社会運動と知識の生産：身体、実践と社会の東アジア

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Social Movements and the Production of Knowledge: Body, Practice, and Society in East Asia

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Never doubt that a small group of thoughtful, committed citizens can change the world; indeed, it's the only thing that ever has.

—Margaret Mead

1. Social Movements as Knowledge Producers

There has been a sharp rise in the occurrence of social movements in East Asian countries since the end of the dictatorships in Taiwan and Korea, and the Great Hanshin Earthquake in Japan. These movements comprise various forms of social activism, ranging from environmentalism, indigenous politics, and feminism to democratization and social welfarism, and engage a wide range of cultural practices that may not all be conventionally recognized as political, including ritual, storytelling, artistic performances, and even the conservation of property deemed as “cultural heritage.” Their main confrontations occur in relation to the symbols that shape social meanings and their interpretations. The assorted forms of cultural practices that provide alternative definitions of nature, ethnicity, women, and democracy are necessarily political actions (Alvarez et al. 1998: 7).

In this volume, based on examples from South Korea, Taiwan, and Japan, we propose to interpret social movements as crucial sites for the creation and transmission of knowledge. Of course, we are not the first to take this approach, or to recognize its importance; there has been attention paid of late within the study of social movements in their role in generating knowledge (for example, Casas-Cortes et al. 2008; Clammer 2000; Eder 1985; Eyerman and Jamison 1991; Kurzman 2008). Indeed, the interested parties view knowledge and its production process as occupying the very heart of contemporary social movements, and argue that the importance of social movements as contexts in which people acquire new information or skills, refine or revise their beliefs or values, and reinforce or transform their self-identity deserve to be recognized. However, although there is a reasonable body of literature on knowledge production in social movements from a sociological perspective, the field of anthropology has yet to play a prominent role in the theoretical and methodological debates in this area.

The main aim of this volume is to develop the study of social movements from an anthropological viewpoint, through an exploration of the forms, mediums, and dynamics of knowledge. It also sheds light on how the contents of knowledge depend on the constraints
constituted by the attributes of its mediums, and on the effects of the constraints determined by those with power over activists’ activities. Although the authors of this volume diverge in the theories and methods they employ, we all share the aim of demonstrating the processes by which meanings, identities, and emotions are socially produced through the repertoires of cultural practices in social movements. Another point we have in common is our agreement that this analysis of knowledge production should be reflexively applied to our anthropological inquiry itself.

The ethnographic cases treated in this volume include some movements that have long been objects of anthropological inquiry without being treated as proper social movements. These cases, like many other cultural movements, tend to display no direct confrontation with the state or its agents, seemingly consisting of transient personal cultural practices. Yet, these movements are still protests in the sense that, by assigning their own meanings to various phenomena, they challenge the domination or oppression embedded in social institutions and their practices. By establishing a dialogue between means of anthropological inquiry and social movement studies, this volume argues, we can create a new perspective on modern society’s protests against the contradictions generated by state control or capitalist expansion.

In order to provide some context for this, I shall begin by briefly reviewing the recent theoretical emphasis on knowledge within the field of social movement research. I shall then turn to the concept of knowledge in our approach to social movements. After that, I shall consider three areas that the authors of this volume identify as important in the analysis of knowledge production in social movements: embodied knowledge, political practice, and the relation between knowledge and society. Finally, I shall touch upon the problem of how ethnographers should interact with activists in the course of knowledge production.

2. Knowledge in Social Movement Research

In the 1980s, the contemporary social movements that had appeared after 1960 such as the feminist movement, the environmental movement, and the peace movement, came to be referred to as “new social movements” to mark the fact that they were fundamentally different in nature from older movements, like the labor movement. The difference lay in the fact that, although these new campaigns highlighted problems with the state policy and the administration system just like older ones did, they also sought to realize an alternative community based on their own original values and lifestyle, rather than demanding social justice and democratic behavior from governmental institutions. According to one of the foremost theorists in this area, Alberto Melucci (1989), there are four structural features of the new social movements. First, information takes a central role as resource. Second, participation in collective action constitutes an aim in itself, rather than being a means to achieve a political aim. Third, lifestyle practice and social reform are considered as complementary to one another, meaning that everyday life becomes regarded as an aspect of social activism. Finally, there is a recognition that many of the problems facing contemporary society are global in nature. Other scholars have suggested alternative features: the core members of these movements belong to the new middle class or the educated, non-privileged
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class; their activities seek change in cultural rather than political domains; and their aim is to claim an identity rather than to make material demands (Scott 1990). However, these features roughly correspond to those proposed by Melucci.

The new social movement theory has met with certain criticisms. One is that many contemporary social movements cannot be considered as either “old” or “new” in the sense defined by new social movement scholars (Edelman 1999: 16). Scholars in this field are also criticized for not paying enough attention to particular situations in considering how activists form their identities or interests, and rather merely projecting their own interpretations on them (Jasper 1997). Moreover, new social movement scholars tend to emphasize the cultural dimension of movements as autonomous, and are therefore censured for ignoring the ways in which social movement groups structure themselves, utilize their resources, and change through interaction or negotiation with the state and other political actors (Davis 2002: 9; Faulks 1999: 95).

Yet we could still say that the new social movement theory has made a significant contribution to the study of contemporary social movements. Their recognition of social actors as bearers of multiple identities, and of culture and politics as competing fields, for example, have been crucial (Edelman 1999: 20). As they point out, many contemporary social movements, while maintaining a distance from the state and neoliberal systems of governance, aim at constructing new kinds of social relations and innovative lifestyles. What participants in these movements are seeking is, they argue, to construct an alternative society, and this quest is embedded in the practices of everyday life (Delany 2003: 124).

Particularly important for the purpose of the discussion within this volume is the recognition on the part of the new social movement scholars of the social production of culture, identity, and knowledge as the core feature of contemporary movements—a feature which has been largely overlooked by those social movement studies dominated by structural or macro-political approaches.

In the mid-1980s, an approach called the framing perspective began to gain popularity among social movement scholars in the US (for example, Gamson 1975; Snow et al. 1986; Tarrow 1998). This perspective considers social movements as important agents of collective meaning-making. According to adherents of this perspective, the frame for a collective action emerges through an interactive process of interpretation in which a group defines the meaning of certain events, social situations, or aspects of living as problematic, seeks to identify the issue or issues responsible, and thus reinterprets them. This frame helps mobilize people toward activity, and legitimate this activity (Snow et al. 1986). Though this perspective has surely advanced the study of social movements, it also suffers from some shortcomings. For example, adherents do not inquire into the historical processes in which frames emerge, the ways that frames are chosen by activists, or the kinds of interactions frames emerge through. The analysis of social movements requires an analysis of the struggles and the discursive practices that bring about changes in meanings and definitions of problems within a particular group. In describing frames merely as a means of mobilizing people for certain issues, the framing perspective fails to make sense of their role as the central object of struggle within movements. Moreover, the perspective tends to treat the meaning in movements as a manipulable resource. Frames are constitutive aspects of the
agents’ subjectivity, which the agents cannot easily separate themselves from (Steinberg 1999). In other words, framing is not just a matter of cognition in its narrow sense, but also one of embodied knowledge entangled with emotion and identity.

The noteworthy work *Social Movements: A Cognitive Approach*, which deals with the cognitive dimension of social movements, serves as a useful guide for our purposes. Here, the authors Ron Eyerman and Andrew Jamison address the cognitive praxis of social movements, through which they emphasize the creative role of consciousness and cognition in both individual and collective actions (1991: 3). Like the framing perspective, their approach also focuses on the process of knowledge production, but does so in a broader sense. It deals with the ways in which social movements provide spaces within which various types of intellectual innovation take place, including not only “cosmological” innovations but also technical and organizational ones. They then attempt to trace the significance of these innovations for broader social processes. For Eyerman and Jamison, knowledge is the product of a series of social interactions between activists within a movement, between those of different movements, and between activists and their opponents. Another key characteristic of their approach is their placing of social interactions within historically situated political and cultural contexts. Finally, their approach suggests that social movements provide contexts in which everyday knowledge and professional knowledge compete, interact with, and influence each other. Randolph Haluza-Delay criticizes this approach for playing up the cognitive dimensions of human practice in social movements too much, stating that overemphasizing the intentionality of agents implies relying excessively on theoretical logic, instead of the theory of practice (Haluza-Delay 2008: 210). It is indeed true that Eyerman and Jamison’s theory does not fully tackle the contextuality of cognitive practice or the embodied nature of knowledge, which is representative of a general failure to accredit these aspects with their due importance.

In the past two decades, some sociologists have described how collective emotions arising from social movements have become a crucial resource for solidarity or new ways of living. Until quite recently, many sociologists have adhered to implicit behaviorism and thereby regarded emotion not as a serious object of examination, considering it as an ambiguous referent to unobservable internal situations (Calhoun 2001; Emirbayer and Goldberg 2005; Goodwin et al. 2001). They have regarded motivation as something naturally occurring, based on the structuralist assumption that it occurs automatically as an objective byproduct of interest (Goodwin et al. 2001), and therefore all but ignored it. However, it is precisely this emotion that is needed to give rise to all social actions, including political ones, where the motive or goal for action takes the form of a deep emotional commitment (Aminzade and McAdam 2001; Jasper 1998; 2011). Even if we understand the purpose or legitimacy of an action, we do not necessarily seek to carry it out (Goodwin et al. 2000: 72–73). Emotion is an embodied form of intention within the world, so that a change in the subject’s emotions brings about a change in his or her understanding of the world (Crossley 1998: 25). Therefore, in order to inquire into the processes in which new knowledge is produced, we need to investigate collectively generated emotive energy or changes in emotions. Rather than treating the emotions arising from social movements as mere reflections of experience, we must analyze them seriously as social practices related to social relations.
and power, or “embodied thoughts” (Rosaldo 1984: 143) that provide the creative force for new practices.

Thus far, we have seen how the new social movement theory, the framing perspective, the cognitive approach, and the sociology of emotions have dealt with the issue of cognition, identity, and knowledge in social movements. Such studies are overwhelmingly led by sociologists. While the production of knowledge has long been one of the central issues in anthropology, anthropologists have not played a prominent role in the theoretical and methodological debates within this field. Why should this have happened? In the early 1990s, Arturo Escobar, an anthropologist who is almost unique in the fact of his having contributed to the study of social movements, pointed out that there were a number of reasons why anthropology had not properly addressed the issue of collective actions (1992). The first is the boundary lines drawn within the field of academia. Anthropological studies of collective actions were concentrated on those of peasants, the urban poor in the third world, ethnic minorities, and religious sects, leaving the study of other forms of collective action to sociologists, political scientists, and historians (Edelman 2001: 286). These anthropological studies, which successfully demonstrated the political dimensions of culture, were classified in a way that meant they belonged to a totally different theoretical framework from the study of modern social movements (Escobar 1992). The second is, Escobar argues, anthropology’s individualistic approach to practice. Until the mid-1980s, at least in the United States, anthropologists have been absorbed in everyday, rather than organized, protests (Edelman 2001: 286). Thirdly, according to Escobar (1992), the structuralist approaches favored in anthropological inquiry have rendered the investigation of social movements an unlikely choice for researchers. For anthropologists, the study of social movements necessitates self-critique, whereby they are required to reflect on the fieldwork method, ethnographic writing, and political expression (Escobar 1992). Finally, Escobar raised the issue of the decline of collective action. Excluding this last factor, Escobar’s reasons are all applicable in accounting for the present underdevelopment of social movement studies within anthropology, but do not entail that anthropological research in this field is limited in its possibilities or unsuitable. Rather, in our view, they illustrate that an anthropological approach in social movement research is long overdue, and holds great promise. As Escobar (1992: 412) pointed out in the same paper, the relevance of social movement research for anthropology resides in the fact that social movements are principally seen as struggles over meanings as much as over socio-economic conditions. The meaning-making and cultural practices of collective action are the terrain of social movement studies to which anthropological research and analyses can make significant contributions.

In order to make this possibility an actuality, we need to illustrate more concretely how anthropology can analyze the processes of knowledge production in social movements. Here, I propose to begin our anthropological inquiry by asking three closely related questions. What are the bodies of knowledge produced in a social movement? What are the social practices through which they are produced? How do these bodies of knowledge interact with the dominant knowledge? I argue that we can open up a new direction in social movement studies by developing a comparative ethnographic analysis of these questions.
3. The Concept of Knowledge

In the first paragraph of his seminal paper, “An Anthropology of Knowledge,” Fredrik Barth wrote, “I wish to focus on the problem of knowledge—what a person employs to interpret and act on the world. Under this caption I wish to include feelings (attitudes) as well as information, embodied skills and as well as verbal taxonomies and concepts: all the ways of understanding that we use to make up our experienced, grasped reality” (Barth 2002: 1). Although Barth does not state this explicitly, what we call knowledge includes not only those things people embody but also their objectifications, for example, artefacts, rituals, institutions, organizations, actions, technologies, and procedures. An object or object-like entity of one of these kinds surely “provides people with a way to understand major aspects of the world, ways to think and feel about the world, and ways to act on it” (Barth 2002: 4).

Just as Barth did in his paper, we must ask why we should term this knowledge rather than culture, despite the fact that our usage of the two words is similar, and that some might suppose that the label of culture would be more appropriate. Barth (2002: 1) went on to explain that referring to this as knowledge enables us to treat it as something related in distinctive ways to events, actions, and social relations, or something distributed among a specific group. In other words, we can assume that, by calling it knowledge, it becomes regarded as transitory, context-dependent, and constantly changing, being produced or achieved in response to opponents’ and bystanders’ reactions in the context of social movements.

Barth (2002) proposed a framework for analysis with which to explore the comparative ethnography of knowledge. In this proposal, he identified three interconnected facets of knowledge: “a substantive corpus of assertions, a range of media of representation, and a social organization” (Barth 2002: 1). This framework is quite useful and may be applicable to the kinds of knowledge produced in social movements. However, it needs to be modified slightly to be used for the purpose of analysis in our context. Although Barth’s framework deals with the long-term history of knowledge in terms of cumulative generations of reproduction, it does not take account of the possibility of radical transformations in habituated actions or embodied knowledge. His framework pays little attention to creativity, emotional energy, or the dimension of performance, the importance of which we identified in the review of social movement research, partly because he makes much of ritual knowledge in his case studies. In addition, in emphasizing the diverse relations of knowledge between individual and group, Barth did not fully attend to the relations of knowledge between group and outside agencies. Of course, these are not flaws in his framework, but they are aspects which deserve to be developed further, especially in the context of social movements.

The concept of “communities of practice” proposed by Jean Lave and Etienne Wenger proves enormously helpful in patching over these gaps. In Situated Learning: Legitimate Peripheral Participation (1991), they insisted that learning is an aspect of all social activities, and that participation in a social practice should be viewed as a fundamental form of learning. According to Lave and Wenger (1991: 47), “the production, transformation and change in the identities of persons, knowledgeable skill in practice, and communities of practice are
realized in the lived-in world of engagement in everyday activity.” For example, in apprenticeship, a newcomer gradually acquires knowledge as well as the identity of an expert by participating in the community’s practices. The community they refer to is not the community that anthropology and sociology have conventionally dealt with, but “an activity system about which participants share understandings concerning what they are doing and what that means in their lives and for their communities” (Lave and Wenger 1991: 98). It involves a wider range of relations and actions and a greater portion of the world than specific technical knowledge. Therefore, it does not presuppose that the members share interests, viewpoints, or other cultural elements in advance. In short, they view the process of learning as community. What is important for us here is that collective knowledge, often including informal learning curriculums, is accumulated within the community, and that the community is always transforming through social practices, without having clear boundaries or a single center toward which all participants aim.

Following on from this argument, Lave developed with Dorothy Holland an approach to social movements called “history in person” (Holland and Lave 2001). Distinguishing contentious local practice that is directly linked to people’s lives from broader, more enduring struggles, they analyze how local social practice mediates between subjects’ intimate self-making and social struggles. They focus on the one hand on the relations between subjects’ self-making and participation in local social practice, and on the other on the relations between local social practice and broader enduring struggles. They then ask how social struggles are locally realized, how they shape subjectivities, and how history in person constructs social struggles. In short, they see that “both enduring struggles and history in person be seen as realized in contentious local practice” (Holland and Lave 2001: 6). Local social practice forms self-identity while protesting against broader structural forces. Holland and Lave suggest that our analysis should start with social practices and trace out practices of knowledge production and the relations of these practices to broader structural forces (Holland and Lave 2001: 9).

We are now ready to put forward our framework for analysis based upon a modified version of Barth’s. For the analysis of knowledge in the context of social movements, the first line of inquiry should be into the bodies of knowledge produced in social movements. Here, we should be particularly aware that knowledge emerges transiently through embodied practices. In other words, it is formed performatively through political struggle, where embodied knowledge is particularly significant. Knowledge is always in the process of transformation. For us, the second line of enquiry should be into the media via which knowledge is communicated. Specifically, we should ask what those social practices through which knowledge is constructed and transmitted are. Whether a form of knowledge continues to exist or not largely depends on the medium by which it is communicated. According to Barth’s proposal, the third line of inquiry would be into the organization that produces the knowledge. Here, Barth (2002: 3) focused on the process in which knowledge is communicated, employed, and transmitted within a series of instituted social relations. Therefore, in the context of social movements, we should pay attention to how knowledge emerges and is transformed through interactions not only within an activist group but also between the activist group and outside institutions. A body of knowledge produced in a social movement
correlates with state control, capitalist expansion, and public reactions. Bodies of knowledge possessed by activists, opponents, and bystanders often interact, negotiate, and partly fuse with each other. We see that the relation with society resides in knowledge. As Barth (2002) suggested, these three facets of knowledge are closely interconnected. For example, the contents of knowledge are limited by constraints arising from the nature of its medium. The characteristics of the medium of knowledge influence the opponents’ or bystanders’ reactions. Negotiations with opponents determine the content or medium of knowledge to some extent. The contributors to this volume explore the possibility of an anthropological inquiry of social movements by investigating how these facets of knowledge are interconnected within their specific ethnographic contexts.

Focusing on the process of knowledge production, this volume unravels the potential of anthropology in the study of social movements guided by three key themes: embodied knowledge, political practice, and knowledge and society. The volume’s first part examines the political realities of different kinds of embodied knowledge in social movements. The second part deals with multiple ways in which social practices can be considered as political. The volume’s final part deals with the dynamics of knowledge production in social movements. Specifically, how does a body of knowledge in a social movement transform when it faces changes in contextual circumstances that facilitate or constrain the effect of that knowledge? How do social movements change the contents and use of knowledge in order to deal with relevant agents more effectively?

4. Embodied Knowledge

In recent decades, many anthropologists have taken an increasing interest in embodied knowledge and its transmission. Embodied knowledge is important because there are entities that can be thought or communicated only through the body, and in some kinds of learning, thinking, and communicating through the body is more important than verbal communication. In fact, the recent anthropological study of human knowledge has made particular advances through an exploration of the interdependence of mind, bodies, and environment (Marchand 2010: S2). Bourdieu’s concept of habitus has taken the leading role in such exploration. According to Bourdieu, habitus is those socially constructed dispositions possessed by an individual or group (1977; 1984), where a disposition signifies a tendency in an agent’s action, perception, or evaluation. It is through the possession of these tendencies, or the logic of practice, that the agent can act reasonably according to the situation they are presented with. A critique of Kantian mind-body dualism, the concept encouraged the development of discussions of embodied knowledge by focusing on the intelligence of the body, and the interdependence of the body and social relations. Moreover, the concept affirms the physical foundation of cognition, pointing toward an intelligence of the body in which emotion plays a key part.

Despite having caused a radical shift in the anthropological conception of knowledge, the concept of habitus has nevertheless left us with certain problems. On the one hand, it focuses on the way in which values and behavioral patterns are transmitted in social environments, but does not fully demonstrate the concrete mechanisms by which this occurs.
In other words, Bourdieu’s theory does not deal with the issue of performance, that is, how knowledge is transmitted efficiently. On the other hand, the concept of habitus does not shed light on the process in which embodied knowledge is used as a resource for resistance in modern society, although anthropologists have demonstrated the efficacy of this concept in those third world settings in which the weak resist the modern system of state or capitalist controls in terms of non-capitalist habitus (see Comaroff 1985; Hirai 1998; Ong 1987). As Foucault pointed out (1980), the body is a target of control in modern society, and the effects of forms of power on the body can cause physical reactions which may then constitute the foundation of resistance. The forms of protests in contemporary movements are increasingly founded upon forms of embodied knowledge (McDonald 2004). Important issues for discussion in this volume are: what the forms of embodied knowledge we encounter in social movements are, their conditions of emergence, and the roles they take in political practice. We see embodied knowledge as one of the most promising areas for anthropological inquiry in social movement studies.

In “The Indigenous Land Rights Movement and Embodied Knowledge in Taiwan,” Shu-Yuan Yang describes how the indigenous peoples in Taiwan attempted to stake a claim over their traditional territory through a form of embodied, place-based knowledge that figures significantly in local indigenous cultures. Since the 1980s, riding on the tide of Taiwan’s new-found democracy, the indigenous peoples orchestrated waves of social movements contesting Han domination, land loss, and cultural marginalization. In so-called “root-searching expeditions,” Bunun people travel through the jungle to the ancestral settlements which they were forced to leave under the period of Japanese colonial rule. According to Yang, these activities are a form of practice in which Bunun people reclaim their ancestral past and raise cultural self-consciousness. They equate these activities to hunting as a significant experience of a heightened consciousness of self, place, and embodiment. Here, the body is not an object to be studied in relation to culture, but is to be considered as the subject or the existential ground of culture (Csordas 1990: 5). Tracing the development of root-searching, this chapter shows how these activities gain new relevance when indigenous communities attempt to stake claims over territory that was originally theirs through community mapping practices. It also points out how these activities differ from the urban elite’s movements that are chiefly based on discourses drawn from global indigism and the international land rights movement. This movement should be considered not as an essentialized objectification of traditional ethnic culture, but as reflecting the agency and autonomy of indigenous peoples in the process of engaging with modernity (Yang 2011: 327).

One central problem faced by many social movements is the question of how to transmit their knowledge from one generation of activists to another, while at the same time combatting the gradual incorporation of their protest activities and their activists into established political routines and organization (Eyerman and Jamison 1991: 130). This is especially true when the knowledge comes in less easily transmittable forms such as embodied knowledge. A clear illustration of this problem is provided by the Ainu rights recovery movement after the 1990s when the Japanese government began to respond to some of its appeals. In “Breaking Through Impasses in the Ainu Rights Recovery Movement: A Case Study of one
Transformational Activist-Disciple Relationship,” Jeff Gayman seeks to shed light on the intergenerational transmission of activist knowledge. According to Gayman, in present-day Ainu society, the youth have lost their interest in Ainu political activism, partly because they feel that the Ainu ethnic identity is already socially approved, at least on a superficial level, and partly because they have a distaste for the Spartan disciplinary practices seen in the traditional seniority relations of Ainu communities. This chapter argues that the unique relationship fostered between an Ainu activist and an Ainu youth served to break through impasses in communication between different generations of Ainu cultural practitioners, and thus to create new possibilities for achieving gains in the Ainu rights recovery movement. Particular focus is given to how the internet has been used to transfer embodied practices as well as discourse. While it is often argued that the introduction of new media technologies has enabled ethnic minorities to take their case directly to the people of the world and form global networks for mutual assistance, one consequence of which is the emergence of transnational indigenous rights movement, this chapter sheds light on a case whereby a form of new media technology has also helped transmit traditional types of embodied knowledge between generations of activists.

Ajun Appadurai (1996) has asserted the importance of linking the process by which relations between place and culture are becoming increasingly deterritorialized with people’s everyday interpretive processes. According to Appadurai, locality is a property of social life, and a phenomenological quality, which expresses itself in interaction (1996: 178). It is, precisely, a form of embodied knowledge. People continue to produce locality, and this is the opposite side of the reconceptualization of culture as deterritorialized (Escobar 2001: 147). The production of place and culture should be approached from the perspective of cultural construction as well as that of political economy (Escobar 2001: 153). In short, the production of place is increasingly a struggle (Appadurai 1996: 189).

In “The Care of Place: Contesting New Urbanism in Postauthoritarian Taiwan,” Ya-Chung Chuang illustrates how a new body of knowledge, which can be referred to as “new urbanism,” has developed through struggles that evolved in response to the massive urbanization taking place in Taiwanese cities. Since the early 1990s, residents in Taiwanese cities have been experiencing overwhelming transformations in their lives influenced by Taipei’s “global city” campaign that promotes consumer culture and neoliberal capitalism. This has prompted the emergence of a trend for local mobilization, which calls for greater attention to be paid to a sense of place and its link with culture within urban neighborhoods. According to Chuang, this contestation has given rise to what he terms “new urbanism,” a means by which local residents have sought to bring about their own version of life within a community setting. Investigating an ethics of place through two case studies, this chapter looks into a pervasive demand for “place-care” among Taiwanese neighborhoods, where a knowledge of a new form of life has been sought, pursued, and discussed.

5. Political Practices

Briefly stated, practices are the various forms of action that people perform routinely in everyday life. Since it constitutes or subverts the social structure, all practices can be
considered to have political implications with or without the agent’s intending them to. However, I would like to use political practice in the narrower sense here, that is, practice related to an active engagement with governmental processes. It includes participation in the processes of both decision-making and resistance. Bourdieu (1991) discusses the concept of the political field, in which different agents compete with each other in pursuit of political rewards. This field, like the economic and artistic fields, centers around political capital, having relative autonomy. It was noted that his usage of this concept was ambiguous in that the political field refers to specifically political institutions and actors in one context, and to the whole field of power relations in society in another (Swartz 1997: 139). Acknowledging that the boundary between political and non-political was indeed ambiguous, Bourdieu (2000) went on to assert that the struggle over the definition of the boundaries of institutionalized politics or the political field is one of our contemporary political issues. This implies that social practices that are not commonly included within the political field often constitute part of it. In fact, as several chapters of this volume demonstrate, political practices include not only conventional methods of protest, such as demonstrations, sit-ins, petitions, and formal meetings, but also unconventional acts, which may be seen as non-political, such as ritual, storytelling, artistic performances, self-help group meetings, social business, and even the conservation of cultural heritage. A small habit, such as sorting rubbish for recycling, can, in certain situations, be considered as political practice. The experiences and knowledge resulting from these practices have sometimes countered dominant views, leading to alternative views on society, reconsideration of the form of everyday life taken for granted, and changes in the common habits of everyday life.

Charles Tilly defined culturally specific methods of protest as “repertoires of contention.” According to Tilly, “the word ‘repertoire’ identifies a limited set of routines that are learned, shared and acted out through a relatively deliberate process of choice” (1995: 26). For agents, this set of activities appears to be appropriate and feasible. Being the product of historical struggles, they are always changing (Tilly 1995: 26). This concept of repertoire is quite close to that of political practice that we just defined. However, there are differences. One is that, as is clear from his definition, Tilly treats repertoire as a tool that the agent uses by choice. On the contrary, we emphasize that the agent has historically constructed tendencies or dispositions to join particular political practices of which the agent is not necessarily conscious. The other is that Tilly seems to suggest that all participants assign the same meaning to a repertoire of contention. We contend that each participant produces different meanings from the same practice, depending upon his or her dispositions.

What Bourdieu’s analysis of the political field suggests is that the problem of political practice implies the issue of symbolic power (Bourdieu 1991). Since the political field can be considered as the site in which agents try to change the world by transforming people’s ways of perceiving the world and the attitudes and hopes they harbor towards it, political practice is also a cognitive struggle for the power to impose or reorient into their own version of the world as legitimate (Bourdieu 2000). In social movements, agents are intentionally or unintentionally engaged in a labor of representation by which they seek to transform not only people’s perception and appreciation of the world but also their schemes or dispositions, so that they begin to experience the world differently (Bourdieu 2000: 186).
Here, Victor Turner’s analysis of ritual, and the extended theory of performance, are helpful for us because they confirm the importance of the symbolic dimension of political practice. Turner pointed out in his anthropology of performance or experience that symbolic actions in ritual and other similar forms of cultural performance are not just epiphenomena, or neurotic symptoms or cultural defense mechanisms, but also have an ontological status (Turner 1974; 1986; 1988). According to Turner, cultural performances provide opportunities in which not only are existing cultural elements communicated, but new forms of knowledge are also reflexively generated (1988). In other words, they are not simple mirrors of culture but active agencies of change (Turner 1988).

Emotion may be the most important form of knowledge generated by political practices in the context of social movements. The nature of political practice requires that its idioms resonate emotionally with participants in order to strengthen moral commitments, stir up strong emotions, and reinforce a sense of solidarity. It seems quite natural that many social movements utilize rituals or ritualized protest performances as a means of dramatizing injustice, building solidarity, and affirming identity (Aminzade and McAdam 2001). As has been argued already, emotions are a form of embodied knowledge, which always inheres in our perceptions, thoughts, worldviews, and behaviors. They not only nurture forms of sociality but also become the main energy sources for production and transmission of knowledge. As Bourdieu points out with regard to emotion, “it is this practical knowledge that orients interventions in the symbolic struggles of everyday life which contribute to the construction of the social world” (Bourdieu 2000: 184).

In “Storytelling as Political Practice: Habitus and Social Change in the Minamata Disease Movement,” Kyonosuke Hirai argues how storytelling can contribute to the production of social change by examining the Minamata guided tour, in which advocates tell visitors the history of the pollution disaster. In Minamata, a town in southwest Kyushu, Japan, which once experienced a terrible catastrophe caused by the mercury contained in the effluent from a chemical factory, local advocacy groups nowadays make efforts to hand down the lessons of this disaster to the wider public to prevent similar incidents from ever happening again. Their main form of activity is the guided tour. If stories of a catastrophe are handed down by victims and even perpetrators to the public through activists who are not victims or the original observers themselves, how can they be perceived and appreciated by the audience as legitimate, and shape their subjective experience in the dialectic of self and society? According to Hirai, the key to understanding this is the “moral shock” that occurs when the stories raise such a sense of surprise in the audience that they are urged to reflect their own habitual ways of thinking and living. The chapter illustrates why and how storytelling can be considered as a form of political practice and part of a social movement.

Material resources or artefacts often play a crucial role in the production of the identity of a movement. Meaning-making occurs through production, distribution, and consumption of cultural artefacts, which evoke sentiments, memories, and multiple perceptions of the group (Holland et al. 2008: 118). Museums are also used in constructing new ethnic identities to reorganize historically disparate interest groups (Merriman 2000: 301). Within the context of ethnic identities being recognized by the state and wider society as being expressed
primarily through material culture, the conservation of cultural materials—along with the development of new bodies of knowledge of ethnic culture and ethnic history, and the reinterpretation of the state’s history that this entails—becomes a central form of political practice employed to organize the whole movement in interaction and competition with other ethnic groups. In “The Significance of Museum Materials in the Name Correction Movement of the Pingpu Peoples of Taiwan,” Atsushi Nobayashi discusses the significance of material culture in the name-correction movement of the “Pingpu” peoples in Taiwan. In aboriginal movements in Taiwan, it is particularly important to create a distinctive visual image of the group in Taiwanese society in order to acquire a social position or legal authorization. This paper shows how, after having lost their original culture by being sinicized through interactions and intermarriage with the Han Chinese, the Pingpu people, having not yet been fully recognized as an indigenous group, currently use historic objects, such as ethnic costumes, handicrafts, and religious objects, stored in museums or other research institutes as cultural resources to delimit their ethnic boundaries with other indigenous groups and the Han Chinese, and to fight for the public approval of their ethnic identity as an indigenous group. The ethnic identity of Pingpu people emerges as a result of these cultural struggles in which artefacts play a significant role.

The women’s movement is arguably a movement in which the boundaries between political and non-political practices are particularly fluid. Although women’s movements are often regarded unilaterally as feminist movements, many of them devote their attention to a wider range of issues than those concerning inequalities between the genders. In some such cases, activists themselves often define their activities not as political but community work, social services, or even wage labor so that they can avoid being seen as straying too far from traditional gender roles within their society. In “An Alternative Place for Women: A Case Study of Women’s Support Activities in Japan,” Mari Kagaya reconsiders the meaning of political practice and social movement by examining how a women’s movement has managed to endure while oscillating between personal transformation and political change. When feminist movements in Japan reached almost an impasse in 1990, the Women’s Space, Mizura was established in Kanagawa, Japan, as a center dedicated to providing care and support for women with serious problems. Although the original members were all activists, Mizura was defined as being committed to providing practical services without expressing feminist ideologies or mounting political campaigns. This was a strategy to avoid producing internal divisions or acquiring the undesirable “activist” label, to recruit a broad range of politically indifferent members, and possibly, to receive more financial support from governments or potential donors. As the group accumulated knowledge and experiences about consultations for troubled women and gained public recognition, local governments began to take their activities seriously and provided them with institutional support as a legitimate partner in public services. Concurrently, Mizura enhanced the professionalization of its services with better rewards for members as well as the centralization of its management system, thereby bringing up the issue of the ambiguous position of the “paid volunteer” staff member. Most of the members still construe personal fulfillment or their own transformation as individuals through encounters with clients or colleagues as the primary reason for their participation with the group, denying the political nature of their engagement.
Although Mizura advocates non-confrontational tactics, their activities can be considered as political practices, which, in fact, being part of gender politics or feminist activism in the conventional sense, sometimes lead to change in state policies.

6. Knowledge and Society

It is one of our central arguments that research into activists’ political practices must include an investigation of the other groups with which they interact. The character of political practice and the knowledge arising from it are both strongly affected by interactions with external sets of agents, such as opponents, supporters, and bystanders (Snow and Soule 2010: 191). By viewing a social movement through activists’ experiences, we tend to view the opponent as a constant (Collins 2001: 39). However, it is certain that, in reacting to activists’ practices, opponents and bystanders change their practices, and that activists in turn then modify their practice in response to this. These kinds of interactions form the history of a movement. On the one hand, the state and its agencies make increasing use of those mechanisms of institutionalization or modern forms of government by which people are educated, persuaded, managed, and pushed in certain direction as a part of economic, legal, and medical projects. This enables them to control or discipline people’s lives from a distance, without directly oppressing them (Rose and Miller 1992). We also see that the greater use of NGOs on the part of governments, especially in Japan, is closely linked to these mechanisms. On the other hand, activists’ political practices are conditioned by the society around them. The image of activists’ political practice within society and the appraisal given it largely affect its performance, and the political practice and knowledge it generates are transformed accordingly. The reactions of opponents and bystanders constitute an essential element in any social movement, and, accordingly, in the process by which its knowledge production develops. It can be said that the knowledge produced in social movements is the joint product of the activists, opponents, and even bystanders.

Conditioned by the historical contexts from which they emerge, social movements tend to reproduce the political practices found within these contexts. However, when a movement endures over a long period of time, political practices are likely to be transformed not only in response to its opponents’ reactions, but also according to the demands or expectations of society. In those cases in which a movement transforms in nature, the production of knowledge takes place in interactions between contemporary social movements and old ones in the direct sense of interplay and competition (Eyerman and Jamison 1991: 58). In “Orchestrating Time: The Evolving Landscapes of Grassroots Activism in Neoliberal South Korea,” Mun Young Cho argues that a social movement organization survives and develops over time by putting knowledge produced through past struggles to new uses, in response to emergent concerns within society. The Korean Community Organization Information Network (CONET) was founded in the mid-1990s by veteran activists who have participated in grassroots movements on behalf of the urban poor since the 1970s. After the Asian financial crisis in the late 1990s, emerging anti-poverty intervention created a new partnership between activists and the state. Today, the CONET trainers, once radical activists, teach methods of community organization, through production of textbooks and training sessions,
to those who work in close partnership with the state, among others. With one eye trained on the ambiguity of the discourses within the organization and the resilience that this provides, this chapter explores how what Mun Young Cho calls the orchestration of time, a series of processes via which activists eliminate, restore, freeze, and defer time of/for activism, contributes to broadening the horizons of the direction it is heading in and people’s visions of its potential, despite the dangerous contradictions that it reveals.

We have already surveyed the importance of embodied experience in contemporary social movements. This is dramatically evident in those political practices using music and dance performed on the street as a form of protest (McDonald 2004: 586). Performative arts of this kind can embody a sense of community in quite a unique way. This community may be an imagined one, but it nevertheless has a genuine effect on people, by helping them to construct their sense of identity through these embodied experiences (Eyerman and Jamison 1998: 173). The practice of music can provide a space for the transmission of cultural tradition and the promotion of identity and self-esteem. Moreover, it can change the perceptions of the general public as it interacts with the dominant culture. However, there is the danger that when major sectors of society appreciate or absorb the minority’s music, the element of challenge that it originally posed to the dominant notion of cultural hierarchy may be neutralized.

In “‘Being Okinawan’ Within and Beyond the Ethnic Boundary: The Process of Identity Formation in an Okinawan Cultural Activist Group in Osaka,” Sumi Cho explores the changes in Okinawan cultural activism in Osaka, Japan, from the 1970s to the 2000s, focusing on a group that originally targeted the school-age children of underprivileged, working class Okinawan immigrants. In the 1970s, the discrimination against Okinawans was still at its height and Okinawan culture was stigmatized as a result of the poverty and low social status that were perceived as characteristics of the diasporic Okinawans. Okinawan cultural activism at this time aimed at challenging the dominant Japanese notion of cultural homogeneity, and promoting Okinawan identity and improved self-esteem for children through the means of Okinawan music and dance. However, as diasporic Okinawans became more socio-economically and culturally integrated, and Okinawan culture became popular in Japanese popular and media culture, the group moved away from its initial anti-discriminatory approach to accommodate new members who were not necessarily Okinawans, or marginalized. Instead, in order to keep their Okinawan legacy, the group organizers attempted to reinterpret the idea of “being Okinawan” and give it new meanings that went beyond ethnic or cultural distinctions. This chapter shows how embodied knowledge produced in certain types of artistic performances can be forms of social protest without articulating a coherent political program, and how the meanings of these protests transform historically through interactions with society.

Studies of new social movements argue that collective identity plays a significant role in the continued existence of social movements (for example, Hunt and Benford 2004; Melucci 1989; Polletta and Jasper 2001; Taylor and Whittier 1992). They often focus on the role of collective identity as a resource for mobilization. However, as Melucci (1995: 44) argues, “collective identity is an interactive and shared definition produced by several individuals (or groups at a more complex level) and concerned with the orientations of
action and the field of opportunities and constraints in which the action takes place. By ‘interactive and shared’ I mean a definition that must be conceived as a process because it is constructed and negotiated through a repeated activation of the relationships that link individuals (or groups).” Collective identity emerges as part of the ongoing process of social movement, and its production depends upon continual struggles between activists and various groups of outsiders. Activists cannot be indifferent to how their activities are labelled by opponents or bystanders because the meanings of their activities and individual and collective identities arising from them are so greatly affected by it.

In “Collection or Plunder: The Vanishing Sweet Memories of South Korea’s Democracy Movement,” Shimpei Cole Ota discusses how the image of past social movements continuously shapes and is shaped by the present political situation. Former South Korean activists tend to look back on democracy movements of the 1980s with a sense of nostalgia for “the good old days.” However, when Korean intellectuals and mass media discuss modern cultural history, they tend to emphasize the dark side of these stories, such as how sacrifices were made in the movements. This negative image facilitates a situation whereby only correspondingly negative memories are listened to and collected in society, and consequently former activists hesitate to express their subjective experiences or to nurture personal networks that are based on the fond memories they share, and began instead to reshape their own images of the experiences. According to Ota, by depicting a purely negative image, the succession of leftist governments that have been in power since democratization, followed by the mass media and academics, emphatically claim that they rescued the people from terror and oppression to secure human rights and peace. This chapter concludes that socially endorsed memories and perceptions are subject to continuous change according to the socio-political situation, and have the power to reshape how movements are remembered and even to constrain the emergence of new social movements.

7. Anthropology and Social Movements

So far, we have discussed how anthropology can contribute to the study of social movements by focusing on how bodies of knowledge are socially produced and reproduced. The same analysis must be also applied to our production of knowledge within anthropology. What are the bodies of anthropological knowledge produced in social movements? What are the social practices through which anthropological knowledge is produced in social movements? And, given this, how is or how should anthropological knowledge be reconciled with knowledge among activists, and the dominant forms of knowledge? By tackling these closely related questions, we will be able to achieve a better understanding of how anthropological inquiry enriches the study of social movements, and that of the processes of knowledge production in society. Although these are not easily answerable questions, a crucial issue for ethnographers here is to continue to reflect on the relations with activists and activist knowledge.

The second and third questions above may require additional explanation. It is now obvious that there is no clear division between academic knowledge production and activist knowledge production. As the chapters of this volume make evident, anthropologists engage
with the subject of social movements within the contexts of their own individual interests and commitments. Escobar suggests that many anthropologists begin their ethnographic research of activism out of political interest, rather than academic curiosity (2008: 24). Hence, the basis of anthropologists’ knowledge production is almost the same as that of the activists who reflect on and evaluate their own collective knowledge (Escobar 2008: 24). On the one hand, academic knowledge production is based on our own experience in social movements (Escobar 2008: 22), and it is almost impossible to make distinctions not only between research and activism (Casas-Cortes et al. 2013: 214), but also about where the knowledge of us and our fellow activists originates from. On the other hand, activists engage in research based on their own experiences, working well with academic concepts and theories, dealing with practical and academic problems that are similar to academics’, and sometimes participating in academic discourse. Some of them publish their research results not only through the internet, newsletters, independent publications, and public seminars, but also in academic publications and at academic meetings. Their products are as sophisticated as ethnographers’ own (Casas-Cortes et al. 2013: 208). We must therefore have the courage to admit that the dichotomy between academic knowledge and activist knowledge has been broken down.

How, then, should ethnographers deal with activist knowledge in which activists themselves reflect on their own struggles? For example, how should we react to activist knowledge or practice which we oppose or think is ethically unacceptable? We can produce knowledge that is helpful to activists not only as an academic treatise, but as one that also constitutes a form of political practice itself (Juris and Khasnabish 2013: 8–9). Yet, how then should we handle the situation where the knowledge we produce is harmful to the movement? Here, ethnographers are likely to be confronted by those who produce knowledge on their activities specifically in order to challenge the role of the ethnographer or their epistemological authority. Some such individuals may claim the legitimacy of their knowledge as “true” indigenous knowledge. Others may criticize or suppress ethnographers’ analysis simply for its posing an obstruction to their activities. In other words, ethnographers encounter competition from activists for their role as the analysts or interpreters of social movements. Since our research is grounded in and affects the lived realities of activists and others who are involved, we must at all times be very sensitive to the politics of knowledge (Juris and Khasnabish 2013: 26–27).

Hale (2006) argues that there are two positions that ethnographers working on social movements can take: cultural critique and activist research. While practitioners of cultural critique produce knowledge which aligns with activists, activist researchers engage in activism to produce knowledge which benefits activists (Hale 2006). Each author of this volume situates himself or herself somewhere between the two. Wherever one positions oneself on this scale, one has the potential for competing, in varied degrees, with activists who analyze their own struggles. However, we believe that ethnographers and activists can co-produce new knowledge as a foundation for challenging the dominant knowledge and its institutions by interacting, disputing, and engaging in dialogue with each other. Ethnographers and activists can cooperate with each other to set in motion a process of mutual refinement (Clammer 2000: 2). In fact, new bodies of knowledge have so far emerged from the civil
rights movement, the post-colonial movement, the peace movement, and the feminist movement. Knowledge is embedded in social relations. This encourages us to reflect more on how ethnographers position themselves toward movements and activists, and produce knowledge countering the dominant knowledge production.

We speculate that social movement research urgently requires the anthropology of knowledge production. Social movements are important agents for bringing about social change and fields in which new knowledge is created. Here, a crucial issue is to observe and understand how verbal and embodied knowledge is produced socially and emotionally through practice. Anthropological research provides the way to access to this largely overlooked process. By illustrating the interplay between agency and social structure through political practice, it can surely play a significant role in the theoretical and methodological debates within social movement research. We sincerely hope that the ethnographic cases in this volume help bring this possibility into view.

Notes
1) As will be argued in this paper, the character of a political practice and the knowledge arising from it are both strongly affected by interactions with the state and its agencies. Assuming that different concepts and theories are needed to account for the emergence and trajectory of movements in centralized government, this volume covers contemporary movements only in capitalist East Asian societies, in which people began to demand more say in their government since the late 1980s. Even though they are of great interest to anthropologists, the burgeoning research on contemporary movements in China and Hong Kong is beyond the scope of this volume.

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