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Between Emigration and Immigration: Japanese Emigrants to Brazil and Their Descendants in Japan

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Introduction

In June 1990, the Japanese government reformed the Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act, introducing a new legal category for *Nikkeijin*, overseas Japanese emigrants and their descendants. It provided a “long-term resident” visa status for *Nikkeijin* with few restrictions on their economic activities. As a result, a large number of *Nikkeijin* from Latin American countries entered Japan to work as unskilled, temporary workers. More than 310,000 Brazilian *Nikkeijin* and their families currently reside in Japan, constituting the third largest group of foreign citizens. Rapidly growing Portuguese-speaking communities are now visible in several provincial cities.

Scholars of various disciplines have studied the lives of these migrants from Brazil. That this group comprises the largest immigrant group in Japan from outside Asia has attracted special attention. Behind this lies the fact that Brazil used to be the largest destination for Japanese pre- and post-war mass emigration. However, despite the deep interdependence between the Japanese emigrant community in Brazil and the Brazilian community in Japan, the impact of this phenomenon on the Japanese emigrant community in Brazil has rarely been studied. Instead, Japanese scholars unhesitatingly describe them as “Brazilians in Japan,” often declaring that the “Nikkei-ness” is merely a “myth.”

On the contrary, in the Brazilian context, *dekassegui*—temporary work in Japan—is an issue inseparably connected to the *Nikkeijin* community in Brazil. Recruitment of the potential workers is through the *Nikkeijin* population, remittances are sent to their *Nikkei* family and relatives, and the *Nikkei* organizations are the prime agents offering substantial support to the returnees. Moreover, the massive (re-)emigration of their descendants has changed the basic structure of the immigrant community in Brazil. The Japanese immigrant society in Brazil now functions as the “sending society” for this migration, which exerts unique cultural influences on the members of the community.

This migration cannot therefore be fully understood only by considering the migrants’ lives in Japan. The transnational sociality between Japan and Brazil should also be analyzed from the perspective of the *Nikkei* community in Brazil. By introducing the history of Japanese emigration to Brazil as a necessary context for understanding recent immigration to Japan, this paper helps explain the unique cultural situation of the migrants and their children. It is then argued that the *dekassegui* migration to Japan has deprived the emigrant community of its organizational power, while pressuring it to...
support its younger descendants. To approach this flow of migration in such a way is to reveal the conjunction of Japan’s past emigration and present immigration.

Historical Background: The Japanese Emigration to Brazil

The Japanese Emigration and Emigrant Community in Brazil

Tomas Hammer, in his classic study of European migration policies (Hammer 1985), clarified the distinction between immigration policy, which concerns the regulation of the flow of and the control of immigrants and foreigners, and immigrant policy, which deals with the life of immigrant residents, including their rights and social and political participation (see also Bolzman and Boucher 2006). However, to introduce this migration-migrant distinction into the Japanese political context, another distinction, emigration and emigrant policy, becomes relevant. For it was emigration, rather than immigration, that played a significant role in national politics from the late 19th century to the late 20th century.

In the late 1880s, the Meiji government began sending its citizens to Australia, Hawaii, the USA, and Canada. The government saw emigration as a solution to the problems resulting from rapid population increase during the Meiji era and failures in rural agricultural policy. The development of “emigration organizations” (imin-dantai) and “emigration companies” (imin-gaisha) was a characteristic of this period. After the rise of anti-Japanese movements in North America, the emigrants headed for Latin American countries. Since the arrival of the Kasato-maru, the first Japanese immigration ship to Brazil (in Santos, São Paulo) in 1908, the Japanese government actively promoted emigration to Brazil (see Table 1). During the 33 years until 1941, a total of 188,209 Japanese citizens migrated to Brazil (Commissão de Elaboração da História dos 80 Anos 1992).

Most of the early Japanese immigrants in Brazil were contracted as peasants (colonos), working in the coffee, cotton, and silk farms in the rural regions. The customs left over from slavery (abolished in 1888) caused them great suffering, and the low

<table>
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<th>Country of Destination</th>
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<td>The United States</td>
<td>87,848</td>
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<td>165,106</td>
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<td>Canada</td>
<td>31,052</td>
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<td>Brazil</td>
<td>188,209</td>
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<td>The Philippines and Guam</td>
<td>53,120</td>
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<td>Others</td>
<td>93,023</td>
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Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1971: 142–145
living standards on the farms frustrated their initial intention of repatriation. Although some of them had managed to establish businesses in São Paulo city by the early 1930s, the new President Getúlio Vargas imposed strict controls on foreign residents, including the prohibition of education and publication in foreign languages. As the Pacific War broke out in 1941, Brazil ended diplomatic relations with Japan. After the closing of the General Consulate of Japan in Brazil, the Japanese community in Brazil was placed in a state of complete isolation. This led to a tragic division within the immigrant community during the first few years after the war. The Japanese government subsequently renewed its emigration policy in 1953, sending more than 60,000 of its citizens to Brazil by 1973 (see Figure 1).

Most of the early Japanese immigrants began their lives in Brazil as peasants, but their contribution to the Brazilian agricultural economy was significant. As their second- and third-generation descendants became successful in such fields as politics, law, economy, science, and medicine, Japanese immigrants gained general respect from the rest of the Brazilian population. While the estimated immigrant population of 1.4 million (Centro de Estudos Nipo-Brasileiros 2002) only approximates 1 percent of the whole population of 190 million, the influence of the Japanese immigrants and descendants in the Brazilian society outweighs their numbers.

**Dekasseguis: Political and Economic Background**

Despite their relative success within Brazilian society, the *Nikkeijin* were not free from the crippling effects of the economic chaos in Brazil during the early 1980s. The Brazil-
ian economy was almost completely out of the control of its government. The national inflation rate reached 110 percent in 1980, 224 percent in 1985, and a stunning 1,199 percent in 1990 (Watanabe 1995: 495). The Brazilian middle-class during this period had to develop a “culture of inflation,” a set of informal tactics to counter the problem of impoverishment (Watanabe 1995: 495). In contrast, the Japanese economy was booming. Around the late 1980s, however, the Japanese manufacturing industry was severely damaged by the rapid rise of the Japanese yen against the US dollar (Small and Medium Enterprise Agency 1986). In addition, serious shortages in low-skilled labor were forcing many small and medium sized companies into bankruptcy (Small and Medium Enterprise Agency 1989).

In the mid-1980s, some of the first- and second-generation Nikkei immigrants started visiting Japan to seek better employment. The number gradually increased as Japanese firms “discovered” in the Brazilian Nikkeijin “a new labor reserve” (Higuchi 2006), and Nikkei travel agencies (agências/ryoko-sha) in Brazil and job-brokers (empreiteiras/haken-gaisha) in Japan began developing a complex labor contract system in the late 1980s (Higuchi, 2006). Both the Japanese firms and the Nikkeijin benefited from this “return migration,” and the growing needs led to a series of lobbying activities by local politicians in the Japanese prefectures and by Nikkei congressmen and immigrant leaders in Brazil, aimed at resolving the legal problems concerning this flow of labor.4)
The number of entries to Japan from Brazil grew explosively after the Japanese Ministry of Justice implemented the new Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act in June 1990. That act provided for issuing “long-term resident visas” to overseas Nikkeijin up to the third generation and to their non-Nikkeijin spouses. This allowed the Nikkeijin and their families to engage in temporary unskilled work in Japan. The introduction of the new visa category, which offered some legal rights to the descendants of its emigrants, constituted a relatively small part of the general legal reform. However, it resulted in the creation of a large-scale labor-contracting system through which tens of thousands of Portuguese-speaking workers were recruited in Brazil to work in small- and medium-sized Japanese factories. Only about 2,000 residents of Brazilian nationality were registered in 1985, but the number rose to 148,000 in 1992. As of 2006, the number was 312,900 (Ministry of Justice 2007) (See Figure 4).

The economic effects of this migration on the sending community in Brazil were significant. According to the Inter-American Development Bank, remittances from the dekasseguis in Japan to Brazil reached US $2.6 billion in 2006, accounting for 37 percent of the total amount of remittances to Brazil from overseas.5) The Bank estimates that, as of 2005, about US $1.25 billion was sent to the State of São Paulo, US $650 million to the State of Paraná, and US $100 million to the State of Mato Grosso do Sul. This money has a significant impact on the development of the local economy.
The remittances from the dekassegus are important, because they are sent to the productive sector, not to personal spending. That is the difference from the remittance from the Brazilian workers in other countries. [...] This creates an increase of capital for this country, stimulating businesses in the region that receives the money.

Another study by the bank in 2004 (Inter-American Development Bank 2004) revealed that Japan ranks as the second-largest source of remittances to the Latin American countries after the USA, and that the Japanese remittances to Latin America now exceed the total amount sent from all European countries to the same region.

The Brazilian (Nikkei) Experience in Japan

Formation of a Brazilian Community in Japan

The sudden increase in the number of Brazilian Nikkei and their families in Japan’s provincial industrial cities led to the emergence of a predominantly Lusophone community. Cities such as Toyota (Aichi Prefecture), Hamamatsu (Shizuoka Prefecture), and Oizumi and Ohta (Gunma Prefecture) are world-class centers of car and electronic factories. The Nikkei Brazilian residents concentrate in these cities, mostly in “3K” (kiken, kitanai, kitsui—“dangerous, dirty, demanding”) jobs such as parts assembly or readymade food production lines. In these cities, visitors can easily find shops and stores full of Brazilian products and offering services in the Portuguese language.

In Oizumi, for example, 4,900 residents of Brazilian nationality constitute 15 percent of the town’s total population of 42,000. Hundreds of stores and restaurants, including a few Brazilian shopping centers, are scattered along Route 354. Brazilian meats are easily found, and many migrant families prefer typical Brazilian home meals.
meals—**arroz** (rice), **feijão** (beans), and **bife** (beef steak)—mixed with the typical Japanese foods. Along with Portuguese newspapers such as **International Press Japan** and **Journal Tudo Bem**, a satellite channel offers updates on Brazil and the Brazilian community in Japan.

This does not mean, however, that the workers are enjoying comfortable social lives in Japan. Young workers complain of their impoverished life in their neighborhoods (Ishi 2003). As Takeyuki Tsuda (2003) argues, many Lusophone Nikkei have suffered from what they see as instances of prejudice and misunderstanding by the Japanese-speaking native residents. Despite the similar physical characteristics and their close familial ties with their **issei** (grand) parents in Brazil, many report that the Japanese in Japan (**nihon no nihonjin, japonês do Japão**) will not accept them warmly and instead label them as definite “foreigners” (**gaijin**, **estrangeiros**). This causes major difficulties for the Nikkeijin and their families in adapting to life at work, at school, and in the local community.

As a consequence, after residing in Japan for a while, many Nikkei, whether Lusophone, bilingual, or holders of dual citizenship, call themselves “Brazilians” (**Burajiru-jin, Brasileiros**) to distinguish themselves from the members of a Japanese society that imposes on them rigid social norms and customs. In extreme cases, young Nikkei call the Japanese **japas** (“Japs”) in a derogatory manner, expressing antipathy toward their Japanese neighbors and colleagues. It appears to be an interesting twist for those who know that this word is only used against the Nikkei in Brazil by other non-Nikkei Brazilians, who would otherwise call them **japonês** (“Japanese”).

Much of the negativity Lusophone workers experience in Japan originates in the instability of their lives as temporary migrant workers. Many engage in mechanical work in manufacturing with little contact with other workers. To make things worse, most consider their stay in Japan temporary, no matter how long it actually may be, and dedicate much of their energy to maximizing their earnings. This leaves very little time for them to participate in social activities outside their jobs. Leisure time tends to be spent with their Portuguese-speaking friends, and many adults report that they have few Japanese friends (see Kajita, Tanno, and Higuchi 2005). There is a strong sense of separation between the Japanese and the Brazilians in the community.

Many of the 64,000 children (under age 16) of Brazilian nationality (Ministry of Justice 2006) are experiencing difficulties in Japanese schools. Even though they acquire the Japanese language more quickly than do adults, the great majority find it difficult to succeed in school. Private schools that offer classes entirely in Portuguese are considered expensive, and many parents thus send their children to the public schools where they are expected to compete with native Japanese students. The perception of the Japanese schools among the children of Brazilian Nikkei parents is often negative, as they suffer from the strict school rules, cultural prejudice, and even **ijime** (“bullying”). The dropout rate is very high among the children of Nikkei parents,
reports on crimes committed by Brazilian youth are frequently featured in the press, *International Press Japan* recently declaring that “[t]he criminality among the youths has become one of the largest preoccupations of the Brazilian community in Japan.”

### Dekasseguis in the Eyes of the Brazilian Nikkei Society

#### Impact on the Sending Community

This large outflow of Brazilian *Nikkeijin* to Japan has also greatly affected the lives of those who remained in Brazil. The number of registered Brazilian nationals in Japan reached 312,900 in 2006 (Ministry of Justice 2007), which comprises about 22 percent of the entire *Nikkei* population in Brazil. In other words, one out of five members of the Japanese immigrant community of Brazil is currently residing in Japan as a foreigner. In terms of social networks, most of the *Nikkei* population who have not migrated nevertheless have close friends or family members who have done so. The impact on the traditional immigrant community is grave.

One of the major results is a serious “brain drain” of young community members, which has caused problems for many *Nikkeijin* organizations. Since the end of the state-led mass migration to Brazil in the early 1970s, the immigrant community had depended on the pre-war and post-war *issei* (first generation immigrants), the pre-war *nisei* (second-generation immigrants), and committed young members of the community. By the 1990s, however, pre-war and post-war *issei* and the Japanese-speaking *nissei* were already getting old (Centro de Estudos Nipo-Brasileiros 1989, 2002) and the successful hand-over of cultural enterprises was a matter of great concern. It was in this context that the explosive boom in *dekassegui* migration deprived the *Nikkeijin* communities of potential successors. As a result, many *Nikkeijin* groups saw a general loss of membership and their organizational effectiveness weakened. Today, the circulation of the main Japanese language newspapers such as *São Paulo Shimbun* and *Nikkei Shimbun* is decreasing. Likewise the members of the *kenjinkai* (associations based on the Japanese prefecture of origin) are becoming old.

Such changes have been especially serious in rural areas, but have also occurred in urban areas. Liberdade, the former “Japanese Town” in the Centro district of São Paulo city, used to be the much-celebrated cultural center of the Japanese immigrants, hosting many Japanese restaurants, shops, theaters, and churches. However, its characteristics have gradually changed over the past few decades. Today, the Japanese immigrants in the area have grown old and younger Chinese and Taiwanese immigrants are taking their place. In the town now called *Bairro Oriental* (“Oriental Town”), most of the stores still maintain their Japanese names and sell Japanese products. Looking more closely, however, it becomes obvious that many of these stores are now run by other East Asians, especially those from Taiwan. Some local observers comment that the Japanese immigrants are so positively accepted in Brazil that it has been strategic for
other immigrant groups to maintain a “Japanese” appearance. In any case, the recent youth drain to Japan has become visible in the immigrant town.

Despite the recent popularity that Japanese food, language, music, religion, and youth sub-culture have gained among the general Brazilian public, the leaders of the immigrant community have not been very successful in appealing to their second- and third-generation descendants to stay in Brazil, or at least to stay connected with the Japanese community. Many of them have instead left permanently to return to their ancestors’ homeland as a new first generation of Brazilian immigrants in Japan. Editorials in Japanese language newspapers often take a critical tone in expressing their concern for the future of the young *dekasseguis*. The *dekasseguis*, it is often argued, should learn from the history of their immigrant ancestors, whose efforts came to earn great respect from the host country.

**Ex-dekasseguis, Their Children, and Support Groups**

Despite the lack of comprehensive statistics (cf. Centro de Estudos Nipo-Brasileiros 2002; Kajita, Tanno, and Higuchi 2005), it is easily observed that a large number of families do ultimately return to Brazil. Some hope to stay permanently, and others only to visit temporarily. The principal problem for the former, “ex-dekasseguis,” is that they cannot achieve their initial objectives, especially that of owning their own company.
While many *dekasseguis* return to Brazil in the hope of starting such a new business, most fail in the process. Factory labor in Japan does not give them the necessary managerial skills. Returnees often find it very hard to find a new job, and their money tends to be spent in a short time. For these reasons, many choose to work again in Japan, without giving up their intention of returning to Brazil in the future. This leads to a risky lifestyle, in which they continue migrating between Japan and Brazil without settling in either country.\(^{13}\)

The primary risk of this migratory lifestyle is that it affects the education of their children. The children of *ex-dekasseguis* tend to experience a difficult language transition as their families move between Brazil and Japan for varying periods. Many of those who return to Brazil suffer from limited bilingualism, in which they experience handicaps in both Japanese and Portuguese. This creates great difficulties in their cultural adaptation, and renders them significantly disadvantaged at school and at work.

In order to counter these problems, many *Nikkei* organizations offer support to the *dekasseguis* and *ex-dekasseguis*. In the mid-1990s, several major *Nikkeijin* organizations, including the Brazilian Society of Japanese Culture, established CIATE (Centro de Informações e Apoio ao Trabalhardor no Exterior [Center of Information and Support for Workers Abroad]) to provide legal advice, organize conferences, and promote publications on *dekasseguis*. The “Dekassegui Committee” (Comissão de Estudos dos Assuntos Relacionados ao Dekassegui) was founded within the Society to discuss the issues concerning education and facilitate the (re)adaptation of the children of *dekasseguis*.\(^{14}\) Moreover, some *kenjinkai* in São Paulo and the Japanese community in the state of Paraná, known for its strong *Nikkeijin* groups, are offering support to the *ex-dekasseguis*. This support to the *dekasseguis* in Brazil depends not on the Brazilian government, but on not-for-profit activities initiated by the *Nikkeijin* organizations. To offset their limited financial resources, many leaders look to the large banks. Brazilian banks greatly profit from the remittances of *dekasseguis* and are in competition to increase their share.

Just as with the immigrant community as a whole, immigrant families are experiencing changes in their structure and activities. *Nikkeijin* family gatherings reveal the complex influences that migration has on kinship structure and experience. Members of different generations eat at the same table, comparing each other’s stories of immigration and emigration. On these occasions, the absence of *dekasseguis* provokes conversations about their lives in Japan: if she is doing all right, in what year it was when she left Brazil, if her children are doing well. Questions and comments range from who is going next, to “forget about it and work harder in Brazil,” “Japan is nothing like you imagine,” “I just got fired last week,” “my friend works for an agency and he will take good care of me,” and so on. *Nikkei* youngsters become socialized in these endless conversations on migration, familiarizing themselves with the image of going to work on the other side of the world. In this regard, the *dekassegui* migrants’ families in Brazil function
both as a community of different immigrant generations and as a space for socialization of a new generation of potential migrants.

**Conclusion**

The study of the Brazilian Nikkeijin migration to Japan from the perspective of its sending society in Brazil reveals the continued connections between the Japanese immigrant community in Brazil and the Brazilian immigrant community in Japan. In this light, the history of Japan’s past emigration and its creation of a Japanese community in Brazil provides a necessary context to understand the contemporary migration of Brazilian Nikkeijin to Japan.

Today, the Japanese government is no longer concerned with emigration policy. In fact, its still-existing emigrant policies, inherited by the Japan International Cooperation Agency, have long been shrinking. Many of the Nikkeijin leaders in Brazil are disappointed to see their Japanese-speaking community diminish in size and power. In contrast, the Japanese government and major economic organizations have shown a growing interest in discussing the issue of immigration. The decreasing size of the working population is pressuring leaders to look for foreign labor forces. The government has been reorganizing its immigration and immigrant policy in an unprecedented fashion.

Exactly how this development will affect the course of the two migrant communities in Brazil and Japan is difficult to predict. However, it is crucial that the Japanese government takes greater measures to support the children who are suffering as they are pulled between these two communities. It is perhaps by listening to these migrant children that Japan can best achieve a peaceful and effective transition to a more immigrant-friendly country.

**Acknowledgment**

I am indebted to Bela Feldman-Bianco of the Center for International Migration Studies at the State University of Campinas, São Paulo, Brazil, for providing an ideal setting for fieldwork from which this paper could be written, and to David W. Haines, John Mock, Biao Xiang, Jerry Eades, Makito Minami, and Shinji Yamashita for their helpful suggestions.

**Notes**

1) The researchers at Centro de Estudos Nipo-Brasileiros in São Paulo have played a role as community intellectuals of the Brazilian Nikkei society. A former researcher at the center, Koichi Mori of the University of São Paulo, has published extensively on the issue of dekassegui from the perspective of the Nikkei community. See Mori 1992, and Mori’s
contributions in Watanabe 1995.

2) The Japanese word, “dekasegi (出稼ぎ)” was used to refer to the practice of temporary work involving a migration between the rural and urban regions. The meaning was extended to refer to the Japanese emigration in the Meiji era, in which many intended to return to the mainland. It then entered the Portuguese dictionaries to refer to the temporary work(ers) in Japan.

3) Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística (IBGE, Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics) shows the estimated national population on its official website. http://www.ibge.gov.br/


7) Based on the statistics the author obtained from the Oizumi-machi official in September, 2003.

8) My interviews with the former students in the Japanese elementary and junior-high schools conducted in Gunma, Tokyo, and São Paulo (2003–2007).


11) The two main newspapers of the Nikkei community, Nikkei Shimbun and São Paulo Shimbun, are published both in Japanese and Portuguese, but the latter plays a rather complementary role. In contrast, in Jornal Nippo-Brasil, the sister newspaper of International Press Japan, most of the articles are written in Portuguese.


13) The most recent trend among the Brazilian citizens is to obtain the permanent visa and buy apartments or houses to settle in Japan.

14) The committee is organized by researchers and activists who are actively engaged in the problems of education of the Nikkei children, such as Reimei Yoshioka, Décio Nakagawa, and Kyoko Nakagawa. (Sociedade Brasileira de Cultura Japonesa 2006 : 49–50) The committee’s activities include initiating “publications and studies to collaborate on solving the problems concerning the dekasseguis in Japan” and “helping the adaptation (or readaptation) of the Brazilian children to the Japanese and/or Brazilian educational system.” (Sociedade
References


