National Identity and Multi-Culturalism in China: Segmentary Hierarchy among Three Muslim Communities

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National Identity and Multi-Culturalism in China: 
Segmentary Hierarchy among Three Muslim Communities

Dru C. Gladney

“We have made Italy, now we have to make Italians”

– Massimo d’Azeglio at the first meeting of the parliament of the newly united Italian Kingdom (Hobsbawm 1991: 144).

How are nations “made”? This paper suggests that nations, and the peoples that compose them, are made by following established paths of representation. As Thongchai Winichakul (1994: 15) has eloquently argued, nations become mapped through the imposition of borders, boundaries, and categories of configuration upon previously borderless, unbounded, or uncategorized regions, peoples, and spaces. In this paper I argue that it is through “path dependence” that nationhood is created by the promotion of stereotypical representations of nations and nationalities perpetuated through national censuses, museums, folklore, and the interaction of subject peoples and the states that legislate their identity. As Takashi Fujitani (1993: 101) has argued, promulgation of the accepted “folklore of a regime” becomes an accepted hermeneutic by which contested and convoluted tales of history and society become master narratives among several competing versions. This paper will argue that the examples of three Muslim peoples in China, the Hui, the Uygurs, and the Kazakhs, illustrate the role of path dependency in shaping their contemporary ethnic and national identities.

Path Dependence: Derivative Discourses of Nationalism

In a seminal 1985 American Economic Review article challenging developmental and rational-choice models of economic change, Paul David, economic historian at Stanford, wrote about the rather anomalous establishment of “QWERTY” as the industry standard for American typewriters. David described how “QWERTY” came to be the first six letters on the upper left of the American typewriter keyboards. According to David despite the fact that it is the least efficient keyboard, other keyboards have failed to displace the “QWERTY” model. It so happened that when the typewriter was first produced in the 1890s, the QWERTY model was quickly adapted as an industry-wide standard due to the simple physical fact that at that time it was the only way to physically insert all of the keys. Once this typewriter became the most widespread standard by which all
beginning typists are trained, “path dependence” has insured its survival, despite many recent attempts to produce more efficient alternatives.

Noting that competing typewriter designs “have made as much headway as Esperanto over English,” Peter Passell (1996: 60-61) has recently argued that the persistence of the inefficient keyboard due to path dependence can help to explain similar recent failings: the Macintosh Apple Computer to the IBM standard (though any rational person knows Mac is “better” and more user-friendly); Sony Betamax video format to VHS format (though Sony was first, it was marketed poorly and failed to establish a “path”); the loss of the 1909 Stanley Steamer automobile design to the more costly gasoline combustion models due to the marketing of the steam engine as a “luxury” line; the preference of “light water” nuclear reactors over less hazardous alternatives such as gas-graphite systems; and the obsoletion of high definition television before it was ever produced in quantity; to name but a few examples. Like Thomas Kuhn’s (1970) theory of “scientific revolutions,” the path dependence approach suggests that “standards” become established not due to any inherent reasonability, efficiency, or intrinsic value, but due to historical accident, market advantage, or the sheer “weight of numbers” (Passell 1996: 61).

While Anderson (1991), Greenfeld (1992), and Hobsbawm (1991) have helped to chart the historical rise of the nation-state as something invented and “imagined,” as Jean Comaroff (1987: 301-323) has noted, these theories are problematic in that they assume an inherent teleology driving the process, the rise of the nation-state is coupled with a Weberian “disenchantment” of the secular and the rise of “modernity”. However one might wish to define modernity, the rise of the nation-state with the post-imperial order may not be due to any necessary correlation with “modernity”. Here we might have yet another example of path dependence: the rather haphazard moving down one of Greenfeld’s five roads, without purpose, stumbling along as if in a drunken stupor. It just as well could have been any of several possible roads. Yet recent discussions of ethnic nationalist movements around the globe have often seen them as inevitable out bursts of tribal and national urges, held tenuously in check by Soviet and other formerly hegemonic regimes. The rise of nationalism today represents not any return to tribal routes but a reaffirmation of that path-dependency.

Though anthropologists discarded the notion of “tribe” over two decades ago, since it was felt that “tribe” was often only applied to less developed, non-Western societies (viz., “they are tribal; we are ethnic”), the idea of tribalism has resurfaced to explain the recent reassertions of identity politics as distant and diverse as the former Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, South Asia, Africa, and even Chinese nationalism. By contrast, post-structuralist approaches conceptualize identities as highly contested, multiple, constructed and negotiated within and between the
power relations of the nation-state, rather than naturalized and primordial (Gupta and Ferguson 1992; Malkki 1992). Nationalist ideologies become cultural productions (Befu 1993; Fox 1991), legitimized as inventions of tradition and narrated as social histories (Hobsbawm 1983).

While it has perhaps become axiomatic that ideas of identity, ethnicity, and nationality are socially constructed, the problem with suggesting that these identities are “imagined” is that Anderson is often taken too literally (in ways he may have never imagined), as if ethnic and national identities were completely “invented” (to use Hobsbawm’s and Ranger’s formulation which can be, and is just as often as Anderson, completely misconstrued) out of thin air, a fiction of the collective imagination, or an idea which arose in the smoke-filled drawing rooms of a few nouveau British aristocrats (as Greenfeld 1992 seems to suggest). As a corrective, this paper was written out of a desire to locate the paths of nationalism in particular but rather accidental moments of history, coterminous but not synonymous with the end of empire, the rise of colonialism, the expansion of global capital, and the domination of groups gradually classified and taxonomized as subject peoples, ethnicities, and eventually nations. This paper suggests that these paths continue, just as accidentally, and often just a linked to global capital and international tourism, through the promulgation of iconographic representations in state policy and public media.

I argue that nationalism itself is not just an imagined idea, but represents certain paths of imagined representation, a mode of representation that contributes to a grammar of action now most often defined by interactions within or resistance to the nation-state. As Hobsbawm (1992:4) argues, “Nationalism is a political program...Without this programme, realized or not, ‘nationalism’ is a meaningless term.” Nationalism is not arbitrary, but neither is there any core content to it, no essential essence that is not shifted and redefined in internal and external, often dialogical, opposition, using powerful symbols that John Comaroff (1987) has accurately described as defined by “totemic” relationality. And, as Duara (1995) has recently noted, all nationalisms and ethnicities are not necessarily by-products of or contained within the nation-state construction.

Path dependency theory helps to explain the resiliency of identity experienced among immigrant groups in the diaspora who often cling to and replicate constructed pasts in new places of residence. I spent the 1992-1993 academic year as a Fulbright Research Scholar in Istanbul following up on interviews I had in 1988 with refugees who had come there from China in the 1940s. This was after spending 3 years in China conducting fieldwork between 1982-1986 primarily among the people known as Hui, but with brief trips to Uygur and Kazakh areas in China during that time. Since then, I have been back to China every year, visited Almaty on four occasions, most recently in September 1995, and attempted in each
case to follow up on contacts with Hui, Uygur, and Kazakhs and their relatives I had met during the earlier period. Spending most of my time moving between the boundaries of nation-states among the peoples that cross them, rather than “squatting” (Geertz 1989: 23) in one “timeless, self-contained” village, neighborhood, town, or state (the preferred hierarchy of structural anthropologists) follows Richard Fox’s (1991: 1) maxim to “work in the present,” or Bhabha’s call, among the “interstices,” across the boundaries by which the groups I am interested in most define themselves.

The spate of what might be termed “Soviet nostalgia” in Foreign Affairs and other policy manuals which complain of the re-emergence of “tribalisms” in Central Asia and Eastern Europe now that the “peace-keeping” hand of the Soviets has been withdrawn, is misplaced, if not dangerously wrong. These peoples were profoundly different than they had been before their domination by the centralizing states of Soviet and Chinese Central Asia, and their multi-faceted identities are anything but tribal. Those suggesting pan-Turkism and pan-Islamism as an explanatory panacea for recent events in these regions have equally failed to note expressions of Turkic or Islamic solidarity are often only one aspect of these complex identities in certain circumstances. In fact, the outcome of the desiccation of post-Soviet Central Asia has been most profoundly disappointing to the pan-Turkists and pan-Islamicists. This paper attempts to suggest why these pan-ideologies may be even less compelling in the post-Soviet era than in the pre-Soviet period when they arose. The following three examples comparing the Hui, Uygur, and Kazakh will serve to make the argument for understanding current post-cold war configuration of nationalism in terms of relational alterity and path dependency.

Relational Alterity and Oppositional Identities

One way of conceptualizing contemporary discourses of identity in China, Central Asia, and even Turkey, is to envision an identity that is both relational, relative, and grounded in an historical representation in which the people who have come to be known as the Hui situate themselves. I propose that it might be best understood through the notion of relational alterity, loosely abstracted from anthropological descent theory. Though in an entirely different territorial and economic context, Evans-Pritchard’s (1940) classic study of the Nuer first suggested the expansive-contractive character of the hierarchical segmentary lineage style among acephalous nomadic societies. When the Nuer (or Dinka) were confronted with an outside power, they unified and organized to a higher degree of political complexity in order to respond to the perceived challenge. When the threat subsided, they diversified and atomized, in an articulated pattern
of what Gregory Bateson (1972: 96) once described as nested hierarchy. For as Bateson (1972: 78) argued, it takes two somethings to make a difference, without an other, you only have “the sound of one hand clapping.” While Evans-Pritchard’s study was mired in the nineteenth century colonialist structuralisms which portrayed “tribal” pastoralists as pre-modern and over-determined by tradition, his model of alterity is surprisingly relevant to the post-modern, post-cold war period, where it could be argued the world is becoming increasingly acephalous and breaking down into smaller and smaller relational units. These relations, like E-P’s Nuer, are segmentary in principle, taking as their basic components not the face-to-face herding units, but the imagined community of the nations, and its constituent parts.

This approach can be roughly diagrammed for heuristic purposes as an articulating hierarchy of relational alterities, a schematic that segmental kinship theorists have been playing with for some time. For example, when “A” and “B” encounter a higher level of opposition “D,” they form “C,” moving a node up the scale to form higher-level relations, or conversely, down the scale when the higher-level threat subsides. While this scheme is binary, it is always constructed in a field of social relations, and is inherently ternary in that A and B are always in union or opposition depending on their interaction with D. As David Maybury-Lewis and Uri Almagor (1989) once argued, it is the attraction (or repulsion) of “perceived” opposites that is key, there is nothing critical to binariness beyond that perceptual act. Indeed, there is nothing that prevents three groups from becoming a fourth in actual social relations, though it is difficult to portray in two-dimensional diagrams. Also, it is important that these alliances, relations and oppositions are based on my own observations and reading of social histories; it is not a cognitive map, and the only constraints are those imposed by the specific contexts of alterity.

As I have argued elsewhere, these alterior relations are best perceived as “dialogical” rather than “dialectical” (Gladney 1994b; 1996a: 76-78), insofar as strict dialectics (Hegelian vs. Maoist) are generally thought to move in a certain direction, always negating past relations, rather than dialogic interaction that can move back and forth, up and down, depending on the nature of interaction. Here we are merely tracing a “chain of stereotypical representation” (Bhabha 1994: 251), and seeking to outline in rather static terms constantly shifting relations and multiplicities of perceived identities that mask many levels of social simultaneity. As Rachel Moore (1994: 127) observes, these fluctuating alterities can become so stereotypically fixed and represented that essentializing regimes, elites, and anthropologists often engage in “marketing alterities” for remarkably different purposes. The hierarchy of alterior opposition emerges within the context of social relations. As Thomas (1994: 171) has argued, these are often “strategic
reformulations” and do not represent “eternal properties of self-other relations” divorced from particular sociohistorical moments. Nor does this assume a cognitive map, or that there are no other options available depending on shifting social relations. These representations, I am arguing, generate paths of representation that channel the ways in which people represent themselves.

Path Dependency and the Hui Muslim Chinese

Imbedded within the ethnoscape of China and Inner Asia, the Muslim Chinese, known as Dungan in Xinjiang and much of Central Asia, and as Hui in China, are distributed widely. According to the official nationality census and literature in China, the Hui people are the second most populous of China’s fifty-five recognized minority nationalities, and the third largest Muslim minority. The Hui are the most widespread minority, inhabiting every region, province, city, and over ninety percent of the nation’s counties. While the Hui are the largest group among 10 Muslim nationalities, only three groups have substantial populations of nearly 1 million or more, the Hui, Uygur, and Kazakh. For this reason, and due to the author’s own primary fieldwork among these three groups, this paper takes these three groups as the main subject of analysis.

In addition to geographic dispersion, there is also extensive economic and occupational diversity found among the Hui, from cadres to clergy, rice farmers to factory workers, school teachers to camel drivers, and poets to politicians. In the north, the majority of Hui are wheat and dry rice agriculturists, while in the south, they are primarily engaged in wet-rice cultivation and aquaculture. Since the collectivization campaigns of the 1950s, most Hui were prevented from engaging in the small private businesses that were their traditional specializations. Since the reforms initiated by Deng Xiaoping in 1978, Hui have flourished in these traditional entrepreneurial occupations (Gladney 1998).

Finally, and most importantly for Hui internal and external Islamic relations, the Hui are divided along Islamic factional lines that are quite complex. Although the Hui, like most of China’s Muslims, are Sunni, they include a wide variety of Sufi, non-Sufi, and Traditionalist Muslims (known among the Hui as the Gedimu). These differences are too complex to examine here, but they are of crucial importance in determining the path dependency and internal self/other relations among the Hui in terms of determining economic networks, national connections, and even marriage relations. In many areas, members of one Sufi order will not marry those from non-Sufi orders, or even neighboring villagers that may be Sufi, but not members of their own order (Gladney 1996a: 36-60).

The people now known as the Hui from the beginning have been the diaspora, the immigrant in China, whom Lipman terms, China’s “Familiar Strangers.” Even
their name, “Hui” in Chinese can mean “to return,” as if they were never at home in China and destined to leave. Proudly tracing their descent from Persian, Arab, Mongolian, and Turkish Muslim merchants, soldiers and officials who settled in China from the 7th to 14th centuries and intermarried with Han women, largely living in isolated communities, the only thing that some but not all Hui had in common was a belief in Islam. Until the 1950s in China, Islam was simply known as the “Hui religion” (Huijiao 回教)-believers in Islam were Huijiao believers. Until then, any person who was a believer in Islam was a “Hui religion disciple” (Huijiao tu 回教徒).

Were it not for China’s nationality policy, the Hui would most likely still regard themselves as primarily a religious group (Huijiao tu 回教徒), as they do in Taiwan. However, as Heberer (1989: 30-39) has detailed, the adoption of a Soviet nationality in China and the promulgation of the nationality identification policy in the 1950s that labelled some groups as “minzu” (民族), derived from the Japanese term minzoku and combined with Western and Chinese notions of identity (see Gladney 1996a: 81-95). A historic transition from empire to nation led the early Chinese nationalists to appropriate a Japanese-derived term for nation (minzoku) and label initially 5 under the nationalists and later 56 groups under the communists as “nations” (minzu). The notion of the Han as a minzu (nationality) is a quite recent phenomenon, popularized by Sun Yat-sen, in relational opposition to Tibetans, Mongols, Manchu, and Hui, in his 5 peoples policy (wuzu gonghe), and more importantly, to the foreign imperialists, all of whom were perceived as “nations” (Gladney 1994a). The category of “Han” as a people was actually left to China by the Mongols, who included all northern peoples as Han (including the Koreans), as distinguished from southerners (nan ren), Central Asians (semu ren), and the Mongols. Han as minzu was a notion promoted by Chinese nationalists such as Wang Jingwei and Liang Qichao in the late 19th century, influenced by Japanese and German nationalist ideals (Duara 1995: 36-40). As I noted in 1991: “According to the Nationality Volume of the Chinese Complete Encyclopaedia, the term was introduced to China in 1903 by the ‘capitalist Swiss-German political theorist and legal scholar, Johannes Kaspar Bluntschli’” (Gladney 1996a: 85).

This nationalist minzu policy has helped to set the Hui and other recognized nationalities on a path of nationality identity and official designation. The Hui are recognized by the state as one nationality, and they themselves now use that self-designation in conversations with other Hui and non-Hui. Like their unique Islamic architecture and art, Hui combine often, as they say, “Chinese characteristics on the outside, and Islamic ones on the inside,” with mosques appearing like Buddhist temples on the outside yet embellished internally with Quranic passages. In a painting of the Chinese term for “longevity” (shou) popular with many Hui and mass-produced by the China Islamic Society for public profit,
Quranic suras are written so as to form the very Chinese ideograph for “longevity” itself, beautifully illustrating the dual nature of the Muslim Chinese. This hybridity, both Chinese and Muslim, resident stranger, is critical to their self- and other-representation. As Hobsbawm (1991: 70-71) surprisingly predicted: “No doubt Bosnian and Chinese Muslims will eventually consider themselves a nationality, since their governments treat them as one.”

If we examine the case of the Hui Dungans described above, it becomes clear that Hui represent themselves as such depending on the nature of their interaction with others. Thus, Beijing and Shanghai Hui differ in language, custom, and locality, often leading to disruptive and non-hierarchical competitive business relations, often only until a non-Hui enters the scene. At this moment, the Beijing and Shanghai Hui may unite as “Hui”, and so on up the scale of interactions. When Hui or Dungan move outside of China, their “Chinese”-ness may become enhanced in interactions with non-Chinese, or “Muslim-ness” in interactions with non-Muslims. Indeed, the very nature of the Hui as a “nationality” is based on Chinese nationality policies that recognized them as an official minzu (民族), giving them legal status. This initiated a process that I have described elsewhere in which a Muslim people became transformed into minority nationality (Gladney 1996a).

Here I should note, there is nothing determinative in these relations. They are merely reflections of what I have observed in the field. The hierarchy of segmentation is not fixed; it is determined by the local context of difference, as defined by specific constellation of stereotypical relations, of hierarchy, power, class, and opposition, that are often shifting and multifaceted, but never arbitrary. Thus, even in China, there have been times where Hui have united with Han Chinese against other Hui, when it was in their interest to do so, often downplaying their Muslim identity, in favor of cultural, ethnic, or linguistic similarities to the Han Chinese with whom they sought to share practical interests. The history of Gansu and Xinjiang is filled with these shifting power-alliances (see Forbes 1986), where brother united with brother, and sometimes with the Chinese, against a cousin who was often a rival Hui warlord (Lipman 1984). The relational alterity approach seeks to map out the significant fault lines of relation, opposition, and nodes of hierarchy—a heuristic way of depicting this phenomenon. It does not, of course, pretend to have predictive or universal, dehistoricized explanatory value. This articulated hierarchy of identity is not unlike the segmented opposition revealed in athletic competitions (e.g., the volatile Fehnerbahce and Galatasaray rivalry among Istanbul football teams disappears when the Turkish national team opposes the German national team), or on a more popular level, science fiction portrayals of world cooperation in opposing invading alien forces (such as the multi-ethnic, multi-national Star Trek crew’s unity against
the Klingons, or Russian, American, and Arab cooperation in opposition to invading aliens in the recent film, Independence Day). The model helps to explain certain levels of “both/and” identities, for example, how it is that a person in China can be both a Shanghai local, a member of the Hui nationality, a participant in the Muslim umma, and a Chinese citizen, all at once. Path dependency suggests when and why different levels of identity come into play, and when they are less relevant.

The Uygur: Diversity and Relational Alterity

The Uygur, like the Hui, share certain levels of similarity and path dependency that become relevant in the context of social relations. Uygur are divided from within by religious conflicts, in this case competing Sufi and non-Sufi factions, territorial loyalties (whether they be oases or places of origin), linguistic discrepancies, commoner-elite alienation, and competing political loyalties. It is also important to note that Islam was only one of several unifying markers for Uygur identity, depending on those with whom they were in significant opposition at the time. For example, to the Dungan (Hui), the Uygur distinguish themselves as the legitimate autochthonous minority, since both share a belief in Sunni Islam. In contrast to the nomadic Muslim peoples (Kazakh of Kyrgyz), Uygur might stress their attachment to the land and oasis of origin. In opposition to the Han Chinese, the Uygur will generally emphasize their long history in the region.

Every Uygur firmly believes that their ancestors were the indigenous people of the Tarim basin, now known as Xinjiang. This land is “their” land. This is despite recent studies of excavated 4,000 year old dessicated corpses in the Tarim basin that have revealed through DNA and anthropormorphic testing that the Tarim mummies were primarily caucasoid (Mair 1996). Similarly, I have argued elsewhere the constructed “ethnogenesis” of the Uygur (Gladney 1990). While a collection of nomadic steppe peoples known as the “Uygur” have existed since before the 8th century, this identity was lost from the 15th to 20th centuries. It was not until the fall of the Turkish Khanate (552-744 C.E.) to a people reported by the Chinese historians as Hui-he or Hui-hu that we find the beginnings of the Uygur Empire described by Mackerras (1972). At this time the Uygur were but one collection of nine nomadic tribes, who initially in confederation with other Basmil and Kalukh nomads defeated the Second Turkish Khanate and then dominated the federation under the leadership of Koli Beile in 742 (Sinor 1969: 113).

Samolin (1964: 74-5) argues that the stability of rule, trade with the Tang and ties to the imperial court, as well as the growing importance of establishing fixed Manichaean ritual centers, contributed to a settled way of life for the Uygur tribes.
Sedentarization and interaction with the Chinese state was accompanied by socioreligious change: the traditional shamanistic Turkic-speaking Uygur came increasingly under the influence of Persian Manichaeanism, Buddhism, and eventually, Nestorian Christianity (Sinor 1969: 114-15). Extensive trade and military alliances along the old Silk Road with the Chinese state developed to the extent that the Uygur gradually adopted cultural, dress and even agricultural practices of the Chinese (Mackerras 1972: 37). Conquest of the Uygur capital of Karabalghasun in Mongolia by the nomadic Kyrgyz in 840, without rescue from the Tang who may have become by then intimidated by the wealthy Uygur empire, led to the distribution of the Turkic peoples into the glacier-fed oases of Tarim basin. One branch of Uygur that ended up in what is now Turpan, took advantage of the unique socioecology of the glacier fed oases surrounding the Taklamakan and were able to preserve their merchant and limited agrarian practices, gradually establishing Khocho or Gaochang, the great Uygur city-state based in Turfan for four centuries (850-1250).

The gradual Islamicization of the Uygur from the 10th to as late as the 17th centuries, while displacing their Buddhist religion, did little to bridge these oases-based loyalties. From that time on, the people of Uyguristan centered in the Turfan depression who resisted Islamic conversion until the 17th century were the last to be known as Uygur. The others were known only by their oasis or by the generic term of Muslims (Haneda 1978: 7). With the arrival of Islam, the ethnonym “Uygur” fades from the historical record. Instead, we find the proliferation of such localisms as “yerlik” (persons of the land), “sart” (caravaneer), “taranchi” (agriculturalists from the Tarim basin transplanted to Yili under Qian Long), and other oasis-based localisms.

During the Republican period, Uygur identity was again marked by factionalism along locality, religious and political lines. Forbes (1986), in his detailed analysis of the complex warlord politics of Republican Xinjiang, finds important continuing distinctions between the three macro-regions of Xinjiang: the northwestern Zungaria, southern Tarim basin, and eastern Kumul-Turfan (“Uyguristan”) areas. Rudelson’s (1992) dissertation confirms this persistent regional diversity among the three, and he insightfully proposes that there are four macro-regions, dividing the southern Tarim into two distinct socio-ecological regions. The Uygur were recognized as a nationality in the 1930s in Xinjiang under a Soviet-influenced policy of nationality recognition that contributed to a widespread acceptance today of continuity with the ancient Uygur kingdom and their eventual “ethnogenesis” as a bona fide nationality (see Gladney 1990; Rudelson 1988). This nationality designation not only masks tremendous regional and linguistic diversity, it also includes groups such as the Loplyk and Dolans that had very little to do with the oasis-based Turkic Muslims that became known as
the Uygur (see Svanberg 1989b; Hoppe 1995).

The path dependencies of contemporary Uygur identity were created by historic migration, environmental adaption, the gradual spread of Islam into Central Asia, and the Soviet and Chinese policies that identified the Muslim Turkic people of the Tarim oases as descendants of the ancient Kingdom. These somewhat accidental and haphazard factors have combined to inform and create an identity that is being internationally promoted as the indigenous people of the "Eastern Turkestan" region (Alptekin 1992), leading to growing international support for increased sovereignty and perhaps independence (Gladney 1996c). This does not detract from the seriousness of Uygur claims on the region or the validity of their identity, as every modern ethnic group and nation constructs and writes its history (Duara 1995), revealing countless similar examples of ethnogenesis (e.g., Athabaskan nomad, to Apache tribal member, to "Indian", to "Native American"). It merely seeks to map the contours and levels of contemporary Uygur multi-cultural identity in China.

The Kazakh: Nomadic Nostalgia and the Power of Genealogy

In my interviews with Kazakh pastoralists in the Tian Shan mountains of northern Xinjiang and eastern Kazakhstan in 1987, 1992, 1995, and 1996, I found that whereas a traditional Kazakh ayyl had the mutual participation of all members in a wide-range of tasks, each household of the clan in the post-collectivist period divided up the various tasks of nomadic pastoralism: herding, marketing, leather processing and rug-making. This was almost completely abolished during the Chinese collectivization campaigns of the 1960s and 1970s and the de-privatization of the herds, just as under Stalin in the 1920s and 1930s. There was no inherent incentive to care for the animals when the state controlled the profits, and traditional shared work roles were reassigned to specific collective enterprise tasks. The traditional household and ayyl economies were dismantled. Now that there has been a return to traditional nomadic pastoralism in China and the private ownership of animals, one would expect a resurgence of traditional household and ayyl economic organization.

However, unlike the traditional Kazakh social structure as outlined by Alfred Hudson (1938) and Lawrence Krader (1963), one now finds that often each yurt will perform specialized tasks for the entire clan or ayyl: one household will be responsible for herding, another for marketing, and another for production of certain leather goods, crafts, or rugs. While this may not be the rule for all Kazakh ayyls of the Altai, it represents a new form of household economy and social organization that is perhaps due to the collectivized experience of the 1960s and 1970s. These households are also becoming tied into the local and transnational
economies through the marketing of their products. This reorganization of traditional household economies may be one factor in the increased herd size reported in the Altai and will be an important aspect in the changing socioecology of the region.

The Kazakhs of Kazakhstan and Turkey look to the nomads of the Altai as their living cultural ancestors. An understanding of this nomadic way of life will assist in determining the evolving nature of Kazakh national identity. It is a way of life that is resurgent, albeit in a somewhat altered form, in China, while passing away elsewhere. It is clear that in reciting the oft-memorized genealogies among the Kazakhs, nomadism and its cultural by-products loom large as important factors in their representation of Kazakh identity. For the Kazakhs, the tracing of genealogy is a much more powerful force in their identity construction than we have found for either Hui or Uygur. For Kazakhs, their identity is represented as segmentary in principle. For the Hui, a generalized notion of descent from foreign Muslim ancestors is important for contemporary identity. It does not really matter to modern Hui if these ancestors may have been Arab, Persian, or Turk, only that they were Muslim, migrated to China, and maintained their distinctive identities. For the Uygur, knowledge of genealogy seems to be important only as it relates to the land, as proof of early Uygur settlement in the Tarim oases, prior to the Chinese or other nomadic Turks. The keeping of detailed genealogies, according to my Uygur informants in Xinjiang and Turkey, is something the Chinese like to do, not them. Indeed, it is Kazakh preoccupation with genealogical minutiae that not only influences mate-selection and nomadic nostalgia, but may also contribute to an increased awareness of identity.

As descendants of the Turkish Khanate that dominated the Mongolian Steppe in the 6th century A.D., the Kazakhs are pursuing a style of nomadic pastoralism that is derived from these Turkish ancestors, who, according to the late Joseph Fletcher (1979: 24), “developed steppe nomadism in its final form, the form in which the Mongols later adopted it.” Even as Kazakh nomadism disappears from the Central Asian steppe, debate has raged in the former Soviet Union over the role of religion and Turkism in defining Kazakh national identity. While some intellectuals argue for the role of Islam in defining Kazakh identity, others maintain that is only pan-Turkism that can unite the peoples of the steppe (see Saray 1993: 16-17). These endless debates have marred the important role of nomadism for Kazakh national identity, the idea of a nomadic past that unites Kazakhs transnationally from China to Central Asia to Turkey, among a people for whom, according to Martha Olcott’s study, “traditional Kazakh culture defined a man through the animals he owned, making private ownership of livestock almost the definition of what it was to be Kazakh” (Olcott 1987: 248). While Russian-speaking urban Kazakhs in modern Almaty certainly do not wish to
become nomads, I argue that a kind of “nomadic nostalgia” nevertheless characterizes much current discourse regarding the re-discovery of their pastoralist past, a resumed interest in pre-Islamic Kazakh belief systems, an urge to preserve and discover “pure” Kazakh nomadic traditions in the Altai Mountains of China, a continued lament over the tragedy of Stalinist sedentarization, and that this discourse impedes to some extent the construction of a contemporary “Kazakhstani” identity that includes non-Kazakhs. The continued salience of “nomadic nostalgia” to contemporary Kazakh identity in Kazakhstan is clearly demonstrated by their recently selected national stigmata: the flag of Kazakhstan, which has the famous flying horses beneath the interior dome of the yurt on a field of blue sky.

In the Altai mountains of China, with the pervasiveness of market economies in China and the former Soviet Union, and the increasing contacts of these Kazakhs with the large immigrant community in Turkey, the role of animal husbandry and Kazakh identity is resurfacing as an important factor in changes in their socioecological nexus (Kazakh 1987). During interviews with Kazakh immigrants in the Zeytin Burnu district of Istanbul (see Glandey 1990, 1996b; Svanberg 1989a), I found a population that largely defined itself in terms of its burgeoning leather and tanning industry, with leather fashion boutiques run by extended Kazakh networks in Istanbul, Paris, London, Berlin, Stockholm, and New York. Now that more unrestricted travel has been taking place between Turkey, Kazakhstan, and China (there are direct flights from Istanbul to Urumqi, Istanbul to Almaty, and Almaty to Urumqi, which I flew in May and June of 1993, as well as the Eurasian rail connection between Urumqi and Almaty, which I traveled in October 1995), Kazakhs once separated by artificial political boundaries are beginning to trade and exchange ideas and products to an unprecedented extent.

A typical Kazakh genealogy among members of the Saqabay sub-lineage with whom I interacted is several levels deep. At the highest level, most Kazakhs among the Saqabay knew they were descendants of the Orta Juz (middle) (mistranslated “Horde” or in Turkish, “orda”, which refers to the original tribal military formations). At the level Kazakhs refer to as “tayipa” (from the Arabic, *tayifa*), which Svanberg (1989a: 115) translates as “tribe” and Hudson (1938: 19) as “uru” (Krader 1963 as “ru”) they identified with the Kerey. At the next level of *ru*, or “lineage” (Svanberg 1989a: 115), they traced their lineage to the Zantekey. Yet many Kazakhs call all of these levels *juz* or *ru*, and there is no real consistency. At the base is the emphasis upon migration groups known as “auyl” (or “awl” Hudson 1938: 19), which would have been comprised of different households, related by these complicated descent lines. It was clear, however, that a Saqabay would rarely marry a Barzarkul or Tasbike, and only with great reluctance marry
outside of the Zantekey line. As Svanberg notes, beyond the Kerey, there was not much knowledge of specific connections to other Orta lineages. This knowledge is increasing, however, with frequent travel to Central Asia, where Kazakh members of the Ulu (or “Great”) Orda are primarily concentrated. Interactions traditionally would move up the scale from household to auyl to lineage. Now, there is specific interest only at the lineage and above level, since migration groups have changed dramatically as noted above. It is noteworthy that distinction from Uygur and Hui only takes place at the sixth and seventh levels of interaction, revealing a much higher range of relations than has been described for Uygur or Hui.

Kazakh preoccupation with genealogy is reflected in their more detailed scale of relational alterity path dependency. Thus we see that genealogy plays an important role in determining the relations of path dependency for contemporary Kazakhs. For contemporary Kazakhs, this path dependency not only influences interpretations of the past, but also decisions about marriage and even business associations.

**Educational Policy and Path Dependency**

As an example of the role of path dependency and state policy in channeling contemporary Muslim identity in China, I would like to take a brief look at Muslim education in China. There are least two types of schools for Muslims in China: state-sponsored and mosque-sponsored (which sometimes receive state funding). As yet, there are few if any non-Muslim private schools in China to which Muslims have access. Although I and others have written extensively about Muslim minority identity and identification in China, few have specifically addressed the role of education and the transmission of Islamic knowledge in the “making” of Muslims in China. While there are at least 10 official Muslim nationalities in China, with extremely divergent histories and diverse identities, as we have seen with the three groups discussed above, this paper suggests that through centralized, state-sponsored education, and a tradition of fairly regularized Islamic education in China, the education of Muslims, both public and private, or state-sponsored and Islamic-inspired, follows certain systematized path dependencies. The systematization of the transmission of knowledge to Muslims in China, I would argue, has played a privileged role in influencing Muslim identities. In addition, government educational policy has helped to set Muslim nationalities along certain paths of national development.

Recent writing on China’s minorities and national identification program has begun to focus on the “civilizing mission” of China’s policy toward its “backward minorities” (Anagnost 1996; Borchigud 1995: 278–300; Gladeney 1992, 1994a; Harrell 1995). In state-sponsored media and publications, and public
representations, the Han majority are represented as the most “modern” and, by implication, the most “educated.” The Han are frequently represented as somewhere near the “modern” end of a Marxist historical trajectory upon which China’s minorities must journey. Much of this derives from a continued commitment in Chinese social science to the study of minorities as “living fossils” indicating the origins of “primitive communism.” Matrilineality, communal living and property holding, and even extra-marital sexuality among the minorities all become “proofs” of how far the Han have come. Chinese Marxist social science has been heavily influenced by stage evolutionary theory, particularly as represented in the writings of the American anthropologist, Lewis Henry Morgan (Yang 1992), yet another example of the path dependency of Soviet-influenced Chinese nationality policy. In his famous 1878 treatise, Ancient Society, Morgan described in his first chapter, entitled the “Ethnical Period,” the development of society from savagery, to barbarism, and then to civilization. Tong Enzheng (Tong 1988:182, 184), the Sichuanese anthropologist and museologist, was one of the earliest to publicly criticize Chinese anthropology’s heavy reliance, almost reverence, for this theory of societal evolution, in which Morgan’s work was “canonized, and for the past 30 years has been regarded as something not to be tampered with..... therefore, to cast any doubt on it would be to cast doubt on Marxism itself.”

The Han, as representative of “higher” forms of civilization, were thought to be more evolved, and were to lead the way for minorities to follow. While there are many nationalities in China, the Han are so-defined as to be in the cultural and technical vanguard, the manifest destiny of all the minorities. While many younger scholars, like Tong Enzheng, are beginning to challenge the dominance of the Marxist-Stalinist-Morganian paradigm, it still heavily influences the popular discourse regarding nationalism and Han superiority in China, as well as state policy.

Minorities, generally less educated in the Chinese school system than the Han majority, are thought to be somewhere behind the Han culturally. Education plays a privileged role in executing China’s national integration project (see Hawkins 1983; Postiglione, et. al. 2000). This is reflected in popular discussion about education and “culture” in China. One of the most difficult questions I had to ask in China was one regarding education. The way to pose the question in Chinese is, literally: “What is your cultural level?” (nide wenhua chengdu duoshao). “Culture” here, refers only to learning in State-sponsored schools and literacy in Chinese characters. In the volume of “nationality statistics” recently published by the Department of Population Statistics of the State Statistical Bureau and the Economic Department of the State Nationalities Affairs Commission, the educational sections are all listed under the category of “cultural levels” of the
various minority nationalities as compared to the Han (Dept. of Population Statistics 1994: 38-70). I still remember asking this question to an elderly Hui Hajji in Hezhou, who answered that he “had no culture.” This Islamic scholar had spent 12 years living in the Middle East, was fluent in Persian, Arabic, and a master of the Islamic natural sciences. Efforts to integrate “nationality general history” (minzu changshi) into the State school curriculum do not even begin to address this issue of pervasive Han chauvinism. It may be a strong factor that keeps Hui children from wanting to go to mainly Han schools.

Muslims, as minorities, are generally thought to be less educated than the majority and are portrayed are exoticized and even eroticized in the public media in similar fashion as other minorities even though the Muslims are generally much more conservative socially and morally (Gladney 1994a: 114-16). This is quite remarkable given the long tradition of learning idealized by Muslims (the desire, as the prophet said, to “Seek Knowledge, even unto China”), the proliferation of Muslim centers of learning in China, and the fact that at least two Muslim groups, the Tatar and Uzbek, are considerably better educated than the general populace including the Han Chinese. This is not unusual, however, given the fact that the Korean minority in China is also popularly perceived as a “backward minority” even though the Koreans in China possess the highest literacy and educational rates, far surpassing the Han and other groups (with three times the proportional number of college students than any other nationality, see Yeo 1996: 25; Lee 1986). The Koreans, like all Muslims, are members of the minorities of China, and they are thus in need of education, or “culture.”

This may reflect also in China the view that education was the means to acculturation into Chinese civilization, and that depended on the learning of Chinese. Minorities and foreigners per force had less possibility of attaining such in depth knowledge of Chinese and would therefore always be on the periphery. Yet, this knowledge was not limited to elites. Myron Cohen argues that interaction between elites and common people in China’s educational system led to not just “a common culture in the sense of shared behavior, institutions and beliefs,” but also to “a unified culture in that it provided standards according to which people identified themselves as Chinese” (Cohen 1991: 114). As long as one maintained these standards, one was Chinese. Yet, knowledge of those standards was communicated in Chinese, in state schools. In imperial China, exhortations and rituals articulating the standards set by those in power helped to extend beyond establishing a “tiny literate reef” in the midst of “illiterate oceans” of the general populace (Woodside and Elman 1994: 3). Yet this top down view often excludes those it fails to inspire, particularly groups like Muslims, Tibetans, and Mongols who follow different moralities and path dependencies according to different religious texts.
This is perhaps why “culture” (wenhua) in China is so tied to literacy, and literacy in Chinese. The Chinese term Wen, translated as literature, writing, inscription, is a central part of the idea of culture. Strassberg’s (1994: 5-6) work on “inscribed landscapes” emphasizes the transformative power of writing in traditional China that helps to incorporate the landscapes into the realm. By the same token, literacy inculcates not only Chinese language, but Chinese culture, wenhua, into those minorities who are to become Chinese. Literacy and education are thus central to China’s nationalist project of integration. As Pamela Crossley (1990: 4) has argued, belief in the tenets of Chinese classicism, including: “a reverence for the imputedly inherent transformative power of civilization, a distaste for displays of military power, [and] a contempt for commerce and semiliterate or illiterate cultural values” contributed in the West to notions of the inevitability of Sinicization and assimilation of minorities and other marginals. In other words, to learn Chinese meant one became Chinese. This notion has been shared by both Chinese and Western scholars who adhere to a Sinicization paradigm that links literacy and education with assimilation, the primary method of China’s “civilizing project.” As Labelle and Verhine (1975) have theorized, access to education contributes to the nature of social stratification in many societies. In China, Muslim minorities have increasing access, but as will be seen below, there seems to have been less progress in their educational development.

Muslims often have a very different view of themselves than that found in most state-sponsored public media, where they are frequently portrayed as exotic and erotic minorities, or militant Islamicists. By contrast, Muslim publications often stress their devotion to learning and scholarship. One pictorial published for charity by the China Islamic Association (1985), A Collection of Painting and Calligraphy Solicited for Charity in Aid of the Disabled, presents an entirely different view of Muslims than that found in various government nationality pictorials and the increasingly popular portrayal of Muslim and other minorities in paintings belonging to the Yunnan Art School (Gladney 1994a: 1-34). Here, Muslims are represented as studious, hardworking, devout, and dedicated to the family and society. There is even a presentation of Chinese calligraphy by Muslim artists (and at least one Han artist who wrote calligraphy in praise of Islam!), reminiscent again of Muslim attempts to establish their literary and artistic credentials in the classic Chinese arts of painting and calligraphy (see below). The various publications by the China Islamic Association entitled “The Religious Life of Chinese Moslems” (1957, 1978, 1985) feature not only various mosques and prominent Muslims, but also a great deal of emphasis on education. The Muslim sponsored pictorial, Islamic in Beijing (Hadi Su Junhui 1990), contains not only fine examples of Islamic architecture, art, and scholarship in Beijing, but also features photos of famous Muslim scholars and teachers. Similarly, the Xinjiang
publication by the Uygurs Jori Kadir and Halik Dawut, *Examples of Uygur Architectural Art* (1983), contain not only fine examples of mosques and tombs to religious figures, but also tombs to Muslim scholars such as the poet Yusup Has Hajip and the lexicographer, al-Kashgari.

Muslims in China are not only a minority nationality, but members of a long religious and scholarly tradition that has contributed to Chinese culture and society. The transmission of this image of Islam and Islamic knowledge in China is a difficult task for a population that occupies only 2 percent of the total, and one that has generally been stigmatized throughout much of Chinese history. Generally thought to be lower in “cultural level” than most Han Chinese and less “educated”, their pride in their own tradition of Islamic learning is only now beginning to be communicated to non-Muslims. And, as will be seen below, for most Muslim nationalities in China, including the Hui, Uygur, Uzbek, and Tatar, their general Chinese education equals or exceeds that of the Han. Though this is not the general perception, and one that is only gradually changing in China.

**Chinese Education of Muslims**

Muslims in China were incorporated into the nationalized Chinese educational system in the 1950s, when mosque schools and madrassahs were either abolished or strictly curtailed (Gladney 1996d). Since 1982, Muslims have made some gains in public education in China compared to the rest of the population according to the 1982 census. Comparison with figures from the 1990 census reveals that for the Hui, educational rates have remained basically the same. Significantly, college graduate rates for all Muslims except for the Tatar and Uzbek are similar to the rest of China (about 0.5 percent). The primary distinction for Tatar and Uzbek is that their numbers are small and that they are primarily concentrated in urban areas. Though their college educational rates are extraordinary compared to the rest of the population (2.7 and 3.7 percent respectively in 1990), there are at least 10 other minority groups with higher educational rates in China than the Han (including the Korean, Manchu, Russians, Daur, Xibe, Hezhe, Ewenke, and Oroqen). It is clear that the most rural Muslim groups (the Dongxiang, Baoan, and Salar in Gansu) and the still semi-nomadic or pastoralist (Kazakh and Kyrgyz) suffer from the least access to public schools, though there do seem to be some gains in primary school education among the Uygur, Kazakh and Dongxiang. The gap between rural and urban, nomadic and sedentary, shows up most dramatically in illiteracy and semi-illiteracy rates. While Hui have made some gains between 1982 and 1990 (reduced from 41 to 33.1 percent), the two groups with the highest illiteracy rates in 1982, the Dongxiang (87 percent) and the Baoan (78 percent) have shown only marginal gains in literacy in 1990 (reduced to 82.6 percent and 68.8 percent). This
compares to an overall illiteracy reduction in China between 1982 and 1990 from 32 percent to 22 percent. This dramatic drop has apparently not reached the Muslim communities in rural Gansu.

At the other extreme, when college educational levels among Muslims is compared with the rest of China, not only have they done comparatively well, but there have been some gains between 1982 and 1990, particularly for the most educated Muslims, the Tatar and Uzbek. Most remarkable gains have been among undergraduate education for the Uygur, Kazakh, Kyrgyz, Salar, and Tadjik. Whereas the Han undergraduate college population grew from .2 to 2.4 percent, these groups experienced even greater gains (Uygur 0.1 to 2.1; Kazakh 0.2 to 3.3; Kyrgyz 0.1 to 2.9; Tadjik 0.1 to 2.3)

For the most part, however, we have not seen much change between 1982 to 1990 in Muslim education in China, despite significant state efforts to promote education in minority and Muslim areas. Not only is primary and secondary education provided in several primarily Muslim languages (especially Uygur, Kazakh, Kyrgyz, and Tadjik), but the state provided the normal minority nationality incentives for preferred college entrance. The state in China has made strong efforts to provide equal educational access for minorities and Han in rural and urban areas (Kwong and Hong 1989). It is noteworthy, however, that second-language education is not widely available among the least educated Muslim populations concentrated in the Hexi corridor of Gansu, the Dongxiang, Baoan, and Salar. As these groups speak a mixed combination of Chinese, Turkish, and Mongolian, the state for the most part provides primarily Chinese language education. In all Muslim areas, however, the state has sought to adapt to Muslim needs by providing “qing zhen” or Halal food that does not contain pork, with special “Hui” schools in urban areas. Yet even these efforts do not seem enough to raise Muslim minority education in China. This may have to do with the content of education that is set by the central education bureau, than its medium of adapting to local languages and Muslim customs.

For example, in my Beijing city research, many Hui parents in the Oxen Street district told me that, while they were glad for the Hui schools and the priority Hui are now receiving in education, they felt their children would be more motivated to study if there was more ethnic content. Many of them remember that Hui schools in the early 1950's often invited famous Hui scholars such as Bai Shouyi and Ma Songting to give lectures on Hui history and on historic Chinese Muslim personages. The Hui Middle school in Oxen Street also offered Arabic as a second language, so they did not have to go to the mosque to learn it. Beijing Hui parents are not tempted to withdraw their children from school and send them to the mosque for religious education like many Northwestern Hui. Instead, they argue that there is more of a need to integrate secular and religious education in
order to motivate their children. They also point out that the Islamic schools, even with the course for training Imams at the Chinese Islamic Association in the Oxen Street district, cannot supply enough Imams for as many mosques as need them. One of the reasons is that many young men upon graduation use their Arabic or Persian to become interpreters or translators overseas where they can travel and earn more money, instead of becoming Imams. The distinction between ethnicity and Islam in the city is still too strong for most Hui parents, and they think it might help the country if the two were brought closer together.

Like other minorities, the Hui in Niujie receive special consideration on their exams for entrance to middle school, high school, and college. In general, they receive two "levels" of ten points each for college entrance preference. For example, if the threshold for college entrance on the state exams is three hundred points, a Hui who scores 280 points will be accepted. This may make a difference. I knew a Hui who scored 281 on the exam and was admitted to Beijing Normal University (Beijing Shifan Daxue). His Han neighbor complained bitterly of this to me, as he scored 295 and was not admitted to the college of his choice, but had to go to a "television university" (dianshi daxue) where most courses are taught on video cassette. Athletes who place among the top six (qian liu ming) in provincial competitions are also given two stage preferences. Hence, it is conceivable that a Hui athlete could score 260 on the exam and still be admitted to college with a total score of 300 since he receives four stage preferences. Preference for high school and college minority education is just beginning to show long term effects, and 1990 records should reveal a significant improvement over the 1979 to 1981 figures cited above.

For other Muslim minorities, efforts have been made to bring state education to the minority areas, including the pastoral areas, through the novel program of setting up schools in the pastures, or more commonly, requiring Kazakh and Kyrgyz herders to leave their children in school until they can join them in the herding areas during vacation. Despite these efforts, Muslim illiteracy (with the exception of the Tatar and Uzbek) remains high, and there has been little overall change in Muslim minority education in the last 8 years. The reason, again, may have more to do with "what" is taught, rather than "how" it is taught, which may be linked to the path dependency of China’s nationality policy, regarding non-Han histories and cultures as less civilized and important for study. The lack of nationality content and Muslim world history may be forcing Muslims interested in their people’s history to go to the mosque rather than public schools and libraries for such "religious" knowledge. This is odd since other world religions are frequently mentioned in the public schools, including Buddhism and Christianity, though often in a critical fashion.
The Gender Gap: Male/Female Education Discrepancies Among Muslim Nationalities

It is clear that China’s policy of coeducation and mixing male and female students runs directly against traditional Muslim sensitivities. While it could be argued that China’s Muslim women are more “liberated” than their Middle Eastern counterparts, in that they are not subject to the strict rules of purdah and seclusion, the 1990 data on education suggests a significant male/female discrepancy in access to state-sponsored education, at both ends of the spectrum. China, as a society dominated by male influence related to the East Asian tradition of patrilineal descent and patrilocal residence, is characterized by male preference in terms of birth, education, and social mobility (Shin 2000). For Muslims, this is even more significant in terms of public education. In terms of illiteracy and semi-illiteracy rates, Muslim females are nearly twice as high as Muslim males. While China’s overall illiteracy rate is about 22.2 percent, the Muslim average (excluding the Tadjik and Uzbeks) is about 45 percent. The rates diverge even more across gender boundaries. Hui females average 42.7 percent illiteracy and semi-illiteracy compared to 23.7 percent among Hui males and 12.3 percent among Han males (Han females average 31.1 percent). For the three least educated Muslim groups, the Dongxiang, Baoan, and Salar, the rates are even worse: Dongxiang males: 73.8 percent, females: 92 percent; Baoan males: 53.3 percent, females: 85.3 percent; Salar males: 49.2 percent, females: 88.9 percent. Earlier, Hawkins (1973) argued the importance of minority education for inter group relations in China. This data reveals that high rates of illiteracy among females and males for at least three Muslim nationalities bodes ill for inter-group relations with Han Chinese and the Chinese state.

At the other extreme, college education among Muslim males and females reveals a similar gender gap. Whereas for Han males, 0.4 percent have received university education, this is true for only 0.1 percent of females. Among at least educated Muslim groups, this gap is negligible, since so few have attended college. But it is interesting to note that 3 times as many Kazakh males attend college as females (0.35 to 0.1 percent respectively), and Uygur males twice as often (0.16 to 0.16 percent respectively). Among the more educated Muslim minorities, the Uzbek male/female college ratio is equal (1.3 percent for both males and females) and for the Tatar it is only slightly different (2 percent for males and 1.5 percent for females). This indicated that more educated Muslim tend to send both males and females to school together. This is not true, however, for the more rural and less educated Muslim populations.

China’s Muslim males and females never pray together, it is no wonder they do not want their children to study together. Although China is distinguished in the
Muslim world by having many women’s mosques that are often attached to or even independent from men’s mosques, it is clear that they rarely mix together for ritual or religious education. On one holiday, however, that of Fatima’s birthday celebrated widely among Muslims in China, I have witnessed men and women praying together. In general, however, women pray at home, in the back or side of the mosque separated by a curtain, or in an adjacent or separate “women’s mosque” (nu si). While it is not clear how well educated China’s Muslim women are in Islam, they are active in studying the Qur’an and in establishing mosques. This is not true for their participation in public education.

It is clear that if China wants to improve the education of its Muslim population, it not only needs to end coeducation in Muslim areas. An examination of traditional Islamic education in China, though generally equally exclusive toward women, is one that is highly developed and permeates all of China’s Muslim communities, male and female. This cannot be said for public school education. Here we might have a case of contrasting path dependencies: Islamic and Chinese. Whereas Muslims are devoted to a path of separate male/female educational traditions and positive view of religion, Chinese government policy dictates coeducation and a centralized curriculum that follows the Marxist critique of religion. These contrasts have led to very low rates of education among many Muslim nationalities, despite a traditional Muslim valuation of learning and scholarship.

Conclusion: Prospective Paths of Nationality Identity

This approach has attempted to describe the influence of Chinese government policy in the context of “both/and” identities: how it is, say, that a person who calls himself a “Turkestani” can be both Kashgari and Uygur, Muslim and Turk, Chinese and Central Asian. In China, all of these groups are Chinese citizens, and travel on a Chinese passport, whether they like it or not. The project then becomes not any essentialized attempt at a final definition of the meanings of these representations (i.e., what is a Uygur), but an examination of the conditions of path dependency (i.e. when is a Uygur). As this paper has argued, being Uygur was not as meaningful for between the 15 and early 20th centuries, but it certainly has become relevant for the 8-9 million Oasis-dwelling Turkic people who have been labeled “Uygur” since 1934 as a result of nation-state incorporation, great game rivalries, and Sino-Soviet nationality policies. Educational paths chosen by contemporary Uygur are strongly influenced by Chinese government policies and past Uygur ethnogenesis.

Being Uygur and participation in Chinese education may be further influenced by shifts at higher levels of international relations. The post-Cold War
period has led to a downward movement of opposition: it is no longer a U.S.-Soviet-Chinese trilateral configuration, but a much more particularized, multi-polar, and multi-valent world, where shifting identities may move quickly up and down or even between scales of relation depending on specific circumstances. Without the Russian and U.S. threat to China’s sovereignty, lower-level identities may increasingly come into play.

It is clear that we must attend to the nature of shifting national identities in these regions, and the impact of changing international geo-politics. But geo-politics are not enough, as these processes of identity formation and re-formation cannot be understood without attention to historiography and cultural studies. In China, recognition of official national identities has empowered these groups and assisted their ethnogenesis, particularly for the Hui and Uygur, to a crystallization of contemporary identities.

As this paper has argued, for Kazakhs, their identity is represented as segmentary in principle, where genealogy and nomadic nostalgia plays an important role in influencing path dependency and social relations. For the Hui, a generalized notion of descent from foreign Muslim ancestors is important for contemporary identity. It does not really matter to modern Hui if these ancestors may have been Arab, Persian, or Turk, only that they were Muslim, migrated to China, and maintained their distinctive identities. For the Uygur, knowledge of genealogy seems to be important only as it relates to the land, as proof of early Uygur settlement in the Tarim oases, prior to the Chinese or other nomadic Turks. The keeping of detailed genealogies, according to my Uygur informants in Xinjiang and Turkey, is something the Chinese like to do, not them. Indeed, it is Kazakh preoccupation with genealogical minutiae that not only influences mate-selection and nomadic nostalgia, but may also contribute to an increased awareness of identity.

These identities influence and channel response to government policies such as education and economic development in Muslim areas. It is only by attending to the role of path dependency in their ethnic and national development that we can begin to understand not only responses to government policy, but to inter-ethnic relations and shifts in international geopolitics.

Notes

1) A more detailed analysis of relational alterity and transnational analysis is presented in Gladney 1996b.

2) The fairly reliable 1990 Chinese national census gives a substantially clearer picture of the population of the 56 official nationalities of China, with minorities totaling 91.2 million (8.04 percent) out of a total population of 1.04 billion, representing a growth rate
of 35.5 percent among minorities, compared to an increase of only 10 percent among
majority Han population since the last census in 1982 (Renmin Ribao 1991: 3). 1990
population figures indicate the following: Hui (8,602,978); Uygur (7,214,431); Kazakh
(1,111,718); Dongxiang (373,872); Kirghiz (373,872); Salar (87,697); Tadjik (33,538);
Uzbek (14,502); Bonan (12,212); Tatar (4,873). Some Muslim minorities charted large
population increases since 1982 (the Hui grew 19.04 percent, the Uighur grew 20.9
percent, the Kazaks grew 22.3 percent, and the Kirghiz grew 24.1 percent). These
growth rates do not reflect natural population growth, but rather the reluctance of many
Muslims and other minorities (such as the Manchu) to register as minorities in 1982. The
post-1978 reforms have led Muslims to admit membership in the registered Muslim
minority populations, although Uighur Muslims frequently complain that their numbers
are deliberately underrepresented. The Chinese census, like that of the U.S., does not
register religious preference; hence there may be some non-Muslims among the
state-stipulated 10 Muslim nationalities, as well as some Muslims among the Han
majority and other non-Muslim nationalities. The 1990 census revealed that there are
17.9 million members of the 10 Muslim nationalities in China; this does not, however,
tell us how many actual Muslims there are in China. For extended discussion of the
problems of counting Muslims in China, see Gladney 1996a.

3) Note that the 1982 census included a category for college education, whereas the 1990
census broke that category into “undergraduate” and “technical school” figures. For 1982
and 1990 comparisons, these figures have been combined.

4) For more on Muslim women in China, see the “Women in China’s Islam project” in
Zhengzhou, initiated by Ms. Xie Jiejing and Maria Jaschok; also see Alles 1994:

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