnic movements, ethnic problems and ethnic policies as topics of ethnological research (ibid.: 85). Ishida did not explicitly mention Oka and his arguments for ethnology’s collaboration with Japan’s project of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere (Oka 1943), but he apparently refuted Oka’s arguments one by one. While Oka had emphasised the practical contribution that anthropology, if properly innovated, could make to the broader society in which anthropology was situated, Ishida emphasised the academic value of anthropological research that should most pertinently be recognised in a de-contextualised state. For Oka, collaboration with the contemporary situation was an inevitable factor for the value of anthropology, but Ishida refused the same collaboration as a source of derogation. Through this argument, Ishida tried to save anthropology from the deviation into which Oka and his fellows had driven anthropology.

In the same issue of the journal in which Ishida published his editorial policy, Oka contributed a brief article ‘in response to the editor’s suggestion.’ It was the first article he published after the war. In that article, he argued for historical ethnology, responded to certain criticisms against the culture-historical method of the Viennese school, and emphasised that the present-oriented sociological method alone cannot clarify the minzoku (people or nation), the primary subject of ethnological inquiries (Oka 1948). The implicit messages of this article were that he abandoned his wartime project of innovating anthropology (this was his second tenkō, so to speak) and that he would revert to the culture-
historical ethnology, which he had once abandoned (this was his first tenkō). ISHIDA edited an issue published one year later as a special issue on the ‘Origin of the Japanese people and culture’ (ISHIDA ed. 1949), in which OKA presented a summary of his idea that he had developed into his doctoral dissertation at Vienna University. As noted above, no sooner than he completed the dissertation, he realised that both topic and method were entirely obsolete in the context of Europe in the 1930s. Although his dissertation had been unknown in Japan until he himself presented its essence in this special issue, it had already been renowned among European Japanologists. Thus, it could be a source of academic authority for OKA who was to make a renewed start in post-war years.

Interestingly, SUGIURA also contributed an essay to the first issue edited by ISHIDA (SUGIURA 1948). He wrote the essay in commemoration of F. Boas and B. Malinowski, whose deaths were unknown to Japanese anthropologists until the war ended. He praised Malinowski’s contributions, but he failed to mention Malinowski’s proposal of practical anthropology, which SUGIURA should have studied when he wrote on anthropology and colonial administration during the war.

ISHIDA, OKA and SUGIURA commonly adopted the same strategy by which they liked to deny the characteristics of wartime anthropology and revert to an older set of characteristics in anthropology. In the situation in which anthropology was stigmatised as a ‘war-responsible’ discipline, especially by leading scholars of the Minka, it was imperative for anthropologists to publicise that anthropology was determined to depart from the wartime deviation. ISHIDA took the lead for the sake of anthropology; OKA, SUGIURA and others joined, followed or co-operated with him.

Although ISHIDA chose to de-contextualise wartime anthropological research in order to emphasise its academic value, he was not apolitical altogether. As previously stated, he edited a special issue for the topic of the ‘Origin of the Japanese people and culture,’ in which he tried to show the relevance of anthropology to the scientific interests in the history of the Japanese people; with respect to the origin of the Japanese, OKA’s theory suggested multiple origins and cosmopolitan bases of the Japanese culture; with respect to the origin of the Japanese monarchism, OKA’s and EGAMI’s contributions showed that anthropology was able to challenge the mythical interpretation once authorised by the autocracy. The special issue broadly attracted popular interests, because the issue discussed sensitive topics in the context of the time. ISHIDA also edited a special issue on The chrysanthemum and the sword by Ruth Benedict, by which ISHIDA tried to impress Japanese intellectuals with the superiority of American wartime anthropology (ISHIDA, ed. 1950). Benedict’s book attracted broad popular interests, too. The fact of Japan’s surrender aroused reflexive interests in the characteristics of the Japanese, their society and culture. This post-war situation encouraged social scientists and psychologists to inquire, mostly critically, into the Japanese character. Benedict’s book, soon translated into Japanese (Benedict 1949), contributed greatly to enhance the popularity of anthropology (see Sekimoto in this volume).

It remains to be examined to what extent ISHIDA’s policy was persuasive outside of anthropology. However, his policy to a large extent reflected a common recognition of anthropologists and it surely delimited the direction of the later development of anthropology in Japan. For a long time, Japanese anthropologists pursued static topics such as social and
symbolic structures of particular peoples, their ecological adaptation to natural environments, and the like, all observed and analysed without reference to the broader social context in which the peoples were situated. The situation of anthropological research was also out of anthropologists’ scope, as well. It was as late as the late 1960s that Japanese anthropologists began to seriously question the social effects of anthropological practices; until the late 1980s the term ‘primitive’ remained a key word in anthropological literature; social and economic development began to be a topic of serious study in the late 1980s.

Conclusion

So far I have traced the trajectory of anthropology and anthropologists in Japan in the wartime situation of the 1930s and 1940s and thereafter. Apparently the trajectory contained issues of morality on the side of anthropologists, but I have refrained from giving ethical judgements to the conducts of anthropologists. If their conducts were evaluated only retrospectively from the present point of view at the turn of the century, the judgement could be a political criticism but could not be an ethical judgement. It is easy to point out, from the present-day point of view, the vices of the past wartime situation in which anthropology was involved. It was not so easy for anthropologists who were living in the wartime situation to comprehend the political, intellectual and ethical implications of their circumstances. In order to consider some moral issues involved in the wartime anthropology that I have so far surveyed, an analytical preparation is necessary.

In the years when Japanese anthropologists were not yet involved in the wartime scientific mobilisation, they rarely paid attention to whether their academic representation of the peoples in Japan’s colonies could have practical utilities in other non-academic sectors of society (the only exception was Ken’ich SugiuRA who at the commission of the colonial government investigated the land tenure systems in the Japanese mandate in Micronesia). Since they were preoccupied with the research of primitive or folk cultures, their style of representation may be compared with the Orientalism conceived of as a form of colonial domination (in this case not by Western powers but by Japan, an Oriental power) of the colonised Oriental peoples (Said 1978). If it might have been the case, however, the form of domination that the Japanese anthropologists took charge of was not of a socio-political kind. The colonial domination in the administrative and business sectors appeared to the anthropologists as simply destroying the primitive cultures they sought to study. From the point of view of the administrative and business agents, the ethnographic knowledge provided by anthropologists (either through their deskwork or fieldwork) had few utility values. It is more appropriate to consider the contribution of anthropologists in the pre-war peacetime situation in complementary terms; while Japan dominated its colonies politico-economically and destroyed indigenous cultures thereof, Japanese anthropologists considered it their mission to salvage the vanishing indigenous cultures through their academic research. Although the colonial agents and anthropologists were related with the same peoples in the colonies, the relationships of the two with those peoples, one politico-economically practical and the other academic, were basically disconnected with each other.

It was exactly that type of colonial anthropology, characteristic of the pre-war peacetime
situation, that Oka emphatically urged his fellow anthropologists to abandon. To analyse his proposal in terms of the relationship pattern of colonial anthropology, Oka attempted to connect together the two relationships to the colonised peoples, that of the agents of practical domination and that of anthropologists. The key concept to hinge the two relationships was practical utility. While Oka tried to internally correlate anthropology to the practical agents of domination (in this case the military and government agents in the battlefields), Hirano sought to externally mobilise anthropology and mediate it into the same agents of domination. Both in Oka’s and Hirano’s projects, anthropologists were related to the peoples not only directly through their academic practices (i.e. research and writings), but also indirectly through the domination of the same peoples by the government and military authorities. Moreover, the ultimate power to define the practical utility of anthropological representation was no longer in the hand of anthropologists; the intermediary agents held it. Thus, the introduction of the value of practical utility at the same time reduced the possibility of subjective intervention by which anthropologists could control the practical usage of their academic output.

With this understanding of the structure of the wartime situation in which Japanese anthropologists were related with the peoples they studied, I can now proceed to some ethical issues implicit in their relations with the wartime situation. As I pointed earlier, a retrospective evaluation of the conduct of a person in the past should be combined with a situational analysis of the same conduct. Once a situational analysis is introduced, it expands the perspective of ethical consideration to other related situations. For instance, Japanese anthropologists in the wartime situation in the 1930s and 1940s can be compared with anthropologists in the present-day wartime situations at the turn of the century. Moreover, since the key factor that located Japanese anthropologists in the wartime situation was practical utility, one may expand one’s consideration of ethical issues to those situations in general in which anthropological information is needed for its practical utility, such as projects of economic, social, educational and/or cultural development.

To consider the conditions of ethical judgement in a situational perspective, the issue to be solved first is not the ethical judgment itself but the process in which to attain that judgement. To take account of the Japanese anthropologists who co-operated with the government and military authorities in the wartime situation, the issue to be first addressed is how the anthropologists, who were living that situation, could arrive at the judgement that their practices were to be blamed as constituting complicity with what should be blamed as the military expansionism of the wartime regime. The difficulty of the issue can be understood if one tries to transpose the position of moral judgement to the present-day anthropologists who are required to respond positively to the call of support made by their country at war or to the call of co-operation to a developmental project.

In this respect, the most problematic in the conducts of Oka and his contemporary anthropologists was that they conceded the ability of defining the practical utility of anthropological knowledge to the mobilisation agent like Hirano and to the wartime regime itself. Hirano’s approach to anthropology suggests that anthropologists who conducted academic practices in the wartime situation, even if their conducts ended in complicity with the wartime regime, should have accurately comprehended the reality of the whole wartime
situation and the relationship of their conducts with that situation, to the extent that they could counteract the intermediate agents like Hirano.

Moreover, if anthropologists could have retained some control on their academic practices, their control should be articulated in terms of their relationships with the mobilisation agents, on the one hand, and with the peoples on whom anthropologists were to conduct research and whom the government and military authority were to dominate and govern, on the other. In the wartime situation, as I noted before, Japanese anthropologists were doubly related with their subjects; in their direct relationship, they conducted research on the people, either through literature studies or through fieldwork; and in their indirect, mediated relationship, the knowledge they provided on the people was to be utilised in the policy of the wartime regime on the same people. To proceed further in pursuing ethical issues, the case of the Mantetsu Research Department is suggestive.

I mentioned previously that the Mantetsu Research Department, in its final Comprehensive Research Projects in China, produced reports that connoted criticisms of the war efforts of the regime, which eventually invited a violent suppression by the wartime regime. Although the staff members of the research department were not unitary in their attitudes to the projects, they may be considered highly sophisticated in several senses. First, they recognised through their field research the contradictions between the war purposes of the Japanese autocratic regime, on the one hand, and the worsening economic difficulties in China and Japan that, so they concluded through their fieldwork in China, were caused by the war efforts by the Japanese regime, on the other. Secondly, they were realistic enough to foresee that their report could invite the suppression by the regime. Thirdly, for them ethics were not simply a matter of their academic practices, but a matter of their whole social practices. As previously noted, many of the staff members of the research department had gone through suppression by the wartime regime and survived it by stating tenkō. At least for some of them, the Comprehensive Research Projects constituted another front for their struggle against the wartime regime, although it was a retreated one in the realm of applied science. Instead of directly criticising the policy of the regime, which should have surely caused suppression by the regime, the leading members of the department tried to induce the regime to revise its policy by implicitly pointing out, through their reports of the projects, the inadequacies of the regime’s policy of war. Therefore, the extent to which they would invest their reports with their critical findings concerning the regime’s policy was not a matter of scientific accuracy but a matter of tactical negotiation with the situation.

At least for some leading members of the Mantetsu Research Department, their research and reports were part of their political struggle, so that they were able to discuss, in a debate made in post-war years (Ishidō 1978; Anonymous 1982; Ishidō et al. 1986; Nonomura 1986), whether their control on their research activities was a tactical failure or a strategic failure or both of them. They might have made a tactical failure, so admitted those members who lead the Comprehensive Research Projects, because their reports triggered more severe suppression by the regime than they expected, but the plan of the Comprehensive Projects was strategically right. The Comprehensive Projects, according to some other members who kept negative to the projects, but who were suppressed together with the leading members by the military police, were a strategic failure. The last argument is concerned with what I
consider the fourth aspect of their sophistication. At the time when the Comprehensive Projects were planned, the autocratic regime of Japan had no longer an ability to change their policy of war according to the logic of reason. In such an extremely difficult situation it was strategically wrong to expect to attain a change in the policy of the wartime regime by sending to it a report, implicitly criticising the regime’s policy. Actually, they later realised that the regime had had an accurate recognition of the whole difficulties in China and Japan as caused by the very policy of the regime itself (ISHIDÔ et al. 1986). Although the staff members of the Mantetsu Research Department might have doubly failed in their practices in relation to the wartime regime, I think that, as intellectuals who lived in the wartime situation with a critical stance, they endeavoured well in whatever they should and could do in resisting and/or struggling against the wartime regime. When a political regime carries out a total war, it will fight against any intellectual enemies as seriously as against its military enemies. The experience of the Mantetsu Research Department suggests that, to the extent that the regime is autocratic, those intellectuals and scholars who are critical of the regime’s policy of war will have no other choice than to fight a total war with the regime.

To turn our attention back to anthropology, perhaps the fourth aspect of the sophistication I found among the Mantetsu researchers might be beyond what could actually be expected of Japanese anthropologists who lived in the same wartime situation. The method and theory of anthropology alone could not recognise the wartime situation as comprehensively and realistically as the Marxist theories of those years did. But, the experience of Japanese anthropologists indicates in categorical terms that anthropologists must have a comprehensive recognition of the whole situation in which their research is located and also of the whole situation in which their academic practices are conducted.

Even if anthropologists may have insufficient recognition of those situations, they are equipped with enough methods and theories to find contradictions between the realities of the people they study and the approaches that the external agents of practical domination (or project) make to the same people. This is a factor comparable with what I considered the first aspect of the sophistication found among the Mantetsu researchers. This factor is located between the two relationships that anthropologists have with the people they study. When anthropologists find any serious contradictions between the realities of the people whom they observe through their research and the policies of the external agents that approach the same people, the contradictions should dictate the kinds of anthropological practice. Those contradictions should be the initial and minimum moment for the recognition and consideration of ethical issues for anthropologists. As for the further steps of practice, the choice made by the staff members of the Mantetsu Research Department in the wartime situation of the 1930s and 1940s can be a positive model for anthropologists. The choice of OKA and his contemporary Japanese anthropologists, who appeared to have only taken advantage of the wartime situation for their own interests, without fully recognising the implications of their conduct in relation to the wartime situation, should be a negative model. In order to place one’s position among these and other possible models, each anthropologist should make a decision on his or her attitude to the broader situation, a decision comparable to that apparent in what I considered the second and third aspects of sophistication found in the Mantetsu Research Department.
ANTHROPOLOGY AND THE WARTIME SITUATION OF THE 1930s AND 1940s

Notes

1) The constitution of the Institute of the Pacific was printed on the back cover of each issue of *Taiheiyō* (The Pacific), the monthly journal published by the institute.


3) It was when they visited Palau that they met Hisakatsu HUIKATA, who was later recruited by KIYONO to work for the military government in North Borneo.

4) The first book HIRANO published after he joined the Institute of the Pacific was co-authored by KIYONO (1942). KIYONO expressed his support of Japan’s project of Co-Prosperity Sphere in flattering terms similarly as HIRANO did. But, no reader of the book could fail to find that apparently KIYONO was not realistic enough to grasp the wartime situation and what roles anthropology could be expected to play in that situation, as HIRANO did.

5) The Japanese Society of Ethnology reorganised itself and changed its official name several times during and after World War II. See SHIMIZU 1999.

6) NAKAO (1997, also his chapter in this volume) interprets the institute as an ethnological institute.

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